

# THE URBAN GUERRILLA IN LATIN AMERICA: A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY\*

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## I. INTRODUCTION

DURING THE PAST DECADE—MORE PRECISELY DURING THE LAST FIVE TO SEVEN years—the increased use of urban guerrilla warfare and terrorism have characterized the activities of many revolutionary groups in the less developed world. High-lighted by the Olympic assassinations of 1972, this phenomenon has also been evident in various African and Asian states. It is in Latin America, however, that the change from the traditional rural base for guerrilla operations to an urban environment has been most pronounced. The years from 1962 to 1967 saw many Latin American insurgents copying the Cuban revolutionary model, with its emphasis on rural guerrilla operations and the peasantry as the ultimate motive force, but recent years have seen an equally strong pull toward either purely urban insurgency or a more balanced strategy according equal importance to both rural and urban activities. In either case, the identifiable shift away from a totally rural guerrilla strategy for most Latin American revolutionary groups seems an established fact.

Dating this transition from approximately 1968, Robert Moss (1970, 1971, 1973) as well as Robert Lamberg (1970, 1971), Boris Goldenberg (1968) and several other observers of revolutionary developments in Latin America all see the move from rural to expanded urban insurgency as stemming from the strategic inadequacy of Cuban guerrilla doctrine. Developed and tested in Cuba's predominantly rural Oriente Province, where over 60 per cent of the populace resided in the countryside (according to the official 1960 edition of *Geografía de Cuba*), this doctrine has been extremely difficult to transplant and implement in the sparsely settled backlands of South America, whose Andean area Fidel Castro once considered a possible second Sierra Maestra.

In the view of James Petras (1968), this Cuban "mountain mystique" or fixation with the primacy of rural guerrilla operations totally ignores the urbanizing nature of Latin America and the large revolutionary reservoir available for exploitation in the city-centered populations of Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Mexico. In this connection, Ariel Collazo's 1968 analysis of post-Guevara guerrilla activity suggests that Cuban inability to appreciate the revolutionary potential of these population groups may well stem from the minimal recognition accorded urban support

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and insurgent functions during the Cuban revolution itself. Apparently unable to fully comprehend the fact that this revolution might well have failed without the efforts of Frank País in Santiago de Cuba and the actions of various student groups in Havana, theorists such as Ernesto Guevara and Régis Debray, as well as many of their Latin American imitators, have not placed primary emphasis on the vital importance of close linkages between rural and urban guerrilla elements. The failure to establish these linkages, in the eyes of Collazo, Luis Mercier Vega (1969), Alberto Marini (1971), and others, led to the rapid reduction of those isolated and largely unsupported rural guerrilla *focos* which developed during the mid-1960s in Brazil, Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru, Venezuela, and Colombia.

The relative ease with which these and other rural guerrilla units were destroyed brought about renewed interest in the strategies outlined by various Latin American advocates of urban insurgency, particularly the concepts enunciated by Spanish exile Abraham Guillén. A formulator of many tactics used so effectively during the late 1960s and early 1970s by the *Movimiento de Liberación Nacional*, better known as the Tupamaros, Guillén's widely read *Estrategia de la guerrilla urbana* analyzed and adapted urban guerrilla experiences in other areas to the Latin American environment. Followed within a few years by Carlos Marighella's now well known *Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla*, these two books accelerated the exploration and testing of either purely urban insurgent and terrorist operations or a mixed rural-urban effort. In general, the former strategy was followed by revolutionary groups in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, while the latter, named *la línea de insurrección combinada* by Francisco Prada (1968), then leader of the *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional* (FALN) urban units in Caracas, has been more widely used by Guatemalan, Colombian, Venezuelan, and Bolivian revolutionary elements.

In addition to the strategic problems involved in the implementation of Cuban guerrilla doctrine in Latin America, a number of impelling pragmatic considerations also seem to have turned the attention of revolutionary elements toward a reappraisal of the possibilities offered by urban guerrilla warfare. Among these were the social composition of many Latin American revolutionary groups as well as the ready availability, in urban as contrasted to rural areas, of such guerrilla necessities as arms, funds, food, medical supplies, and intelligence information.

In regard to the first of these considerations, even a cursory examination of the Fidelista guerrilla movements in the early and mid-1960s indicates that an important source of manpower was, almost invariably, the city-bred student. Within Guatemalan, Peruvian, Bolivian, and Venezuelan guerrilla groups, as well as the Colombian *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN), these individuals were important elements in the insurgent structure. However, as is well attested to in the comments of Héctor Béjar (1967), Jaime García Quijano (1970), and Ernesto Guevara (1967), such persons often adapted poorly to rigorous and spartan life in the countryside, found it difficult to communicate, much less identify with the peasantry, and as a result

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frequently had to be returned to the city. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Marighella, within an urban area these problems disappeared and the students-turned-guerrillas melted easily into their natural environment and often become a very effective fighting force.

For such individuals, an urban locus also precludes the use of long and insecure supply channels to obtain the necessities required by any guerrilla unit. Arms do not have to be shipped in from abroad or captured from an enemy. Instead, as the Tupamaro and Peronista guerrillas have demonstrated so well, weapons are literally as close as the local police post or gun club. Bank robberies or the kidnapping of foreign diplomats and wealthy industrialists for ransom insure a continuous flow of funds. A useful additional benefit from such operations is the attention focused on guerrilla aims and objectives by the national and international news media. Finally, in urban areas food and medical supplies are obtained easily from local markets or pharmacies while valuable intelligence information often can be gathered from friends, associates, and relatives of the guerrillas, particularly those in high governmental positions. Taken together, these considerations as well as the strategic problems encountered in implementing Cuban guerrilla doctrine have focused increased attention on the revolutionary potential available through urban insurgent operations.

Although the above paragraphs suggest a few of the considerations involved in the transition by Latin American revolutionary groups from rural to urban guerrilla activities, as yet no detailed examination has been made of this significant strategic change. On a hemispheric scale, the now somewhat dated study by Robert Moss (1970) remains the only serious and reasonably in-depth treatment of this subject. While country-by-country analyses of guerrilla activity in Latin America always are in abundant supply, these usually focus almost exclusively on the rural aspects of such operations and generally devote little or no consideration to urban insurgency. Furthermore, comparative studies of the strategy and tactics pursued by Latin American urban guerrilla groups and those exploited by similar Middle Eastern and Asian insurgent-terrorist organizations also are non-existent. Other examinations into the guerrilla phenomenon, such as the series of essays edited by Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy (1968), are more concerned with the political and ideological imperfections of the Guevara-Debray foco concept.

Thus, despite general agreement among many observers that Latin American revolutionary groups have abandoned a purely rural guerrilla strategy for urban or mixed urban and rural operations, no real effort seems to have been made to analyze the significance of this change, particularly in regard to its possible long-term impact on governmental stability within the area. Also, presuming this changed strategy will continue to characterize revolutionary activity within the region during at least a portion of the 1970s, equally inadequate attention seems to have been focused on the type of counterinsurgency tactics which might be employed to meet the challenge posed by urban terrorism. Accordingly, whether one views the Latin American

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revolutionary movement from a conservative point of view or as a supporter of guerrilla generated socio-political change within the region, the strategy, tactics, organization, operations, and political goals of the urban insurgent would seem to merit closer attention.

The primary emphasis in this article is on the military and political aspects of urban insurgency. Research efforts have sought to identify those materials which may provide a definitive view of the political goals and military strategy/tactics of the various Latin American urban guerrilla groups. Data relating solely to internal ideological disputes within these organizations were examined but not considered for bibliographic listing unless the dispute resulted in a change in the strategy, tactics, or political outlook of the guerrilla group itself. With these parameters in mind, then, it is hoped that this bibliographic effort may encourage a more careful exploration of the urban guerrilla phenomenon and the development of those in-depth studies and analyses of the various aspects of this subject which are now so conspicuous by their absence.

Organizationally, bibliographic entries in the present article are grouped according to subject matter or geographic area. Brief introductory comments regarding each grouping outline particularly useful sources and, where appropriate, provide a short summary concerning significant guerrilla organizations.

## II. BIBLIOGRAPHIES

In general, useful bibliographies relating to insurgency in Latin America are in short supply. One of the few recent compilations (1973) is that prepared by the Interamerican Defense College in Washington, D.C. On a country-by-country basis, Russell Ramsey's work on "*La Violencia* in Colombia" (Item #5) is excellent. In the area of Castroite guerrilla groups, both those espousing a purely rural strategy as well as others endorsing both rural and urban operations, Vera Lamberg's now somewhat dated entry (Item #4) remains a standard. However, bibliographies focusing solely on urban guerrilla warfare and terrorism in Latin America are seemingly non-existent. A few earlier works about urban guerrilla warfare on a world-wide scale, such as the compilations prepared by the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Research in Social Systems, were developed prior to the 1968-69 change in guerrilla strategy which placed greater emphasis on urban operations. As a result, these publications are necessarily dated and fail to cover the crucial 1968-1972 period. Because of the absence of definitive bibliographic works on the subject of urban guerrilla warfare and terrorism, the preparation of such works would appear to be the logical starting point for more precise research into the subject.

### 1. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)

- 1973 Bibliografía: guerra revolucionaria y subversión en el continente. Washington, D.C. An extremely useful bibliography, prepared by the Library of the Inter-American Defense College, which contains many references to urban insurgency in Latin America.

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### 2. CHILCOTE, RONALD H.

1970 *Revolution and Structural Change in Latin America: A Bibliography on Ideology, Development, and the Radical Left (1930–1965)*. 2 vols. Stanford. An outstanding compilation prepared under the auspices of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace. Primarily in Spanish, English, Portuguese and French, with some works in Russian and German. Emphasis is on traditional and emerging leftist political forces of Latin American society and their approaches to a theory of structural change. The sections on Cuba and Venezuela are particularly useful.

### 3. CORNOG, DOUGLAS

1964 *Unconventional Warfare: A Bibliography of Bibliographies*. Washington, D.C. Prepared by the Information Technology Division of the National Bureau of Standards, this selected annotated bibliography of bibliographies deals with unconventional warfare, including counterinsurgency, guerrilla warfare, special warfare, and psychological operations. Contains a few references to bibliographies on Latin America.

### 4. LAMBERG, VERA B. DE

1971 *La guerrilla Castrista en América Latina; bibliografía selecta, 1960–1970*. *Foro Internacional*. 12:1:95–111. A very useful, although limited, working bibliography on pro-Cuban guerrilla movements in Latin America. Contains a number of significant references to urban insurgent operations in various countries. Literature listed includes titles in Spanish, German, and French.

### 5. RAMSEY, RUSSELL W.

1973 *Critical Bibliography on La Violencia in Colombia*. *Latin American Research Review*. 8:1:3–44. A comprehensive and detailed bibliography on virtually all facets of the guerrilla war in Colombia. A critical commentary on the literature is accompanied by brief textual explanations of the evolution of the insurgency as well as the guerrilla groups involved.

### 6. SCAUZILLO, ROBERT J.

1970 *Ernesto 'Che' Guevara: A Research Bibliography*. *Latin American Research Review*. 5:2:53–82. The excellent narrative and accompanying extensive bibliography complement the present article by citing numerous references not only on Guevara's life but also on the validity of his theories of revolutionary warfare.

### 7. SYMSER, WILLIS M., *et al.*

1968 *Annotated Bibliography on Internal Defense*. Washington, D.C. Selected books, periodicals, reports, and articles relating to internal defense. Prepared by the Center for Research in Social Systems, much of the material listed deals with the problems of insurgency and urban guerrilla warfare.

## III. GENERAL SOURCES

Although the volume of materials relating to guerrilla activity in Latin America has grown enormously in recent years, the emphasis in such writing invariably has been on the rural aspects of this revolutionary struggle. Analyses of purely urban elements are virtually non-existent. With the exception of brief works by Robert Moss (1970, 1971) and Robert Lamberg (1970, 1971), and the more polemic writing of Abraham Guillén (1966) and Carlos Marighella (1970), the field is lightly explored. No one-volume study on the urban guerrilla, similar to Richard Gott's wide-ranging examination of Latin American guerrilla groups (1971), has been attempted. Accordingly, the reader interested in pursuing the subject of urban

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guerrilla activity in the region must be prepared to mine available data from a wide spectrum of sources. In this article, materials considered particularly useful by the authors are listed under the headings Cuban Guerrilla Theory, Urban Guerrilla Tactics, General Surveys, and Counterinsurgency Techniques.

For continuing information on urban and rural guerrilla activity in Latin America, the Cuban Armed Forces journal *Verde Olivo* and the Communist Party organ *Granma* are very useful. The latter is particularly valuable as it often publishes, in series format, rather detailed articles on guerrilla groups within a particular nation. (See Items #114 through 117 on Argentine urban terrorist organizations). Also useful for continued coverage of guerrilla activity are the quarterly *Tricontinental* and the monthly *Boletín Tricontinental*, both published in Havana by the *Secretariado de la Organización de Solidaridad de los Pueblos de Africa, Asia y América Latina*. The latter contains a regular section entitled *Frentes Guerrilleros*, which summarizes significant developments in worldwide guerrilla activity.

As a supplement to these Cuban publications, *Punto Final*, a Santiago (Chile) weekly, was an excellent source of current information on guerrilla operations, as is the more conservative Caracas *Este & Oeste*. From the military point of view, the Argentine army's *Manual de Informaciones* is excellent and frequently provides a rather objective analysis of insurgency activity. (See Item #8). The London weekly news report *Latin America* also furnishes relatively unbiased and unemotional accounts of guerrilla operations on a hemispheric and country-by-country basis. Finally, on a daily basis, the respected Madrid *ABC* and the Spanish news agency EFE provide broad coverage of Latin America in general as well as the operations of guerrilla groups within the area. In this regard, dailies of the major Latin American cities also are valuable although often somewhat less accurate in their reporting.

### A. Cuban Guerrilla Theory

#### 8. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)

1969 El diario del Che Guevara en Bolivia. *Manual de Informaciones*. Buenos Aires. 11:3:49-64. A useful analysis by the Intelligence Service of the Argentine Army of Guevara's guerrilla campaign in Bolivia. According to the article, Guevara's failure to implement a rural-based insurgency brought about a change in 1968 in Cuban revolutionary strategy—a reorientation of effort toward the creation of campaigns involving terrorism, assassination, strikes, and sabotage. In these campaigns, university students were to become the main revolutionary force.

#### 9. CORVALAN, LUIS

1967 Alliance of Anti-Imperialist Forces in Latin America. *World Marxist Review*. Toronto. 10:7:44-51. A slashing attack, by an old-line Communist, against the Cuban foco concept. The author argues that a successful revolution can never be built by "synthetic" means around a small cadre of men who are not linked at all times to the urban working classes.

#### 10. DEAS, MALCOLM

1968 Guerrillas in Latin America. *World Today*. 24:2:72-78. A lecturer in Latin American politics at Oxford University critically examines the military, social, and political aspects of the Cuban theory of revolutionary war as developed by Guevara and Debray. Deficiencies in this essentially rural-oriented concept are

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illustrated by using examples from various Latin American guerrilla groups.

11. DEBRAY, REGIS  
1968 Algunos problemas de estrategia revolucionaria. In: Ensayos Latino-Americanos. Buenos Aires. Published during 1965 in a mimeographed edition for students at the *Ecole Normal Supérieure* of Paris, this article analyzes the problems involved in the development of insurgent movements during the post-Cuban revolutionary period. Concluding that the prolonged struggle implemented within rural areas is the proper strategy for the region, Debray argues that a city-based guerrilla movement can never succeed in the semi-colonial nations of Latin America.
12. \_\_\_\_\_  
1968 El Castrismo: la larga marcha de América Latina. In: Ensayos Latino-Americanos. Buenos Aires. This detailed essay examines the failure of revolutionary organizations to achieve power during the period 1959–65. In summing up the lessons learned from the revolutionary failures of 1959–65, the author adopts a more moderate position regarding urban guerrilla operations than exhibited in his later works. (Item #13). He concludes that rural focos cannot exist without strong urban guerrilla units providing arms, funds, food, recruits, ammunition, and intelligence. He also indicates that in those nations where population is concentrated in major cities, urban operations may be more important than rural efforts. Prophetically, Debray contends, in regard to the foco doctrine, that Bolivia is the one country in Latin America where "la teoría del foco es, si no inadecuada, en todo caso relegable a un segundo plano."
13. \_\_\_\_\_  
1967 Révolution dans la révolution? Paris. Also available in numerous English-language editions, this text is a theoretical justification for the foco concept of rural-based revolutionary activity. In the area of urban guerrilla warfare, the book represents a much more rigid position than that exhibited by the author in earlier works. (Items #11, 12, 251). In this book Debray concludes that the rural foco can survive even if the urban support apparatus is destroyed.
14. GOLDENBERG, BORIS  
1968 The Strategy of Castroism. Studies on the Soviet Union. Munich. 8:2:127–145. A detailed analysis of the Cuban theory of revolutionary war, including an examination of the theory's historical development and an evaluation of its implementation under fire in Colombia, Guatemala, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia.
15. GREEN, NAN  
1968 Revolutionary Upsurge in Latin America. *Marxism Today*. 12:2:38–45. A somewhat biased and polemic view of the Latin American revolutionary scene and the economic conditions which spawned it. Of interest is the author's criticism of those who subscribe to the Guevara-Debray thesis of armed guerrilla warfare and their belief in the guerrilla foco as a revolutionary vanguard.
16. GUEVARA, ERNESTO  
1963 Guerra de guerrillas: un método. *Cuba Socialista*. 3:25:1–17. This essay adds to an understanding of Guevara's views on the role of urban areas. Espousing guerrilla warfare as the formula for struggle in Latin America, he notes that urban forces, controlled by a rural-based guerrilla leadership, can still play an important role in the struggle.
17. \_\_\_\_\_  
1960 La guerra de las guerrillas. Havana. This tactical handbook on rural-based guerrilla operations contains only a short section (on combat in built-up areas) about urban guerrilla activity. Available in several English language editions.

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18. \_\_\_\_\_  
1970 Tactics and Strategy of the Latin-American Revolution. *Tricontinental*. (July–Oct.). 4–13. Written during the first days of the October 1962, missile crisis, Guevara indicates that a revolutionary command, firmly entrenched in the rural areas, can still utilize urban forces for actions of incalculable importance. However, these forces must be directed from the rural fortress and their destruction will not terminate the revolutionary movement.
19. HARRIS, RICHARD  
1970 *Death of a Revolutionary: Che Guevara's Last Mission*. N.Y. Although the American author is extremely sympathetic toward the Cuban Revolution and believes armed insurrection still can be successful elsewhere in Latin America, he does not believe that this can be accomplished in the Guevara/Debray manner. Debunking the foco theory, Harris points up the main shortcoming of the Bolivian operation, and those of various guerrilla movements in Latin America, as an absence of a mass political organization capable of mobilizing political support for the insurgents in both urban and rural areas.
20. HUBERMAN, LEO and PAUL M. SWEEZY, eds.  
1968 *Régis Debray and the Latin American Revolution*. N.Y. An excellent compilation of essays evaluating the validity of Debray's contributions to revolutionary theory and the theory of guerrilla warfare. In many cases, these essays are slashing critiques of the foco concept and its viability as a revolutionary tool in Latin America.
21. LAMBERG, ROBERT F.  
1970 *Che in Bolivia: The 'Revolution' That Failed*. *Problems of Communism*. 19:4: 25–37. A well-documented and concise account of Guevara's efforts in Bolivia as well as a critique of armed struggle and Castroite guerrilla theory. The author contends that one of the most crucial reasons for Guevara's failure was the fact the "foco" concept is based on fallacious strategic doctrines, principles, and interpretations.
22. MARTINEZ CODO, ENRIQUE  
1967 *Insurgency: Latin American Style*. *Military Review*. 47:11:3–12. An examination of the armed struggle as practiced by Communist China, North Vietnam, and Cuba. Substantial emphasis is placed on Cuban guerrilla theory as articulated by Che Guevara and Debray. This theory is examined in detail and analyzed as to its applicability in various areas of Latin America.
23. MIERES, FRANCISCO  
1967 *Lessons of October and Contemporary Revolutionary Movements in Latin America*. *World Marxist Review*. Toronto: 10:11:77–81. A strong argument against the possibility of duplicating the rural-based Cuban revolution in other areas of Latin America because of changed political, economic, social, and other conditions.
24. MORENO, JOSE ANTONIO  
1970 *Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare: Doctrine, Practice and Evaluation*. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. 12:2:114–133. The author, a Cuban-born, University of Pittsburg scholar, examines Cuban guerrilla theory as implemented in the Castro revolution and later in Bolivia. He concludes that there were no basic differences between the internal structure and functions of the foco in the two campaigns but that sharp differences existed in the external circumstances, particularly the lack of effective urban guerrilla support, in Bolivia.
25. PETRAS, JAMES  
1968 *Debray: Revolutionary or Elitist?* In: *Régis Debray and the Latin American*



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Revolution: Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, eds. N.Y. An excellent analysis of elitist aspects of the foco concept, particularly its emphasis on isolation (at least in its initial stages) from the peasant and urban masses. As the author indicates, this isolation causes Debray to categorize the urban working class as "reformist" and cities in general as "bourgeois." Without support from these areas (support which was critical in the Cuban Revolution itself and without which the Venezuelan, Peruvian, and Bolivian insurgencies failed), the author foresees additional disasters facing those revolutionary groups adhering to the elitist "mountain mystique" of Debray.

26. \_\_\_\_\_
    - 1969 New Forms of Struggle in Latin America. *New Politics*. 8:1:58-61. The author notes that Guevara's death marked the end of rural revolutionary warfare in Latin America. The post-Fidelista left is primarily urban-based and combines armed vanguard actions (by small, select, politicized, and militarized cadres) with mass struggles.
  27. SCHENKEL, PETER
    - 1968 Die Ideologie Ernesto 'Che' Guevara. *Vierteljahresberichte*. Bonn. (June). 137-153. One of the best available analyses of the political and military thought of Guevara. Examines Guevara's emphasis on the importance of rural-based revolutionary efforts, the position of the peasantry as the prime revolutionary force in Latin America, and the role of urban areas as support mechanisms for the rural guerrilla cadre, the essential striking force of the revolution.
  28. SILVA, CLEA
    - 1968 The Errors of the Foco Theory. In: Régis Debray and the Latin American Revolution. Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, eds. N.Y. A strong critique, by a radical Brazilian sociologist, of the foco theory and its non-applicability to an urbanizing Latin America. The author argues the Latin American revolution is generated and takes form within urban areas. He believes that Debray's subordination of the city to the countryside is based on an underestimation of the political and ideological strength of the proletariat as well as an erroneous socio-economic analysis of the area. An informative and stinging rejection of the foco concept and rural revolution in general.
  29. WODDIS, JACK
    - 1972 New Theories of Revolution. N.Y. Containing an excellent essay evaluating the revolutionary theories of Debray, the text examines the development and application of the foco theory, the creation of counterinsurgency tactics to combat this theory, and the conditions necessary to implement armed struggle. Especially pertinent to urban insurgency is the author's belief that Debray's foco theory must be viewed in light of trends in Latin America toward increasing urbanization, a rapid growth in the working class, and the relative decline in a rural population.
- B. *Urban Guerrilla Tactics*
30. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)
    - 1970 El minimanual del guerrillero urbano. Este & Oeste. Caracas. 9:139:12-24. A reproduction and commentary on significant portions of Carlos Marighella's minimanual. Of particular note are the detailed footnotes describing the development, tactics, and operations of urban guerrilla groups in Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Uruguay, and Argentina. The writer concludes that the move to urban insurgency results from the failure of the Guevara-Debray foco theory as well as the availability of "progressive" elements in urban areas willing to participate in revolutionary activity.

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31. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
1971 Terrorism in Latin America. Atlas. (This article appeared originally in *Visión*, México, D.F.). 20:10:18–21. A relatively objective account of the growth and impact of terrorism as a political weapon in Latin America. Particular attention is concentrated on urban guerrilla operations in Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, and Uruguay.
32. BLACK, ROBERT J.  
1972 A Change in Tactics? The Urban Insurgent. *Air University Review*. 23:2:50–58. An examination of the movement by rural guerrilla groups to urban areas and the reasons for this change in locus. The author concludes that accelerating urbanization and the availability of guerrilla necessities in the cities has prompted the move.
33. CRAIG, ALEXANDER  
1971 Urban Guerrillas in Latin America. *Survey*. 17:3:112–128. An examination of the growth, strategy and tactics of urban guerrilla warfare in Latin America. The author attributes this growth to the inadequacy of institutional channels to effect those changes desired by the guerrillas, coupled with the advantages inherent in urban as compared to rural guerrilla activity.
34. GANN, LEWIS H.  
1971 *Guerrillas in History*. Stanford. This concise work describes the many advantages and limitations of urban guerrilla warfare. The author chides Guevara for underestimating the military potential of the modern megalopolis from which guerrilla units can obtain valuable support.
35. GUEVARA, ERNESTO  
1968 Instrucciones para los cuadros destinados al trabajo urbano. In: *El diario del Che en Bolivia*. Montevideo. A commentary on those tasks assigned to the urban support units involved in Guevara's Bolivian guerrilla effort. The total subordination of these cadres to the rural foco is emphasized.
36. GUILLÉN, ABRAHAM  
1966 *Estrategia de la guerrilla urbana*. Montevideo. One of the first to advocate urban insurgency in Latin America, the author sees city-based guerrilla movements as the best means of spreading revolution from urban areas to the countryside. Preferring a favorably disposed populace to desirable terrain, Guillén severely criticizes the foco concept for its isolation of the guerrilla from the people. Chapters 4–6 outline urban guerrilla tactics.
37. \_\_\_\_\_  
1973 *Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla—The Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillén*. N.Y. This text is a concise compilation of Guillén's views on revolutionary strategy. The book contains excerpts from the writer's most significant works. An extensive bibliography contains numerous texts on urban guerrilla warfare.
38. GUZMAN AGUILAR, CARLOS  
1970 *La subversión comunista y las acciones guerrillas*. *Revista de la Fuerzas Armadas*. El Salvador. 2:6:29–41. Drawing heavily upon Guevara's *La guerra de Guerrillas*, the author examines the causes of insurgency. Reviewing the role of guerrilla operations in urban and suburban areas, the writer's comments are largely a paraphrase of Guevara's instructions to his Bolivian urban support units. (See Item #35).
39. HODGES, DONALD C., ROBERT ELIAS, and ABU SHANAB  
1972 NLF National Liberation Fronts, 1960/1970. In the section of this extended study relating to Latin America (pages 215–303), co-author Hodges examines

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the rural to urban move by guerrilla groups, evaluates the reasons for this change in locus, and provides useful information on the organization, operations, and political orientation of these cadres. He concludes that urban terrorism will rely increasingly on a favorable populace more than on terrain.

40. JENKINS, BRIAN MICHAEL  
1971 *The Five Stages of Urban Guerrilla Warfare*. Santa Monica. A Rand paper presented to the Working Group on Military Operations in Urban Areas at the Naval Post Graduate School. It contends that rural revolution is not an acceptable model for an industrializing and urbanizing Latin America. Guerrilla movements are seen as moving to urban areas, where their impact on a national government is greatest.
41. \_\_\_\_\_  
1972 *An Urban Strategy for Guerrillas and Governments*. Santa Monica. Essentially a recapitulation, in less detail, of the arguments advanced by the author in his earlier work on this subject. (See Item #40).
42. LAMONT, NORMAN  
1971 *The Urban Guerrilla*. Crossbow. (Apr.). 32–33. The author contends that urban guerrilla activity often lacks a specific political goal and is aimed simply at discrediting incumbent regimes. The advantages of urban guerrilla operations are discussed in some detail.
43. MARIGHELLA, CARLOS  
1970 *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*. Tricontinental. (Jan.–Feb.). 15–56. A counterpart to Guevara's *La guerra de las guerrillas* (Item #16), this text is a tactical as well as strategic handbook for the urban guerrilla, discussing in detail the organization, operations, targets, security practices, propaganda activities, and virtually all other facets of urban insurgent activity.
44. MARINI, ALBERTO  
1971 *Estrategia sin tiempo*. Buenos Aires. Written by a former director of the *Instituto de Enseñanza del Ejército Argentino*, this text is a useful outline of military views on guerrilla war. Considering insurgency an *estrategia sin tiempo*, the author examines its development and implementation in various areas of the world. Urban guerrilla activity and terrorism are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. The author concludes that the failure of rural guerrilla operations and the accelerating urbanization in Latin America will cause urban guerrillas to become more numerous.
45. MARTINEZ CODO, ENRIQUE  
1971 *The Urban Guerrilla*. *Military Review*. 51:8:3–10. An examination of the principles of urban guerrilla warfare as set forth in Carlos Marighella's *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*. Written by the editor of the *Manual de Informaciones*, an official publication of the *Departamento de Acción Psicológica del Ejército* (Argentina), the article provides a useful analysis and critique of urban guerrilla tactics as advocated by Marighella.
46. MOSS, ROBERT  
1971 *Urban Guerrilla Warfare*. *Adelphi Papers*. No. 79. A detailed analysis of the urban guerrilla phenomenon, including the use of terrorism as a political weapon, urban insurgent tactics, and the limitations of urban operations. The rural-urban move of Latin American guerrilla groups is attributed to the failure of rural activities in the 1960s, rapid urbanization, and the greater publicity given urban terrorist acts. Elitism and an unwillingness to compromise are seen as the major weaknesses of urban guerrilla groups.

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47. O'DONOVAN, HAROLD C. M.  
1972 Insurgency in the 1973–1983 Time Period. (Unpublished Research Study). Montgomery. Prepared by an Air Command and Staff College student, this paper evaluates the movement of guerrilla groups from rural to urban environments, particularly in Latin America. This shift is attributed to the failure of rural-based insurgent efforts and the rapid urbanization of the region. To counter the development of urban guerrilla cadres, the writer suggests rapid social reform, expanded training for police units, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection.
48. O'MARA, RICHARD  
1970 New Terror in Latin America: Snatching the Diplomats. *Nation*. 210:17:518–519. The author alleges that urban guerrilla warfare and political kidnapping result from the failure of rural-based efforts using the Guevara-Debray foco concept. Because of these failures, insurgents have moved to the cities, where middle class terrorists can hide more easily and where additional victims are readily available.
49. SILVERMAN, JERRY M. and PETER M. JACKSON  
1970 Terror in Insurgency Warfare. *Military Review*. 50:10:61–67. The authors conclude that urban terrorism rarely has a decisive influence on the outcome of most insurgencies and should be implemented only during the initial stages of a revolution where it may function as an agitational device. To avoid negative repercussions, terrorism must be reduced as the guerrilla and conventional stages of the conflict develop. (See also Items #52, 58).

### *C. General Surveys*

50. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
1970 Anarcho-Nihilism. *Economist*. 237:6635:28–33. A concise treatment of urban terrorism in Latin America. Emphasis on the causes of this activity and its impact on incumbent governments. The article argues that despite spectacular public successes, the urban guerrillas have not yet seriously affected Latin American society.
51. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
1968 Comentario internacional. *América Latina*. Montevideo. (Oct.), 11–23. An evaluation of developments within the various guerrilla movements in Latin America during 1968. Particular stress is placed on the importance of building strong urban insurgent groups to provide the essential human and material resources required for the subsequent construction of rural guerrilla cadres.
52. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
1971 The Heirs of the Commune (Urban Guerrillas). *Economist*. 239:6667:41–44. Considering the Paris Commune of 1871 as an early example of a nearly successful urban insurrection, this article concludes that urban guerrilla activity normally alienates the general population through the use of “gangster style” tactics. In Latin America, the rise of urban terrorism is seen as a reaction to Guevara’s Bolivian failure and those of other rural-oriented groups.
53. BAMBIRRA, VANIA  
1971 Diez años de insurrección en América Latina. In: *Diez años de insurrección en América Latina*, Volume I. Vania Bambirra, *et al.* Santiago. An excellent overview of those guerrilla movements active in the area during the decade 1961–1971. Because of the failure of Cuban *foquismo* as well as the ineffective activities of orthodox Communist parties, the author sees a rapid rise in urban terrorist groups.

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54. CLAPP, PRISCILLA  
1971 Urban Terrorism in Latin America: The Politics of Frustration and Fury. *Christian Science Monitor*. (May 5). 9. The shift from rural to urban insurgency is viewed as an abandonment of armed revolution on a general scale. The author concludes that urban terrorism cannot develop the leadership and political force necessary to challenge existing political structures.
55. CONLEY, MICHAEL C. and JAMES L. SCHROCK  
1965 Preliminary Survey of Insurgency in Urban Areas. Washington, D.C. Prepared by the former Special Operations Research Office of The American University, Part I of this study deals with the nature of urban insurgency irrespective of its geographic locus. In a useful conceptual framework, a list of indicators of urban insurgency independent of geographic area is also provided.
56. CROWLEY, FRED R.  
1972 Insurgency in the Urban Areas. *Marine Corps Gazette*. 56:2:55-56. A brief, superficial discussion of the role played by urban areas in past and present insurgencies. The article contains a limited discussion of the tactics employed by urban insurgent groups in Brazil and Uruguay.
57. DAVIS, JACK  
1972 Political Violence in Latin America. *Adelphi Papers*. No. 85. Focuses on the urban aspects of guerrilla war in Uruguay, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Venezuela. The author concludes that Guevara's failure in Bolivia provided a strong impetus for the shift from rural to urban insurgency, as did the presence in urban areas of revolutionary student cadres.
58. DE ROCQUIGNY, COLONEL  
1969 Urban Terrorism. *Military Review*. 38:11:93-99. An interesting article, which appeared originally in *Revue Militaire d'Information* (France, February, 1968), discusses the nature of urban terrorism as an arm of psychological warfare. (The conclusion that terrorism can be counter-productive is also noted in Item #49).
59. FALERONI, ALBERTO D.  
1967 What is an Urban Guerrilla? *Military Review*. 47:1:94-96. An advisor to the Political-Social Department of the Argentine National War College discusses the importance of the urban guerrilla in revolutionary warfare.
60. GOODSSELL, JAMES N.  
1966 Terrorism in Latin America. *Commentator*. (Mar.). 9-11. The Latin American correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor* assesses the prospects for insurgency and urban terrorism in the region. He concludes that despite the January 1966, Tricontinental Conference, the level of terrorism and guerrilla activity has been limited.
61. \_\_\_\_\_  
1971 Urban Guerrillas, Ebbing Influence or Wave of the Future? *Christian Science Monitor*. (Dec. 3). 13. The last in a series of five articles on various Latin American problems, this article examines urban terrorism within the area, particularly in Uruguay. The author concludes that urban guerrilla warfare is failing because of inadequate middle class support. While urban terrorism may well continue for some time, it is not the revolutionary wave of the future.
62. GOTT, RICHARD  
1971 Guerrilla Movements in Latin America. N.Y. Despite several inaccuracies, this lengthy work is an excellent reference on revolution in Latin America. Concentrating on guerrilla groups in Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, the author provides useful detail on the failure of rural-based operations. His account of the urban phases of the struggle in Venezuela is excellent.

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63. \_\_\_\_\_  
1970 Latin American Guerrillas, *The Listener*. 84:2166:437–440. A brief summary of guerrilla activity in Latin America, including an evaluation of the rural-urban movement by many insurgent elements. The author sees this change resulting from improved national counterinsurgency and intelligence capabilities. Despite the change in locus, Gott views the guerrilla movements as more on the defensive than ever before.
64. HOAGLAND, JOHN H.  
1971 *Changing Patterns of Insurgency and American Response*. *Journal of International Affairs*. 25:1:120–141. Contrasting rural-based insurgencies in Latin America with the more recent urban varieties, the author notes the latter are harder to combat. Because of the anonymity demanded for urban terrorist activities, the writer concludes that these are not conducive to the creation of popular leadership and clear alternatives to ruling regimes.
65. HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P.  
1972 *Civil Violence and the Process of Development*. *Adelphi Papers*. No. 89. Noting that a basic problem for most urban insurgents is the maintenance of a common social base with portions of the urban population, the writer suggests that the Tupamaros, whose leaders and members are largely middle class, may be pioneering a new form of revolutionary violence appropriate for essentially middle class societies.
66. KAUFMAN, EDY  
1973 *La estrategia de las guerrillas*. *Problemas Internacionales*. 20:1:12–27. An exceptionally good analysis of insurgency in Latin America. Considerable attention is focused on the conflict between advocates of urban and rural guerrilla warfare. The advantages and disadvantages of both strategies are discussed in detail.
67. LAMBERG, ROBERT F.  
1971 *La guerrilla urbana: condiciones y perspectivas de la 'segunda ola' guerrillera*. *Foro Internacional*. 11:3:431–443. An excellent discussion of those conditions conducive to urban guerrilla warfare in Latin America, the weaknesses inherent in this form of struggle, and the types of persons and tactics characteristic of urban guerrilla groups. Urban movements in Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil are described in considerable detail.
68. \_\_\_\_\_  
1970 *Latin America's Urban Guerrillas*. *Swiss Review of World Affairs*. 20:3:18–19. A brief summary of the growth and current status of urban guerrilla activities in Latin America, with particular emphasis on urban operations in Uruguay, Guatemala, Argentina, and Brazil.
69. LANDAZABEL R., FERNANDO  
1966 *Política y táctica de la guerra revolucionaria*. Bogotá. A scholarly analysis of revolutionary warfare by a Colombian Army officer. Examining virtually all aspects of the subject, including the role of clandestine action and urban terrorism, the author views these activities as part of a campaign to destroy public confidence in any incumbent government. Accordingly, these are much more difficult to anticipate and control than normal rural-based guerrilla activity.
70. MARTINEZ CODO, ENRIQUE  
n.d. *Guerrillas y subversión en América Latina*. Buenos Aires *Manual de Informaciones*. (Edición Especial). A wide-ranging examination of guerrilla activities in Latin America by the editor of the Argentine army's intelligence journal. In addition to reviewing the nature of guerrilla warfare within the area, the author also evaluates the foco concept and the role of the urban guerrilla.

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71. MERCIER VEGA, LUIS  
1969 *Las guerrillas en América Latina*. Buenos Aires. Published initially in French, this text evaluates the nature of guerrilla warfare in Latin America. Of interest in regard to urban insurgency is Chapter 3 (containing country surveys outlining the major guerrilla groups in each nation) and a documentary appendix containing information on the internal structure of urban insurgent units in Caracas.
72. MOSS, ROBERT  
1970 *Urban Guerrillas in Latin America*. Conflict Studies. Number 8. Containing a comprehensive examination of urban guerrilla activity in Latin America, this article critiques the Guevara-Debray foco concept and examines those factors leading guerrillas from the countryside to the cities. The author concludes with case studies on Guatemala, Brazil, and Uruguay.
73. \_\_\_\_\_  
1971 *Latin America: Armed Struggle and United Fronts*. In: *Annual of Power and Conflict*, 1971. London. Published by the Institute for the Study of Conflict, this article updates the author's earlier work (Item #72), and provides an excellent summary of insurgency in various Latin American states, with particular emphasis on urban guerrilla activity. The rural-to-urban trend is discussed.
74. \_\_\_\_\_  
1972 *The War for the Cities*. N.Y. A comprehensive analysis of modern urban guerrilla warfare. Much of the material on Latin America (Chapters 7–10) has been included in the author's earlier writings (Items #72, 73), but has been updated and expanded in this text. Of note is the evaluation of the Guevara-Debray foco concept and the move by insurgents to urban areas.
75. \_\_\_\_\_  
1973 *Latin America*. In: *Annual of Power and Conflict*, 1972–73. In this update of Item #73, the author reviews urban insurgent operations in Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia, and Argentina. He describes successful counterinsurgent activity in Uruguay under the Bordaberry government as well as in Bolivia against urban guerrilla nets of the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional*. Expanded urban activity in Argentina by Peronist groups and the Trotskyite *Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo* also is examined.
76. PETRAS, JAMES  
1967 *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*. *New Politics*. 6:1:80–94 and 6:2:58–72. This excellent article describes the major activities of guerrilla movements in Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru. It concludes that the movements failed because they lacked a revolutionary political organization capable of generating strong urban and peasant support.
77. RATLIFF, WILLIAM E. (ed.)  
1971–1972 *Yearbook on Latin American Communist Affairs*. Stanford. Published by the Hoover Institution, these yearbooks contain individual country sections incorporating useful comments on the political orientation, strategy, and tactics of urban and rural-based insurgent groups. A very useful reference work on insurgency in Latin America.
78. RONFELDT, DAVID F. and LUIGI R. EINAUDI  
1971 *Internal Security and Military Assistance to Latin America in the 1970s: A First Statement*. Santa Monica. This Rand Corporation study analyzes domestic political violence in Latin America and its impact on U. S. military programs in the area, particularly the Military Assistance Program. The authors conclude that urban insurgency, while posing a problem for many Latin American nations, is not a viable threat to governmental stability.

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79. \_\_\_\_\_  
1972 Prospects for Violence. In: *Latin America in the 1970s*. Luigi R. Einaudi, ed. Noting the failure of rural insurgency in the early 1960s and an increase in urban guerrilla activity during the early 1970s, the authors of this Rand Corp. study conclude that urban insurgency is less a problem than rural guerrilla warfare was in the previous decade. Despite many terrorist acts, urban insurgents have not gained a strategic advantage.
80. RUSSELL, CHARLES A.  
1972 *Cuban Theories of Revolutionary Warfare Examined in a Comparative Context*. (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The American University, Washington, D. C.). A search for similarities and differences in the guerrilla strategies of the USSR, North Vietnam, the People's Republic of China, and Cuba. Concluding chapters focus on the urban aspects of Cuban-supported guerrilla activity in Latin America.
81. RUSSELL, CHARLES A. and ROBERT E. HILDNER  
1971 *Urban Insurgency In Latin America: Its Implications for the Future*. *Air University Review*. 22:6:55-63. An evaluation of the factors leading Latin America insurgent groups from the countryside to urban areas and the impact of this movement on counterinsurgency strategy and tactics.
82. SORENSON, JOHN L.  
1965 *Urban Insurgency Cases*. Santa Barbara. A major revision of a preliminary workbook for the Defense Research Corporation's Conference on Urban Insurgency, Aug. 31-Sept. 4, 1964. Describing the historical development of urban insurgency, the text also contains nine case studies, including an excellent one on Venezuela.
83. STOTSER, GEORGE R.  
1972 *Concepts of Guerrilla Warfare and Insurgent War*. (Unpublished Research Paper). Carlisle Barracks. Prepared by a student at the U. S. Army War College, this paper traces the evolution of guerrilla warfare from Clausewitz to Marighella. It identifies and contrasts the strategic contributions of various guerrilla leaders and thinkers, including Guevara and Debray, and concludes with an examination of urban insurgency as advocated by Marighella. While the paper is useful because of its comparative aspect, it suffers from the brief treatment of the subject.
84. TORRES MOLINA, RAMON HORACIO  
1968 *La lucha armada en América Latina*. Buenos Aires. A pro-Cuban evaluation of guerrilla activity in Latin America, including country-by-country examinations of active guerrilla groups, their strategies and operations. Chapters 4-6 comment on urban insurgency in Argentina and the Dominican Republic. A final chapter is essentially an apologia for the foco concept.
85. UBOLDI, RAFFAELLO  
1971 *La parabola della guerriglia urbana*. *Est. Rome*. 4:81-86. An excellent analysis of the growth in urban insurgency during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Rejecting the Guevara-Debray concept of guerrilla warfare, the author sees accelerating urbanization, particularly in Latin America, as a factor favoring expansion of the urban insurgent's role.
- D. *Counterinsurgency Techniques*
86. CONLEY, MICHAEL C.  
1969 *The Strategy of Communist-Directed Insurgency and the Conduct of Counterinsurgency*. *Naval War College Review*. 21:9:73-93. Presented initially in lecture form at the Naval War College, the author outlines the strategies which may



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be employed to achieve insurgent goals. Central to these is the need for revolutionary forces to displace existing civil authority. To counteract this effort the central thrust of counterinsurgency must be sociopolitical rather than military.

87. CUERVO GOMEZ, MANUEL ANTONIO  
1969-70 Guerra subversiva y revolución. *Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas*. Santo Domingo. (Dec.-Jan.). 33-42. A detailed and well organized analysis of the stages involved in the development of an insurgent movement as well as an examination of those courses of action which should be followed by counterinsurgency forces.
88. HAWKINS, JACK  
1963 *Guerrilla Wars: Threat in Latin America*. *World Affairs*. 126:3:169-175. A description of Cuban efforts to develop revolution in Latin America, with particular emphasis on Venezuela and Peru. An outline of the measures used to counter this insurgency is set forth along with a reasonably good, but now dated, account of the nature and extent of U. S. assistance in the area of counterinsurgency training.
89. HEILBRUNN, OTTO  
1969 When the Counterinsurgents Cannot Win. *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*. London. 114:653:55-58. Writing shortly before his death in early 1969, the author classifies insurgencies as terrorist wars, small-unit guerrilla wars, and large-unit guerrilla wars. He argues that terrorist wars, because of their urban nature, are unlikely to be defeated as long as the terrorists have popular support.
90. HILLARD, J. L.  
1966 *Countersubversive Operations in Urban Areas*. *Military Review*. 46:6:12-19. To counter urban guerrilla operations, the author suggests the use of prompt action; maintenance of essential services; curfews; coordinated action between police, military, and civil authorities; and extremely reliable communications.
91. HUTCHINSON, S.  
1969 The Police Role in Counterinsurgency Operations. *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*. London. 114:656:56-61. A former police official examines the role of the police in an insurgency situation. He evaluates the duties police forces can perform, the functions they could discharge if properly organized, and those duties unsuitable for them.
92. MARTINEZ CODO, ENRIQUE  
1970 *Continental Defense and Counterinsurgency*. *Military Review*. 50:4:71-74. An outline of the requirements for future effective urban counterinsurgency operations in the hemisphere. Critical needs are indicated to be improved intelligence, expanded training, and enhanced mobility for counterinsurgent forces, as well as improved logistic support for these elements.
93. MERCADO JARRIN, EDGARDO  
1967 La política y la estrategia militar en la guerra contrasubversiva en América Latina. *Revista Militar del Perú*. Lima. (Nov.-Dec.). 4-33. Presented initially as a lecture in the Advanced Course of the U. S. Army Intelligence School, the author (a leader in the Peruvian military regime that seized power in 1968) examines the development of insurgency movements in Latin America, their common characteristics, the factors generating them, and the problems involved in countering same. In contrast to many contemporaries, General Mercado Jarrín concludes that insurgency is a political problem which must be countered by political means.
94. SIMPSON, HOWARD R.  
1970 *Counter-Guerrilla Operations*. *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*. 96:6:56-63. An examination of the problems noted by conventional military forces in counter-

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guerrilla operations. The author attributes the ineffectiveness of these forces to an ignorance of the political nature of guerrilla warfare; underestimation of guerrilla capabilities; inadequate training; and a failure to understand the importance of the populace in countering guerrilla activity.

### IV. URBAN GUERRILLA ACTIVITY BY COUNTRY

#### *Argentina*

Following the 1964 repression of the Cuban-backed *Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo* (EGP) in Salta-Jujuy (Item #112), guerrilla activity in Argentina became quiescent until the late 1960s. By 1969, however, Peronist, Fidelista, and Trotskyite urban terrorist cadres all had become very active. Operating under an umbrella organization known as the *Organizaciones Armadas Peronistas*, three guerrilla units, the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias* (FAR), the *Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas* (FAP) and the *Montoneros* (Items 115–117), all were involved in various acts of terrorism including the assassination of former President Pedro Aramburu, the capture for a few hours of the small cities of Garín and La Calera, the execution of police/intelligence personnel, and the kidnapping of wealthy national and foreign industrialists for ransoms in excess of 3 million dollars. Fidelista urban guerrillas also were active in 1969 and the early 1970s, leading an April 1969, assault on the Buenos Aires *Campo de Mayo* military base and directing the 1970 kidnapping of Paraguayan Consul Waldemar Sánchez. Although activities of the Fidelistas had faded by 1972–73, and those of the Peronists slowed with the return to power of Perón, the Trotskyite *Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo* (ERP) continued its program of political executions and kidnappings.

Despite the intense nature of Argentine urban guerrilla activity over the past four years, little serious study has been devoted to the groups involved, their linkages to other national or transnational organizations, the tactics they have employed, or their political objectives. Thus, the best and most complete material now available on these organizations remains the rather biased series of articles in *Granma* by Héctor Víctor Suárez.

#### 95. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)

1970 Untitled. *Análisis*. Buenos Aires. (Aug. 4–10). 16–17. An excellent summary regarding the organization, development, and recent operations of the most significant Argentine urban guerrilla groups. The political goals and ideology of each group are indicated as well as linkages between the various organizations.

96. \_\_\_\_\_

1973 *Argentina: Guerrillas Launch New Offensive*. *Latin America*. London. 7:15:114, 116. This brief article describes an April, 1973, rash of kidnappings and assassinations by the *Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo* (ERP), the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias* (FAR), and the *Montoneros*, as well as the newly established Maoist-oriented *Fuerzas Argentinas de Liberación Nacional* (FALN).

97. \_\_\_\_\_

1973 *Argentina: Guerrillas under the Throne*. *Latin America*. 7:24:190–191. Activities of the FAR, ERP, and *Montoneros*, as well as other militant groups, are described prior to Perón's expected return to Argentina.

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98. \_\_\_\_\_  
 1972 Argentina: A Revolutionary Problem—Without Solution? *Latin America*. 6:2: 14–15. Describes a new offensive by the urban guerrillas, including the FAR, the *Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas* (FAP), and the *Montoneros*. Also noted are government problems in uniting the people against the guerrillas.
99. \_\_\_\_\_  
 1971 Argentina: Revolutions within the Revolution. *Latin America*. 5:54:337–338. This excellent report describes relationships between Argentina's five most important urban guerrilla groups (FAP, FAR, ERP, *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación*, and the *Montoneros*), and notes that groups appear to be coalescing into two operational bands, one Peronist and the other Marxist.
100. \_\_\_\_\_  
 1971 Asalto a la emisora de TV de Córdoba. *Arriba*. Madrid. (May 30). 12. A good description, in a despatch from the Spanish news agency EFE, of the spectacular take-over by the ERP of the University of Córdoba television transmitter. The article includes information on the techniques used to gain access to the station as well as a summary of the materials broadcast.
101. \_\_\_\_\_  
 1970 Atentos contra tres militares norteamericanos. *ABC*. Madrid. (Dec. 29). 20. A summary of the guises and disguises used by the FAR in gaining access to the homes of members of the U. S. Air Mission in Argentina. The techniques involved are similar to those used by Iranian terrorists in the 1973 assassination of a member of the U. S. Military Mission in Teheran.
102. \_\_\_\_\_  
 1970 Escalada terrorista. *ABC*. Madrid. (Aug. 1). 15. A useful summary of the guerrilla attack on the Argentine city of Garín in late July. Provides information on tactics, particularly the employment of disguises by insurgent elements in order to gain access to key areas of the city.
103. \_\_\_\_\_  
 1973 Terrorismo Argentino. *ABC*. Madrid. (May 20). 23. A fine review of recent kidnappings carried out by Argentine urban terrorist groups. The type of individual chosen for kidnapping and the tactics used in abducting the target are of particular interest.
104. \_\_\_\_\_  
 1973 2000 atentados. *Veja*. São Paulo. (May 9). 48. A detailed description of the assassination of Argentine Admiral Hermes Quijada in Buenos Aires by a unit of the ERP. Political objectives of the guerrillas are outlined as are their tactics. Conflicts between the ERP and various Peronista urban guerrilla groups also are indicated. According to the article, the assassination of Quijada was the 2,000th act of terrorism to take place in Argentina since the 1969 murder of labor leader Augusto Vandor.
105. BROWNE, MALCOM W.  
 1971 Argentine Guerrillas Step Up Drive: Experts Forsee Big-Scale Attacks. *New York Times*. (Feb. 19), 2. A rather detailed article on accelerating urban guerrilla activity during late 1970 and early 1971. The article contains accurate and useful material on guerrilla tactics, targets, kidnapping activity, and armed propaganda. Major guerrilla groups are identified.
106. CARCEDO, DIEGO  
 1973 Inminente enfrentamiento con el terrorismo izquierdista. *Arriba*. Madrid. (June 5). 18. This rather lengthy article is an excellent analysis of the strategy, tactics, and political orientation of the various Argentine urban guerrilla groups. Particular emphasis is placed on operations of the ERP.

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107. CRAWLEY, EDUARDO D.  
1970 Subversión y Seguridad. Buenos Aires. Subtitled *La cuestión de la guerra de guerrillas en el contexto Argentino*, this *Circulo Militar* publication evaluates the potential for guerrilla war in the various geographic areas of Argentina. The author rejects the Guevara-Debray foco concept as totally inapplicable to an urbanizing Latin America, and to Argentina in particular. The writer believes that future guerrilla theorists must place primary emphasis on urban operations or a combined rural-urban effort.
108. DIAZ-ALEJO, RAIMUNDO  
1973 Cuba entregará a Argentina el avión y los secuestradores. Ya. Madrid. (June 7). 11. A commentary on the change in tactics by the ERP from kidnapping wealthy industrialists and military personnel to the sequestering of aircraft.
109. FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE  
1970 Commentary on Guerrilla Activities in Argentina. FBIS. 6:151:0-15. Comments by Radio Havana concerning urban terrorist activities in Argentina, particularly the occupation of Garín. In view of continued Cuban support for the primacy of rural-based insurgent efforts, this extremely laudatory treatment of the Argentine urban guerrilla activity is of interest.
110. \_\_\_\_\_  
1970 Police Chief on Montoneros. FBIS. 6:150:B-6, 7. Comments of Argentine Federal Police Chief General Jorge Esteban Cáceres Monie on links between the Montonero urban guerrilla group and the Uruguayan Tupamaros.
111. \_\_\_\_\_  
1970 Revolutionary Communique Outlines Political Program. FBIS. 6:236:B-4. A detailed analysis of the political program and goals of the ERP, including information on its attitude toward U. S. investment in Argentina.
112. MARTINEZ CODO, ENRIQUE  
1965 Communist Guerrillas in Argentina. Marine Corps Gazette. 49:9:43-50. Prepared by the Director of the Argentine army's *Manual de Informaciones*, this article presents a detailed picture of guerrilla operations conducted by the *Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo* (EGP) during 1963-64. In addition to describing rural activities of the EGP in the Salta-Jujuy area, the writer provides useful information on the urban insurgent apparatus of this group, including a summary of its original structure and data on significant operations.
113. MASSA, PEDRO  
1970 Intensa actividad de los comandos terroristas. ABC. Madrid. (Sept. 20). 25. A useful summary describing Argentine urban guerrilla operations since late 1969. Of particular interest is information regarding an attack on the provincial registry office in Rosario, from which the terrorists stole identity cards, government stamps, and blank identification forms which could be used later to provide false documentation for insurgent cadres.
114. SUAREZ, HECTOR VICTOR  
1970 Montoneros: Grief for the Enemy. Granma. (Dec. 13). 5. This article was the first in Suárez' excellent series on Argentine urban terrorist and guerrilla groups. (Items #114-116). Resulting from an interview with a leader of the *Montoneros*, the article describes the ideology of that group, its views on the Latin American and Cuban revolutions, and its relationship to the Peronist Movement. Useful information is set forth on the origin of the *Montoneros* and their contacts with other armed Peronist groups, particularly the *Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas*.
115. \_\_\_\_\_  
1970 FAL: Marxism in a Holster. Granma. (Dec. 27). 5. An excellent article on the

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background, organization, tactics, strategy, and political orientation of the *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación* (FAL). Comments on the urban insurgent tactics of the FAL indicate these appear to be similar to the *línea de insurrección combinada* advocated in late 1968 by the Venezuelan *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional* (FALN). (Item # 254).

116. \_\_\_\_\_
- 1971 FAP Arms in Hand. Granma. (Jan. 3). 4. Another outstanding article on Argentine urban guerrilla groups. Based on an interview with a leader of the *Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas* (FAP), this piece provides good information on the political orientation of the FAP, its military strategy and tactics, its relationship to the Peronist Movement, and to other armed urban insurgent groups. Additional information is included on the FAP view that revolution will begin in the cities and spread to the countryside, a concept strikingly similar to the strategy outlined by Vietnamese guerrilla leader Truong Chinh in his text, *The Revolution Will Win*, Hanoi, 1960.
117. \_\_\_\_\_
- 1971 FAR With Che's Weapons. Granma. (Jan. 17). 9. An informative article, based on an interview with a leader of the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias* (FAR), concerning linkages between that group and other Peronista guerrilla units. Also of interest are comments by the FAR leader indicating Guevara's death forced a rethinking and reorientation in guerrilla strategy toward urban terrorist cadres patterned after the Tupamaros. Other portions of the article describe the insurgent attack on the city of Garín (see Item # 102), as well as the long-term objectives of the FAR.

### Bolivia

Although Bolivia was once considered by Fidel Castro as an ideal place to implement the foco concept, Che Guevara's 1967 defeat and the subsequent unsuccessful attempts at rural insurgency by Guido ('Inti') and Osvaldo ('Chato') Peredo have forced even the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN) toward increased urban activities. (Items #118, 119, 122–26). Since the 1970 Teoponte guerrilla fiasco led by "Chato" Peredo, the ELN seems to have focused its efforts primarily on the city-centered student and worker populations of La Paz, Cochabamba, Potosí and Santa Cruz, where it is attempting to create an urban insurgent or support apparatus. Although this trend would seem to indicate a significant change in ELN strategy and the locus of its future operations, the move has received little attention and most research on guerrilla activity in Bolivia continues to be centered on the Guevara failure and the unsuccessful rural efforts of the *ELN*.

118. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)
- 1973 Bolivia: detención de terroristas. Arriba. Madrid. (June 10). 15. A news account of actions taken by the Bolivian Government to break up an urban terrorist unit of the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN) in Cochabamba.
119. \_\_\_\_\_
- 1971 Terrorismo. Este & Oeste. 12:145:15–16. An excellent summary of ELN urban guerrilla and terrorist operations during 1970.
120. CYR, ANNE V.
- 1970 The Revolutionary Movement in Bolivia. In: *Cuban Revolutionary Strategy: Lessons Drawn from Insurgency Movements in Bolivia and Venezuela*. Anne V.

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- Cyr, McLean, Virginia. An excellent commentary on the Guevara rural-based guerrilla effort in Bolivia. The failure to obtain adequate urban support and develop urban guerrilla cadres is studied in some detail.
121. DICKSON, T. I.  
1968 He fracasado—I Have Failed. *Marine Corps Gazette*. 52:12:49–51. The former United States Consul in Cochabamba provides an assessment of the lessons learned from the failure of Che Guevara in Bolivia. The author concludes that Guevara seriously misread the Bolivian political situation, particularly in regard to the peasantry, and as a result was unable to obtain needed support from either political or social groups.
122. FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE  
1970 ELN Leaflet. FBIS. 6:178:C-2. A report on a leaflet distributed by the ELN to urban cadres and students providing detailed information on the construction of homemade explosives. (More detailed information is contained in Item #119).
123. \_\_\_\_\_  
1970 Exiled Liberation Army Guerrillas Interviewed. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*. 6:167:C-6. According to this *Prensa Latina* broadcast, substantial support was provided to the ELN by the Uruguayan Tupamaros.
124. \_\_\_\_\_  
1970 Havana Radio Reports Bomb Explosions in La Paz. FBIS. 6:178:C-2. A brief news account of 15 bombing attacks in La Paz by the ELN, including those targeted against air force and army facilities.
125. \_\_\_\_\_  
1970 Quiroga's Resignation May Cause Cabinet Crisis. FBIS. 6:97:C-1. A report on the reproduction of urban guerrilla training materials, including the minimanual of Carlos Marighella (Item #43) at the University of San Andrés.
126. \_\_\_\_\_  
1970 We Have Returned to the Mountains. FBIS. 6:143:C-6–15. A detailed exposition of the strategy and tactics of the ELN, including an analysis of the problems resulting from the destruction of its urban support nets. (For earlier ELN views on the importance of urban guerrilla support nets see Item #134).
127. GALL, NORMAN  
1967 The Legacy of Che Guevara. *Commentary*. 44:6:31–44. An analysis of the weaknesses and failures of the Latin American revolutionary movements with particular emphasis on the Guevara debacle in Bolivia. Attention is focused on the nature, extent, and impact of U. S. public and private aid programs, including military assistance and training, which have affected the revolutionary climate in Latin America. The author concludes with a discussion of the region's accelerating urbanization and its impact on future revolutionary activity.
128. GITTINGS, JOHN  
1968 A Guerrilla's Diary. *Far Eastern Economic Review*. 61:33:313–316. A summary of Che Guevara's Bolivian diary as well as a short analysis of his operations in that country. The author accepts the view that Guevara's plan to create "many more Vietnams" was unrealistic and that his implementation of the foco strategy was largely responsible for his failure.
129. GUEVARA, ERNESTO  
1968 El diario del Che en Bolivia. Montevideo. Published simultaneously in Spanish, French, Italian, German, and English editions, the diary is a day-by-day account of Guevara's experiences during his Bolivian guerrilla effort of 1966–67. Of particular interest in regard to urban insurgency is the chapter, "Instrucciones para los cuadros destinados al trabajo urbano." (See Item #35).

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130. HORNE, ALISTAIR  
1971 Guerrillas of Teoponte. *Encounter*. 37:6:76–83. An account of developments in Bolivia after Guevara's death and the disastrous 1970 attempt by Osvaldo "Chato" Peredo to create a guerrilla foco in the rugged Teoponte area.
131. JAMES, DANIEL, ED.  
1968 The Complete Bolivian Diaries of Che Guevara and other Captured Documents. N.Y. Containing Guevara's personal diary as well as those of several Cuban colleagues, this text is the best available picture of the entire Cuban-supported insurgency in Bolivia. In connection with urban insurgency, the comments of Guevara and "Pombo" (Cuban Army Captain Harry Villegas Tamayo) concerning the importance of an urban support apparatus are significant.
132. MARTINEZ CODO, ENRIQUE  
1969 Guerrilla Warfare after Guevara. *Military Review*. 49:7:24–30. In examining Guevara's defeat in Bolivia, the author concludes that it resulted from a failure to gain popular support and a lack of emphasis on establishing a viable urban base. In conclusion, the writer reviews the evolution of urban guerrilla warfare, a strategy he feels will predominate in Latin America within the near future.
133. MUSSELMAN, JAMES A.  
1971 Communist Insurgency in Bolivia: Origin, Development, Decline, Causes of Failure. (Unpublished Research Study). Montgomery. Prepared by a student in the Air Command and Staff College of the Air University, this study evaluates Guevara's ill-fated attempt to establish a viable guerrilla organization in Bolivia. The paper reviews the Guevara-Debray theory for rural-based revolution, examines the major activities of the Guevara guerrilla group, and analyzes the causes underlying its failure.
134. PEREDO, INTI  
1968 We Will Return to the Mountains! Victory or Death! *Granma*. (July 28). 12. Although Peredo stresses the primacy of the rural foco over urban operations, he does indicate the urban guerrilla nets, largely inoperative while Guevara lived, must become effective if the guerrilla movement is to succeed.

### Brazil

Like Argentina and Uruguay, Brazil has been a focal point for urban guerrilla activity since the late 1960s. Following the 1965 failure of rural operations in the Sierra do Caparaó (Item #144) and Carlos Marighella's early 1968 call to revolutionary action after the Tricontinental Conference in Havana, urban guerrilla groups multiplied rapidly throughout Brazil. In addition to Marighella's own *Ação Libertadora Nacional* (ALN), by 1969–70 other significant groups included the *Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária—Palmares* (VAR-P), *Comando da Libertação Nacional* (COLINA), *Movimento Revolucionário-8* (MR-8), and the *Vanguarda Popular Revolucionário* (VPR). Well described by João Quartim in his excellent analysis of the Brazilian revolutionary movement (Item #155), these organizations engaged in violence in most Brazilian cities during 1968–69. In São Paulo alone, bank robberies by revolutionary groups during 1969 resulted in the loss of over 1.5 million dollars. Strongly supported by student elements (Items #146, 149), these groups also were responsible for kidnapping and holding for the release of political prisoners the U. S., West German, and Swiss Ambassadors, as well as the

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Japanese Consul in São Paulo. With the death of Marighella in late 1969, however, these organizations lost their spiritual leader and unifying force. This fact, and severe governmental repression, caused the movement to crumble almost as rapidly as it had grown. By late 1972 it was largely inactive. As Quartim indicates, it appears to have failed because violence became an end in itself without supportive political goals, a comment also made by another perceptive observer (James Petras) about most urban guerrilla movements (Item #76).

In contrast to the rather limited research into urban insurgency in Argentina and Bolivia, Brazil has been somewhat more adequately explored. In addition to the excellent text by Quartim (Item #155) and his earlier article (Item #156), the series of short studies by the Caracas magazine *Este & Oeste* are most useful (Items #135, 145). Also valuable are the works of and about Marighella and his guerrilla strategy (Items #30, 43, 152). As in most other nations of the hemisphere, however, a serious and in-depth analysis of the Brazilian guerrilla movement awaits preparation.

#### 135. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)

- 1969 La actividad terrorista en el Brasil. *Este & Oeste*. Caracas. 8:132:1–10. Devoted solely to an analysis of various urban guerrilla groups active in Brazil during the period 1966–69, this article includes valuable detail on the organization, growth and operations of the *Vanguardia Popular Revolucionária* (VAR), *Acção Libertadora Nacional* (ALN), and the *Movimiento Revolucionário-8* (MR-8). Additional data is included on the tactics used in kidnapping U. S. Ambassador Burke Elbrick.
136. \_\_\_\_\_  
1972 Brazil: Jungle Threat. *Latin America*. 6:46:360, 362. An account of the emergence of a small-scale, rural-oriented guerrilla activity in Maraba in north-central Brazil. It also notes that earlier in the year the government had claimed the nation's urban guerrilla movements had been smashed.
137. \_\_\_\_\_  
1970 Brazil's Urban Guerrilla in Theory and Practice. *Radio Free Europe Research: Free World*. (June). Entire issue. A brief examination of the urban guerrilla movement in Brazil, including a review of the organizations involved, the lack of support provided by the Brazilian communist movement, a summary of Marighella's urban guerrilla theory, and commentary on the declining role of Cuba in the Latin American revolutionary movement.
138. \_\_\_\_\_  
1970 Carlos Lamarca, líder del movimiento guerrillero. *Ya*. Montevideo. (Nov. 28). An informative article on the urban guerrilla movement developed by Marighella and carried on after his death by Joaquim Ferreira Câmara. Useful information includes background on Brazilian guerrilla groups and the unifying role of Marighella in their activities. Brief biographic data is incorporated on Lamarca and his role in the *Vanguardia Popular Revolucionária*.
139. \_\_\_\_\_  
1968 Carlos Marighella: disparos en la plaza. *América Latina*. Montevideo. (Oct.). 123–134. This document describes those events leading to Marighella's break with the *Partido Comunista Brasileiro* (PCB), his resignation from the party and its central committee, and the urban guerrilla strategy which he advocated. Also reported is the *Pronunciamento do Agrupamento Comunista de São Paulo*, which



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severed connections between Marighella's followers and the PCB. This declaration argues that any successful rural guerrilla activity in Brazil will be impossible without a strong urban support apparatus including sabotage and terrorist units.

140. \_\_\_\_\_  
1971 Death of a Guerrilla. *Economist*. 240:6683:45. Concluding that the death of Carlos Lamarca signals defeat for the "first wave" of urban guerrilla warfare in Brazil, this article presents a brief analysis of the rise and fall of Lamarca's *Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária* (VPR). The primary weakness of the urban guerrilla movement is seen to be its estrangement from the traditional left. Accordingly, effective insurgent activity will require new leadership, new tactics, and a broader political base.
141. \_\_\_\_\_  
1963 Guerra revolucionária. Rio de Janeiro. Although now somewhat dated, this training manual of the *Escola de Comando Estado-Maior do Exército* includes an excellent section (Chapter 3) on counterinsurgency tactics against urban and rural guerrillas.
142. \_\_\_\_\_  
1971 Un guía para la subversión. *Manuel de Informaciones*. Buenos Aires. 12:1:27-37. An extensive commentary on the urban guerrilla strategy and tactics advocated by Carlos Marighella. Considering his *Minimanual* as the urban insurgent's counterpart to Guevara's *La guerra de las guerrillas*, the article indicates urban terrorism will develop rapidly in light of Guevara's unsuccessful rural-based insurgency in Bolivia.
143. \_\_\_\_\_  
1970 Last Interview held with Joaquin Cámara Ferreira, Revolutionary Leader Murdered by the Brazilian Regime. *Granma*. (Nov. 8). 10-11. Outlining the revolutionary situation as of late 1970, Cámara Ferreira, the now deceased commander of Brazil's ALN, sees the primary struggle in his nation as taking place in the countryside. Cámara's comments on the ease of urban operations compared to those in a rural area are particularly interesting.
144. \_\_\_\_\_  
1965 Manifiesto del Frente de Liberación Nacional Brasileño. *Barricada*. Montevideo. (April-May). 14-16. Distributed a few days following the late March 1965 initiation of guerrilla operations by Col. Jefferson Cardim de Alencar Osorio in the *Sierra de Caparão*, the manifesto calls upon Brazilians to organize themselves into urban action groups for agitation and insurrection against the Castello Branco government.
145. \_\_\_\_\_  
1969 Los problemas de la subversión en el Brasil. *Este & Oeste*. Caracas. 7:124:1-28. In addition to outlining the reasons for Carlos Marighella's resignation from the PCB, the article devotes over seven pages to a review of Brazilian guerrilla movements from their rural-based inception during 1965 to the later urban activities of Marighella and his imitators. Organization, tactics, and operations are reviewed in depth. An excellent examination of insurgency in Brazil.
146. \_\_\_\_\_  
1971 Terroristas reunidos estão prontos para embarcar. *O Jornal do Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro. (Jan. 12). 15-16. The article contains biographic sketches of 19 of the Brazilian urban guerrillas released in exchange for the kidnapped Swiss Ambassador, Giovanni Enrico Bucher. The biographic data provide an interesting profile of the social origins and backgrounds of various Brazilian urban guerrilla organizations, particularly the VPR, VAR-Palmares, ALN, and the MR-8.

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147. \_\_\_\_\_  
1969 Tristeza tiene fin. Punto Final. (Jan. 14). 32. A report on the December 29, 1968, attack by 40 members of Carlos Marighella's urban guerrilla force on an arms factory, resulting in the loss of a large quantity of explosives. The techniques used in this operation are indicated.
148. FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE  
1971 Authorities Believe End of Terrorism Near. FBIS. 6:88:D-3, 4. As a result of the information contained in a document prepared by an unknown terrorist and discovered in a government raid on a terrorist safe house in Recife, the writer concludes that urban terrorist groups in Brazil are in serious difficulties. Realistic assessments are provided concerning the capabilities of these groups as well as data on the infighting and disagreements between them.
149. \_\_\_\_\_  
1970 More Terrorists Linked to Universities. FBIS. 6:141:D-1. According to information provided by General Antonio Carlos da Silva Muricy, 56 per cent of all individuals apprehended for terrorism are students or closely related to the student environment. The average age of such urban guerrillas allegedly is 23 years. Many of these individuals purportedly come from middle-class backgrounds. (See also Item # 146).
150. FRENTE BRASILENO DE INFORMACIONES  
1970 Feroces torturas aplican en Brasil. Punto Final, Suplemento. (Jan.). 6-8. A vivid description of "Operación Bandeirantes" carried out by the Brazilian Army against guerrilla groups in the state of São Paulo. Attention is concentrated on counterinsurgency operations and the reported role of torture and terror in these activities.
151. LATIN AMERICA  
1970 Brazil 1969. N.Y. An unedited compilation of articles on Brazilian political and economic developments which appeared in the London weekly, *Latin America*. Extremely useful because of the numerous accounts of urban terrorist operations.
152. MARIGHELLA, CARLOS  
1971 For the Liberation of Brazil. Harmondsworth. Containing material not included in an earlier (1970) French edition, this outstanding collection of Marighella's works includes the *Minimanual* as well as eleven other essays and letters on urban guerrilla strategy and tactics. Additional items comment on urban guerrilla warfare as the first phase of the revolutionary struggle, to be followed by and coordinated with rural guerrilla operations as the second phase. (For a description of the *Minimanual*, see Item # 43).
153. NOVITSKI, JOSEPH  
1970 Brazil's Urban Guerrillas Take High Toll in Killings and Thefts. New York Times. (June 29). 7. A good overview on the leadership and major terrorist activities of the ALN and the VPR. Carlos Lamarca's interest in creating a rural guerrilla column also is mentioned.
154. PINTO, ONOFRE  
1970 Brasil: la acción forja la unidad. Boletín Tricontinental. (Apr.) 35-36. A brief article summarizing operations of the VPR, including the March 1970 kidnapping of Noburo Okushi, Japanese Consul General in São Paulo. (See Item # 158). Information also is included on police counter-terrorist operations.
155. QUARTIM, JOÃO  
1971 Dictatorship and Armed Struggle in Brazil. N.Y. One of the most informative books available in English about the urban guerrilla struggle in Brazil during the

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1966–1970 period. The author provides valuable insights into the development, strategy, tactics, operations, and weaknesses of most revolutionary organizations. Although accepting the premise that the Brazilian Revolution will be decided within that nation's rural areas, Quartim critiques the Debray foco concept and its applicability to Brazil. An appendix identifying revolutionary groups active during the 1966–1970 time span is useful for readers unfamiliar with developments in Brazil during this period.

156. \_\_\_\_\_  
1970 Régis Debray and the Brazilian Revolution. *New Left Review*. Number 59. (Jan.–Feb.). 62–82. A criticism of the Debray foco theory as it applies to Brazil. The author discusses Debray's failure to deal seriously with how the foco is prepared and his overestimation of the efficacy of armed propaganda. In an introductory note to the article, Quartim indicates that urban guerrilla warfare became an end in itself by the close of 1968, and that the guerrillas failed to subordinate these operations to political actions.
157. ROTCAGE, LIONEL  
1970 Going for a Ride with Brazil's Guerrillas. *Atlas*. 19:8:49–51. A French journalist's account, translated from the respected Paris weekly, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, of his experiences accompanying urban cadres of the VPR during a bank robbery and an assault on a Rio de Janeiro supermarket. Contains information on guerrilla tactics as well as data on torture procedures reportedly used by the government's counterinsurgency forces.
158. TRUSKIER, ANDY  
1970 The Politics of Violence: The Urban Guerrillas in Brazil. *Ramparts*. 9:30–34, 39. Based upon a series of interviews with members of the ALN, MR-8, and the VPR, the author provides, in question and answer format, a substantial amount of detailed information on guerrilla strategy, tactics, organization, weapons, recruiting techniques, and political objectives. Additional details are furnished on the March 1970 kidnapping of the Japanese Consul General in São Paulo.

### Colombia

For over two decades, guerrilla activity in Colombia has posed a significant problem for the national government. Centered in operations of the communist-backed *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas* (FARC) during much of the 1954–1968 period, the 1960s saw the growth of two competing groups, the Maoist-influenced *Ejército Popular de Liberación* (EPL) and the Castroite *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN). With the FARC operating during recent years in Caquetá, Tolima, and Huila departments, south of Bogotá, and the EPL and ELN in Northern Colombia (Antioquia, Córdoba, and Santander), most guerrilla operations of these groups were rural in nature. Since approximately 1970, however, all three organizations have expanded their activities in urban areas, employing the tactics of kidnapping, political execution of police officials, arson, bank robberies, and bombings. The ELN and FARC have been most involved with attacks against targets in Bogotá, Medellín, Barrancabermeja, Bucaramanga, Santa Marta, and Cali.

As in the case of Uruguay, a substantial volume of material is available on insurgency in Colombia, including both its urban and rural aspects. Fortunately, the bulk of the documents of real value are listed, with critical commentary, in Russell

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Ramsey's excellent bibliography on *La Violencia*. (See Item #5). Accordingly, the following items are furnished only to supplement that work, particularly with respect to the urban aspects of guerrilla warfare in Colombia.

159. ANDINO, RICARDO  
1971 Colombian Guerrilla. *Bulletin Tricontinental*. (Dec.). 35–40. This article heralds a resumption of guerrilla warfare in Colombia during late 1971. Various guerrilla movements, leaders, and areas of operation are identified.
160. AUTHOR UNKNOWN  
1973 Colombia: Guerrillas Rampant. *Latin America*. 7:20:157–158. In this discussion emphasizing the trial of 120 guerrilla suspects, the sensational kidnappings and active anti-government campaigns of Colombia's pro-Castro *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN), the Moscow-line *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas* (FARC), and the Maoist-oriented *Ejército Popular de Liberación* (EPL) are reviewed.
161. \_\_\_\_\_  
1971 Colombia: Guerrillas Unite. *Latin America*. 5:41:335–336. This article discusses the measures adopted by the government to cope with the resurgence of guerrilla activity in both the cities and the countryside. It is suggested the FARC, EPL, and ELN may have joined in a *Frente Unido de Acción Guerrillera*.
162. \_\_\_\_\_  
1970 Colombia: La guerrilla crece. *ABC*. Madrid. 19. An excellent report on the three major Colombian guerrilla organizations, including their organization, areas of operation, size, leaders, and tactics.
163. \_\_\_\_\_  
1973 Colombia: Rural Guerrillas. *Latin America*. 7:10:73. Describing cooperation between the FARC, EPL, and ELN, this article evaluates their urban tactics, including political kidnapping, bank robberies, and arms seizures.
164. \_\_\_\_\_  
1968 Extracto de la resolución política del tercer pleno del comité central del Partido Comunista de Colombia (ML), sobre la línea de masas. *Causa Marxista-Leninista*. Santiago. (July–Aug.). 63–77. A detailed exposition of the PCC-ML program, including its advocacy of a rural-based guerrilla effort backed by strong urban support elements.
165. \_\_\_\_\_  
1971 Grupo guerrilla urbano. *El Tiempo*. (Feb. 6). 1. 6. A useful news report commenting on an urban guerrilla net discovered in Medellín, composed almost totally of professional people, particularly those employed in local banking institutions. These individuals apparently were responsible for the shipment of funds, drugs, and weapons to rural guerrilla forces.
166. \_\_\_\_\_  
1968 La guerra popular de liberación en Colombia. *Causa Marxista-Leninista*. Santiago. (May–June). 66–74. A description of the organization, development, programs, and recent operations of the Maoist EPL in Colombia. Government countering operations also are discussed.
167. CASTRO, GERMAN  
1970 Lo fusilan a uno por cualquier cosa. *El Tiempo*. Bogotá. (Oct. 1). 1, 16. Based on an interview with Salvador Afanador, a former general staff member of the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN), the article is of particular interest for Afanador's comments on the inability of city-bred students to adjust to operations

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in the rural areas of Colombia. (For similar views see Item #177). The article also contains brief remarks on ELN urban nets.

168. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)

1970 Planes subversivas. *El Siglo*. (May 12). 2. A report concerning the interrogation of Januario Valero (aka. Oscar Reyes), FARC organizer for urban insurgent operations. According to the report, Valero, who had been trained in the USSR and Czechoslovakia, was to concentrate on the development of an urban guerrilla network to replace that destroyed by intelligence personnel approximately a year earlier.

169. \_\_\_\_\_

1971 Subversión descubierta. Arriba, Madrid. (Jan. 14). 13. A very interesting report on plans developed by Dr. Germán Liévano Rodríguez, Chief of the ELN urban support apparatus, to kidnap a North American diplomat as well as engage in a program of bank robberies, kidnappings, assaults on local firms, and arson operations. Liévano was responsible for reactivation of largely dormant ELN urban nets. According to the report, the ELN was attempting to organize an urban apparatus similar to that of the Uruguayan Tupamaros.

170. DELGADO, ALVARO

1966 The Working Class and Labor Movement in Colombia. *World Marxist Review*. Toronto. 9:9:51-57. A strong attack by a member of the orthodox *Partido Comunista de Colombia* against the Guevara-Debray concept of a purely rural-based revolutionary effort. The author claims the support of the urban working class and city-based revolutionary units will be decisive in attaining final victory.

171. FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

1970 FARC Guerrilla Collaborator Captured by Army. FBIS: 6:107:4-4. An account of activities carried out by an organizer of FARC urban guerrilla nets in Barranquilla and Santa Marta. The article includes information on sabotage and subversive and attack training of urban groups, as well as data on techniques used to procure arms and explosives.

172. \_\_\_\_\_

1971 ELN Guerrillas. FBIS: 6:89:J-2. Reports on the apprehension of ELN urban guerrillas in Bogotá.

173. \_\_\_\_\_

1970 Army Searches for Guerrilla Doctor, Arsenal. FBIS: 6:143:F-1. Additional background is provided on Dr. Germán Liévano and his plans for urban ELN operations. Biographic data on Liévano is included.

174. \_\_\_\_\_

1971 Government Positions Held by Urban Guerrillas. FBIS:6:24:F-1. An interesting news report commenting on the infiltration of urban guerrilla elements into high government positions. According to the report, ELN members held key positions in the Bogotá offices of the Colombian Agriculture-Cattle Institute and the People's National Bank of that city. Lawyers and other professional people also were involved in the urban ELN net.

175. \_\_\_\_\_

1971 Successes in Counterinsurgency Operations Cited. FBIS: 6:71:F-1. A radio report concerning the destruction of an urban guerrilla net in Bogotá. Individuals apprehended apparently were associated with the ELN and were engaged in propaganda activities.

176. \_\_\_\_\_

1971 Terrorist Captured, Subversive Sought. FBIS. 6:23:F-2. A report on terrorist and kidnapping operations of a small urban guerrilla group in Pereira. The group

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appears to have been formed from ex-members of the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement.

177. GARCIA QUIJANO, JAIME

1970 El consejo de guerra del siglo. Verde Olivo. (Feb. 1). 55–56. Written by a member of the ELN while awaiting a military trial in Bogotá, this *autodefensa* is of particular interest in view of the author's comments on the difficulties encountered by city-bred students and intellectuals in adapting to life in a rural guerrilla unit. The author's remarks are similar to those of Salvador Afanador. (See Item #167).

178. GOMEZ, ALBERTO

1967 The Revolutionary Forces of Colombia and their Perspectives. World Marxist Review. Toronto. 10:4:59–67. A strong, orthodox Communist argument that the guerrilla struggle develops differently in various nations and that the experiences of other nations (such as Cuba) cannot be applied mechanically. In the case of Colombia, the author argues that one of the basic failings of the guerrilla movement was an inability to develop effective urban support and insurgent networks, thereby combining rural with urban operations.

## Guatemala

Initiated in late 1960 as a reaction to the ineffective and corrupt government of President Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, guerrilla activity in Guatemala accelerated rapidly during the early and mid-1960s. By 1964–65, two distinct insurgent organizations had emerged; the largely rural-based *Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre* (MR-13) and the urban-rural *Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes* (FAR). Both had grown from a common source, the November 13, 1960, revolt of military personnel in Guatemala City, led by Lieutenants Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, Luis Turcios Lima, and Luis Trejos Esquivel.

Defeated in their initial rural encounters with government forces, the guerrillas moved to urban terrorism during 1962–63, working in coordination with the self-defense units of the *Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo* (PGT) and student elements in Guatemala City. Although subsequently shifting to rural activity, the death in 1966 of FAR leader Turcios (in an auto accident which occurred when he was driving), and the severe anti-guerrilla campaigns of the government in that and the following year forced the FAR from its "safe areas" in Zacapa and Isabal back into the cities. The subsequent death in May 1970 of MR-13 chief Yon Sosa, who was killed by a Mexican Army patrol when his unit strayed across the border from Guatemala, ended the effectiveness of that group.

FAR urban operations, commencing in 1968, included the January murder of two U. S. military advisors assigned to the embassy, the assassination in August of U. S. Ambassador John Gordon Mein, and the 1970 abduction and execution of West German Ambassador Karl von Spreti. In the latter year, the FAR also abducted the former Guatemalan foreign minister and the U. S. Labor Attaché. Other acts of terrorism included political executions, assaults on police posts, the bombing of military facilities, and additional kidnappings. In the case of the primarily rural-based

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MR-13, its only urban element, the *Frente Rodolfo Chacón* in Guatemala City, was eliminated in 1965–66.

In contrast to many Latin American nations, materials on insurgency in Guatemala are found relatively easily. Primarily documents of a polemical nature, as in the case of articles by Adolfo Gilly, Alvaro López, or *Prensa Latina* correspondent Eduardo Galeano (Items #188, 189, 192, 197), or reports in a journalistic style, such as the *Este & Oeste* article (Item #181), no really detailed and objective study has been made of either the FAR or MR-13. The closest thing to such an analysis is Kenneth Johnson's monograph (Item #196) prepared for the Institute for the Study of Conflict. Accordingly, despite available data, substantial room remains for serious research on both rural and urban insurgency in Guatemala.

179. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)

1968 Guatemala: país en guerra. *Tricontinental*. (May–June). 61–64. Analysis of the split between guerrilla units of the *Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes* (FAR) and the *Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo* (PGT). Also examines urban terrorist operations by the FAR and the *Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre* (MR-13), the need for coordinated rural-urban activities, and urban insurgency tactics and operating procedures.

180. \_\_\_\_\_

1968 L'information vérité. *Tricontinental*. (Nov.–Dec.). 115–116. A brief description of FAR tactics and units employed in the assassination of U. S. Ambassador to Guatemala, John Gordon Mein.

181. \_\_\_\_\_

1973 La política de los comunistas en Guatemala. *Este & Oeste*. Caracas. 11:116–20. Examines the position taken by the PGT regarding the *lucha armada*. Rejecting total reliance on guerrilla warfare, the PGT endorses either the *via pacífica* or a combined urban-rural effort, depending upon the specific conditions existing in a given nation.

182. BARRERA, HERNAN

1968 El terror contrarevolucionario en Guatemala. *Nuestra Epoca*. Santiago (Jan.). 105–108. A detailed analysis of governmental counterrevolutionary operations by such groups as the *Movimiento Auténtico Nacionalista Organizado* (MANO), *Nueva Organización Anticomunista* (NOA), and *Consejo Anticomunista de Guatemala* (CADEG). Detail is provided on the terror tactics (both psychological and physical) used by these organizations, particularly against urban units of the FAR.

183. BARRIOS KLEE, HUGO

1964 Problemas de la situación revolucionaria y la lucha libertadora del pueblo de Guatemala. *Problemas de la Paz y del Socialismo*. Bogotá. (Mar.). 40–55. An analysis, by an old-line member of the PGT, of various revolutionary possibilities in Latin America, and Guatemala in particular. The author criticizes mechanical copying of the Cuban model of rural-based revolution and instead endorses either the *via pacífica* or a combined urban and rural insurgent effort. (See also Item #181)

184. CARDONA FRATTI, ARNOLDO

1968 Guatemala, dogme et revolution. *Tricontinental*. (Sept.–Oct.). 36–58. Written by a young militant in the FAR, this article examines the development of revolutionary forces in Guatemala from 1954 through mid-1965, focusing attention

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- on 1960–65. Ideological and strategic differences, urban and rural operations, and areas of activity of the FAR and MR-13 are discussed, as are reasons for the PGT-FAR split.
185. COMITE DE DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS  
1969 *La violencia en Guatemala*. México, D. F. Contains an extensive chronology of governmental activities against the insurgents, and provides detailed information on the operations of government-supported terrorist groups, particularly *Mano Blanco* and *Ojo para Ojo*.
186. FERNANDEZ, ORLANDO  
1966 *Guerra de guerrillas en Guatemala*. Casa de las Américas. 6:38:4–11. An evaluation of mistakes made in the initial years of the Guatemalan guerrilla movement. Urban and rural groups are identified and strategies and tactics are critiqued.
187. FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE  
1970 Untitled. FBIS. 6:183:M-1. An interesting broadcast about the FAR. Outlines disagreements within that organization between Cuban proponents of rural guerrilla warfare and the Guatemalan advocates of a return to urban insurgency.
188. GALEANO, EDUARDO  
1967 *With the Guerrillas in Guatemala*. Ramparts. 6:2:56–59. Written by a former editor of the Montevideo leftist newspaper *Epoca*, the article contains a good account of the background and the varying doctrinal positions of Turcios Lima and César Montes of the FAR, and Yon Sosa of MR-13. The author notes that both groups used *propaganda armada* in urban and rural operations.
189. \_\_\_\_\_  
1970 *Mataron al guerrillero*. Punto Final. (June 9). 9–11. A brief biography, by a *Prensa Latina* correspondent, of MR-13 leader Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, as well as an examination of his urban and rural guerrilla operations in Guatemala. Variations in views between Yon Sosa and the FAR also are examined.
190. GEYER, GEORGIE ANNE  
1968 *The Blood of Guatemala*. Nation. 207:1:8–11. An examination of terrorism and counterterrorist operations in Guatemala. The author discusses the development of terrorism by the FAR and the rightist *Mano Blanco*. Attention is focused on reported U. S. support for organizations such as *Mano Blanco*.
191. \_\_\_\_\_  
1970 *Guatemala and the Guerrillas*. New Republic. 163:1:17–19. The author notes that the prominent position of the FAR within Latin American guerrilla groups has waned following government counterinsurgency operations in the Zacapa area. These operations forced the FAR into urban areas and city-based terrorism.
192. GILLY, ADOLFO  
1965 *El movimiento guerrillero en Guatemala*. Monthly Review, Selecciones en Castellano. Buenos Aires. (June–July). 15–104. This double issue describes the origin, organization, objectives, operations, and political orientation of the MR-13. Interviews with Yon Sosa provide useful background on the MR-13–FAR relationship. Chapter 7, “La Ciudad,” outlines MR-13 urban strategy. A biased but useful study.
193. GINIGER, HENRY  
1968 *Guatemala is a Battleground*. New York Times Magazine. (June 16). 14 ff. The social, economic and historical heritage of the FAR and MR-13, as well as the creation of government supported right wing terrorist groups, are analyzed in considerable detail by the Central American Correspondent of the *Times*.



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194. GOODSELL, JAMES NELSON  
1972 Guatemala: Edge of an Abyss? *Current History*. 62:366:104–108. A discussion of the terrorism and violence which plagued Guatemala during 1971 as well as an assessment of the economic situation and President Arana's first 18 months in office. The author concludes that the anti-terrorism campaign has not been particularly successful.
195. HOWARD, ALAN  
1966 With the Guerrillas in Guatemala. *New York Times Magazine*. (June 26). 8 ff. Having been in Guatemala during 1963–1964, the author returned in the spring of 1966 and visited with Turcios Lima and the FAR. The article provides useful information about Turcios Lima's participation in the Tricontinental Conference, the goals of the FAR, and the rural character of the movement.
196. JOHNSON, KENNETH F.  
1972 Guatemala: From Terrorism to Terror. London. Published by the Institute for the Study of Conflict, this monograph provides a fine evaluation of insurgency and counterinsurgency in Guatemala during 1960–1972. The historical development of the FAR and MR-13 are traced in some detail, including operations of the MR-13 *Frente Rodolfo Chacón* in Guatemala City. The author concludes that ideologically motivated insurgent operations ended in 1969–70, and that current urban terrorist activity is essentially criminal in nature.
197. LOPEZ, ALVARO  
1971 La crisis política y la violencia en Guatemala. In: *Diez años de insurrección en América Latina*, Volume I. Vania Bambirra, *et al.* Santiago de Chile. A Marxist analysis of the origin and growth of the insurgent movement in Guatemala. Detailed background is provided on the FAR and MR-13 as well as the socio-political forces which led to the 1960 military uprising and a subsequent growth in guerrilla activity. In conclusion, the author evaluates the foco theory and states that the Guatemalan experience proves the theory's strategic inadequacy.
198. MONTES, CESAR  
1968 Statement Made by César Montes, Commander in Chief of the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) of Guatemala. *Bulletin Tricontinental*. (May). 37–42. An account of the FAR-PGT separation. The development of the Guatemalan guerrilla movement and the roles of MR-13, FAR, and PGT are also discussed.
199. \_\_\_\_\_  
1968 Turcios Lima: la dimension d'un homme. *Tricontinental*. (Nov.–Dec.). 111–114. A eulogy to deceased FAR leader Turcios Lima by then FAR commander César Montes. Provides useful information on the FAR-MR-13 relationship and between the FAR and the PGT.
200. NIEDERGANG, MARCEL  
1966 La guérilla révolutionnaire en Amérique Latine. *Le Monde*. (Feb. 5). 1, 5. (Feb. 6–7). 4. A two-part account by *Le Monde's* special correspondent describing major polemics at the Tricontinental Conference. The article also provides informed comments on the background of MR-13 and FAR activities in Guatemala and on the applicability of Cuban rural-based guerrilla theory in Latin America.
201. PERRERA, VICTOR  
1971 Guatemala: Always La Violencia. *New York Times Magazine*. (June 13). 13 ff. An outstanding discussion of events leading to the violence of the late sixties as well as an in-depth review of the FAR urban organization, describing the small six to eight man cells of trained terrorists, including the tactics they employ.

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202. PRIETO, FRANCISCO J.

- 1972 Communist Role in Guatemala. *World Marxist Review*. Toronto. 15:9:87–90. In this comment on political and economic conditions in Guatemala, the author notes that the PGT regards armed struggle as the main way to advance the revolution. However, armed struggle is not the only means available and, according to the author, the PGT should strive to develop and combine all forms of struggle.

## *Uruguay*

Since the early 1960s, urban insurgency in Latin America has been almost synonymous with the term Tupamaro. Completely rejecting the Guevara-Debray concept of a rural foco, the Tupamaros, as in the case of Brazil's urban revolutionaries, have opted totally for city-centered guerrilla warfare. (See Items #217, 225, 227, 231). In contrast to Brazil, however, the Tupamaros see no real possibility for an ultimate rural revolution in Uruguay.

Operating almost at will during the greater part of a decade (1964–1972), the Tupamaros have been the most successful of all Latin American urban guerrilla groups. As a result of this success and their linkages to other Latin American revolutionary organizations, Tupamaro strategy, tactics, and material support apparently have been made available to the urban components of these groups. (See Items #110, 116, 169, 209).

Tupamaro success also has resulted in the development of a rather large volume of literature on the Uruguayan guerrilla movement. While much of this material is propagandistic in nature, it also includes a significant number of useful studies. Particularly noteworthy is Ernesto Mayans' outstanding documentary anthology on virtually all aspects of Tupamaro activity (Item #226), as well as the shorter but more analytical text by Mercader and de Vera (Item #227). Together, these two works provide the best available picture of the Tupamaro movement, its aims, objectives, and operations. Also useful are the reasonably in-depth writings of Robert Moss (Items #228, 229) as well as the excellent 1969 and 1971 articles in *Este & Oeste*, (Items #205, 209). Similarly useful, although highly biased, are several reports on Tupamaro activity in *Punto Final* (Items #206, 211, 212). Finally, of little value, despite the publicity it has received, is Maria Ester Gilio's work on the Tupamaros. (Item #221). Purporting to be a study of Tupamaro strategy and tactics, according to its subtitle, the book contains no information on these subjects but instead presents a sociological study of the movement. Thus, even in the case of Uruguay, where perhaps more has been written on the urban guerrilla movement than in any other nation of the hemisphere, there exists no definitive study of the urban guerrilla.

203. ALSINA, GERONIMO

- 1972 The War and the Tupamaros. *Bulletin Tricontinental* (Aug.). 29–42. A report on governmental counterinsurgency operations directed against the Tupamaros, particularly those implemented since the election of President Bordaberry. Attention is focused on operations of the "Death Squad" as well as future Tupamaro strategy.

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204. ANDRADE, JOAQUIN  
 1970 Espectacular golpe de los Tupamaros. Punto Final. (June 9). 4-5. A brief description, by the *Prensa Latina* correspondent, of the Tupamaro attack on the *Centro de Instrucción de la Marina de Guerra* in Montevideo on May 29, 1970. Information is included on the techniques used in this assault as well as other operations which took place in late 1969.
205. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
 1971 La acción revolucionaria de los Tupamaros. Este & Oeste. Caracas. 9:148:1-4. A report on the background and development of the Tupamaro movement, including information on operations carried out since the July 1970 kidnapping of Brazilian Consul Aloysio Mares Díaz Gomide.
206. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
 1969 Año nuevo guerrillero. Punto Final. (Jan. 14.). 31-32. A brief summation of Tupamaro operations in the first week of 1969, including the January 1 attack on a Montevideo court where a number of Tupamaros were being tried.
207. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
 1970 Assalts no Uruguai. O Estado do São Paulo. (Apr. 7). 12. A description of the tactics used by the Tupamaros in an April raid against a tobacco firm in Montevideo that resulted in the acquisition of over 100,000 pesos in currency as well as gold, weapons, and radio transmitters.
208. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
 1972 Como funciona el movimiento clandestino. El País. Montevideo. (May 12). 5 (Second Section). Containing the text of a Tupamaro document, this article describes in detail the personnel, organizational, security, and propaganda practices of the movement. It also contains considerable information on Tupamaro medical assistance, weapons repair, and other support functions.
209. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
 1969 El comunismo en Uruguay. Este & Oeste. Caracas. 7:126-127:1-60. Of particular note are pages 23-25, containing comments on the organization and development of the Tupamaro movement. Tupamaro operations conducted between 1966 and 1969 are examined, as are links between that group and other Latin American revolutionary elements.
210. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
 1972 Hay plan en acción para tomar el poder. El País. Montevideo. (May 3). 1, 6 (Second section). Two communiques issued by the Tupamaros in March 1972, analyze relations between the guerrillas and the people.. Both documents urge increased terrorist action to polarize the population and develop a condition of all-out war.
211. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
 1970 Los Tupamaros abren una ruta revolucionaria. Punto Final. (Jan. 6). 30-32. Based on an interview with Ariel B. Collazo, Uruguayan editor and a founding member of the Movimiento Revolucionario Oriental, the writer concludes that revolutionary warfare is the only effective means of implementing political and social change in Latin America and that urban and rural-based guerrilla operations should be used for this purpose.
212. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
 1968 Los Tupamaros y la lucha armada. Punto Final. (July 2.) This article contains useful information on the development and political objectives of the Tupamaro movement, including its relationship with other leftist political groups in Uruguay. Also included is the now well-known "30 Preguntas a un Tupamaro". Most of the article appeared subsequently in *Politique Aujourd'hui*. Paris. (Sept.-Oct.). 1970.

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213. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
1972 Uruguay: Raúl Séndic. *Latin America*. 6:36:281. An examination of how the September 1, 1972, capture of the Tupamaro founder-leader will effect the movement.
214. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
1972 Uruguay: Another Round. *Latin America*. 6:30:233. Describes Tupamaro counter-military operations including the assassination of the army's director of civil defense whose brother was the officer in charge of anti-Tupamaro activities.
215. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
1970 Uruguay: los Tupamaros en acción. *Tricontinental*. (Mar.-Apr.). 45-60. A sympathetic and comprehensive article on the development, strategy and tactics of the Tupamaros. It includes information on Tupamaro political goals as well as a summary of significant operations between 1966 and December 1969. (The summary of activities included in Item #227 is somewhat more detailed. Taken together, the two listings are the most complete record available of Tupamaro operations during the indicated period).
216. BROWNE, MALCOLM W.  
1969 A Small, Elite Rebel Band Harasses Uruguayan Regime. *New York Times*. (Jan. 23). 12. One of the most comprehensive accounts of Tupamaro activity to appear in the U. S. press. It includes data on major activities, organization size, and intelligence capabilities of the Tupamaros. The author relies on the July 1968, *Punto Final* article (Item #212) for much of his information.
217. COLLAZO, ARIEL  
1968 . . . Y el Uruguay no era una excepción. *América Latina*. Montevideo. (Oct.). 3-8. This editorial argues strongly that guerrilla warfare cannot develop in rural South America without a strong urban insurgent apparatus. Attributing Castro's success in Cuba to the urban support operations of Frank País in Santiago de Cuba, the writer sees Guevara's failure in Bolivia as caused by a lack of similar support.
218. CORTIZO VAZQUEZ, LINO  
1971 Código de los Tupamaros. *El Comercio*. Quito. (Sept. 1). 4. A description of the Tupamaro penal code as set forth in a document captured by government forces. The article contains only portions of the code and thus is of limited value in determining the standards used by the guerrillas in judging those who oppose them.
219. D'OLIVERIA, SERGIO L.  
1973 Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth. *Military Review*. 53:4:25-36. An evaluation by a Uruguayan Army Intelligence officer of the counterinsurgency campaign against the Tupamaros. D'Oliveira attributes initial successes of the Tupamaros to governmental failure to recognize the danger posed by this group, and police inability to combat the movement. The author believes that the decline of the Tupamaros is a result of tactical mistakes on their part and the assignment of primary counterinsurgency responsibilities to the Uruguayan Armed Forces.
220. GERASSI, MARYSA N.  
1969 Uruguay's Urban Guerrillas. *Nation*. 209:10:306-10. A comprehensive account of the development and early operations of the Tupamaros; provides a good insight into the tactics used in acquiring their "Robin Hood" image.
221. GILIO, MARIA ESTER  
1970 La guerrilla Tupamara. Havana. Although purporting to examine Tupamaro structure and strategy, this text contains no information on these subjects. How-

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ever, it does include useful data on the political, social, and economic conditions that gave rise to the Tupamaro movement.

222. HUMBERT, MAXIMO

1969 *Los métodos de los Tupamaros. Punto Final.* (Mar. 25). 28–29. A detailed description of attacks against the Hotel Casino San Rafael in Punta del Este (Feb. 18, 1969) and Montevideo's *Financiera Monty* (Feb. 14, 1969) by the Comando Mario Robaina Méndez and the Comando Liber Arce of the Tupamaros. Useful information on Tupamaro tactics and operational techniques.

223. LABROUSSE, ALAIN

1971 *Les Tupamaros: guérilla urbaine en Uruguay.* Paris. A fair account of the origins, tactics, and objectives of the Tupamaros as well as the economic and political situation in Uruguay which facilitated the success of the guerrilla movement.

224. LINGENFELTER, JAMES

1973 *Uruguay: Urban Guerrillas and Counterinsurgency.* (Unpublished Research Paper). Montgomery. A comprehensive study by a student at the Air Command and Staff College, Air University, examining the development, strategy and tactics of the Tupamaro movement. The governmental response to the Tupamaros is reviewed from its inception to the establishment of a full scale counter-insurgency program.

225. MADRAGA, LEOPOLDO

1970 *Tupamaros vs. the Government: Two Powers in a Head-on Clash.* *Granma.* (Oct. 18). 9–11. Based on an interview with a Tupamaro leader identified only as "Urbano," the article presents an excellent "inside" evaluation of guerrilla objectives, strategy, and tactics in Uruguay. Information is included on Tupamaro organization, personnel practices, and recruitment, from the cell to column levels. The advantages of urban over rural operations are reviewed in detail.

226. MAYANS, ERNESTO ed.

1971 *Tupamaros, antología documental.* Cuernavaca. Published by the *Centro Intercultural de Documentación*, this 492 page text is, without question, the most complete single-volume compilation of documentary materials relating to the Tupamaro movement. Following an extended introduction by the editor, examining in sympathetic detail those political, economic, and social factors giving rise to the Tupamaros, as well as the operational techniques and tactics employed by that group, the text continues with an outstanding collection of facsimiles drawn from a wide variety of sources on virtually all facets of Tupamaro activity. Of almost equal importance to those documents and other materials reported in the body of this book is an extremely useful 63-page compilation of all significant Tupamaro operations conducted between May 1962 and March 1971, as well as an exceptional bibliography listing some 250 books and articles in Spanish, French, English, and German regarding Tupamaro objectives and operations. This text is the best reference work available today in English or Spanish on the Tupamaros.

227. MERCADER, ANTONIO and JORGE DE VERA

1969 *Tupamaros: estrategia y acción.* Montevideo. Based upon guerrilla documents as well as interviews with police and the insurgents, this small work by two Uruguayan journalists is probably one of the best available texts on the Tupamaro movement. It contains not only detailed data on Tupamaro organization, strategy, and tactics but also information on linkages to other Latin American revolutionary groups. A final section describes significant Tupamaro operations between June 1962 and March 1969.

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228. MOSS, ROBERT

1971 Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay. *Problems of Communism*. 20:5:14–23. An analysis of how the Tupamaros, lacking a definitive ideology, program, and mass support, were able to flourish despite determined government opposition. The author concludes that disaffection among students, public employees, and professional men made this possible. Useful information also is included on Tupamaro operations, strategy, and tactics.

229. \_\_\_\_\_

1971 Uruguay: Terrorism versus Democracy. *Conflict Studies*. Number 14. Focuses on the economic and social conditions which led to the creation and growth of the Tupamaro guerrillas, the insurgent techniques they used, and the impact of these upon Uruguay's political system.

230. ONIS, JUAN DE

1972 Life in Uruguay Disrupted by Violence and Inflation. *New York Times*. (June 15). 1, 14. A short but informative account of the progress made by Uruguayan security forces against the Tupamaros after President Bordaberry assumed office in March 1972.

231. NUÑEZ, CARLOS

1969 Los Tupamaros: vanguardia armada en el Uruguay. Montevideo. An analysis of Tupamaro objectives, strategy, and tactics based upon information published earlier in *Tricontinental*, *Punto Final*, *Izquierda*, and *Al Rojo Vivo*. This book lacks the objectivity of the Mercader-de Vera text (Item #227) and much of the valuable detail on Tupamaro activity set forth in that book.

## *Venezuela*

As in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, guerrilla activity in Venezuela has received considerable attention. In addition to the usual journalistic coverage afforded these operations, a number of rather complete analyses have been prepared on various aspects of the insurgency. Among these are studies focusing on those periods of essentially urban operations (1960–62 and 1963–64) by the *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional* (FALN) and the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR). Failing in their city-based efforts to prevent the election of President Leoni in December 1963, the guerrillas, with Cuban advice and logistic support, turned to a program of rural revolution following the Guevara-Debray foco concept. Although somewhat successful for a short period during the mid- and late 1960s, these operations faded as a result of the vigorous anti-guerrilla programs of the Venezuelan government, friction within the FALN as well as its internal division, its split from the Venezuelan Communist Party, and, finally, the guerrilla amnesty program of the former Caldera government. As a result of these problems, guerrilla groups deemphasized rural operations and stressed a combined urban-rural strategy captioned "la línea de insurrección combinada."

A number of good studies have been prepared on the urban aspects of insurgency in Venezuela. Possibly the best of these for the 1960–64 period is the 236-

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page analysis by the Atlantic Research Corporation—Georgetown Research Project (Item #233). Also very valuable, as companion pieces, are the shorter and less detailed works by Norman Gall, Moses Moliero, Thomas Snodgrass, and John L. Sorenson. (Items #253, 257, 258, 259). Good coverage of specific FALN and MIR operations, plans, and strategy is found in *Este & Oeste, Punto Final*, and in various FALN and MIR documents. (See Items #232, 235, 236, 240, 243, 249). Untouched from an analytical point of view, however, are the years since 1968 when both the FALN and MIR have turned more and more toward urban operations. A careful examination of this period is needed.

### 232. ALBERTINI, GEORGES

1969 Situación de los movimientos comunistas en Venezuela después de las elecciones presidenciales. *Este & Oeste*. Caracas. 7:125:1–7. An analysis of developments in the Venezuelan Communist party since 1963, containing detailed information on disagreements between proponents of urban versus rural operations. Also included is information on the decision to rebuild urban guerrilla units, particularly in Caracas.

### 233. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORPORATION, GEORGETOWN RESEARCH PROJECT

1970 Castro-Communist Insurgency in Venezuela; A Study of Insurgency and Counter-insurgency Operations and Techniques in Venezuela, 1960–1964. Alexandria. An excellent study, focusing primarily upon the two urban insurgency efforts of the *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional* (FALN) during 1960–62 and 1963–64. Contains detailed data on the command structure, street fighting tactics, and weaponry of the *Unidades Tácticas de Combate* in Caracas.

### 234. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)

1964 Ayuda de los oficiales nacionalistas a la revolución. *Pueblo y Revolución*. Caracas. (Mar. 30). 1–2. An interesting FALN commentary on the importance of establishing revolutionary cells within the Venezuelan military as well as using sympathetic personnel as sources of information.

### 235. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)

1968 Un cónclave guerrillero. *Punto Final*. (Dec. 31). 10. Describes the results of FLN-FALN and MIR meeting in Caracas, and indicates that both organizations concur in the important role of urban guerrilla units. Since the major cities of Venezuela contain a substantial portion of the nation's population, both groups agree that these areas must be focal points for guerrilla operations.

### 236. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)

1969 La FLN-FALN y el MIR se unen para luchar por la liberación de Venezuela. *Punto Final*. (July 29). 16–17. A detailed report on steps leading to the FLN-FALN and MIR agreement to join in urban and rural guerrilla operations.

### 237. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)

1972 El Grupo Cero. *Este & Oeste*. Caracas. 10:1959:14–16. A short article on alleged Cuban support for the Punto Cero guerrilla group. Urban terrorist activities reportedly are designed to obtain weapons and funds for a rural guerrilla front.

### 238. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)

1964 Hablan los guerrilleros venezolanos. *Revista de la Liberación*. Buenos Aires. 2:3:17–19. An informative articles outlining the development of the FALN and its political arm, the *Frente de Liberación Nacional*.

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239. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
1964 Untitled. *Boletín Informativo*, Instituto Cubano Venezolano de Solidaridad Revolucionaria. Vedado. (Feb.). 5–6. This bulletin contains reports on operations of the urban *Unidades Tácticas de Combate* of the FALN in Valencia, El Junquito, and Barquisimeto.
240. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
1964 Untitled. Izquierda. Caracas. (Feb.). 2–4. A detailed article on the development, objectives, and tactics of the FALN. Of particular interest are comments on the reasons for a change in FALN strategy from urban operations (1961–63) to an essentially rural campaign.
241. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
1964 *Papel de inteligencia y contra-inteligencia*. *Pueblo y Revolución*. Caracas. (Mar. 30). 7–8. An excellent discussion of intelligence in guerrilla operations, the importance of this activity to FALN urban and rural units, and the significance of counterintelligence for all guerrilla cadres. The article is one of the few analyses by any insurgent group of intelligence and counterintelligence activity in guerrilla operations.
242. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
1964 *Planes de operación en una guerra prolongada*. *Pueblo y Revolución*. Caracas. (Mar. 30). 3–6. The role of urban and rural guerrilla units in a lengthy insurgent conflict is explained. The difficulties which will be encountered by these units and the tactics to be used in combatting government operations are evaluated.
243. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
1970 *Situación del comunismo en Venezuela. Este & Oeste*. Caracas. 8:136:1–8. An evaluation of urban guerrilla operations in Caracas and other major cities. The writer concludes that these actions have resulted from a failure of Cuban-endorsed rural insurgency.
244. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
1968 *Venezuela: nueva etapa operativa*. *Tricontinental*. (May–June). 14–21. An analysis of the new overall program of the *Comando Unitario del Frente de Liberación Nacional—Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional* (CUFF) as well as requirements for the more important role assigned urban and suburban terrorist units.
245. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
1973 *Venezuela: Students Yes, Guerrillas No*. *Latin America*. 7:21: 162, 164. A commentary on the inability of Punto Cero to develop strong popular support. Described as elitist groups without mass contacts, Punto Cero and Bandera Roja are among the few active insurgent groups.
246. (AUTHOR UNKNOWN)  
1973 *Venezuela: Traffic Jams to Beat Guerrillas*. *Latin America*. 5:11:85–86. The article notes the failure of kidnapping attempts by guerrillas claiming to be members of the FALN and discusses government concern for the resurgence of guerrilla activity in Caracas as well as in the countryside.
247. CALLAHAN, EDWARD F.  
1969 *Terror in Venezuela*. *Military Review*. 49:2:49–56. An analysis of terrorist tactics used by urban insurgent forces during the period 1960–64. Useful statistical data is included on the nature and extent of terrorism during the period studied.



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248. COCKCROFT, JAMES D. and EDUARDO VICENTE  
1965 Venezuela and the FALN since Leoni. *Monthly Review*. 17:6:29–40. An excellent review of FALN-PCV-MIR strategic differences. Analysis of the acceptance by the FALN of the need for a prolonged and predominantly rural-based struggle, including emphasis on the development of an effective military apparatus in urban areas.
249. COMITE POLITICO, FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL  
Undated Programa de acción de la Frente de Liberación Nacional. Caracas. Outlines the political program and the functions of the FALN, including those of its urban *Unidades Tácticas de Combate*.
250. CYR, ANNE V.  
1970 Cuban Revolutionary Strategy: Lessons Drawn from Insurgency Movements in Bolivia and Venezuela. McLean, Virginia. Prepared for the U.S. Army by the Research Corporation, this study compares the urban-rural insurgency effort in Venezuela with what the author characterizes as the "narrow gauge," purely rural-oriented operation led by Guevara in Bolivia. The writer describes FALN objectives, guerrilla activity in urban areas, and Cuban support for these operations.
251. DEBRAY, REGIS  
1968 Quince días en las guerrillas venezolanas. In: *Ensayos Latino-Americanos*. Buenos Aires. Published initially in the French review *Révolution*, this 1964 essay contains the author's comments on some 15 days spent with a FALN unit in Falcón State. Of note is the excellent detail provided on urban support units of the FALN and the significance Debray attaches to these operations as absolutely essential for the success of rural guerrillas.
252. FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL  
1963 Frente de Liberación Nacional—Mensaje del Frente de Liberación Nacional. Caracas. (Oct.). 1. Addressed to members of the Venezuelan Armed Forces, this article outlines FLN-FALN political and military programs. Distributed during the most active period of FALN urban operations, the leaflet exhorts members of the Armed Forces to cease resistance and support the guerrillas.
253. GALL, NORMAN  
1972 Teodoro Petkoff: The Crisis of the Professional Revolutionary. Part I: Years of Insurrection. *American Universities Field Staff Reports*. South America. 16:1–19. Based on ten hours of taped conversations with Petkoff, the author sketches a detailed portrait of this former FALN leader and provides valuable information on the growth, organization, and tactics of the Venezuelan insurgent movement, particularly of the FALN urban apparatus.
254. GARCIA, PATRICIO  
1968 Chilenos combaten en la guerrilla venezolana. *Punto Final*. Suplemento. (Dec. 31). 1–16. Based on a December 12–13, 1968, interview with Comandante Francisco Prada, Chief of the FALN's *Brigada Móvil Fabricio Ojeda*, this article outlines the need for a revised guerrilla strategy in the post-Cuban revolutionary period. Rejecting the Guevara-Debray foco concept, Prada endorses "la línea de insurrección combinada," consisting of coordinated urban, suburban, and rural insurgent operations.
255. MEDINA SILVA, PEDRO and NICOLAS HURTADO BARRIOS  
1963 Por qué luchamos. Caracas. Published by the FALN, this document outlines FALN objectives and provides information on government counterinsurgent operations.

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### 256. MENENDEZ RODRIGUEZ, M.

1967 *Why We're Rebels*. Atlas. (Originally published in *Sucesos*, México, D.F., Dec. 17 and 31, 1966, and Jan. 7, 1967). 14:1:26–32. Douglas Bravo, Luben Petkoff, Elias Manuit Camaro, and Francisco Prada discuss the aims and objectives as well as activities of the FALN. Particularly interesting is the interview with Nery Carrillo, reported leader of FALN urban cadres, who examines the functions of an urban guerrilla.

### 257. MOLEIRO, MOSES

1971 *Las enseñanzas de la guerra revolucionaria en Venezuela*. In: *Diez años de insurrección en América Latina*. Volume I. Vania Bambirra, *et al.* Santiago. A detailed analysis of the errors made by guerrilla forces during the period 1962–69. Careful consideration is given to those factors which led to an emphasis on urban insurgency during the years 1962–64, the reasons behind a reversion to rural guerrilla warfare (1964–67), and finally the decision to engage in joint rural-urban operations subsequent to 1968.

### 258. SNODGRASS, THOMAS

1972 *Urban Insurgency: Observations Based on the Venezuelan Experience, 1960 to 1964*. (Unpublished MA Thesis). Austin. A detailed and well documented examination of the urban guerrilla efforts in Venezuela, containing information on the FALN and MIR organization, street-fighting tactics, weaponry, combat training, and overall strategy.

### 259. SORENSON, JOHN L.

1965 *Urban Insurgency Cases*. Santa Barbara. This excellent text, prepared under the sponsorship of the Defense Research Corporation and the Advanced Research Project Agency, contains an outstanding case study on urban insurgency in Venezuela. Included is information on the background to the guerrilla effort, the groups involved, and their major activities. (See also Item #82).

### 260. SOTO TAMAYO, CARLOS

1968 *Inteligencia militar y subversión armada*. Caracas. Published by the Ministry of Defense, this text contains a useful analysis of urban and rural guerrilla operations in Venezuela. Particular attention is devoted to an examination of the role played by urban terrorist groups.

### 261. TAYLOR, PHILIP B.

1968 *Venezuela (1958 until 1963)*. In: *Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict*. D. M. Condit, *et al.* Washington, D.C. An analysis, prepared by the Center for Research in Social Systems, of those political and economic factors responsible for the development of guerrilla warfare in Venezuela. Useful data are included on FALN and MIR operational strategy, training, recruitment, and military organization.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

While the general subject of insurgency in Latin America has been covered in some detail by a wide variety of authors, the urban guerrilla still remains relatively unknown. Only in Venezuela has this aspect of an insurgency been explored in any depth. In most other nations of the hemisphere, emphasis has been placed on an examination of guerrilla theory, particularly the contributions of Guevara and Debray, as well as attempts to implement this strategy in the sparsely settled rural areas

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of various states. As has been noted, however, all these attempts have ended disastrously. Accordingly, in view of the apparent strategic inadequacy of the foco doctrine as applied to most Latin American nations, and considering the rapidly urbanizing nature of the area, it is not surprising that an increasing number of guerrilla groups have turned to a purely urban or combined urban-rural approach to revolutionary warfare.

With the rural to urban movement by numerous guerrilla groups an established fact, it appears possible that a predominantly urban insurgent strategy will characterize much of the revolutionary activity in Latin America during the 1970s. If this is the case, the current state of research on urban guerrilla warfare will provide few, if any, answers to even such basic questions as the best tactics to use in coping with a city-centered revolutionary effort or the impact of such activity on the increasingly nationalistic and steadily expanding middle class populations of the area. Without substantially more detailed investigation into the urban guerrilla phenomenon, these and myriad other questions will remain unanswered.