

the reader does not foresee the conclusions Rozman is driving at, it is not always apparent why he concentrates on various details.

I am afraid this book might be ignored by Russian historians because of the general theoretical nature of the model and by urban sociologists because they might wrongly assume the results are relevant only to Russia. Such an outcome would be unfortunate, because this book has a great deal to offer students both of Russia and of economic development.

BARBARA A. ANDERSON  
*Brown University*

IMPERIAL RUSSIA IN FRONTIER AMERICA: THE CHANGING GEOGRAPHY OF SUPPLY OF RUSSIAN AMERICA, 1784–1867. By *James R. Gibson*. *Mikos Pinther*, cartographer. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. xiv, 256 pp. Illus. Maps. \$10.00, cloth. \$6.00, paper.

The lure of Russian America—Russia's only overseas colony, comprising Alaska, the Aleutian, Pribilof, Commander, and Kurile Islands and impermanent subsidiary developments in Hawaii and California—was fur. The quickly depleted sea otter, primarily, and the more numerous, less valuable, and more slowly reduced fur seal were the inducement for numerous licensed expeditions to, and chartered company exploitation of, the marine fur resources of the northern Pacific after 1740. Distance from the homeland, as western Pacific rookeries were exterminated, made permanent settlement essential and, in view of climatic and manpower limitations on agriculture, regular imported food supplies mandatory.

Gibson's book is a study of the costly, uncertain, and ultimately unresolved search for a reliable, inexpensive food base for the colonies. The Russian-America Company, the designated controlling operation in 1799, originally supplied its "counters" (colonies) from Siberia—by boat down the Lena to Yakutsk and by man- and horse-killing overland pack routes to the port of Okhotsk (and later Ayan). The transpacific route was later supplemented by equally costly and irregular circumnavigations from Kronstadt. Ultimately, however, it was local supply which was essential. The failure of northern agriculture and the Russian-America Company's informal and formal trade arrangements with New England and Hudson's Bay men (who simultaneously were poachers on the fur trade and subverters of controlled natives) and with Californians and Hawaiians are the substance of *Imperial Russia in Frontier America*. It tells little about the fur trade; it does explore in informative detail the changing patterns of trade relations, political geography, and settlement of more than one hundred years of Russia in America.

JEROME D. FELLMANN  
*University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign*

NESSELRODE AND THE RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT WITH BRITAIN, 1836–1844. By *Harold N. Ingle*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. xii, 196 pp. \$11.75.

Russia's foreign policy in the nineteenth century was remarkably stable. Though ultimately determined by objective conditions of the nation's existence and the will of autocratic tsars, it was shaped and executed throughout most of the century by only two individuals, Count Karl Robert Nesselrode and Prince Aleksandr Mikhailovich Gorchakov. Neither has found a competent biographer, but Nesselrode, who, unlike

Gorchakov, was not a Russian, not a classmate of Pushkin, and not an imperialist, has fared badly at the hands of most historians generous enough to pay attention to a man who conducted Russia's foreign relations for an astounding forty years.

Harold N. Ingle has written neither a biography nor a study of Nesselrode's entire career. He has concentrated instead on one aspect of the minister's diplomacy—his political Anglophilia born of a conviction that the peace of Europe depended on good relations between Russia and Great Britain. Having studied an impressive amount of archival and published sources, Ingle shows that Nesselrode, the proponent of "European policy," consistently used his influence to mitigate conflicts (the *Vixen* affair, the Persian campaign against Herat, the problem of the straits) and to promote their peaceful solution. The ultimate defeat of his policies does not prove that they were undesirable or unwise.

Harold Ingle's study is sensitive, urbane, but too brief. His position is "revisionist" in that he approves of a diplomat who has been attacked from the right and from the left. Ingle may have gone too far in his "rehabilitation" of Nesselrode, however, by attributing too much influence to a man who was a diplomatic technician, not a creator of foreign policy.

It is regrettable that more attention has not been paid to the preparation of the manuscript for the press. Errors in transliteration, misspellings, and plain typographical errors are annoyingly numerous. This measured and sober study deserved better of its editors and publishers.

FIRUZ KAZEMZADEH  
Yale University

REBELS IN THE NAME OF THE TSAR. By *Daniel Field*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976. xvi, 220 pp. \$9.95.

Daniel Field's *Rebels in the Name of the Tsar* offers well-chosen documents and intelligent, balanced commentary concerning two famous cases of Russian "naïve monarchism": the Bezdna peasant demonstration and massacre of 1861 and the so-called "Chigirin affair" of 1877. At both Bezdna and Chigirin, Great Russian and Ukrainian peasants invoked the name of the tsar-*batiushka*, their benevolent ruler and protector, when they claimed to carry out his will in refusing to obey the orders of officials and soldiers who actually were the approved local representatives of the tsar. Field describes very well the dilemma "naïve monarchism" posed for the Russian intelligentsia, especially in regard to Iakov Stefanovich's attempt to manipulate the credulity of the Chigirin peasants in order to obtain popular support for the Russian revolutionary movement. But Field is also inclined to see the peasant as being somewhat less naïve than tsarist officials, educated Russians, and historians have believed them to be, and he leaves open the possibility that certain peasants might have tried to manipulate the symbolism of the tsar-*batiushka* for their own purposes—that is, to obtain what had been denied them, sizable land allotments and freedom (*volia*). But the evidence available to Field does not permit him to argue this point very convincingly.

In his introductory chapter, "Myth of the Tsar," Field quite correctly points out that such abstractions as "*narod*" and "the peasantry" can be used glibly and that it is easy to forget that "these terms subsume millions of individual men and women." He suggests, therefore, that historians might imitate philologists and anthropologists by trying to "plot social myths on a map," in order to indicate how myths changed with the passage of time and "varied in their intensity from place to place." To do this well, the historian would certainly have to take into account variations in peasant attitudes, customs, nationality, and social organization as well as the historical back-