between the Central Powers and the Allies, the Central Powers were on the whole more successful. They secured the adherence of Turkey in 1914 and of Bulgaria in 1915, while the Allies obtained only that of Rumania in 1916. In Greece the strain of the contest between the two belligerent camps for her allegiance provoked a schism and civil war between the pro-Allied government of Venizelos at Salonika and the pro-German government of King Constantine at Athens. The schism was not healed until the summer of 1917 when the Allies intervened militarily in Greece and reunited the country forcibly under the pro-Allied Venizelos. Albania, which by 1914 had not yet constituted herself as a nation, properly speaking, became a battlefield without any diplomatic preliminaries.

The main facts of the story of the Central Powers' Balkan diplomacy in World War I have been known for some time. This book provides a systematic, day-by-day, document-by-document account of it, based on a thorough examination of the Wilhelmstrasse and Ballhausplatz archives. It is history for historians, not amateurs. It is, moreover, diplomatic history in the classic sense--that is, it concerns itself exclusively with the acts of statesmen and soldiers, not with public opinion and other factors that affect diplomatic history. Nor does the book concern itself with the moral aspects of who was right and who was wrong, but rather judges strictly by the pragmatic standard of who succeeded and who failed. It assumes a pretty thorough knowledge of the subject on the part of the reader, including the whole Allied side of the story. For a reader so equipped, it will make rewarding reading; for one less well prepared, it will only be confusing.

> VICTOR S. MAMATEY University of Georgia

THE TEACHING OF CHARLES FOURIER. By Nicholas V. Riasanovsky. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969. xii, 256 pp. \$6.50.

It is ironical, as Maxime Leroy observed in a splendid chapter on Charles Fourier in his Histoire des idées sociales en France, that the most delirious of the social reformers should have provided the most forceful criticism of the "incoherences" of modern society. Fourier, like Robert Owen, is remembered primarily as an advocate of small, largely self-sufficient, and highly organized communities, but his theme was more profound, if simple. He insisted that all human ills flow from the repression and frustration of the natural passions of men, and claimed to have discovered the laws and organization of harmony and happiness through "passional attraction." He thought that he represented the next stage in the development of science after Newton's discovery of gravitational attraction. Surely, in the development of the idea of "social engineering" Fourier has an important place. Unfortunately his work has been rather inaccessible. Little has been translated into English, and even in French thorough study is painful because of the voluminous, repetitive, and peculiarly pedantic nature of his writing. We must therefore be grateful to Professor Riasanovsky for giving us the first general survey of Fourier's thought in English.

The book is for the most part a very good one. It is well written, thoroughly documented, and includes a good bibliography, both of Fourier's writings and of later analysis and commentary. A biographical chapter helps the reader understand how Fourier's ideas developed. Consideration is also given to his influence on the socialist and social reform movement of the last century, including—with surprising brevity, considering the author's major interest and expertise—that of Russia and Eastern Europe. The index is good for names and the more obvious concepts, but unfortunately is no help in locating more subtle ideas. Evidently the author is a historian more than a philosopher or theorist.

The principal weakness of the study, to this reviewer, is that it does not adequately present or attempt to explicate a central aspect of Fourier's analysis, the idea of "series," which underlies his "mathematics of the passions," as Leroy called it, and his communitarian schemes. Without this, one can understand his influence on Marx but not his influence on Proudhon or other advocates of systematic association as the basis for a human life both harmonious and free. It was Fourier's approach to "natural law" that Proudhon used, in his own way, as he explicitly acknowledged. Marx, on the other hand, appreciated Fourier's social criticism, but had his own logic and version of materialism to guide his analysis and expectations. It may be some indication of the validity of Fourier's basic ideas, his psychological perspective, and his serial logic that they have been rediscovered by many who never heard of him.

> WILLIAM H. HARBOLD Whitman College

FOR MARX. By Louis Althusser. Translated by Ben Brewster. New York: Pantheon, 1970. 272 pp. \$6.95, cloth. \$1.95, paper.

Althusser's *Pour Marx*, published in 1965, brings together seven articles originally published between 1960 and 1964 in various leftist periodicals such as *La Nouvelle Critique*, *La Pensée*, and *Cahiers de l'ISEA*, as well as the Catholic review *Esprit*. Only the introduction, twenty pages long, was written in 1965. The English translation by Ben Brewster contains in addition a preface "To My English Readers" (which is but a literal translation of the preface, "An die deutschen Leser," to the German edition of 1968) and a useful "glossary" by the translator that briefly comments upon more than thirty special terms used by the author.

Althusser, born in 1918, a member of the French Communist Party since 1948, and presently a member of the Central Committee as well as professor of philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris, has become known as the leader of a French trend trying to combine Marxism, and even Marxism-Leninism, with the Structuralism of authors such as Lévi-Strauss and Foucault. As is to be expected, the results are somewhat ambiguous. Without necessarily questioning the interesting results emerging in some of the writings of the French Structuralists, the present reviewer has never been able to discover precisely what it is that Structuralism purports to claim; occasionally he even succumbs to the temptation to regard it as little else than a version of ideas familiar to any honest philosopher of social science, mutilated beyond recognition by a typically French tendency to use grand vogue-words. Since recent developments have also made it increasingly difficult to say what Marxism amounts to, it hardly needs pointing out that a synthesis of Marxism and French Structuralism (which should not be confused with the linguistic structuralism of de Saussure or Trubetskoi) is a disturbingly ambiguous theoretical position.

It would, of course, be unjust to pass over in silence the fact that Althusser