

DIPLOMAT IN BERLIN, 1933–1939: PAPERS AND MEMOIRS OF JÓZEF LIPSKI, AMBASSADOR OF POLAND. By *Józef Lipski*. Edited by *Wacław Jędrzejewicz*. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968. xxxviii, 679 pp. \$17.50.

This is not the place or the occasion to analyze Polish foreign policy in the years preceding the German invasion of Poland. Nor is it in order to subject to examination the qualities of Lipski's diplomacy. Suffice it to say that most scholars consider Beck's foreign policy catastrophic for Poland and that Ambassador Józef Lipski played a key role in the development of Polish-German relations in the critical years that led to the outbreak of World War II. According to Wacław Jędrzejewicz, editor of this volume, Lipski was the "main author and architect" (p. vii) of the Polish-German Declaration of Nonaggression of September 26, 1934, which—it is today generally recognized—opened the road to Nazi expansion and the collapse of the French system of security in Europe (though not without a French share of responsibility). Five years later he was the crown witness to the ruins of his own architectural structure when his policy of "neighborliness" with Germany ended in her invasion of Poland.

However, criticism aside, the volume presented by Professor Jędrzejewicz is a most significant documentary contribution to our knowledge of the intricate relations between Poland and Germany in the turbulent prewar period of European diplomacy. It contains 163 documents, many of which offer new insights and complement in a substantial way the governmental documents—Polish, British, French, and German—published in the past. The useful comments provided by the editor serve to establish the sequence of events mentioned in the documents. The book is an indispensable source for students of the diplomatic history of the interwar period.

JOSEF KORBEL  
*University of Denver*

POLAND AND THE WESTERN POWERS, 1938–1939: A STUDY IN THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE. By *Anna M. Cienciala*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968. x, 310 pp. \$9.00.

The object of Professor Cienciala's study, as she states it in her preface, is twofold. First, she seeks to explain "the nature and historical roots of the problems facing Polish foreign policy in 1938–39" and the way in which the Polish leadership responded to them. Second, she attempts to illustrate the political interdependence of Western and Eastern Europe, the interdependence that hinged on the German problem. The author stresses that the attitude of France and Britain toward Poland and Eastern Europe as a whole was essentially a reflection of their policy toward Germany. At the same time (and it is perhaps the most important and original contribution of the book), she demonstrates that the policy of Paris and London toward Berlin was a decisive factor in the individual reactions of Germany's eastern neighbors to the threat of the resurgent, revisionist, and increasingly militarist Third Reich.

In an excellent introductory chapter, entitled "The Background, 1918–1938," the author points out that among the post-Versailles states of East Central Europe, Poland was in a uniquely disadvantageous position because she was the neighbor of

two dynamic powers who were both dissatisfied with the post-World War I settlement. Poland not only had to strive to avert the German menace, but she also had to consider the possibility of Soviet encroachment and expansion. Thus Poland had to navigate between two dangers: becoming a German vassal or a Soviet satellite. The author illustrates with numerous examples that the possibilities for a sensible, acceptable compromise on either side were very limited. Until 1932 (as far as the Soviet Union was concerned) and 1934 (in the case of Germany) Poland's relations with both her big neighbors were virtually in a state of cold war; only the nonaggression pact signed in those years normalized them somewhat. One of the ways to counterbalance the overwhelming strength of the two giants was to enlist the assistance of the Western democracies. The Western Powers, however, but especially Britain, regarded East Central Europe as a nuisance and extended little help to the countries of the area. France, after having signed a treaty of defensive alliance with Poland in 1921, persistently tried to disengage herself from the affairs of East Central Europe. Locarno was the first step in that direction. Consequently Poland's limited resources were strained to the utmost just to survive. The author, however, is not concerned with Polish domestic problems; she focuses entirely on foreign affairs, especially on the diplomatic game conducted by Colonel Józef Beck in order to cope with a host of intricate problems facing a medium-sized country precariously wedged in between two aggressive powers.

The book starts with a tightly woven, well-reasoned introduction, and then deals with the Anschluss, the Czechoslovak crisis, and the interlude before the storm—the last moments of peace following the Munich conference. The chapter entitled "The Parting of the Ways: The British Guarantee to Poland" and an epilogue and conclusion close this compact but extremely rich book. It originated as a doctoral dissertation, but grew into a first-class monograph that compares favorably with anything written on the subject. In the opinion of the present reviewer, the introductory and concluding chapters together form the best short summary of Poland's foreign policy in any language. A few minor mistakes do not detract from the overall value of the work. On the whole, this is the best defense of Colonel Beck's policy to be published so far.

M. K. DZIEWANOWSKI  
*Boston University*

**FROM PRAGUE AFTER MUNICH: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1938-1940.**

By *George F. Kennan*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. xxviii, 266 pp. \$6.50.

George F. Kennan has included in this handsome volume selected German, Czech, and Slovak documents, the text of the Nazi Germanization plan designed to solve the Czech question "once for all" (a plan that, fortunately, was never carried out), and materials containing explanations of the conflicts between the Czechs and the Slovaks, of the latter's resentment of Jewish domination of some sectors of the economy in Slovakia, and of economic problems in the province caused by capital investment owned almost exclusively by the Czechs and the Jews. The greatest value of the book, however, is Kennan's perception of the climate of opinion at the time of writing his confidential letters from his post at Prague (and later Berlin) to the State Department. In this context the renowned diplomat demonstrates how liberalism and democracy were discredited in Czechoslovakia after the Nazi occupation of the Sudetenland. Earlier, Masaryk's democracy had been almost universally