

the author: the book is not available in paperback form, and this is a pity. I, for one, would like every student of mine to possess his own copy.

S. V. UTECHIN
Pennsylvania State University

THE USSR ARMS THE THIRD WORLD: CASE STUDIES IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. By *Uri Ra'anan*. Cambridge, Mass. and London: The M.I.T. Press, 1969. x, 256 pp. \$10.00.

Two case studies from the middle 1950s make up this book. One is the famous arms deal involving the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Egypt, the catalyst of a sea change in the military balance and the political climate of the Middle East. The other is the Soviet decision to arm Indonesia, a move which had certain parallels with the Egyptian case but no such durable results.

This is no routine exercise drawing on the many accounts which have been written on these events. The author has deliberately set out to test the generally accepted interpretations of diplomats, journalists, and scholars against all the old and new evidence he can find, some of it previously overlooked. Particularly in the first study, where he writes with the double credentials of a thorough Sovietologist and a scholar-diplomat with a close knowledge of the Middle East (having been in the diplomatic service of Israel), he has done a careful and convincing job. Fortunately he has had the good sense to link the Egyptian arms deal with Soviet policy elsewhere, with the internal struggle for power in the Soviet Union, and with Egypt's position amid the shifting sands of Arab politics and in its relations with the West as well as in the conflict with Israel.

The main line of argument has to do with some vital points of chronology: When did the Soviets decide to arm Egypt? When did Nasser decide to turn in their direction, and when was the real agreement reached? The conclusion is that these decisions were taken in late January and early February of 1955. Thus they preceded the Gaza raid of February 28, generally given as the cause of Nasser's decision to get arms wherever he could. They preceded also his request for U.S. arms and the fruitless negotiations with the Pentagon, which in this light were but an exercise in deception. Thus the charge that American diplomacy drove Nasser to turn to Russia by the inept and negative response to his request is beside the point. The crucial bit of evidence has to do with a Czech "trade mission" to Cairo in February 1955, and with a statement in a Soviet publication ten years later (*International Affairs*, no. 5, 1965) that a Czech-Egyptian agreement on arms was concluded in that month. The author develops the story with added points from many sources including Khrushchev's later interviews with Heykal in *Al Ahram* and Molotov's speech of February 8, 1955, which he subjects to intense scrutiny with fascinating results.

A reader may be granted at least the privilege of harboring a shadow of doubt about some of the author's deductions and conclusions, particularly since there is a liberal amount of speculation on his part. What he has done is to put the burden of proof on those who have taken the hitherto generally accepted view, and that is no mean achievement.

The decision of the Soviet Union to arm Sukarno's Indonesia is also closely examined and placed in 1956, about two years earlier than the public acknowledgment-

ment of it. The author exhibits the same careful research and often brilliant analysis as in the first study, and gains the same reward, the satisfaction of shedding new light on the past. The case is especially interesting in that Indonesia, unlike Egypt, had a large and strong Communist party whose revolutionary possibilities were ignored by Khrushchev, and this at a time before the PKI had so clearly lined up with the Chinese. Both studies are most helpful in increasing our knowledge of what really happened at this time of a major shift in Soviet policy toward the third world.

JOHN C. CAMPBELL
Council on Foreign Relations

SURVEY OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE: A COMMENTARY AND EXTRACTS FROM THE RECENT POLEMICS, 1963–1967. By *John Gittings*. London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. xxix, 410 pp. \$11.75.

This book is different from all other documentary collections on the extensive Sino-Soviet polemic in its organization of extracts according to significant subject matter. Instead of compiling editorials and official statements chronologically, Mr. Gittings has carefully culled the extensive Russian and Chinese materials for 1963–67, grouping explicit references under thirty categories, such as “The Korean War,” “The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, 1959,” “The Sino-Soviet Border, 1962–4,” and “Nuclear Weapons and Defense, 1958–9.” Because these documents as issued contained a hodgepodge of current and retrospective charges and counter-charges, this reordering is particularly helpful for quick reference and will be of use to the undergraduate reader and paper writer.

Gittings prefaces each grouping with a cogent analysis of the larger relevance of the excerpts, integrating where possible more recent Russian and Chinese materials. He wisely eschews assessing the merits of particular accusations or the reliability of alleged revelations, maintaining careful objectivity throughout. Especially valuable is his twenty-seven page introduction, which offers a genuinely fresh overview of Sino-Soviet relations with particular emphasis on elements of strain manifest between the two parties prior to 1949. Here as elsewhere in the volume Gittings proves himself no less a scholar through his illuminating research among original sources than the more established experts in Sino-Soviet affairs to whom he pays homage in his helpful footnotes. Moreover, his British perspective makes possible a thoughtful critique of fallacies and assumptions underlying American policy in this earlier period.

An appendix contains another twenty “major historical documents” from the years 1950–62, but here excerpts do only a partial service, and the selectivity over so long a period is inevitably contentious. Finally, the author includes a list of all relevant items issued by either side in 1963–67, going well beyond those selected for the main portion of this collection. The full span of materials indicated in his list, together with their eventual decline in quality and authoritativeness as compared with the exchange of letters between the Russian and Chinese parties in 1963–65, underscores Gittings’s justification in extracting the few kernels of historical relevance from the vast chaff of propaganda verbiage spewed out in Moscow and Peking. Since the true scholar will inevitably examine full texts in their original