

solved its agrarian problem. This is instructive, since both parts have made great progress industrially.

The papers on the People's Republic of China reveal the difficulty of obtaining accurate data on that country, thus contributions are especially welcome. Other specialists deal with agriculture in Taiwan and Japan.

The book by Professor and Mrs. Adams also makes interesting reading. Most of it is made up of descriptions of all types of farms in the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Introductory chapters are provided on the evolution of agriculture in the various countries before the analyses of observed phenomena are provided. The authors are perceptive observers, and the great variety of farms described give a real insight into collectivized agriculture. The chapters on Poland and Czechoslovakia are illuminating. The two countries present a paradox—Poland overwhelmingly devoted to private agriculture, Czechoslovakia the exact opposite. Convinced believers in the efficiency of collective agriculture exist in Poland, and the future may belong to them. Since this visit the Polish worker has manifested his discontent over the slow growth in his standard of living and has demanded a more sophisticated diet. All the pointers indicate concessions to the private sector in Poland.

Soviet agriculture has been quite successful since 1967. The Eighth Five-Year Plan recorded a creditable increase in production, although failing to fulfill the plan. In the present plan period greatly increased investment has been promised, and last year's output was good. Despite the defects, apparent to all, the system seems capable of secular growth. However, a heavy price is being paid. One has only to remember the magnitude of the meat subsidy.

MARTIN MCCAULEY
University of London

ECONOMIC WARFARE IN THE COMMUNIST BLOC: A STUDY OF SOVIET ECONOMIC PRESSURE AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, AND COMMUNIST CHINA. By *Robert Owen Freedman*. New York, Washington, London: Praeger Publishers, 1970. xvi, 192 pp. \$14.00.

Has economic warfare as practiced by the Soviet Union been an effective weapon in its quarrels with other Communist countries? This is the question posed and examined in great detail by Freedman. The nature of the study is such, however, that in broad outlines both facts and conclusions are already known: the Soviet Union has applied considerable economic pressure in its quarrels with Yugoslavia (1948–55), Albania (1960–), and China (1960–), but in terms of its political objectives the pressure proved to be ineffective and very likely even counterproductive in each case. "If a communist leader is in firm control of his party," concludes Freedman, "no amount of economic pressure will cause his regime to collapse if alternate suppliers of raw materials, capital goods, and economic aid are available" (p. 48).

The signal contribution of this book is its detailed documentation of the chronology and extent of Soviet economic pressure against the three "target" countries. We learn that the Soviet arsenal includes delay in trade negotiations, refusal to buy or sell key commodities, delay or refusal to ratify trade agreements or to deliver goods for which contracts had been signed, reduction or suspension of economic assistance and training of students from the "target" nation, and a complete embargo of trade.

We also learn that in all cases the pressure was applied gradually instead of suddenly and strongly, even though in retrospect the latter method might have been more effective, because it would have made it more difficult for the target nations to find alternative sources of supply.

A vivid picture of Soviet tactics and countertactics is presented by Freedman, largely from the public statements. This is done skillfully, for the author knows how to "read" and interpret these polemical documents. Less successful is the attempted evaluation of the economic vulnerability of the target countries and the assessment of the economic consequences of Soviet pressure and the switching to new "patrons" by Yugoslavia and Albania. Unhelpful generalizations make the study less analytical than it might have been.

In attempting to give the reader more than just an accurate chronology of fascinating events, the author offers the conclusion that the Soviet leadership has become more sophisticated in its use of pressure since 1948. He cites as prime supporting evidence that although Stalin enforced a bloc-wide embargo against Yugoslavia, trade was never completely severed with China. This reviewer finds the conclusion less than fully convincing. An alternative explanation might note that between 1960 and 1965 China amortized close to a billion dollars worth of credit to the Soviet Union in the form of a regular trade surplus (and had a trade surplus with Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Rumania as well), so it would have been quite costly for the USSR to impose an embargo on China.

PAUL MARER
Indiana University

SOCIALIST MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING: TOPICS IN COMPARATIVE SOCIALIST ECONOMICS. By *Nicolas Spulber*. International Development Research Center, Studies in Development, no. 2. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1971. xviii, 235 pp. \$10.00.

This book is vintage Spulber. But a familiar cliché tells us that aging and rebottling does less for ideas than it does for wine. This is a collection of thoughtful and informative essays by a knowledgeable economist. But regular readers of the literature on Eastern Europe will regret, as I do, that this latest collection contains so little that is new and so much that is merely rebottled.

Only three of the essays contain a large proportion of new material. Two of the essays were published earlier as articles, and the rest of them present material that appeared in only slightly different form in Spulber's other books.

One very good essay, which appeared earlier in *Soviet Studies*, compares the Soviet and Chinese development strategies. Spulber measures both Stalinist and Maoist strategies for industrialization against the policy alternatives put forward in the Soviet industrialization debates of the twenties and finds that "the Chinese approach comes closest to Bukharin's preoccupation with both agricultural supply and peasant demand, his insistence that the countryside needs the products of both heavy and light industry—both agricultural machinery and manufactured goods for mass consumption—and his understanding that industry's growth is limited directly by the growth in output of grain, cotton, hides, wool, and flax" (pp. 51–52). At the same time, both Chinese collectivization of agriculture and the mobilization of rural labor and savings for forced industrialization will remind the reader more of Stalin than of Bukharin.