

pitfall confronting Varga's treatment of tactical issues in the party's uphill struggle. Apart from the syndicalist arguments of Ervin Szabó, a much respected theoretician but somewhat of an outsider, the bulk of discussions between the leadership and the opposition within the party did not concern doctrinal purity, as they were all orthodox Marxists. Rather, they argued about whether to apply the accelerator or the brake to the occasionally violent temper and radicalism of the industrial and agricultural proletariat. Varga has written an interesting, lively, and dynamic book on this subject. He carefully avoids painting a one-sided picture by acknowledging the genuinely socialist credentials of the leadership and the human frailties of the opposition, and of Gyula Alpári in particular. Yet he maintains the impossible assumption (pp. 114 and 186) that somehow a more radical socialist policy could have succeeded in pre-1914 Hungary. In fact, the socialist leadership could be faulted for doctrinaire rigidity, mistaken notions on many issues, misplaced trust in opponents, and occasional tactical errors, but their basic instinct toward caution was a critical choice of self-preservation over self-annihilation in the best interest of the Hungarian working class. This critical choice does not emerge in Varga's book because he treats the Social Democratic Party in isolation. He ignores, just as Gyula Alpári did, the decision-making responsibilities of the party leadership, which were ultimately determined not by quotations from Marx or Kautsky but by the reality of the Hungarian political situation, where the party was smothered by a combination of generally hostile press and national and local authorities, from cabinet ministers down to the village gendarmes.

In conclusion, both books are important and valuable contributions to our knowledge of the period immediately preceding World War I. However, neither a purely theoretical nor a somewhat unhistorical approach can do full justice to the complex problem of Hungarian socialism at the turn of the century.

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A MOVE: EGY JELLEGZETES MAGYAR FASISZTA SZERVEZET, 1918–1944. By *Rudolfné Dósa*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1972. 228 pp. + 24 pp. photographs. 60 Ft.

A BUDAPESTI LIBERÁLIS ELLENZÉK, 1919–1944. By *Zsuzsa L. Nagy*. *Értekezések a történeti tudományok köréből*. Új sorozat, 59. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1972. 178 pp. 22 Ft., paper.

Both works deal with the same period—the years between the two World Wars—and both deal with the Hungarian middle classes. Hungary developed two middle classes as a result of the “Ausgleich,” and the Trianon (Versailles) Peace Treaty. On one hand, there was a non-Western, reactionary, gentry-aping middle class (the hotbed of Hungarian fascism); and on the other, a more Westernized middle class about 90 percent Jewish. Rudolfné Dósa's work describes the reactions of the non-Western middle class to the challenges of the twentieth century, while Zsuzsa Nagy deals with the weak self-defense of the predominantly Jewish middle class against the aggressive actions of the reactionary middle class.

By and large, one can only applaud the efforts of Hungarian historians in recent years to deal with this “sensitive” period. Dósa has chosen, quite appropriately, a powerful, paramilitary social organization, the MOVE (one out of 10,000)

to illustrate the problem of the interwar years. The volume includes much important and interesting material, and the statistics presented are generally relevant and valuable but not complete. Moreover, the conclusions drawn from the data are sometimes trivial.

The constraints of socialist historiography are apparent in some sections of Dósa's work. For example she does not explain, for obvious reasons, the "change of mood" within the middle class between October 1918 and March 1919. She treats the miserable collapse of the Béla Kun regime as "the proven superiority of the working class, which even retreated in an impressively organized manner" (p. 23), and there is not the slightest criticism levelled at the failings of the left, which greatly facilitated the rise of fascism in Hungary. She offers no reasons for the transformation of E. Bajcsy-Zsilinszky from a leader of fascism into the hero of anti-fascist resistance. She substantiates the attempted coup of the MOVE forces in 1937 with references from the monumental work of C. A. Macartney, thus adding nothing to our limited knowledge of this event. Finally, Dósa recognizes that it was the Arrow Cross, and not MOVE which attracted the workers. She nevertheless fails again to explain why and how this occurred while the legal Social Democratic Party and its trade unions were still in existence. The rationalizations and conclusions in this volume are depressingly predictable.

Nagy's work is shorter. It deals with the liberal response in Budapest to these fascist currents. Budapest played an extraordinary but exaggerated role in Trianon Hungary. And in Budapest, it was the Jews who played a correspondingly exaggerated role. The history of the liberal opposition in Budapest is mainly the history of Budapest Jewry. Nagy recognizes the pathos characteristic of the liberals, their hopeless position and struggle. She also describes the fate of the remnants of the "liberal opposition" after the new, triumphant ideology followed Soviet tanks into the city.

Despite flaws, these volumes should be read by scholars interested in the interwar period in Hungary.

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KORESPONDENCIJA STJEPANA RADIĆA. 2 vols. Vol. 1: 1885–1918. Vol. 2: 1919–1928. By *Bogdan Krizman*. *Izvori za hrvatsku povijest*. Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Institut za hrvatsku povijest. Zagreb: Liber, 1972–73.

This two volume collection of the correspondence of Stjepan Radić inaugurates a new series, *Izvori za hrvatsku povijest* (Sources of Croatian History), which is sponsored by the Institute of Croatian History of the University of Zagreb. Judging by the quality of the first collection, this series will be of major scholarly importance.

Although the Croatian Peasant Party (*Hrvatska pučka seljačka stranka*, later *Hrvatska republikanska seljačka stranka*) was the most important political party in Croatia in the interwar years, there is as yet no definitive study of the history of the party or of its dynamic and controversial leader Stjepan Radić (1871–1928), who led the party from its founding in 1904 to his death by assassination in 1928. There are some useful articles and brief monographs on specific topics and periods by B. Krizman, J. Šidak, L. Vuković-Todorović, and Z. Kulundžić, as well as an unpublished doctoral dissertation by Robert G. Livingstone on Radić and the party