russkoi ekonomicheskoi mysli published in the late 1950s under the auspices of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, to whom this is an insult to the "mighty creative powers of the Russian people." Once such preliminaries are disposed of, Soviet historians can stress dutifully the "originality" of Russian contributions which only by accident parallel some of the well-known mercantilist, physiocratic, and classical economic theses of the West.

Professor Ischboldin, who emigrated from Russia long ago, strives in this book to offer a "synthesis" of the opposing views of those who stress the primacy of the exogenous or of the endogenous influences on Russian thought. According to him, Russian economic thought "reflected a rather peculiar non-Western social environment," and because of this went "beyond a mere imitation of the Western train of ideas." On the other hand, since Russia went through various historical "phases" similar to those of the West, a certain parallelism did develop in Eastern and Western trends of economic thought. Having established this quite sensible framework, Ischboldin goes on to present in twenty-one brief chapters what he calls the evolution of the "non-Marxian socioeconomic thought" from the end of the fifteenth to the middle of the twentieth century. An apparent believer in the French saying "On n'est jamais aussi bien servi que par soi-même," Ischboldin tops his book with a chapter devoted to himself and to his own "School of Economic Synthesis."

The volume is conceived somewhat along the lines of Heilbroner's well-known *The Worldly Philosophers,* but unfortunately lacks the polish or depth of its model. Short biographies of writers succeed one another—from Ivan Peresvetov to Boris Ischboldin—with a too careful attention to trivia and a painful dearth of insight and analysis. I may disagree with Pashkov; but there is, alas, more to gain from the perusal of his biased volumes than from the study of the "unbiased" effort of Ischboldin.

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SOCIALIST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REFORMS: FROM EXTENSIVE TO INTENSIVE GROWTH UNDER CENTRAL PLANNING IN THE USSR, EASTERN EUROPE, AND YUGOSLAVIA. By *J. Wilczynski.* New York and Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1972. xvii, 350 pp. $17.50.

At first glance this is a most welcome book for the "general reader," a kind of nontechnical vade mecum of the principal static and dynamic features of "socialist" economics, the perplexing diversities of the economic reforms of the sixties in the eight countries, and the problems of their relations with one another and with the "capitalist" world. In addition, the author boldly offers projections of their growth, individually, to the year 2000. Alas, this ambitious task does not come off well; on balance, the general reader may have been done a disservice. It may be instructive to ask why.

To begin with, the work aims to be at once a treatise on broad historical trends affecting the Communist economies and a kind of statistical compendium for the eight countries. Unfortunately the generalizations are not always supported, hence too often they fail to be convincing. The statistical data are very conveniently

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brought together; but though the author is clearly aware of the problem, the reader is not adequately warned of the data's limitations.

The author's chief conceptual premise is the distinction between "extensive growth . . . based on increases in the volume of the factors of production, especially labor and capital, [and] . . . intensive growth [based on] . . . increases in productivity" (p. xv). That the transition from the former to the latter occasions institutional changes (economic reforms), as the author argues, is a familiar line of reasoning, frequently espoused by economic reformers in Eastern Europe as well as by Western students. (Among the first to develop it in the West was Erik Boettcher in his 1959 book, *Die sowjetische Wirtschaftspolitik am Scheidewege*, not mentioned in the work under review.) This line of reasoning has a good deal of merit, but when the definitions of "extensive" and "intensive" lack rigor, as they do in the present work, the ensuing argument leaves much to be desired. Moreover, in our view it would be more useful to restrict attention to one factor—labor in the modern sector—since it is the exhaustion of potential reserves of this factor that makes the crucial difference (as Boettcher pointed out), even if capital formation still proceeds at a very high rate (as in fact it is doing).

But perhaps a more fundamental weakness of the work is the failure to distinguish between two entirely different kinds of economic reform: that which merely delegates some functions within and tries to improve the operation of the bureaucratic pyramid, and that which largely dismantles the bureaucracy and the command economy and attempts to replace them with a market mechanism. This failure to distinguish between what we may call "minor" and "major" reforms, respectively, is responsible for the awkward organization of the book. That is, the book's chapters deal separately with planning, prices, finance, incentives, international trade, and so forth, on the implicit assumption that these functions and problems can be separated out from their overall contexts and discussed for all the countries at once, instead of treating the two *kinds of reform* as integral wholes. This cannot be done satisfactorily. Even a poorly informed reader is bound to notice the problem when the author's generalizations about particular aspects of the reforms are constantly followed by qualifications and exceptions, and the countries that prompt the qualifications and exceptions are *usually the same*. The author often uses such phrases as the "new system"; but there is no one such thing for Eastern Europe as a whole.

Perhaps in part for the same reason, the author's appraisal of the success of the reforms is unclear. Throughout the book he generally takes a sanguine view of the various specific measures. Yet toward the end the book (pp. 300 ff.) he reports —without disputing—that Western students have noted little positive effect of the reforms. The reader is left puzzled. The author's expectation that "none of these countries will revert to the old system of directive centralized planning and management" (p. 60) is not implausible if taken strictly and applied to the long run. But it does overlook the possibility of substantial reversion in the shorter run— which is just what has happened in regard to the minor reforms in Bulgaria, East Germany, and the USSR at the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies. Some would say that the minor reforms are inherently nonviable and that re-centralization was to be expected, thus once again emphasizing the importance of distinguishing between the two kinds of reform.

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