

tions, that the Victorians learned what they needed to know about anatomy from statues and paintings. Gay reminds us that "though they were normally idealized, private parts were public property." Perhaps; but in 1885, Henry Horsley, signing himself "A British Matron," launched an attack upon the depiction of the nude by such painters as Leighton and Watts that was quintessentially Victorian in its overheated indignation. Gay's last chapter, "Fortifications for the Self," explains as a defense what seems to be hypocrisy in figures such as Horsley: "Evasiveness, cant, prudishness, hypocrisy, were cultural defense mechanisms in a time of upheaval, a search for safety."

If this first volume has more questions than persuasive answers and leads to as much impatience as enlightenment, it usefully forces us to look anew at old data, and it presents us with a Victorian repast of new data, complete with a wonderful bibliographical essay. We look here through a funny keyhole. We get an alien, jumbled, frequently steamy view of the unconscious life of an era. The steam may have distorted the view, just as the authoritative voice of the historian may have skewed the evidence. **WV**

Correspondence


THE POST-PERSHING WORLD

To the Editors: Peter Goudinoff's review of Paul Bracken's *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* (*Worldview*, June) should have dealt with the book's implications for the post-Pershing II world, which can be characterized as follows:

1. The Soviets said that deployment of the Pershing IIs would require them to go to a "launch upon electronic warning" state of readiness—i.e., whenever their network of radar and computers indicated that the Pershing IIs had been fired at them, their missiles would automatically fire in response.

2. Because of the speed and devastating accuracy of the Pershing IIs, they could wipe out the Soviet ability to respond within six-to-eight minutes after being launched. This would leave the Soviets no time to double check whenever their radar/computer network indicated a Pershing II launch.

3. The U.S. radar/computer networks, NORAD, etc. have produced false "electronic warnings" many times: Computer chips have failed which were interpreted at the time as confirmation that the Soviets had launched their missiles, a U.S. spy satellite interpreted a fire in a gas pipeline as a launch of Soviet missiles based nearby,



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etc. Fortunately, because we were not in a launch-on-electronic-warning posture, we took the time to double check, and nothing happened other than an increase in the stress level of the missile and bomber crews.

4. The Korean airliner atrocity indicated that the Soviet ability to detect, intercept, and identify an incoming flying object was quite deficient: It took them two-and-a-half hours to get close enough to shoot. Nonetheless, because of their paranoid suspicion of our intentions, they were willing to shoot first and ask questions later.

Thus, the Pershing IIs have not added to our security or to that of Western Europe. Rather, they have reduced us to hostages to the Soviet radar/computer network. The establishment of the jointly staffed "crisis centers" described by Mr. Goudinoff in the next-to-last paragraph are imperative; and U.S.-Soviet talks to that end should be initiated immediately.

James A. Bush

Detroit, Mich.

GRENADA & THE PRESS

To the Editors: I read with interest in the *July Worldview* the piece on the press and

censorship in the Grenada episode ("War News: Under New Management," by Bernard Diederich). Since it was written by a newsmen, it painted one side of the picture. Several articles on the same subject appeared in the July issue of the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*. They give the other side of the picture. These are written from the viewpoint of the men who were told to do the job and put their lives on the line.

The articles might explain the last paragraph of the Bernard Diederich article in which he described how a bunch of soldiers in a jeep "accelerated and snarled" when approached by a newsmen.

I happened to have been on the nearby island of Petit St. Vincent immediately after the invasion and met and talked to quite a few of the officers involved, all of whom were Vietnam veterans. I was amazed at the depth of resentment these men—ordinary combat captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels—displayed with respect to the way they felt the press had treated them in the past. They all can't be wrong.

Maybe the press should listen to what these men are saying rather than talk of "Mr. Reagan's victory over the press."

I. V. de Chellis

New York, N.Y.