POLICY CHOICE, SOCIAL STRUCTURE, AND INTERNATIONAL TOURISM IN BUENOS AIRES, HAVANA, AND RIO DE JANEIRO

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Abstract: Latin American global cities have embraced international tourism as a pillar of economic development. Even as tourism has recently grown dramatically, some cities have succeeded and others have failed at capturing international tourists and delivering benefits to the population. This article examines the role of new public institutions (tourism ministries) and social structure from 2000 to 2010 in Buenos Aires, Havana, and Rio de Janeiro. Based on extensive fieldwork and interviews, the evidence shows that both policy choices and social structure shape the composition of international tourism. Prospect theory and economic crisis help explain the emergence of entrepreneurial and innovative bureaucracies. Buenos Aires is an example of innovative inclusive tourism, Havana exhibits innovative disarticulated tourism, and Rio de Janeiro features stagnant urban enclave tourism.

The growth of tourist arrivals and tourism revenues led Latin American countries and cities to aggressively embrace the sector in the 1990s and early 2000s with the hope of capturing more of the US$919 billion in annual international tourism expenditures (UNWTO 2011). Tourism revenues could help solve balance of payments crises, create jobs, bring development to previously ignored regions, and increase foreign investment—all without smokestacks. Tourism institutions were created or enhanced at both the national and local levels, grandiose plans were announced, airports were constructed and modernized, country and city brands were formulated, teams of tourism officials went on the international tourism fair circuit, and expectations were raised in every Latin American country. Tourism was a boom industry that would promote development. Tourism expanded rapidly, with international tourist arrivals to Central and South America growing from 9.72 million in 1990 (UNWTO 2001) to over 31.4 million in 2010 (UNWTO 2011). Today, many years into the era of international tourism in Latin America, some destinations have succeeded in harnessing the sector while others have failed.

Urban tourism is one of the star tourism segments. This article examines tourism development in the Latin American global cities of Buenos Aires, Havana, and Rio de Janeiro from 2000 to 2010. Using extensive fieldwork and a prospective

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comparative process-tracing methodology, I show that Buenos Aires and Havana exhibit creative and innovative local tourism authorities while Rio de Janeiro continues with a rigid and constrained bureaucracy. Consequently, Buenos Aires and Havana have revolutionized their brand and product and experienced high levels of international tourism growth, while Rio de Janeiro has experienced product stagnation and a decline in tourism over the 2000–2010 period. Success in tourism requires more than a merely competent Weberian bureaucracy. A creative and innovative bureaucracy with entrepreneurial leadership is necessary.

Scholars have long been puzzled as to why some state bureaucracies innovate and others do not (Breznitz and Ornston 2013). The evidence in these cases shows that crises and social structure provide the explanation. Weyland (2002) applies a powerful cognitive theory known as prospect theory to explain the rather unexpected behavior of policy makers in regard to harsh structural adjustment programs. The most fundamental findings of this theory are that individuals behave as risk seekers when they perceive themselves to be in the domain of losses, and avoid risk when they are situated in the domain of gains. In the face of an extreme economic crisis such as the "special period" in Cuba in the early 1990s and the Argentine crisis in the early 2000s, policy makers behave from the perspective of the domain of losses and are risk seekers. In response, Buenos Aires and Havana chose unorthodox and bold tourism policies that resulted in the most creative and innovative tourism policies in the region, while Rio de Janeiro did not. In addition, structural variables such as class, poverty, and human capital can constrain bureaucratic policy options in urban tourism. In destinations with low levels of human capital, high crime rates, and high levels of inequality, tourism innovation is limited.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND OBJECTIVES

This is an inductive study that began with fieldwork in three global cities and process traced their development over a decade. The methodology is best described as prospective comparative process tracing whereby the causal mechanisms and causal paths were observed and tracked as they developed from 2000 to 2010.[1] I made nine trips to Buenos Aires, five trips to Rio de Janeiro, and four trips to Havana between 2000 and 2011. I conducted 484 interviews (about 39 of these were repeated interviews) with local and national tourism authorities, representatives of tourism business organizations, journalists, scholars, entrepreneurs, tourists, and taxi drivers.[2]

1. Instead of the retrospective process tracing of George and Bennett (2005), this research uses a prospective comparative process-tracing methodology. This resolves the potentially serious problem of bias when cases are chosen based on known variances in the dependent variable.

2. Interviews included seventeen interviews with Buenos Aires city tourism officials, twenty-two interviews with Argentina national tourism authorities, seventeen interviews with provincial tourism authorities at their *casas* in Buenos Aires, four interviews with the City Historian's Office in Havana, six interviews with the Cuban national tourism authority, two interviews each at the regional tourism offices in Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Trinidad, and Santa Clara, thirteen interviews at Embratur offices in Brasilia, and five interviews at RioTur. Interviewees were granted anonymity to preserve confidentiality, except for those whose views are publicly known. Anonymity is always given when the interviewee could face consequences for candid observations and information. This is always true of mid-level and lower-level bureaucrats, as well as individuals who receive contracts from tourism ministries.



Figure 1 Tourist arrivals in three global cities, 2000–2010 (millions)

Analysis focused on two inputs and two outputs. The inputs were the policies and changes in local tourism authorities and the effects of social structures on receptive international tourism. The outputs were the change in numbers of international tourists and the amount of international tourism receipts, as well as the distribution of the benefits of tourism.

I expected that Rio de Janeiro would be the most successful of the three cities over the decade for the single reason that Rio has the greatest natural and cultural endowment and an unmatched number of globally recognized tourism icons. In contrast, in 2000 Buenos Aires was in the middle of a long and dreary economic recession, and the United States continued to bar most travel to Havana. My expectations, however, were incorrect. As shown in figures 1 and 2, tourism to Buenos Aires and Havana expanded dramatically, while tourism to Rio de Janeiro fell.[3]

Buenos Aires is the clear tourism success story, with growth in international tourism of 71 percent, while Havana experienced international tourism growth of 42 percent.[4] Rio de Janeiro received 11 percent fewer tourists in 2010 than in 2000. The fact that Rio de Janeiro had fewer international tourists in each of the years

3. The data for Rio de Janeiro come from RioTur, personal correspondence. The data for Buenos Aires come from the city of Buenos Aires (http://www.bue.gov.ar/?ncMenu=443). For Havana, long-term data show that a fairly constant 56 percent of tourists to Cuba visit Havana (Colantonio 2004). For Havana, these data are 56 percent of tourist numbers for Cuba from the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).

4. One may assert that differences in tourism performance are caused by exchange rate fluctuations and perceptions of price. The empirical evidence in a longitudinal cross-sectional panel data study of Latin America found that price is irrelevant for tourism growth (Eugenio-Martin, Martin, and Scarpa 2004). In addition, Argentina's most impressive growth occurred in 2010, when the Argentine peso was not undervalued (Perdiguero 2011) and the brand was established. Price is important for generic destinations and beach vacations.

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

Figure 2 Total percentage change in international tourists, 2000–2010

2006–2010 than in 2000 is particularly puzzling, as the city hosted the 2007 Pan American Games.

The experiences of these three cities in international tourism provide valuable lessons for understanding the roles of policy making and capacity of bureaucracies as well as social structural variables. Cities are the incubators of tourism innovation, and these three cities reveal distinct and important patterns and lessons in bureaucratic organization, autonomy, and innovation.

The differences in innovation, autonomy, and creativity were not the result of happenstance or random chance but were intentional. They resulted in a forward-looking and successful rebranding of Buenos Aires and a symbiotic relationship between tourism and colonial architecture renovation in Havana, while Rio de Janeiro chose to follow the same stagnant tourism strategies of the past. It is important to distinguish creativity from innovation. Creativity refers to the process of developing new ideas and solutions that are imaginative, inspired, or original (Hall and Williams 2008). This is a challenge in bureaucracies such as tourism ministries. The typical evolution in all bureaucracies is "gradual ossification" (Downs 1967), and best practices are often no more than to efficiently recycle campaigns, policies, and activities of the past with professionalism, merit, and efficiency. Innovation is a more difficult endeavor. Successful innovation in tourism is the application of novel or recombined methods or products at any stage of the tourism cycle that allows a destination to successfully offer new and/or improved tourism services and products, which result in improved performance in the sector.[5] Policy innovation is not coterminous with creativity,

5. This definition was largely borrowed from personal communication with innovation scholar Dan Breznitz.

as innovation requires the actual implementation of novel or creative ideas or strategies.

Hall and Williams (2008, chap. 4) provide the most extensive analysis of the public sector and innovation in tourism, presenting eight innovative dimensions of government roles in tourism: coordination, planning, legislation and regulation, entrepreneur, stimulation, promotion, social tourism, and interest protection. They focus largely on the developed countries at the national level. In the developing world, where the state is just beginning to play an important role in tourism, active involvement by government institutions is required to compete and catch up (Gerschenkron 1962). Subsequently, tourism innovation by local tourism authorities in the developing world can go well beyond these eight dimensions, and in two of our cases tourism authorities have a much more active role as brand developer not only in marketing but in creating, nurturing, and recombining tourism products to create a novel experience. City branding is a rapidly growing field of study and practice, with tourism one of several essential branding elements (Anholt 2007).

Local tourism authorities do not only need sufficient autonomy; successful cities with innovative policies must have excellent leaders who are willing to take risks in implementing novel and creative policies. A competent bureaucrat is not sufficient for this task. As Kotilainen notes (2005, 78–79), active innovation in a bureaucracy is in "most cases a radical change. It often requires changes in legislation and, even more so, in the mindset of people working in an administration. A businesslike attitude is required."

Policy choices do not occur independently of the social structure in which they are embedded. Structure constrains the options of policy makers in many social domains (Giddens 1984; Lewis 2002; Sibeon 1999) and especially in local tourism. It is the intersection of structure and choice that determines the type and amount of tourism in global cities.

City tourism is a complex and competitive product and the focus of considerable research (Donald and Gammack 2007; Judd and Fainstein 1999; Maitland and Newman 2009). The growing importance of tourism destinations and the rapid growth of mobility have eroded the demarcations between work and leisure and between host and visitor (Maitland and Newman 2009). Successful global tourism cities provide value to mobile tourists through a sense of experiencing authenticity, where authenticity is derived "from the property of connectedness of the individual to the perceived everyday world and environment. . . . Authenticity is born from everyday experiences and connections which are often serendipitous" (Hall 2007, 1140). This search for authenticity provides opportunities for urban tourism innovation.

Rapid globalization and mobility result in intense competition between cities, and successful cities must be creative and deliberate in developing and executing long-term tourism plans that differentiate them. This is all the more important as globalization includes forces for cities to become generic, replaceable, and substitutable, with similar restaurants, hotels, and shopping malls (Bramwell and Rawding 1996). These three global cities approached these new opportunities in very different ways.

BUENOS AIRES: INNOVATIVE AND INCLUSIVE TOURISM

In a single decade, Buenos Aires has been transformed from a city whose charm was retrospective and associated with historical icons—based on eclectic architecture, steak and pasta restaurants, and nostalgia for Carlos Gardel and Eva Perón—to a city with one of the most vibrant, creative, and forward-looking tourism brands, as in this description from *Travel and Leisure:* "I keep recalling the question that the angry young narrator Che asked in the . . . musical *Evita:* 'What's new, Buenos Aires?' . . . what's new is youth, vigor, and a fresh sense of self-awareness that has nothing to do with Europe yearning of past generations" (Owen 2005).

This transformation was a product of multiple conjectural factors that began in the late 1990s, was briefly derailed and then accelerated by the devastating economic crisis in the early 2000s, and was nurtured by an innovative and highly capable local tourism authority. Human capital and other structural variables were crucial for the dynamism and distribution of tourism in the city. Paradoxically, the economic crisis enhanced human capital, especially in the creative sector.

The combination of a large middle class with high levels of human capital and innovative policies resulted in a city akin to what Richard Florida describes in *The Rise of the Creative Class* (2002). Educated and creative people choose to live in and visit cities with "street level culture," where individuals are participants and not mere spectators in the cultural mix. Florida uses the term "street-level culture" to describe these participant and experiential activities with a "teeming blend of cafes, sidewalk musicians, and small galleries and bistros, where it is hard to draw the line between participant and observer, or between creativity and its creators" (166). Street-level culture and the creative class constitute the model for tourism innovation in Buenos Aires.

This street-level culture model reaches its apex with Hernán Lombardi, as he explicitly bridges culture and tourism in philosophy and as secretary of tourism for the city of Buenos Aires in the late 1990s, secretary of tourism for Argentina from 1998 to 2002, and minister of culture and president of tourism for the city of Buenos Aires since 2007. Trained at the graduate level in economics and tourism in Buenos Aires and Switzerland and experienced in a wide range of private sector activities, Lombardi has a vision of "a totally radicalized position that every tourist is a cultural tourist," where every international tourist wants to discover how people live in other parts of the planet (Lombardi 2009, 13). Lombardi (2009, 13) posits that this common interest focuses contemporary international tourism on culture and identity: "The intersection of tourism epistemology and culture epistemology is the concept of identity." The greatest advantage of Buenos Aires in culture and tourism is its mosaic of identities as characterized by such elements as eclectic architecture, vibrant and distinct neighborhoods, 176 independent theaters, café culture, and the explosion of unique chef-owned restaurants in the city.

I interviewed more than twenty-five academics, tourism entrepreneurs, politicians, and tourism bureaucrats across a range of ages and political ideologies to learn about Lombardi. Lombardi was widely and enthusiastically praised despite

political differences, though tourism scholar Regina Schlüter believes that his focus on tourism culture "is fantastic" for the city of Buenos Aires but "his culture vision was not effective when he served as secretary of tourism for the entire country where nature tourism is more important" (interview, June 7, 2011, Buenos Aires). Historian and tourism entrepreneur Ricardo Watson contends that Lombardi's radical idea that all tourism is culture leads to a conceptualization that all culture is tourism with a tendency to commodify cultural patrimony (interview, June 15, 2011, Buenos Aires). All twenty-five agreed on what constituted Lombardi's tourism vision and his core idea that all tourism is culture.

Lombardi's vision for tourism in Buenos Aires is constructed on several conceptual pillars. First, this identity and the cultural products that accompany it must be an authentic element of the city and its people and not merely a product to please tourists: "The first time that one goes to Paris, someone can fool us with the Moulin Rouge, but after that they will not fool us again. The first time you go to Cuba, they can fool us with the Tropicana. . . . But, real Cubans do not dance in the Tropicana and the real French do not dance in the Moulin Rouge, this can be seen in destination after destination and confirm that the artificialization of cultural resources is also bad business to encourage" (Lombardi 2009, 16).

Second, to maintain the authenticity of cultural activities that are largely enjoyed by locals in spaces shared with a smaller number of tourists, activities must be dispersed throughout the city and neighborhoods to avoid excessive use and the "touristification" and denaturalization of the cultural product. Not only are the products altered if it is a cultural show produced to meet the perceived expectations of the tourists, but "transculturation is a risk to be attenuated. This phenomenon can be associated with cultural colonization, with questions of self-esteem, etc." (Lombardi 2009, 14). If a restaurant or cultural event is largely full of tourists and not locals, the risk of touristification grows (Hernán Lombardi, interview, June 1, 2009, Buenos Aires).

Third, expansion of tourism throughout the city requires an active government agency with significant resources and a city with high levels of public safety. This facilitates the continuous expansion of tourism zones into new neighborhoods and the inclusion of new identities and cultural activities.

Successful implementation of this radical and creative tourism vision requires high levels of bureaucratic expertise and technical skills. According to Lombardi, this innovation in Buenos Aires was not possible in the 1990s in part because the bureaucrats did not possess the requisite technical skills. "The new model is forward looking, creating a new and vibrant demand based on culture, new cuisine, art, festivals, identity, and other elements that are unique to Buenos Aires. This makes tourism less price sensitive. . . . Buenos Aires is no longer a cheap destination, but the numbers are growing. . . . The ideal is to have tourists come to a unique place that cannot be replicated at any price" (June 1, 2009).

The plan's emphasis is on building an international reputation with events that are for Argentines and attended by them but with a significant number of tourists mixed in. According to Buenos Aires tourism officials, the annual museum night brings 400,000 people into the streets. Gallery nights mix 15,000 Argentines and

5,000 tourists. The annual book fair (Feria Internacional del Libro de Buenos Aires) has more than 1.2 million total participants, overwhelmingly Argentines but with tens of thousands of visitors from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Spain, and Uruguay; it is the most important book fair in the Spanish-speaking world. The foreign attendees are their countries' trendsetters.

> Here is how it works. We have an international design fair. Lots of Argentines participate, but also Peruvians, Colombians, Brazilians, etc. They help create the product by making Buenos Aires the most relevant city in Latin America for design, and then create the demand by telling their colleagues and friends about the city. We repeat this pattern with film, food, poetry, architecture, wine, literature, theater, nightlife, etc. All tourism is culture and culture is a way to create a brand and a constantly evolving product. (Lombardi, interview, June 1, 2009, Buenos Aires)

The innovative strategy can be condensed to four steps. First, invest heavily in culture-led urban regeneration that enhances identity across a range of neighborhoods (Santos and Azeredo 2010; Kanai and Ortega-Alcázar 2009). The range of identities included in cultural urban regeneration goes far beyond ethnicity or religion and also includes the gay community, bohemians, young people, artists, and intellectuals. Florida (2002) found that an atmosphere of tolerance toward designers, musicians, filmmakers, gays, and other culturally unconventional identities builds a "creative class" and "sidewalk culture" and attracts creative people to move there or to visit.[6]

A second step is to support festivals, events, and activities that highlight cultural products and provide a strong participatory interface between culture producers and culture consumers. The city of Buenos Aires supports a wide range of large and small cultural activities, including theater, dance, exhibitions, film festivals, gaucho fairs, operas, music, gay *milongas*, and museums. For success, the Buenos Aires Ministry of Culture and Tourism Office requires a substantial budget and significant autonomy to develop and implement creative ideas. Without this, the ministry could not attract top talent (Lombardi, interview, June 1, 2009, Buenos Aires). Lombardi only agreed to serve as minister of culture and president of tourism for the city under Mayor Mauricio Macri when he was sure that he could work with a "guarantee that we would be able to act with total liberty" unrestricted by the city government and that "we could focus on identity" (Fontevecchia 2007). The budget of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism Office for 2011 was US$212 million.[7] Of that amount, only US$4.7 million was budgeted specifically for tourism. But since all tourism is culture in the Lombardi model, and Lombardi is in charge of both culture and tourism, the total tourism budget for the city should be thought of as US$212 million. This budget dwarfs the tourism budgets of other cities and even countries in Latin America. An important element in the innovative capacity in Buenos Aires is in eliminating bureaucratic boundaries, embedding the tourism bureaucracy within the Ministry of Culture and having the culture minister serve as the president of the tourism board. In-

6. For another example, see the "Cool Japan" campaign ("Cool Japan," *Economist*, October 15, 2011).

7. Using an exchange rate of 4.1 pesos to 1 US dollar (http://www.buenosaires.gov.ar/areas/hacienda/presupuesto2011/?menu_id=33249).

stead of fragmenting resources and encouraging ministries at cross-purposes, as occurs in Rio de Janeiro, real synergies are created in Buenos Aires. While there are areas of culture that are not fully related to tourism, "the synergies (between tourism and culture) are splendid" (Lombardi, in Fontevecchia 2007). The Ministry of Culture and the Tourism Office in Buenos Aires were fused in 2007, and while tourism and branding have benefited considerably from the marriage and the Lombardi model, some culture purists have voiced concerns that culture will be shaped by market forces.[8] The model concentrates power and resources in a single office and grants high levels of autonomy and independence to the minister. This is a risky bureaucratic development but one that Buenos Aires embraced after the severe financial crisis.

Third, target and recruit the creative class, bohemians, artists, journalists, intellectuals, and the gay community from other countries to participate in exhibitions, fairs, and other events and thus in the production of culture in Buenos Aires. This augments the cultural offerings and tourism product and transforms visitors into Buenos Aires brand builders back home. A large number of these highly creative people moved to Buenos Aires, strongly enhancing the cultural and gastronomic production and acting as magnets for tourism from their colleagues, friends, and relatives (Salkin 2006).

The relationship between tourism officials and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexual (LGBT) community exemplifies these efforts. On July 22, 2010, the same day that President Cristina Kirchner signed the law to make gay marriage legal in Argentina, Culture and Tourism Minister Lombardi was opening an annual LGBT tourism conference in Buenos Aires. The gay community makes up nearly 20 percent of all international tourists to Buenos Aires and spent nearly US$850 million in 2008 (Mosely-Williams 2010). Individual spending by gays is higher than average, and gay tourists are also likely to recommend destinations to friends and colleagues. The city and tourism sector caters enthusiastically to this sector. The gay community is key in Lombardi's model for culture and tourism, and the city supports numerous events such as gay milongas, gay hotels, LGBT conferences, and festivals in the arts and design with considerable numbers of LGBT participants.

The fourth step is to expand geographically and by product within the city. If a neighborhood, restaurant, or activity is characterized as locals serving tourists, the essence of cultural tourism implodes, the product is artificial, and the local population is culturally colonized (Lombardi, interview, June 1, 2009). International tourists must remain a minority of participants. There are areas of every city where tourists dominate and cultural offerings are mere caricatures of local cultural identity. In Buenos Aires this is found in the business hotel district the Micro-Centro. There is nothing hip, bohemian, or interesting about this sector of

8. According to Josefina Delgado, "I believe that the fusion between culture and tourism, since Lombardi is from that sector, can be good or bad. For the city, culture is more important than tourism." Noé Jitri argues that culture and tourism are totally distinct, and that this fusion is purely utilitarian and that does not serve culture. "I do not see how you resolve this "fusion" (all quotes from Jesús Cornejo, "Hernán Lombardi fue designado por Macri para hacerse cargo de Cultura," *La Nación*, November 9, 2007).

tourism even though business tourism is important. The real tourism innovation occurs in the inclusion of new identities and neighborhoods in the cultural tourism mix. Indeed, the bohemian, cultural, and creative class constantly identifies and moves to new neighborhoods as the formerly new hip neighborhoods are gentrified and housing prices escalate.

Lombardi's model, while an overwhelming success in Buenos Aires, cannot be easily replicated in other Latin American destinations. The model is viable due to structural conditions in Buenos Aires of high human capital, relatively low levels of crime, and a large middle class and was facilitated by the particular dynamics of the economic crisis and recovery.

Structural Conditions and the Crisis

Buenos Aires is a city with relatively high levels of human capital and low levels of violent crime. According to the 2010 Global Cities Index (A. T. Kearney 2010), Buenos Aires has the highest level of human capital of any city in Latin America. This human capital is in one of the safest cities in the Americas, with the second lowest murder rate of any large city in the hemisphere (Rodríguez 2010). While there are many dangerous areas in the suburbs outside of the city proper, many of the neighborhoods of the city of Buenos Aires exhibit relatively low levels of violent crime.

When the economic and political crisis erupted in Argentina in 2001–2002, its immediate effect on tourism was strongly negative. The media image was of a country in chaos, with multiple presidents, waves of express kidnappings to steal money from ATMs, and Argentines abandoning the country. However, the crisis had a powerful long-term positive effect for three reasons. First, the exchange rate lured many tourists to the city. Second, *porteños* with high levels of education became entrepreneurial. Third, thousands of creative expatriates moved to Buenos Aires. When mixed with city cultural and tourism policies and with the social structure of Buenos Aires, these three consequences of the crisis resulted in a cultural blossoming of Buenos Aires and the continuing tourism boom even when the city became relatively expensive. This cultural expansion is documented in the Global Cities index as Buenos Aires rose from twenty-fifth globally in 2008 to ninth in 2010 for cultural experience (A. T. Kearney 2010). This was the biggest jump of any city in the world, placing it first among Latin American cities.

Argentines also became more entrepreneurial due to the crisis. In tourism, individuals began renting out their fully furnished flats in US dollars to tourists wanting to live in a neighborhood, and multiple businesses blossomed as online rental agencies. As of late 2011, the company BYTArgentina lists nearly two thousand family-owned apartments in ten different neighborhoods. This is but one of dozens of listing agencies. Thousands of Buenos Aires families are now tourism entrepreneurs by renting apartments in neighborhoods that just a few years ago would have been isolated and excluded from the tourism market.

Historian and tourism entrepreneur Ricardo Watson contends that the role of expats in the transformation of the city is too often overlooked. Expats contributed to sidewalk culture and a diversity of cultural and gastronomical offerings

throughout the city (Ricardo Watson, interview, June 2011, Buenos Aires). The exchange rate benefits of the crisis and the low prices for lofts and creative space brought the first wave of expats to Buenos Aires, and word of mouth and cultural development in the city brought subsequent waves. "Lured by B.A.'s high culture at low prices," many of the expats are writers, architects, artists, restaurateurs, musicians, and entrepreneurs (Salkin 2006). "There are expats everywhere tapping into the city's thriving cultural arts scene. . . . And it's not backpacker types, but people with money and contacts" (Lee 2008).

Tourism's economic contribution to the city has grown dramatically, and it is now the third largest employment sector. Tourism is responsible for 13 percent of employment in the city, at 330,000 jobs (Tomino 2011). While the structure, the crisis, and the arrival of expats were important for the growth of tourism, specific policies and a creative, well-funded, and autonomous bureaucracy with exceptional leadership were necessary to innovate the product, distribution, benefits, and city brand while making Buenos Aires a more desirable global city to visit and in which to live. City policies have played a positive role for many years and "have enhanced tourism strengths and attenuated tourism weaknesses" (Lombardi, quoted in Perdiguero 2011). Buenos Aires is now a "mature and solid" tourism city, no longer susceptible to booms and busts from tourism trends or price competitiveness. For that reason, even as the city becomes comparatively more expensive, twenty-four new large hotels and twelve small boutique hotels are under construction throughout the city (Tomino 2011).

High long-term inflation has transformed Buenos Aires from a bargain to a relatively expensive destination. "The great cultural offering and the extensive geography that boasts a diversity of landscapes, helps to prevent this tourism destination from the economic cycle downturns" (García and García 2010). This did not result from happenstance or luck. Policies and leadership matter, and Buenos Aires built an innovative tourism product through an innovative bureaucracy. A favorable social structure permitted inclusive tourism in neighborhoods throughout the city.

HABANA VIEJA: CREATIVE, INNOVATIVE, AND DISARTICULATED TOURISM

When the Russians reduced support for Cuba in 1991, the Cuban economy collapsed, resulting in the dramatic deterioration in living standards referred to as the "special period." The change in Russian support greatly reduced the flow of foreign currency into the Cuban treasury, and tourism was identified as a potential source of dollars. After all, Cuba has nearly a century of booms and busts in international tourism, with golden years in the 1920s and 1950s (Schwartz 1999). Upon seizing power in 1959, Fidel Castro confiscated the foreign-owned hotels, shut down the casinos and bordellos, and generally disdained tourism. As the Soviet Union began imploding in 1988, just over 300,000 tourists visited Cuba. The special period resulted in rapid legal and political reforms that led to over a million tourists by 1996, a compound annual growth rate of 16 percent (Suddaby 1997, 123).

Cuban tourism marketing strategy was quite traditional for the sun, sand, and

sea market, offering all-inclusive pricing and welcoming foreign investors (Sudday 1997). At the same time, the desperate conditions led to extreme measures and some unusual strategies, such as allowing the Cuban military to operate a large tourism company and own dozens of hotels. The most creative ideas and innovative actions occurred in the Cuban capital. As with the case of Buenos Aires, extraordinary local leadership and uncharted institutional reforms accompanied and led transformations and innovation.

Eusebio Leal was born in 1942 and was active in Catholic action organizations in his youth. In 1959, Leal began working for the city historian, Dr. Emilio Roig. Leal was named director of the City Museum and City Historian's Office in 1967. He was largely self-taught in history and cultural heritage, earning his undergraduate degree in 1979 and doctorate in historical sciences many years later.

Leal declared the large colonial neighborhood of Habana Vieja a national monument in 1979, which resulted in increased resources from the Cuban government and the first phases of rehabilitation of the colonial center. In 1981, the Cuban state assigned an exclusive budget to the Office of the City Historian for rehabilitation and restoration of the colonial squares and architecture. In 1982, Leal shepherded the old city through the process to be designated a UNESCO World Heritage site. He also initiated and hosted a popular weekly television program for twenty years, *Walking in Havana*.[9]

Due to the long Spanish colonial period, which lasted until the end of the nineteenth century, Havana is especially rich in colonial architecture. Old Havana houses over one hundred thousand residents in 4.4 densely packed square kilometers (Hearn 2006, 148). There are thousands of colonial era buildings as well as fortifications and colonial squares. The wealthy citizens began moving out of the old city over a century ago, and the area's deterioration accelerated in the first decades of the Revolution. Rehabilitation of the crumbling colonial buildings and squares proceeded at a slower pace than the deterioration. The last straw was in 1993, when a dilapidated building collapsed just as a journalist from a London tabloid, *The Independent*, was photographing the building, humiliating the Cubans (Scarpaci 2000).

It was in that year that Leal synthesized several trends into an innovative policy that transformed Havana. The economic crisis was both a curse for the city historian's efforts and an opportunity. The curse was even fewer local resources than before but it was an opportunity because the depth of despair placed the Communist leadership in the domain of losses and made them risk seekers. The economy was collapsing, people were undernourished, and communism was being overthrown around the world. In this environment Leal turned the City Historian's Office into an autonomous income-generating entity never before seen in Cuba. Leal made a deal with the nation's leadership, promising to rapidly rehabilitate the colonial heritage of Habana Vieja and increase tourism revenues for the state in exchange for unprecedented autonomy. "The State Council, through the

9. This section draws from the application packet of the 2007 UN Habitat Scroll of Honor for Dr. Eusebio Leal Spengler, and van Oers (2009).

Decree-Law 143 as of October 1993, declared (Old Havana) as 'Prioritized Preservation Zone' and gave the Historian's Office the status of the only authority in charge of self-financed management" (Habitat Scroll, 1).

With the authority of Decree-Law 143 and the green light from the government, Leal quickly established four corporations under control of the City Historian's Office to institutionally facilitate the generation of income for rehabilitation. Habaguanex, a tourism company, was founded in 1993 with US$1 million to rehabilitate colonial buildings such as hotels in Habana Vieja. The company now controls nearly two dozen small hotels as well as tourist shops, restaurants, and offices generating tens of millions of dollars per year. Habaguanex is unique in Cuba in being able to negotiate directly with foreign corporations and in not being required to remit profits to the state (Scarpaci 2000). The City Historian's Office is also the principal shareholder in a travel agency (San Cristóbal) and two construction/real estate management companies (Fénix and Aurea). Altogether, these businesses generated operating profits of US$43 million in 2009, with half going to the state and half going to rehabilitation projects (Goldberger 2009). In ten years (1994–2004), the Historian's Office had recovered and rehabilitated a full 33 percent of the area of the historical center and implemented five times the number of projects of all previous periods (von Oers 2009, 10). The renovations start at public squares and work out, block by block. In addition to hotels, restaurants, and shops for tourists, the projects rehabilitate tenements and apartments for residents, libraries, after-school facilities for neighborhood children, community centers, and the like.[10]

In 2001, the conditions of Decree-Law 143 were extended to the Malecón shoreline for rehabilitation and tourism development. In 2003 the picturesque Chinatown, just west of Habana Vieja, was given over to Leal's office under Decree-Law 143 (von Oers 2009, 9). Local ethnic Chinese have been given rights to open small restaurants and businesses in order to draw tourists into the neighborhood. Leal predicted a decade earlier, "In less than a few years Barrio Chino will reappear; Chinese people will live from one side to the other. They will start . . . to bring the traditional restaurants back to life. . . . I know very well that it's not a matter of changing it or adorning it; it's a matter of bringing it to life, and life always comes from the inside out" (Leal, quoted in Hearn 2006, 151).

The limited survey research shows that residents of Habana Vieja are satisfied with the transformations and the benefits of tourism. Colantonio (2004) reports that 95 percent of surveyed residents of Habana Vieja viewed "change brought by tourism" as positive, and nearly the same percentage supported more tourism development. This corresponds with two informal surveys that I conducted of twenty-five residents each in 2002 and 2004 in Old Havana. There was near universal agreement that tourism was positive for the area, that Eusebio Leal was

10. Our students have volunteered in an impressive after-school art institute in Old Havana, funded by the City Historian's Office. One of the facility's directors explained that the children of Habana Vieja need a place to do photography, crafts, and art and to be active and busy so that they are not tempted to hustle tourists (May 14, 2004).

a transformative figure, and that the rehabilitation of the buildings by the Historian's Office was very positive.[11]

Structural elements and tourism in Habana Vieja

Tourism in Havana is different from the enclave tourism found at some Cuban beaches such as Varadero, as there is mixing on the streets and in the squares, and many tourists eat in family-owned restaurants (*paladares)* and stay in rented rooms in family homes (*casas particulares*). Habana Vieja is not enclave tourism in a direct sense, such as the all-inclusive resorts of Jamaica or the Dominican Republic, where a fence or security guards keep locals away and the tourists are warned not to leave. Yet extreme differences in class, race, and liberties result in a disarticulated tourism structure and limited benefits for the local community. There is a "Havanalandia" feel to the colonial center. Tourists and locals both stroll the squares and streets and inhabit the same geographical space, but in such different dimensions that the locals are a type of ornamentation and somewhat akin to the costumed characters of Disneyland.

Entrepreneurship and the distribution of benefits of tourism

In the inclusive tourism structure of Buenos Aires or Costa Rica, tourists often participate in the same activities as locals, and small businesses benefit from the additional customers and spread of tourism to new neighborhoods or regions. In traditional enclave tourism, tourists are concentrated in large corporate hotels in Cancún, in all-inclusive hotel packages at Puerto Plata in the Dominican Republic, or on cruise ships that let the tourists off for a couple of hours at private beaches in Haiti. In enclave tourism, entrepreneurial activity is largely limited to vendors on the beaches or vices such as prostitution. Havana is somewhere in between, and a number of entrepreneurial opportunities appeared in the 1990s for paladares and casas particulares.

Paladares are strictly regulated in the number of chairs allowed and are subject to a flat monthly tax. Casas particulares are also strictly regulated by the Cuban state, and owners must register all guests and pay a monthly tax in dollars per room, whether anyone stays or not. In 1999, 2002, and 2004 I interviewed a total of fourteen paladar owners and nine casa particular owners in Habana Vieja, Vedado, Trinidad, and Cienfuegos. The biggest problem faced by both businesses is that the Cuban state represents unfair competition as it both owns restaurants and hotels and determines and regularly alters the conditions and taxes for private restaurants and room rentals.

When tourism grew faster than the state could supply corresponding services, the incentives were very high for the private sector to fill the absence of restaurants and places to stay. Taxes were low and paladares could function with up

11. Other entities, including Spanish universities, have provided considerable resources, architects, and engineers to the colonial restoration. Critics argue that local architects and engineers have been excluded from participation (Scarpaci 2000).

to 24 seats. As the number of state-owned restaurants and hotels grew, private sector businesses were viewed as unwanted competition. The state responded by quadrupling taxes, and paladares were limited to 16 seats and 4 tables (interviews, 2004, Havana). By 2004, the City Historian's Office had rehabilitated and opened 15 hotels, 28 cafeterias, 18 restaurants, and 4 bars in Havana. The other tourism companies operated by the military and the other state companies ran an additional 58 hotels, 141 cafeterias, and 15 restaurants in Havana alone (Colantonio 2004, 38). Taxes for casas particulares vary by location and type of rooms (interview, May 2004, Ministry of Tourism). As of 2010, monthly taxes per room in Havana approximate US$200 per month and must be paid every month.

Rules change often and dramatically in Cuba. Raul Castro's 2011 reforms led to the dismissal of hundreds of thousands of government workers and an easing of restrictions for small businesses. Paladares can now have up to fifty seats, and taxes on casas particulares have been reduced by 25 percent.[12] While these prospects are promising, the Cuban state has a history of reversing reforms. Interviewees expressed frustration, and several of the casa particular owners claimed in May 2004 that they were losing money when they factored in taxes and electricity costs. Some interviewees challenged the fairness in a system where the state is both competitor and regulator.

Tourism and Race

One of Cuba's greatest revolutionary successes was in the reduction of the achievement gap between Afro-Cubans and white Cubans (de la Fuente 2007). While the Cuban approach does not produce a racial paradise, Cuba "could justifiably claim that the country's relative success in combating racism was one of the great achievements of the socialist country" (de la Fuente 2007). The downside of tourism in Cuba is that it has revived racism throughout the island.

The principal class divide in Cuba is between those who have access to dollars and those who do not. Remittances from Miami and Spain represent one major source of dollars necessary for exchanging for Cuban convertible pesos (CUCs) that can purchase goods and services at well-stocked outlets. Supplies and variety at regular peso stores are sparse at best. For those Cubans who do not receive regular remittances, tourism is an alternative source of dollars, euros, or CUCs. A maid can make more money in tips per month than a medical doctor can make in a year. Tourism jobs are therefore highly desirable.

> It is in this juncture that racist ideas came to play a more active role in the allocation of scarce resources. In order to minimize the black and mulatto presence in tourism, white managers began to demand from prospective employees what they defined as a "pleasant appearance" (*buena presencia*), an aesthetic attribute which only people deemed to be white could fulfill. . . . blacks barely represent 5 percent of the labor force employed in tourism and other dollar-related activities. (de la Fuente, n.d., 3)

12. According to Cubanálisis, http://www.cubanalisis.com/section%20in%20english/self-employment%20expanding,%20but%20not%20enough.htm.

While Cuba remains a destination with considerable structural weaknesses in tourism, impressive changes have occurred in Habana Vieja, and Eusebio Leal has been an innovator. He is overseeing an impressive rehabilitation of Habana Vieja and improved conditions and generated revenues for the state. He and his work have become important components of the global branding of Havana and Cuba and are in part responsible for the increase in international tourism. The structural conditions for entrepreneurs and Afro-Cubans limit the benefits for the inhabitants. The liberty gap between tourists and locals results in inequality and exploitation.

RIO DE JANEIRO: STAGNANT MODEL AND URBAN ENCLAVE STRUCTURE

Rio de Janeiro should have experienced significant tourism growth in the first decade of the twenty-first century, when international tourism arrivals grew 39 percent (UNWTO 2012). This city has an important supply of globally recognized tourism icons and events—Ipanema, Copacabana, the Corcovado, Carnaval, Réveillon, Maracanã, Sugarloaf, and more. But Rio de Janeiro is much more than those renowned attractions. Astonishing baroque, rococo, and neoclassical churches from the colonial period are found throughout the downtown area, as well as dazzling theaters, museums, libraries, cultural centers, restaurants, bars, and live music.[13] Looking at that mix of scenic and urban endowment, Rio de Janeiro should have been able to continue with the sun, sea, and sand tourism that already existed and create a large new flow of tourists for the rapidly expanding culture, architecture, and urban tourism markets. This did not happen. Due to policy, bureaucratic rigidity, and an unfavorable social structure, Rio de Janeiro maintains a stagnant brand. The "marvelous city" of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil's world-class tourism destination, experienced an unexpected 13 percent decline in international tourist annual arrivals, from 1.8 million to 1.61 million between 2000 and 2010 (RIOTUR, e-mail communication, June 27, 2011).

The benefit of so many natural and cultural wonders has also been a curse for bureaucratic creativity and innovation. With newfound oil resources and a booming economy, Rio de Janeiro has been in the domain of gains and has been content to continue with decades old strategies and institutions and rest on the same cultural and natural attractions used in the 1960s or the 1990s.

Policy Limitations and Lost Opportunities

While Buenos Aires and Havana have autonomous and well-funded tourism authorities with creative and entrepreneurial leadership and innovative policies, Rio de Janeiro's RioTur has limited bureaucratic autonomy and merely competent leadership. A competent Weberian bureaucracy may be sufficient in some ministries, but in contemporary tourism, competence must be supplemented

13. RioTur (n.d.); Jordan (2002); and my own tours of the city.

with entrepreneurship and innovation to compete with other destinations. One tourism expert with more than twenty years of tourism policy work in the state of Rio de Janeiro characterizes the tourism authority as "doing the same thing over and over for decades, beaches, sun, bikinis, occasional big concerts. They are incapable of successfully doing anything new" (interview, June 27, 2011, Rio de Janeiro). A senior staffer at RioTur complained that the mayor will have some sudden idea from hearing about events or festivals in other cities, and RioTur will try to copy the experience here. "But it is always half-baked and is a bit of a flop. People come for the beaches, the icons, Carnaval, and New Year's Réveillon."

Without significant resources and considerable autonomy, exceptional leaders will not agree to head tourism bureaucracies. The director of RioTur is António Pedro Viegas Figueira de Mello, who has experience as subsecretary of tourism for the state of Rio de Janeiro and who served as director of the Tijuca forest, home of the Corcovado Christ statue. Interviewees described him as an energetic and competent bureaucrat, but nobody described him as creative, visionary, or entrepreneurial. On December 21, 2011, a Lexis-Nexis Academic search of the tourism leaders of Buenos Aires, Havana, and Rio de Janeiro yielded 488 results for Eusebio Leal/Havana, 97 hits for Hernán Lombardi/Buenos Aires, and zero hits for Rio de Janeiro's tourism director.

De Mello, RioTur, and their supporters contend that they are at a disadvantage vis-à-vis Buenos Aires and Havana for four principal reasons. First, RioTur is a bureaucratic island, unable to leverage other elements to build synergies with tourism. In Buenos Aires, Lombardi has the considerable resources and strengths of the Ministry of Culture to leverage tourism. In Havana, Leal is able to build synergies with urban rehabilitation and generate tens of millions of dollars. In contrast, the Culture Ministry in Rio de Janeiro City is completely independent from tourism and follows a different agenda leading to expensive unused facilities, such as the City of Music concert hall constructed on isolated swamps, which are wasted opportunities to enhance the city center.

The second disadvantage for RioTur is the lack of autonomy. Due to the highly rigid bureaucracy in Brazil, RioTur is even unable to spend money abroad without navigating a labyrinth of bid requirements and regulations that make it difficult. As a result, the city only participates in fairs and tourism events in partnership with EMBRATUR, the national tourism promotion board. This limits rebranding and promotional efforts and leads by default to continuing with the same brand that the city has had for the past fifty years.

Third, the national governments of Argentina and Cuba enthusiastically encourage tourism in Buenos Aires and Havana and feature these cities as the crown jewels of tourism in international campaigns. For the past ten years, Brazil has made efforts to balance tourism throughout the country. RioTur officials complained in 2009 and 2011 that Rio de Janeiro is often not prominently featured in promotional materials and that the rivalry between cities and states undermines branding efforts.

Finally, crime and other social structural impediments constrain the tourism brand options, forcing tourism activities to largely take place in the urban tourism

enclave of the South Zone of the city. The beach areas of Copacabana and Ipanema are fully built out, and tourism growth is difficult if the city cannot expand the geographical footprint of international tourism.

Structural impediments to international tourism growth in Rio de Janeiro

The greatest threats to tourism are issues of crime and security. High profile crimes, CNN stories of riots, films that portray a destination as crime-ridden or dangerous, or State Department crime warnings lead to swift and dramatic declines in tourists and tourist revenues. The widespread perception of violent crime, corrupt police, and arbitrary justice negatively impacts all of Latin America but is particularly acute in cities such as Rio de Janeiro.

Rio de Janeiro has a high level of violence, with a murder rate of 39.7 per 100,000 inhabitants (Rodríguez 2010). Crime waves targeting tourists have occurred, and violence is the biggest problem for tourism in Rio de Janeiro. Unfortunately for Rio de Janeiro, the widespread perception of an increase in crime occurred just as regional tourism recovered from the 9/11 attacks (De Oliveira 2004).

Instead of focusing on measures to reduce violence, Brazilians too often focus on the negative effects of the media that portray the violence. The Rio tourist board not only complained about a *telenovela* that featured random violence in the posh Leblon neighborhood, but sued Fox Television for *The Simpsons* episode called *Blame It on Lisa,* a take on the 1984 film *Blame It on Rio.* In the episode, Homer and Bart are mugged in a juice bar, fearsome monkeys roam the streets, and taxi drivers kidnap tourists (Bellos 2002). "Placing the blame on the media, the country misidentifies the cause of the problem, that in reality are the many failures in the national system of tourism, which include an absence of promotion, which could generate a significant change in the image of the country. . . . The product itself must change, and social problems that are real and denigrating the image of Brazil need to be solved or reduced" (Bignami 2002, 22).

A human capital deficit is evident in the surprisingly small number of English or Spanish speakers in Rio tourism promotion. Observers have identified the lack of English speakers in Rio de Janeiro and in Brazil as a major disadvantage for tourism in the country (Fitzpatrick 2003).

Class and crime perceptions both inhibit tourists from exploring the city and shape tourism policies. The geographic contours of poor favelas rising on the hilltops at the edges of the tourist zones enhance the feeling of tourist enclaves. Tourists are wary of leaving the Zona Sul because they fear that one wrong turn or mistake will place them in a dangerous situation, where nobody speaks their language. Officials are wary of tourists leaving the enclaves and suffering violent crime. Consequently, the cultural, architectural, and historical jewels of downtown Rio de Janeiro, which would draw millions of tourists in other cities, are largely ignored by international tourists.

The class, crime, human capital, and geographical structure of the city combine to concentrate international tourism far from the city center, in the narrow band along the beaches of the Zona Sul and Barra de Tijuca. These are enclaves within the city, relatively safe and protected, with hotel and service workers with

Table 1 Policy choices, social structure, and tourism models in global cities

	Weak bureaucracy / Failed policies	Weberian bureaucracy / Stagnant policies	Entrepreneurial bureaucracy / Innovative policies
Favorable structure / Inclusive tourism			Buenos Aires
Limited structure / Disarticulated tourism			Havana
Unfavorable structure / Urban enclave tourism		Rio de Janeiro	

foreign language skills for dealing with tourists from the United States, Latin America, France, and Germany.

Rio de Janeiro tourism is shaped by unfavorable social conditions and a professional local tourism authority that is constrained and rigid. Consequently, during years of impressive international tourism growth in the hemisphere, international tourism has declined and continues in an urban enclave model with limited local benefits.

Table 1 presents a typology of urban tourism based on policy choice and social structure. In the period studied, Buenos Aires has both a favorable social structure for inclusive tourism and an entrepreneurial bureaucracy. Havana has limited structural conditions with an entrepreneurial bureaucracy. Rio de Janeiro lacks an innovative and entrepreneurial bureaucracy, and the social structure results in urban enclave tourism in the beach communities of the South Zone.

CONCLUSION

Policy choices and social structure determine the composition and growth of tourism in Latin American global cities. City tourism is one of the most dynamic and growing sectors of international tourism. Cities can develop unique brands that are not as price sensitive as generic and declining beach vacations. Politics and policies matter, as cities are incubators of tourism innovation, and some cities leverage dramatic institutional redesign for improvement in tourism and the distribution of the benefits. In contrast to traditional views of bureaucracy, entrepreneurial leaders such as Hernán Lombardi in Buenos Aires and Eusebio Leal in Havana operate with significant autonomy and are risk takers. In both cases, prospect theory helps explain why cities pursue innovation and risk. Severe economic crisis in Buenos Aires and Havana led to bold and risky empowerment of bureaucracies, resulting in innovative institutions with creative leadership. The success of Buenos Aires and Havana requires extensive autonomy and substantial resources; if political change eliminated these advantages, emblematic leadership may not be enough and branding and other advances could stall or be reversed.

Social structure shapes the distribution of tourism in a city and the benefits

that accrue to the local population. Favorable structural conditions contributed to the policies in Buenos Aires and resulted in an inclusive tourism product with a wide distribution of benefits. Social conditions in Havana were less favorable, resulting in innovative but disarticulated tourism. Due to unfavorable structural conditions, Rio de Janeiro exhibits an urban enclave model of tourism, and its rigid bureaucracy continues with stagnant policies and a decline in international tourism. While social structure changes quite slowly, policy choices can have dramatic and relatively rapid effects in these and other cities.

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