

Party" (MÉP), is mistaken. This distinction has to be made in order to understand the events of 1942–44—and Imrédy's role in them.

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THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION. By *David Pryce-Jones*. New York: Horizon Press, 1970. 127 pp. \$4.95.

This book is essentially a pictorial chronicle. Numerous photographs showing crowds milling in the streets, Soviet tanks in action, scenes of fighting, key personalities, and so on, convey the drama and agony of the unequal struggle; the text provides a running commentary. The longest chapter (pp. 61–103) is devoted to a day-by-day account of the two weeks of Hungary's revolutionary upheaval (October 23 to November 4, 1956). This central section is surrounded by shorter chapters dealing with the antecedents and the aftermath of the revolutionary crisis up to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

A short picture book, of course, offers little scope for exploring the social and political background of the events described and illustrated. Accordingly, the pre-Communist period receives only summary treatment, but the reader is given at least a glimpse of the main issues facing Hungarian society. Developments since 1956 are dealt with even more sketchily, so that the specific character of the Kádár regime does not come through at all. It is different with the central part, devoted to the revolutionary crisis itself. This section not only conveys the drama of mounting social and political tension with its denouement in a shattering climax, it also shows in some detail how one thing led to another. Mr. Pryce-Jones has a good grasp of the general conditions as well as the contingent circumstances determining the course of events. Thus he properly stresses the importance of the Soviet-Yugoslav rift and of the succession crisis following Stalin's death in explaining the mounting difficulties encountered by the Hungarian and other Communist-bloc regimes during the 1950s. The strength of nationalism as a political factor is also brought out clearly.

The narrative is punctuated by well-chosen, brief quotations from prominent as well as anonymous participants in the revolutionary events. Thus we get a good idea of the mounting radicalism of the masses, forcing Imre Nagy to go farther in defying the Soviets than he had intended. In this connection, however, some crucial historical details remain in the dark—inevitably so, since the key data are not available.

Why did the Soviets intervene? Pryce-Jones singles out the Suez crisis as the main determining factor, but this may well be doubted. The abolition of the one-party system may have carried more weight: had the Soviets let this decision stand, their whole Central European position might have become untenable. Pryce-Jones, however, does not go into the radical political implications of the abandonment of one-party rule. He only speaks of the "coalition" government formed by Nagy, without pointing out how different this was from the "coalition" devices adopted by the Communists at earlier times. Thus we are left with a fragmentary picture, but even so the book does give an evocative, searching record of one of the most tragic episodes in recent history.

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