

THE SOVIET NAVAL OFFENSIVE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF SOVIET NAVAL FORCES IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT. By *Edward Wegener*. Translated from the German by *Henning Wegener*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975 [1972, 1974]. x, 135 pp.

Wegener, a retired German naval officer who served both during World War II and in a NATO command, has written an important book not only for strategists but for all persons seriously concerned with Soviet foreign policy. Modifying Admiral Mahan's position, Wegener provides a plausible strategic doctrine for evaluating Soviet and Western naval postures.

His analysis is at all times thoughtful, informing the reader of the latest technological developments as well as quantitative trends. Wegener distinguishes the prerequisites for psychological warfare in peacetime and for actual wartime operations. His crowning achievement, however, is to base his entire analysis on the geographical conditions which, on balance, favor the West and severely limit the USSR, for example, the triple obstacle course Soviet ships must run to pass from the Black Sea to the Indian Ocean. Contrary to Admiral Zumwalt and *Jane's Fighting Ships*, Wegener suggests that the United States masters all the oceans and the critical eastern Mediterranean, and can retain this mastery if past performance is continued.

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COMMUNISM AND ZIONISM IN PALESTINE: THE COMINTERN AND THE POLITICAL UNREST IN THE 1920'S. By *Jacob Hen-Tov*. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1974. viii, 184 pp.

Professor Hen-Tov's study of the Palestinian Communist movement during the twenties is narrowly focused and apparently directed at the specialist. The author has the necessary linguistic credentials to delve into this complicated subject, as he utilizes numerous sources in Russian, Hebrew, and Arabic, and he also provides a fascinating array of information and a thorough bibliography. His research is excellent but, unfortunately, his presentation is marred by poor writing and organization and the lack of any comprehensive analytical framework. In addition, his book is not edited very carefully—there are at least forty-five typographical, spelling, and grammatical errors, as well as an inconsistent system of transliteration.

Hen-Tov discusses the Comintern's opposition to Zionism and the linkage of this issue to the problem of Jewish nationalism in the Soviet Union. He also points out the incongruous position of Palestinian Jewish Communists, many of whom emigrated from the Soviet Union to Palestine only to adopt an anti-Zionist line. Jews predominated in the Palestine Communist Party since few Arabs could be attracted as members but, beginning in 1928, the Comintern came to view the Arabs as the main revolutionary force in Palestine while the Jews were perceived as allies of British imperialism. This led to an accelerated drive to recruit Arabs but the turning point did not come until the 1929 Arab riots which led to the Arabization of the P.C.P. and the purging of many Jewish members. The Jewish leaders of the party had at first condemned the Arab rioters and had called for cooperation with Jewish defense forces in order to oppose what they labeled an "anti-Jewish pogrom," but the Comintern then successfully pressured the P.C.P. to reverse its stand.

Certain aspects of Hen-Tov's study could use some further elucidation. His comments on Jewish and Arab membership in the P.C.P. are not backed up with

precise statistics and he doesn't explain the role of the British Communists in Palestinian affairs. His observation that the Comintern had a "rather independent role" vis-à-vis the Soviet Union prior to 1928 should have been buttressed with supportive evidence.

Although this book is certainly of scholarly interest, Hen-Tov's style tends toward the elephantine and his organization toward the labyrinthine. Such a combination produces a rather tight and uncomfortable fit.

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THE ANATOMY OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVERS. Edited by *Thomas T. Hammond* and *Robert Farrell*. Foreword by *Cyril E. Black*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975 [1971]. xviii, 664 pp. \$25.00, cloth. \$5.95, paper.

This remarkably fine volume will undoubtedly be well received and widely used. With contributions by thirty American and foreign experts, it is the most convenient and comprehensive analysis yet available of the ways and means by which Communists have come to power in various countries or parts of countries since 1917. (Not included are the recent victories in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, which occurred after the book was published.) About one-third of the essays deal with Communist failures, aborted preparatory efforts, or Communist counter-revolutions. Professor Hammond introduces the volume with a lengthy chronological survey of Communist attempts to seize power, and also provides a conclusion in which he offers a "typology" of takeovers and speculates on the reasons for success or failure of Communist bids for power.

This volume is not and does not purport to be a history of world communism but of Communist takeovers. The word "takeover" is used to encompass all routes to power (genuine revolution, installation by the Red Army, free elections, and so forth) and indicates that the emphasis in these essays has been intentionally narrowed to exclude detailed treatment of pretakeover conditions and historical background as well as posttakeover transformations.

Hammond finds no less than twenty-two successful Communist takeovers (see the list on p. 643) since 1917: Russia, Outer Mongolia, Tannu Tuva, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Yugoslavia, Albania, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, North Vietnam, China, Tibet, Cuba, San Marino, Kerala, and West Bengal. The takeovers are all analyzed in the volume but with these exceptions: (1) the treatment of Russia is limited to two essays, one on the October Revolution in Petrograd and the other on the Bolshevik conquest of the Moslem borderlands, thus, unfortunately, ignoring the bulk of the former Russian Empire, and (2) no treatment other than in the introductory essay is given Tibet, San Marino, and West Bengal.

Communist failures are discussed in essays on Finland in 1918, Poland in 1920, Germany during 1918-23, the first Kuomintang-Communist alliance of 1924-27, Greece during 1942-49, the Azeri and Kurdish regimes in northern Iran during 1944-46, and Indonesia in 1965. Several other essays help to round out the picture. One is concerned with the problematic situation in Finland in 1948, and here Devlin argues that "the Finnish Communists made no serious effort to seize power" (p. 445). Another essay describes Communist efforts in Guatemala during 1951-54 to develop and expand their influence under the Arbenz regime. The Hungarian