



ORIGINAL ARTICLE

## Selfhood, persistence, and immortality in Jaina philosophy

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(Received 17 February 2023; revised 15 November 2023; accepted 15 November 2023)

### Abstract

This article explores the notion of immortality in Jaina philosophy by focusing on the problem of the persistence of the self. It considers the concept of persistence within the broader context of Jaina metaphysics and its specific application to living beings. The article analyses the relationship between the immaterial self and its material body to determine which aspects of living beings can be deemed immortal or persisting beyond death. It also investigates the state of liberation as an immortal condition. Drawing from the *Tattvârtha-sûtra* and four of its commentaries, the article demonstrates the complexity of the Jaina treatment of the issue of the self's persistence over time and its commitment to the doctrine of non-one-sidedness. It also shows that Jaina philosophers deal with this critical philosophical problem in a way that reflects their engagement with the intellectual debates of their time.

**Keywords:** Jaina philosophy; selfhood; persistence; immortality; death

### Introduction

This article examines the Jaina perspective on immortality by exploring philosophical treatments of the issue of the persistence of the self.<sup>1</sup> It first provides an overview of the fundamental principles of Jaina metaphysics, giving special attention to the concept of persistence. Next, it delves into the topic of immortality in relation to non-liberated beings and examines the Jaina conception of the self, its relationship with the body as that which is other to it, and the way the embodied self persists over time through successive rebirths. Finally, the article shifts its focus to liberated beings, analysing the nature of persistence after the self has transitioned from the final death in the body to the state of liberation. The article demonstrates that the problem of the persistence of the self over time, or diachronic identity, was a significant concern for Jaina philosophers, who endeavoured to resolve it in ways that reflect their commitment to the doctrine of non-one-sidedness. It also shows that their treatment of this topic reveals their familiarity with the broader philosophical debates of their time.

While tracing certain fundamental concepts historically, the article focuses on analysing five texts that include the root text, the *Tattvârtha-sûtra*,<sup>2</sup> and four commentaries. The author of the *Tattvârtha-sûtra* is referred to as Umāsvāti in the Śvetāmbara Jaina tradition

and Umāsvāmin in the Digambara Jaina tradition.<sup>3</sup> The text provides an early systematic presentation of the Jaina doctrine, previously scattered across the vast canonical corpus, and is the Jaina response to the *sūtra*-style Sanskrit texts<sup>4</sup> that were emerging in South Asia at the time. It is a rare text in the Jaina tradition that is considered authoritative by both main sects, despite slight differences in their respective versions. The exact dating of the text remains uncertain, but recent scholarship places it in the second half of the fourth century CE (c. 350–400 CE) (Balcerowicz 2008, 35, note 23; Balcerowicz 2017b, 191; den Boer 2020, 67). The earliest extant Digambara commentary on the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* is Pūjyapāda Devanandin's *Sarvārtha-siddhi* (c. fifth–sixth centuries), which was followed by Akalaṅka's *Tattvārtha-vārtika*, or *Rāja-vārtika*, in the eighth century. Akalaṅka's text often functions as a subcommentary on the *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, as it reuses substantial portions of it. The earliest extant Śvetāmbara commentary on the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* is the *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya*, the authorship of which is debated. Some maintain it was composed by the author of the root text, an existent practice in this philosophical context, while others argue that the root text and the *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya* have different authors. Piotr Balcerowicz (2008, 35, note 23; 2017b, 191) and Lucas den Boer (2020, 67) place the composition of the text between 400 and 450 CE.<sup>5</sup> The final text analysed in the article is the *Tattvārthādhigama-tīkā* (c. seventh–ninth centuries), Siddhasenagaṇi Gandhahastin's subcommentary on the *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya*. Exploring the root text through its commentarial lineages is beneficial since it allows tracing conceptual developments and potential disagreements in traditional exegesis.<sup>6</sup>

### Origination, cessation, and persistence: the foundations of Jaina metaphysics

This section focuses on Jaina metaphysics and explains the basis it establishes for considering immortality. It underscores the central role of persistence in the Jaina understanding of reality and highlights the importance of distinguishing between dynamic persistence and immutable permanence. Jaina philosophers are proponents of metaphysical pluralism, acknowledging the reality of multiple substances (*dravya*) of various kinds that exist independently of our cognition. The *Tattvārtha-sūtra* presents the foundational principle that substance is real by stating that its distinctive characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*)<sup>7</sup> is 'existing' (*sat*).<sup>8</sup> In turn, the text continues, existing is possessed of (*yukta*) origination (*utpāda*), cessation (*vyaya*), and persistence (*dhrauvya*).<sup>9</sup> What is the relationship between existing as the possessor and its characteristics as the possessed in this context? In response to a hypothetical objection that one thing being possessed of something else implies that the two entities are different from each other, the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* indicates that in the case at hand such a difference cannot be absolute and highlights the necessary bond between existing and its three features by analysing the semantic function of the word 'possessed of' (*yukta*) in the *sūtra*.

[An opponent] says that the word 'possessed of' (*yukta-śabda*) is used when there is difference (*bheda*) [between entities]. Just as [it is used in the sentence], 'Devadatta is possessed of a stick.' If that is so, non-reality (*abhāva*) of those three [i.e. origination, cessation, and persistence] and the substance possessed of them obtains. [Response:] This fault does not apply. Even in the case of non-difference (*abheda*), the word 'possessed of' is used in a certain respect (*kathaṃcit*, lit. somehow), with regard to the viewpoint of difference (*bheda-nayāpekṣā*). Just as [it is used in the sentence], 'A pillar is possessed of firmness (*sāra-yukta*).' If that is so, the statement about existing (*sad-vyapadeśa*) is suitable because of their necessary connection (*avinā-bhāva*) [i.e. the three features are necessarily connected with existing]. Or the word 'possessed of' (*yukta*) indicates constitution (*samādhi*). 'Possessed of' (*yukta*) means 'constituted

of' (*samāhita*) – in other words, consisting of that nature (*tad-ātmaka*). To put it simply, 'existing is possessed of origination, cessation, and persistence' means that it consists of the nature of origination, cessation, and persistence.<sup>10</sup>

The commentary establishes that existing and its characteristics are non-different in the sense that they form a necessary connection, where their separation would result in their non-existence. Yet, in a certain respect, it observes, they may still be differentiated in the way that entities and their essential properties can be. In a similar vein that emphasizes the essentiality of the relation, the *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya* identifies the possession of the threefold dynamics as the distinctive characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of existing (*sat*), and the *Tattvārthādhigama-ṭikā* states that the three traits<sup>11</sup> represent its inherent nature (*svabhāva*; lit. own-nature), noting that all three of them assembled (*samudāta*) necessarily denote existence (*sattva*). The *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya* and the *Tattvārthādhigama-ṭikā* add that anything other (*anya*) than that is 'non-existing' (*asat*).<sup>12</sup>

This means that substance, by definition, can never be non-existing, and as existing, it is inherently marked by the specific threefold dynamics of coming into being, ceasing to be, and persisting. Persistence over time is thus an essential characteristic of substances as existing entities, but it is always also accompanied by non-persistence. The *Sarvārtha-siddhi* provides an illustration of how a single existing entity can be subjected to such seemingly opposing forces:

Originating (*utpādana*) – origination (*utpāda*) – is the obtainment of a different state (*bhāvāntarāvāpti*) due to both [kinds of] causes (*ubhaya-nimitta-vaśa*)<sup>13</sup> by the conscious (*cetana*) or non-conscious (*acetana*) substance (*dravya*) without giving up (*ajahat*) its (*sva*) nature (*jāti*), like the mode of the pot (*ghaṭa-paryāyavat*) [in relation to] the clod of clay (*mṛt-piṇḍa*). So also, cessation (*vyaya*) is the loss of the previous state (*pūrva-bhāva-vigamana*). Just as the form of the clod (*piṇḍākṛti*) [is lost] in the origination of the pot (*ghaṭōtpatti*). 'Persistent' (*dhruva*) means 'it persists' (*dhruvati*), 'it is stable' (*sthiri-bhavati*), because there is no cessation or arising (*vyayōdayābhāva*) with respect to the beginningless inherent nature of undergoing transformation (*anādi-pāriṇāmika-svabhāva*). The state (*bhāva*) or action (*karma*) of a persistent [entity] (*dhruva*) is persistence (*dhruvya*). Just as there is continuity of clay, and so on (*mṛḍ-ādy-anvaya*), in the states of the clod of clay, the pot, and so on (*mṛt-piṇḍa-ghātādy-avasthā*).<sup>14</sup>

The example explains that origination and cessation refer to processes through which substances acquire new states and lose prior ones, caused by various factors. The inherent nature of the substance remains constant throughout these changes, just like clay retains its inherent nature despite being moulded into different shapes.

The subsequent *sūtra* designates an entity as 'eternal' (*nitya*) if its nature (*tad-bhāva*)<sup>15</sup> does not cease (*avyaya*),<sup>16</sup> and the *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya* expounds that the term 'eternal' applies to that which does not, and will not, cease in terms of its nature (*bhāva*) of existing (*sat*).<sup>17</sup> The *Tattvārtha-vārtika* clarifies that the root text refers to substance (*dravya*), meaning that *substance* is eternal in the sense that it does not cease in its nature.<sup>18</sup> This is aligned with the root text's earlier description of substances as eternal (*nitya*).<sup>19</sup> Eternality in this context must thus be clearly distinguished from immutable permanence.<sup>20</sup> Substances are eternal insofar as they persist over time, but they are not immutable since they endure precisely in their dynamic nature.

The *Sarvārtha-siddhi* further states that 'its nature' (*tad-bhāva*) is the cause of recognition (*pratyabhijñāna-hetutā*), which refers to the act of remembering (*smaraṇa*) that 'this is

the same as that'. The text emphasizes that recognition does not occur accidentally and indicates that it is brought about by the object's persistence in its nature over time.<sup>21</sup>

An object (*vastu*), previously observed (*prāg-dṛṣṭa*) with a certain character (*ātman*) [and] again [observed] with that very character (*ātman*), is recognized as 'This is the same as that', owing to [its] nature (*bhāva*). If there were absolute destruction (*atyanta-nirodha*) or merely a new appearance (*abhinava-prādur-bhāva-mātra*), then there would be the impossibility of remembering (*smaraṇānupapatti*). Subject to that (*tad-ādhipa*), worldly dealings (*loka-saṃvyavahāra*) would be impeded. Therefore, in the absence of that, non-ceasing (*avyaya*) – non-ceasing in its nature (*tad-bhāvavyaya*) – is determined as 'eternal' (*nitya*).<sup>22</sup>

In this argument from recognition, the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* underscores the significance of the persistence of objects over time, noting that without it, remembering and the related recognition of previously observed objects would be impossible. It also indicates that our experience supports the existence of enduring objects since our everyday dealings rely on remembering objects and would be hindered without it. The concept of persistence over time was a central concern in classical Indian philosophy, especially in the context of the Buddhist rejection of the permanent self (*anātman*). The argument from recognition was commonly used to prove the reality of persistence, particularly as it pertains to an enduring consciousness or self,<sup>23</sup> and the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* seems to show familiarity with the philosophical debates on this topic.

However, in line with what was indicated above, the text qualifies its commitment to persistence by rejecting absolute eternality, which would render change impossible. This would inhibit, it states, the mechanism of the cycle of rebirths and the possibility of liberation from it.

But this should be understood in a certain respect (*kathamcit*). If there were eternality (*nityatva*) in every way (*sarvathā*), there would be impediment to the process of the cycle of rebirths (*saṃsāra*) and the means of its coming to an end because of the non-existence of [the origination of] a different state (*anyathā-bhāvābhāva*).<sup>24</sup>

The *Tattvārthādhigama-ṭīkā* similarly cautions against misunderstanding the term 'eternal': 'What is meant is the eternality of transformation (*pariṇāma-nityatā*) because of the use of the word "nature" (*bhāva*). Unchangeable eternality is rejected. Otherwise, the *sūtra* would state: "Eternal is that which is itself unceasing" [instead of "Eternal is that whose nature is unceasing"].'<sup>25</sup> If the author of the *sūtra* had intended eternality to mean the entity's immutable permanence, explains the *Tattvārthādhigama-ṭīkā*, he would not have added the word 'nature' to it. Adding this word means that the entity's nature of existing – together with its characteristics – never ceases. Rather than being permanently unchanging, the entity is eternally characterized by the threefold dynamics.

This means that substance by its inherent nature *eternally* persists, that is, remains identical over time, while it also undergoes continuous change, that is, becomes different over time, just like a clay pot exhibits both the continuity of the same substance from its previous state and its changing form, as it transforms from a shapeless clod to a pot shape. This metaphysics embodies the Jaina doctrine of non-one-sidedness (*anekānta-vāda*).<sup>26</sup> Such a metaphysical foundation prompted Jaina philosophers to place significant emphasis on the importance of considering multiple perspectives and challenging one-sided views when examining objects.<sup>27</sup>

According to the texts examined here, all substances share a fundamental structure that enables such non-one-sided operation. The root text states that they possess a set

of qualities (*guṇa*) and modes (*pariyāya*),<sup>28</sup> and it defines qualities as having substance as a substrate (*āśraya*).<sup>29</sup> The *Sarvārtha-siddhi* asserts that qualities are (permanently) connected (*anvayin*) with the substance, while the modes separate (*vyatirekin*) from it, yet the substance is still endowed with both.<sup>30</sup> Similarly, the *Tattvārthādhiḡama-bhāṣya* notes that a mode represents a different state (*bhāvāntara*) and a different name (*saṃjñāntara*), and that substance is where both qualities and modes are found.<sup>31</sup> This indicates that substance persists over time with its coexisting qualities but transforms in its modes through which it assumes different states. Jaina philosophers thus propose relative, rather than absolute, qualitative identity of substance over time. Substance remains qualitatively identical over time in some respects but also becomes qualitatively different in others. At the same time, the substance's function as a substrate unifies these dynamics and ensures its numerical identity over time.<sup>32</sup>

### Life, death, and (re)birth: persistence of the embodied self

How does this model of qualitative identity and difference of substance over time apply to the self, and what are its implications for the Jaina conception of immortality? In the texts analysed here, embodied living beings represent an association of two substances – the immaterial living substance/self (*jīva/ātman*) and matter (*puḡgala*) – that interact within the broader causal network constituted by the other substances of the medium of motion (*dharmā*), medium of rest (*adharma*), space (*ākāśa*), and, according to some, time (*kāla*). The relationship between the living and the material substance is rooted in the prevalent South Asian religious idea that life is a beginningless and potentially endless series of embodiments, and that one's experience in and the character of these embodiments are shaped by karma (*karman*), the result of one's bodily, verbal, and mental activities. Jainism gradually came to accept that karma is subtle matter that binds to the immaterial self whenever its activities are motivated by the passions (*kaṣāya*) of anger (*krodha*), pride (*māna*), deceitfulness (*māyā*), or greed (*lobha*). The Jaina soteriological path aims to suppress, reduce, and ultimately eliminate all bound karma, leading to the liberation of the immaterial self.<sup>33</sup> Despite various factors that may support or hinder spiritual advancement, Jains place the responsibility of exerting effort toward the goal of liberation at the feet of each individual. It is through their own agency that living beings may exit the cycle of rebirths (*saṃsāra*), and Jains propose liberation to be eternal and constant in its perfection.<sup>34</sup>

When considering the Jaina understanding of immortality, it is thus first important to understand how living beings endure over time while embodied, including their transition from one birth form to another in the series of rebirths. To accomplish this, it is necessary to examine the details of the Jaina conception of the immaterial self and investigate its relationship with matter during an individual embodiment and the transition from death to rebirth. The Sanskrit term that the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* uses to refer to the immaterial living substance is *jīva* (from the Sanskrit verbal root *jīv-*, to live), and it divides this category into beings that are in the cycle of rebirths (*saṃsārin*) and liberated beings (*mukta*).<sup>35</sup> The *Tattvārthādhiḡama-tīkā* provides the following explanation of the terms *saṃsārin* and *mukta*:

*Saṃsāra*, which has the form of the eight types of karma (*karmāṣṭaka-rūpa*),<sup>36</sup> is that by the support (*avaṣṭambha*) of which takes place the wandering (*saṃsāraṇa*)<sup>37</sup> [through the cycle of rebirths] – the going (*gamana*) here and there – of the self (*ātman*). Those that have it [i.e. *saṃsāra* in the form of karma] are *saṃsārin*s. Or *saṃsāra* is the name for strong (*balavat*) delusion (*moha*)<sup>38</sup> – due to being bound

by it, [those beings are referred to as] *saṃsārins*. Or *saṃsāra* is the condition of hell-beings, and so on (*nārakādy-avasthā*). Due to being tied to that condition, [those beings are referred to as] *saṃsārins*. Liberated beings (*mukta*) are indeed liberated. If you say: '[Liberated] from where?' [This] is to be said [in response]: 'From the continuity [of rebirths] – *saṃsāra*.' Therefore, those who have completely shaken off karma are called 'liberated from *saṃsāra*'.<sup>39</sup>

Rather than being mutually exclusive, the three definitions of *saṃsārins* seem to be related, representing various possible angles of looking at the condition of non-liberated beings. Owing to the influence of karma, which continues to be accumulated because of its delusion, the self (*ātman*) keeps passing through various states of existence, such as that of hell-beings. *Ātman* is another term that the commentaries analysed here use to refer to the immaterial living substance. It is grammatically used as a noun in the sense of the 'self' as well as a reflexive pronoun that means 'oneself'.<sup>40</sup>

Besides that of hell-beings mentioned in the passage, other possible states of existence (*gati*) that the self can pass through during its journey in *saṃsāra* are those of humans (*manuṣya*), heavenly beings (*deva*), and the category that includes animals, plants, and earth-, water-, air-, and fire-bodied beings (*tiryāṅc*).<sup>41</sup> While humans represent the only embodied form in which it is possible to attain liberation, they are also just one type of embodiment that the self 'wandering' through *saṃsāra* can take on. What is presently a human being has inhabited numerous kinds of non-human bodies in the past and will probably do so in the future. Humans are also not the only kind of living being that possesses the mind (*manas*),<sup>42</sup> which according to the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* enables its bearers to reflect on virtues and faults (*guṇa-doṣa-vicāratva*),<sup>43</sup> even though some Jaina texts single humans out for their continuous mental activity and the ability to use their mind particularly well.<sup>44</sup> Despite the exceptionality of the human condition, it thus seems potentially misleading to frame the issue of the diachronic persistence of embodied living beings in the Jaina context as one of 'personal identity' if what is meant with the expression is only the diachronic persistence of humans.

In what way does a living being endure throughout its series of embodied existences? In the context of explaining the ways in which matter provides support (*upakāra*) to embodied living beings, the *Tattvārthādhigama-ṭikā* defines life (*jīvita*) as the non-cessation (*avyuparama*) of breathing, with the duration of each embodied existence being determined by the association of the living being with the longevity-determining karma (*āyu-karman*), specific karma that decides the duration of an individual life. Death, conversely, is the cessation of breathing and, implicitly, the living being's connection with this specific kind of karma: 'Life (*jīvita*) is the non-cessation (*avyuparama*) of the particular activity called 'inhalation and exhalation' of a human being (*puruṣa*) who has a connection with the [material] substance of life (*āyur-dravya*), which occasions (*nimitta*) the duration of [each] existence (*bhava-sthiti-nimitta*). Death (*maraṇa*) is the complete cessation (*uparati*) of it.'<sup>45</sup> Living beings thus persist as living in a particular embodied form until their connection with longevity-determining karma and, consequently, essential vitalities, such as breathing, is disrupted.<sup>46</sup> Upon death, an almost instantaneous rebirth, which will be discussed below, occurs.

However, there is a more fundamental way in which a living being persists throughout its embodiments. The previous section suggests that the self as a substance must eternally persist. Accordingly, the *Tattvārthādhigama-ṭikā* states that while assuming the forms of heavenly beings, and so on, the living substance (*jīva*) never changes so much that it loses its existence (*sattva-tyāga*).<sup>47</sup> The previous section also indicates that the continuously existing self must have certain distinctive properties that always inhere in it. The *Tattvārtha-sūtra* lists five categories of states (*bhāva*) that form the nature (*svatattva*) of

the living substance (*jīva*) and are not found in other types of substances. Some of these states are dependent on karma, while others, called *pāriṇāmika-bhāva*, are independent of any cause other than the self.<sup>48</sup> There are three such independent states: (1) the state of being alive (*jīvatva*); (2) the state of being able to be liberated (*bhavyatva*); and (3) the state of not being able to be liberated (*abhavyatva*).<sup>49</sup> As indicated, all three of these states are particular to the living substance and non-common (*asādhāraṇa*) with the other kinds of substances.<sup>50</sup> The commentaries also mention additional beginningless inherent states (*anādi-pāriṇāmika*) of the living substance that are likewise independent of karmic dynamics but are not unique to the living substance and are common (*sādhāraṇa/samāna*) with the non-living types of substances. The *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya* and the *Tattvārtha-vārtika* provide very similar lists of these states: (1) existence (*astitva*); (2) otherness (*anyatva*); (3) agency (*kartr̥tva*); (4) the state of being an enjoyer (*bhoktr̥tva*); (5) possession of qualities (*guṇavattva*) or possession of modes (*par̥yāyavattva*); (6) non-pervasiveness (*asarvagatatva*); (7) the beginningless state of bondage with the series of karma (*anādi-karma-santāna-baddhatva*) or the beginningless state of bondage with the series of binding (*anādi-santati-bandhana-baddhatva*); (8) extension (*pradeśavattva*, lit. the state of having space points); (9) formlessness (*arūpatva*); and (10) eternality (*nityatva*). The *Tattvārtha-vārtika* also adds (11) the state of moving upwards (*ūrdhva-gatitva*).<sup>51</sup> These states, unique and shared, continuously co-exist with the embodied living substance as it persists over time, and by listing existence as one of the inherent states of the living substance, the texts again affirm the impossibility of its complete destruction.<sup>52</sup>

With respect to the unique, independent state of being alive (*jīvatva*), the *Tattvārtha-vārtika* addresses two hypothetical objections to its independence that relate to two material factors affecting embodied life. First, it considers whether the living substance (*jīva*) possesses the state of being alive (*jīvatva*) because of the rise of the longevity-determining karma (*āyur-dravyōdaya*), a material substance that determines the lifespan of living beings in each individual embodied form, as noted above.<sup>53</sup> It dismisses this suggestion by noting that in the same way, through a connection with this material substance, non-living substances could also attain the state of being alive, a capacity they do not have.<sup>54</sup> Also, if the state of being alive depended on the connection with longevity-determining karma, this would lead to the unwanted consequence (*prasaṅga*) of perfected beings (*siddha*), who have removed all karma, being non-living.<sup>55</sup> Next, the text attends to another hypothetical challenge with respect to the independence of the state of being alive by examining the fact that it is observed across the three times of the past ('It lived', *ajīvit*), present ('It lives', *jīvati*), and future ('It will live', *jīviṣyati*). This, it notes, indicates the possession of the so-called vitalities, or life forces (*prāṇa*), which are products of karma and indicators that an entity is 'alive'.<sup>56</sup> In response, the text cautions that in the case of conventionally used words (*rūḍhi-śabda*), the verbal activity (*kriyā*), which has a derived meaning, is not the essence (*tantra*). This is similar to how the word 'cow' (*go*) is etymologically connected with the verbal activity of going ('It goes', *gacchati*, from the verbal root *gam-*, to go), but this does not represent the essence of the cow.<sup>57</sup> In the same way, temporary material marks of embodied life that might ordinarily be considered as related to living do not represent the essence of the living substance.

Finally, as an alternative to these suggestions to which it commits, the *Tattvārtha-vārtika* proposes that the meaning of the word 'jīva' is just consciousness (*caitanya*),<sup>58</sup> or, as it states shortly after, 'Consciousness (*caitanya*) is the beginningless (*anādi*) inherent nature (*svabhāva*) of the self (*ātman*) [. . .].'<sup>59</sup> Here, the *Tattvārtha-vārtika* is aligned with the *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, which explains the state of being alive (*jīvatva*) as consciousness (*caitanya*).<sup>60</sup> This means that what makes a living substance a living substance is its possession of consciousness, which it has had as its inherent nature since beginningless time. If a living substance were to lose it, it would cease to be, which is, according to these texts,

impossible since substances are, as indicated in the previous section, eternal. The aspect of living beings that persists throughout the changing series of embodiments is thus not the substantial self that has been abstracted from all its unique characteristics. Instead, the self endures as a conscious entity.

In another place, the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* similarly states that the living substance is distinctively characterized by consciousness (*cetanā-lakṣaṇa*), which is divided in multiple ways (*anekadhā*).<sup>61</sup> The *Tattvārtha-vārtika* explains:

Because consciousness is its inherent nature (*cetanā-svabhāvatva*), the living substance (*jīva*) is distinctively characterized by its varieties (*tad-vikalpa-lakṣaṇa*). Consciousness is the inherent nature of the living substance in consequence of which it is distinguished from other substances. Its varieties (*tad-vikalpa*) are knowledge, and so on (*jñānādi*). Due to being a receptacle of the existing of which the self (*ātman*) becomes a knower (*jñātr*), a perceiver (*draṣṭr*), an agent (*kartr*), and an enjoyer (*bhoktr*), that is the distinctive characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of the living substance.<sup>62</sup>

The unique characteristic that sets the living substance apart from the other types of substances is consciousness.<sup>63</sup> One of its varieties is knowledge (*jñāna*), which in the texts analysed here is usually accompanied by perception (*darśana*).<sup>64</sup> These essential characteristics, according to the *Tattvārtha-vārtika*, not only make the living substance capable of cognition but also establish it as an agent and an enjoyer (i.e. experiencer). Consciousness of the continuously existing living substance thus provides the foundation for its unified and individual experience.<sup>65</sup>

One of the key issues that motivates debates on the persistence of the self in classical Indian philosophy is moral responsibility. If there were no connection between the agent that causes certain karmic consequences and the living being that experiences them, the notion of just karmic retribution would become questionable. This argument often targets the Buddhist doctrine of non-self (*anātman*). For those who espouse a pluralist metaphysical view, accepting the reality of a *continuous individual* self is critical in this discussion as it ensures that the entity that performs an action and the entity that experiences its effects are numerically identical. Seemingly familiar with these debates, the *Tattvārthādhigama-ṭikā* defines living substances as entities whose activities are performed by the same agent (*samāna-karṭṛa-kriyā*) and who enjoy the fruits of these activities (*tat-phala-bhuj*).<sup>66</sup> In support of the view of the identity between the agent and the enjoyer, the *Tattvārtha-vārtika* contrasts the Jaina view with that of Sāṃkhya, where the non-conscious material principle (*prakṛti*) has the agentive function, and the conscious self (*puruṣa*) is merely the enjoyer:

‘Only the self (*ātman*) is the agent (*karṭṛ*) of the action (*karman*), and only the self is the enjoyer (*bhoktr*) of its fruit.’ [. . .] However, others think thus: ‘The one with the three qualities (*guṇa*) is the agent (*karṭṛ*), [and] the supreme self (*paramātman*) is the enjoyer (*bhoktr*).’ This is not reasonable. Because of the impossibility of the agency of the non-conscious (*acetana*) with respect to the sphere of merit and demerit, like a pot, and so on. And in the case of the enjoyment of the fruits of the actions of others (*para-kṛta-phala-bhoga*), there would be the unwanted consequence of non-liberation (*anirmokṣa*) and the loss of [the fruits of one’s own] actions (*kṛta-praṇāśa*). Therefore, it is reasonable that only the one who is the agent is the enjoyer.<sup>67</sup>



The text argues that only a conscious agent can perform meritorious and non-meritorious actions. Non-conscious entities do not generate actions that have a moral character and result in karmic consequences. Moreover, conscious agents must be the same individuals who enjoy the results of their actions. Otherwise, living beings would experience the consequences of actions carried out by others, and they would never be able to attain liberation. Also, the potential results of their own accumulated karma would not arise, having been experienced by others that did not generate the actions leading to them. A morally just reality that enables spiritual progress in an ordered and non-random manner thus requires the agent and the enjoyer to be numerically identical.

In response to the Buddhist rejection of the persistent self, the *Tattvârtha-vârtika* additionally defends the existence of the permanently conscious persistent self by offering an argument from remembering (*anusmarāṇa*).

If there were complete destruction of the application (*upayoga*) [of consciousness], there would not be remembering (*anusmarāṇa*). Because this [present] remembering occurs with respect to an object [previously] experienced by oneself, not a [previously] unexperienced [object] or [an object previously] experienced by another. Owing to its non-existence [i.e. the nonexistence of remembering], all worldly dealings (*sarva-loka-saṃvyavahāra*), which are based on it, would approach destruction (*vināśa*).<sup>68</sup>

According to the text, if the conscious self did not exist continuously, it would be impossible to remember anything. Remembering is, as it indicates, experiencing an object that one already experienced oneself in the past. The persistent conscious subject of experience serves as the link between the two experiences of the same object, and in its absence, present objects would always cause a completely new experience. Even if a subject experienced the same object that was experienced by another subject in the past, the object would not be remembered because of the lack of continuity between the two subjects. The only way to remember objects is through a persistent, conscious, individual self that holds the memory of previously experienced objects. This argument from remembering is similar to the argument from recognition that was discussed in the previous section. The argument there was primarily used to prove the existence of persistent objects, and here it is employed to support the existence of the persistent self. Both arguments substantiate their claim by pointing to our everyday conduct that depends on memory.

In the context of enumerating the various states that are unique to the self, among which the state of being alive (*jīvatva*) is listed as the one that is independent of karma, the *Tattvârtha-sūtra* also mentions the various states that arise due to suppression (*upaśama*), elimination (*kṣaya*), partial suppression and partial elimination (*miśra*, lit. mixed), and rise (*udaya*) of karma. Of particular relevance for the topic of this article are the states that arise due to the elimination of karma since they indicate the unique nature of the continuously existing embodied self without the destructive influence of karmic matter. These states are: 'knowledge (*jñāna*), perception (*darśana*), giving (*dāna*), receiving (*lābha*), enjoyment (*bhoga*), repeated enjoyment (*upabhoga*), and energy (*vīrya*).'<sup>69</sup> To this list, all the commentaries examined here add right worldview (*samyaktva*) and conduct (*cāritra*).<sup>70</sup> These nine states result from eliminating four kinds of destructive karma,<sup>71</sup> the further subdivision of which adds up to nine. As they are no longer inhibited by karma, they operate perfectly. This represents the condition of omniscience (*kevala-jñāna*), which arises during the final embodiment before the attainment of liberation. Living beings who eliminate all destructive types of karma continue

to live in their embodied forms until the non-destructive types of karma, which determine embodiment, run out. This marks liberation.

Ordinarily, however, prior to the elimination of destructive karma, the nine listed states of the living substance do not function fully and instead undergo continuous modification under the influence of karmic matter. This accords with the general model of the substance as possessing coexisting qualities and continuously changing modes that can be affected by various factors, which was presented in the previous section. However, the variety of temporary imperfect characteristics does not affect what the self is, essentially. Throughout the changes, the self maintains its unique inherent nature, as well as its unity, much like the substance of clay persists in what it is despite being moulded into different shapes. In its association with matter, the living substance, therefore, never becomes completely other to what it is, no matter how heavily karmically burdened it becomes. The *Tattvārtha-vārtika* explains that even when two substances enter each other's space points, as in the case of the living substance and the karma with which it is bound, the two remain 'other' by way of their distinctive characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*):

By the means of which otherness (*anyatva*) is indicated where there is mixing with each other (*paraspara-vyatikara*), that is the distinctive characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*). The cause of effecting otherness (*anyatva-pratipatti-kāraṇa*), even when the inherent natures are mixed together (*vyatikīrṇa-svabhāva*), due to penetrating each other's space points (*paraspara-pradeśānupraveśa*) because of acting in conformity with the transformations relating to bondage (*bandha-pariṇāma-anuvidhāna*), is explained as the distinctive characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*).<sup>72</sup>

Throughout its embodiments, the living substance can thus always be distinguished from the body by its distinctive characteristic of consciousness, explained above.

When the passage mentions that two inherent natures become mixed together because of penetrating each other's space points, it builds on the doctrine that the living substance, despite being immaterial, possesses extension (*pradeśavattva*). According to the *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, the living substance can occupy one or more space points (*pradeśa*), up to the extension of the cosmic space itself,<sup>73</sup> which possesses an innumerable number of space points in accordance with the limits of the media of motion and rest.<sup>74</sup> The *Tattvārtha-sūtra* explains that the living substance's capacity for extension functions through the contraction (*saṃhāra*) and expansion (*visarpa/visarga*) of space points, similar to how the light operates.<sup>75</sup> The *Tattvārthādihigama-bhāṣya* adopts this analogy and clarifies that the living substance expands and contracts in accordance with its surrounding boundaries, just as light spreads all around the enclosed space where it shines, be it large or small: 'For example, light (*pradīpa*), which is diffused by means of using oil, wick, and fire, illuminates both a large building with a pinnacle and a small one.'<sup>76</sup> When the living substance is embodied, the bodies it inhabits represent its boundaries, and its ability to contract and expand over a varying number of space points enables it to occupy bodies of varying sizes, adjusting to each one. The *Tattvārthādihigama-ṭikā* explains this immersing function of the living substance in the following way: "Immersion" (*avagāhana*) means the immersing (*avagāha*) of the self (*ātman*) in the body (*śarīra*) – penetration (*anupraveśa*).<sup>77</sup> Apart from pointing to the self's bodily entrapment, adapting to the size of each successive body seems also to present a distinctive way of highlighting the individuality of each embodied self.

The Jaina doctrine is distinct in that the non-liberated living substance is not limited to possessing a single body at a time.<sup>78</sup> According to the *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, there are five different bodies the living substance can inhabit,<sup>79</sup> three of which are particularly relevant to this discussion. The karmic (*kārmaṇa-śarīra*) and the fiery body (*tajasa-śarīra*) are said to

have been associated with every living substance throughout the series of rebirths since beginningless time, which they will continue to be until the moment of liberation.<sup>80</sup> The karmic body represents the accumulated karmic matter<sup>81</sup> of the living substance, while the fiery body helps regulate the living substance's temperature and assists it with digestion. The third body is the gross physical body (*audārika-śarīra*), which is what is commonly understood as the physical body.<sup>82</sup>

At the time of death, the living substance that is still bound in the cycle of rebirths leaves the gross physical body and shortly thereafter assumes a new one based on its karmic conditions.<sup>83</sup> Importantly, during this transition, the living substance is not technically speaking without a body since the karmic and fiery bodies remain connected to it. When considering the issues of diachronic identity and immortality of living beings in the Jaina philosophical context, it is therefore important to recognize that, in addition to the persistent immaterial and conscious self, there is also, in a certain sense, a post-mortem bodily continuity.<sup>84</sup> However, it is necessary to note that while the existence of the living substance is not tied to the body, being able to survive complete separation from it, the body cannot persist without the living substance. It is the living substance that functions as the vital unifying force of bodily formation and continuity. Unlike immaterial selves, bodies are, therefore, ultimately, non-enduring entities, and when the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* explains their occurrence as resulting from the rise of a particular name-determining karma (*nāma-karman*),<sup>85</sup> it explains their general name 'body' (*śarīra*) with the passive form of the verbal root *śr̥-*, which means 'to decay' or 'to wither'.<sup>86</sup> Upon the decay of the final bodily connection, the persistent living substance attains liberation.

### Attaining perfect immortality: persistence in the liberated state

It is thus only the immaterial self that survives the final death. Since this moment represents the total separation of the self from its bodies, it signifies the commencement of its actual immortal 'afterlife'. What is its liberated condition like, and in what ways does it represent a continuity of the embodied state? The beginning of the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* features a dialogue, set in a secluded and tranquil hermitage, between a seeker on a spiritual quest and the Jaina teacher. The seeker asks the teacher about the nature (*svarūpa*) of liberation and how to attain it (*prāpty-upāya*),<sup>87</sup> to which the teacher answers: 'Liberation is a different state (*avasthāntara*) of the self, whose impure stains of karma have been completely removed and who is without a body (*aśarīra*), that has inconceivable inherent qualities of knowledge, and so on (*acintya-svābhāvika-jñānādi-guṇa*), unobstructed bliss (*avyābādha-sukha*), and that is endless (*ātyantika*).'<sup>88</sup> First of all, as indicated in the previous section, the state of liberation ensues when all forms of karma have been entirely eliminated. It represents the exit from the beginningless cycle of rebirths and is endless in the sense that a fall back to karmic entrapment is not possible. It is to be expected that consciousness, as the distinctive characteristic of living substances, persists in the liberated state. The self secured its unimpeded operation in the form of omniscience already when it exhausted all the destructive karmas during its final embodiment in the human form, and it continues to function perfectly in liberation. Another characteristic that the text lists is unobstructed bliss, which will be discussed in more detail below.

The root text itself defines liberation (*mokṣa*) as release from all karma and the absence of the states that arise due to suppression, and so on (*aupaśamikādi*), as well as the state of being able to be liberated (*bhavyatva*), with the exception of perfect right worldview,<sup>89</sup> knowledge, perception, and the state of being liberated (*siddhatva*).<sup>90</sup> The latter was not mentioned in the previous *sūtras* and is seemingly the only characteristic listed here that is newly acquired. According to the *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, the opposite state of imperfection (*asiddha*) is the result of the rise (*udaya*) of karma, and it occurs in dependence on the

rise of karma in general (*karmôdaya-sāmānyâpekṣa*).<sup>91</sup> When discussing the states that result from elimination (*kṣāyika*), the *Tattvârtha-vârtika* raises a hypothetical objection that the state of being liberated (*siddhatva*) is also specified as this type of state in the *Āgamas* and should therefore be added to the list. In response, the text argues that when particularities (*viśeṣa*) are pointed out, a generality (*sāmānya*) that belongs to them is established implicitly, without being uttered, as fingers are implicitly established when knuckles, for example, are pointed out. It asserts that the state of being liberated is common (*sādhāraṇa*) to all the states that arise due to the elimination of karma.<sup>92</sup> In response to a similar hypothetical objection, the *Tattvârthâdhigama-tīkā* alternatively argues that the state of being liberated (*siddhatva*) is not listed among them because it is born from a *total* elimination of karma, whereas the states that arise due to elimination rely only on a *partial* elimination of the eightfold karma.<sup>93</sup> With the emergence of the state of being liberated, the state of being able to be liberated (*bhavyatva*), which was mentioned in the previous section as a unique and inherent state of the living substance that is independent of karma, ceases.<sup>94</sup>

What does it mean that liberation no longer includes states that arise due to suppression, and so on, which are defined as unique to the living substance, as mentioned in the previous section? In an earlier chapter, the *Tattvârtha-vârtika* raises a hypothetical question of whether the self will eventually give up these states or retain them, pointing out that the unwanted consequences of these options are either the non-existence of the self or the impossibility of its liberation:

This is to be considered here: Might it be that the self gives up the states arising due to suppression, and so on, or does not give [them] up? Moreover, if, therefore, first of all, it does give up [these states], emptiness (*śūnyatā*) of the self (*ātman*) obtains, like there is non-existence of fire on giving up [its] inherent nature of heat (*auṣṇya-svabhāva-parityāga*), due to the non-existence of [its] inherent nature (*svabhāvâbhāva*). But if it does not give up [the states arising due to suppression, and so on], non-liberation (*anirmokṣa*) of the self (*ātman*) obtains, due to not giving up [its] inherent nature of anger, and so on (*krodhâdi-svabhāvâparityāga*). This is not [the case]. For what reason? Due to the indication of the standpoint (*ādeśa-vacana*), such as [the following]: [The self] does not give up [its] inherent nature, in a certain respect, from the standpoint of the substance because of the beginningless inherent consciousness (*anâdi-pāriṇāmika-caitanya-dravyârthâdeśa*), [and the self] does give up [its] inherent nature, in a certain respect, from the standpoint of the modes because of [the states that result from the] rise and so on, [of karma] that have a beginning (*ādimad-audayikâdi-paryâyârthâdeśa*), like the seven-fold predication (*sapta-bhaṅgi*)<sup>95</sup> before. The above-mentioned mistake might belong to the one with a one-sided [view] (*ekânta*), for whom there would be either the giving up of the inherent nature or the not giving up [of it], not to those with a non-one-sided view (*anekânta-vâdin*).<sup>96</sup>

The text employs the doctrine of non-one-sidedness to emphasize again that the self is both persistent and changing. This means that from the perspective of the substance, it will continue to exist with its beginningless inherent nature of consciousness. However, from the perspective of the modes, it will eventually give up those states that have a beginning and arise in dependence on karma, that is, the states that are not constitutive to what the self is essentially and are amenable to change.

In response to the root text's list of the characteristics of liberation, the *Sarvârtha-siddhi* addresses a hypothetical conclusion that the characteristics of energy (*vīrya*) and bliss (*sukha*), which are not listed, are absent in the liberated condition. The text challenges

this conclusion by emphasizing the necessary connection between the two characteristics and the qualities that are included on the list: 'This fault does not apply; infinite energy, and so on, are not distinct (*aviśeṣa*), owing to their being necessarily connected with knowledge and perception, because infinite understanding does not occur (*anantāvabodha-vṛtty-abhāva*) in one who lacks infinite power (*ananta-sāmarthya*), and because bliss consists of knowledge.'<sup>97</sup> It should be noted that apart from the quality of energy (*vīrya*), the other states of the living substance that result from the elimination of the energy-obstructing karma (*vīryāntarāya-karman*),<sup>98</sup> which were mentioned in the previous section,<sup>99</sup> are no longer present in the state of liberation. The *Sarvārtha-siddhi* explains that they are dependent on the rise, and so on, of the name-determining karma related to body (*śarīra-nāma-karman*) and the name-determining karma related to the condition of *tīrthaṅkaras* (*tīrthaṅkara-nāma-karman*), which is why they are not present in liberated beings, who have eliminated all karma. It also states that in liberated beings their existence (*vṛtti*) is just in the form of unimpeded supreme bliss (*paramānandāvvyābādha-rūpa*), like the existence of infinite energy (*ananta-vīrya*) is in the form of perfect knowledge (*kevala-jñāna-rūpa*).<sup>100</sup>

The self in the liberated state is, thus, in essential ways, a continuation of its embodied form. The two are numerically identical, and with respect to qualitative identity, the self, most importantly, persists in its inherent nature as a conscious being. There is some divergence in the analysed texts with respect to what other characteristics the liberated self possesses, and some of them explicitly link them to the operation of consciousness, highlighting its central role. The liberated state is also equated with the absence of any states dependent on karma, and in view of its independence from the destructive forms of karma, the liberated self is a direct continuation of the omniscient self. However, the radical shift that liberation presents as a state completely devoid of all karma is marked by the emergence of the new characteristic of being liberated.

What do these characteristics indicate about the persistence of the self *after* the attainment of liberation? In the absence of any karmic impediments, all the qualities of the liberated self operate perfectly, without limitation. This suggests that qualitative change with respect to the liberated self's qualities is no longer possible.<sup>101</sup> Does this imply the immutability of the liberated state? The texts analysed here do not explicitly discuss whether the perfect operation of the self means that all change is absent in the liberated condition, which would, in this case, be reduced to a single perfect modal expression of each quality, and the non-one-sided metaphysical model of substances persisting through incessant change would not apply to the final afterlife. However, as noted in the previous section, the *Tattvārtha-vārtika* emphasizes that the living substance has the inherent characteristic of possessing modes (*pariyāvattva*), which, it explains, is shared with all the other substances and is independent of the rise, and so on, of karma. The text grounds this characteristic in each substance's production of modes (*pratiniyata-pariyāyōpapatti*).<sup>102</sup> If substances continue producing modes, even without any external factors hindering their manifestation, then the persistence-in-change model can also be applicable to the state of liberation. One way of imagining the continuation of the modal production in the state of liberation is through a series of qualitatively identical yet numerically different modes of the liberated self's qualities.<sup>103</sup>

Since the operation of all liberated beings is perfect and unlimited, this, further, indicates that they function in the same way and are thus qualitatively identical. This opens a broad range of questions regarding the individuality and uniqueness of the selves in the liberated state.<sup>104</sup> As this article focuses on diachronic identity, these questions will be briefly addressed here only insofar as they relate to the continuous existence of the self.<sup>105</sup> Two aspects of liberation that are unrelated to the essential qualities of the liberated self yet are still, in somewhat indirect ways, relevant to the question of persistence,

because they relate to the self's final embodiment, are the location and the size of the liberated self. As the self becomes liberated, it follows its innate upward movement and ascends rapidly in a straight line to the highest point in the cosmos.<sup>106</sup> Since the space of liberated beings has the same size as the part of the middle world that human beings<sup>107</sup> can inhabit,<sup>108</sup> and since liberation consists of moving upward in a straight line until the uppermost cosmic border, it may be inferred that liberated beings are located at whichever spot at the top of the cosmos is directly above the place in the human world where they died in their final bodily form. This locational mirroring does not represent a strict continuity between the embodied and the liberated state but certainly reflects an imprint of the final stage of the self's physical existence on the disembodied liberation condition.

The fact that disembodied selves even have a spatial location seems to be connected with their size. As mentioned in the previous section, living substances are held to have an extensive nature, which allows them to extend over a number of space points (*pradeśa*), and according to the texts analysed here, the size of liberated beings represents a continuation of the bodily size related to their last embodiment. In response to the hypothetical opponent's criticism that entities without form cannot exist, the *Sarvârtha-siddhi* explains that even liberated beings have form, specifically, the form of their last body.

If it be argued that there is non-existence of liberated beings (*mukta*) owing to formlessness (*anākāratva*), [then we say] no, because of [their] having the form of the last past body (*atitānantara-śarīrākāratva*).<sup>109</sup>

The hypothetical opponent in the same text then questions why the liberated being does not expand to the size of the cosmic space, since they share the same number of space points. The *Sarvârtha-siddhi* and the *Tattvârtha-vârtika* respond by stating that such an event lacks a cause.

[The following] may be thought: If the living substance is conforming to the body (*śarīrānuvidhāyin*), in the absence of it [that is, the body], because of the state of inherently having the number of space points of the cosmic space, it reaches an expansion (*visarpaṇa*) as great as [the cosmic space]. This fault does not apply. Why? Because of the absence of a cause (*kāraṇābhāva*). For association with the name-determining karma (*nāma-karma-saṃbandha*) is the cause of the contraction and expansion [of the living substance]. But in its absence, there is absence of contraction and expansion.<sup>110</sup>

The state of having the property of contraction and expansion (*saṃharaṇa-visarpaṇa-dharmatva*) is due to the association with the name-determining karma (*nāma-karma-saṃbandha*), like the illumination of light (*pradīpa-prakāśavat*). Just as the illumination of light, whose size is restricted, is great and small, owing to the support of the substances, such as the measure of a vessel and a room, so also the living substance, whose size is likewise limited, contracts and expands due to the association with the name-determining karma; because of the absence of that [that is, of the name-determining karma], there is no contraction or expansion of the liberated living substance (*mukta-jīva*).<sup>111</sup>

Living substances use their ability to contract and expand in association with the name-determining karma, which defines various aspects of their embodiments. In the absence of a body and karmic determination, the operation of expansion and contraction ceases as it no longer has a cause (*kāraṇa*). Consequently, the disembodied liberated

being encompasses only the extent of its last body.<sup>112</sup> While the liberated being has completely cut off its connection with any actual material body, a unique continuity with its last bodily form thus remains even in the liberated condition. Apart from specifically marking its human past, this feature highlights the significance of the self's interaction with the body, leaving its impression even in the immortal state of liberation. Like the function of expansion and contraction in the embodied state, it seems also to serve as a unique principle of individuation that consolidates the pluralist approach of the Jaina position. It signifies that although liberated beings operate in a qualitatively identical way, they remain individual and distinct from each other. This underscores the numerical identity between the embodied and the liberated self.

## Conclusion

This article examined the conception of immortality in selected Jaina philosophical texts. The analysis showed that Jaina metaphysical foundations emphasize a delicate balance between persistence and change and establish a precise structure of substances to facilitate it. According to the texts explored here, it is possible for entities to be both eternal and constantly changing, and sacrificing either persistence or change would lead to unwanted consequences. Giving up persistence would make memory and recognition, for instance, impossible, while forgoing change would prevent rebirth and spiritual growth.

The analysed texts propose that the immaterial self is, as a substance, an entity that is characterized by both persistence and change. While the self is embodied, it persists in its inherent nature of being a conscious entity, but its qualities also continuously undergo modal modifications. These modifications are imperfect as long as they are polluted by karmic matter. Once karma that impedes them is eliminated, at the point of omniscience, the qualities start to operate in an uninhibited way, and they continue to do so for eternity.

At the time of death, the self does not perish but instead is typically reborn in a new gross physical body. It travels to it connected with two other bodies that remain associated with it until its moment of liberation. The texts thus propose a distinct type of material continuity between rebirths that is particular to the immaterial persistent self to which it relates. Once the self severs all of its ties with matter, it attains liberation from embodiment. However, even in this state, its relationship with the body leaves a mark, as the liberated self maintains the approximate size of its last body, which may be how Jaina texts examined here signify the individuality of the liberated self and draw attention to the continuity between the embodied and the liberated self.

In conclusion, the self is immortal in two senses: it persists, in connection with some of its bodies, after ordinary deaths in the cycle of rebirths, and it survives the complete separation from its bodies at its final death. Throughout its lives, the self persists in its inherent nature yet undergoes qualitative change, at least until it attains omniscience. Each self always maintains its individuality, which is, among other indicators, evident in the various bodily sizes the selves assume throughout rebirths and in the liberated state. Therefore, the Jaina model of immortality holds that the self is eternally persistent and maintains numerical identity throughout its entrapment in the cycle of rebirths and in the liberated condition. While it ordinarily undergoes qualitative change, it also remains qualitatively identical in its essence.

## Notes

1. I presented this research in its preliminary form at the 49th Annual Conference on South Asia (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 20–24 October 2021) and the 19th Annual Conference of the European Association for the

Study of Religions (University College Cork, 27 June–1 July 2022). Certain aspects of the article also relate to my PhD work on the Jaina metaphysics of permanence and change and my postdoctoral research on the Jaina conceptions of time and temporality, which I presented at various academic meetings, as well as my research on the Jaina understanding of the concept of inherent nature (*svabhāva*), which I presented at the 50th Annual Conference of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy (Pedagogical University of Cracow, 8–11 June 2018). I am grateful for all the feedback received at these academic venues. Additionally, I have published a chapter in an edited volume on the modal modification of omniscient selves in Kundakunda's texts that includes an exploration of qualitative identity (Bajželj 2018), and a journal article on the Jaina doctrine of liberation that focuses on the specific period during which the disembodied self travels to the space of liberated beings (Bajželj 2019). I would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions on improving the article and Jane Allred for her insightful comments during our readings of the *Sarvārtha-siddhi*.

2. Also referred to as the *Tattvārthādhigama* or the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*. See den Boer (2020, 54–55).

3. For more on the author and his names, see Dhaky (1996) and Soni (2020).

4. These were compositions of concise mnemonic rules or aphorisms (*sūtra*, lit. thread).

5. See den Boer (2020, 47–67) for a detailed discussion of the authorship and date of the root text and the earliest extant Śvetāmbara commentary.

6. While the main body of the article is intended for a general philosophical audience, the notes provide the original passages, additional information, and textual references that may be of particular interest to scholars of South Asian Studies. All translations in the article are mine.

7. The *Tattvārthādhigama-ṭīkā* defines *lakṣaṇa* as the distinction of (having) a non-common power (*asādhāraṇa-śakti-viśeṣa*) (Tṭ 5.37).

8. *sad dravya-lakṣaṇam* / TS<sup>Dig</sup> 5.29. This *sūtra* appears only in the Digambara version of the text, even though the existence of substances is implicitly affirmed also in the Śvetāmbara version. The *Sarvārtha-siddhi* explains it in the following way: 'That which is existing (*sat*) is substance (*dravya*). Such is the meaning' (*yat sat tad dravyam ity arthaḥ*. SS §582 (TS<sup>Dig</sup> 5.29)). The *Tattvārtha-vārtika* adds that this is due to its existence (*sattva*, lit. the state of existing) (*sattvāt, yat sat tad dravyam*. TV 5.29), which reminds of the *Sarvārtha-siddhi*'s definition of 'existing' (*sat*) in the context of describing various methods of ascertaining (*adhigamōpāya*) the categories of reality (*tattva*) and the essential constituents of the path to liberation (*mokṣa-mārga*): "'Existing" (*sat*) is an indication of existence (*astitva*)' (*sad ity astitva-nirdeśa*. SS §33 (TS 1.8)). For similar passages, see also Kundakunda's *PañS* 9 ([. . .] *daviyam taṃ bhaṇṇaṃte aṇṇaṇṇa-bhūdaṃ tu sattādo* //); *PañS* 10 (*davvaṃ sal-lakṣaṇayaṃ* [. . .] //); and *PS* 2.6 (*davvaṃ sahāva-siddhaṃ sad iti* [. . .] //). On a possible relationship between the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* and Kundakunda, see Ohira (1982, 143).

9. *utpāda-vyaya-dhruavya-yuktaṃ sat* / TS<sup>Sv</sup> 5.29/TS<sup>Dig</sup> 5.30. Suzuko Ohira notes that the idea the *sūtra* conveys is not yet present in the extant Śvetāmbara canon (1982, 34). For similar passages, see also Kundakunda's *PS* 2.4 (*sabbhāvo hi sahāvo guṇehiṃ saha pajjaehiṃ cittehiṃ / davvassa savva-kālaṃ uppāda-vvaya-dhuvattehiṃ* //); *PañS* 8 (*sattā savva-payatthā savissa-rūvā aṇanta-pajjāyā / bhaṅguppāda-dhuvattā sappādivakkhā havadi ekkā* //); *PañS* 10 (*davvaṃ* [. . .] *uppāda-vvaya-dhuvatta-saṃjuttam / guṇa-pajjayāsayaṃ vā jaṃ taṃ bhaṇṇaṃti savvaṇhū* //); and *PañS* 11 (*uppattiva viṇāso davvassa ya natthi atthi sabbhāvo / vigamuppāda-dhuvattam kareṃti tasseva pajjāyā* //).

10. *āha, bhede sati yukta-śabdo dṛṣṭaḥ. yathā daṇḍena yukto devadatta iti. tathā sati teṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ tair yuktasya dravyasya cābhāvāḥ prāpnoti? naiśa doṣaḥ; abhede 'pi kathaṃcid bheda-nayāpekṣayā yukta-śabdo dṛṣṭaḥ. yathā sāra-yuktaḥ stambha iti. tathā sati teṣāṃ avinā-bhāvāt sad-vyapadeśo yuktaḥ. samādhi-vacano vā yukta-śabdaḥ. yuktaḥ samāhitas tad-ātmaka ity arthaḥ. utpāda-vyaya-dhruavya-yuktaṃ sat utpāda-vyaya-dhruavyātmakam iti yāvat*. SS §584 (TS<sup>Dig</sup> 5.30).

11. The technical terms it uses are slightly different: stability (*sthiti*), origination (*utpatti*), and destruction (*vināśa*).

12. *utpāda-vyayābhīyāṃ dhruavyeṇa ca yuktaṃ sato lakṣaṇam; yad utpadyate, yad vyeti, yac ca dhruvaṃ tat sat; ato 'nyad asad iti*. TBh 5.29. *sthity-utpatti-vināśa-svabhāvaṃ sad, avasāntayaiva sthity-utpāda-vināśāḥ samuditā eva sattvaṃ gamayanti*. [. . .] *yat kathaṃcin na dhruvaṃ na cōtpadyate na ca vyeti tan na sad iti*. Tṭ 5.29.

13. For more on these two types of causes, see Bajželj (2020).

14. *cetanasyācetanasya vā dravyasya svām jātim ajahata ubhaya-nimitta-vaśād bhāvāntarāvāptir utpādanam utpādaḥ mṛt-piṇḍasya ghaṭa-paryāyavat. tathā pūrva-bhāva-vigamaṇaṃ vyayaḥ. yathā ghaṭōtpattau piṇḍākṛteḥ. anādi-pāriṇāmika-svabhāvena vyayōdayābhāvād dhruvati sthīri-bhavatī dhruvaḥ. dhruvasya bhāvāḥ karma vā dhruvyam. yathā mṛt-piṇḍa-ghaṭādy-avasthāsu mṛd-ādy-anvayaḥ*. SS §584 (TS<sup>Dig</sup> 5.30). The analogy of the pot is widely used to explain Jaina metaphysics. The *Tattvārtha-vārtika* restates the example used in the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* with only minor variations, and the *Tattvārthādhigama-ṭīkā* also employs the analogy to illustrate the dynamics of existents.

15. *tasya bhāvas tad-bhāvāḥ*. SS §586 (TS<sup>Dig</sup> 5.31).

16. *tad-bhāvāvīyayaṃ nityam* / TS<sup>Sv</sup> 5.30/TS<sup>Dig</sup> 5.31.

17. *yat sato bhāvān na vyeti na vyeṣyati tan nityam iti*. TBh 5.30. The *Tattvārthādhigama-ṭīkā* follows this interpretation: *tad ity anenābhisambadhyate sat* (Tṭ 5.30). Earlier in the text, the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* describes substances as



'fixed' (avasthita) (TS<sup>sv</sup> 5.3/TS<sup>Dig</sup> 5.4; see note 19), which the *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya* explains as never deviating from the state of being five in number (*pañcatva*) and the state of being real (*bhūtārthatva*) (*avasthitāni ca, na hi kadācit pañcatvaṃ bhūtārthatvaṃ ca vyabharanti. TBh 5.3*).

18. *kim adhyavasyāmaḥ? dravyam iti vākya-śeṣaḥ. TV 5.31.*

19. *nityāvasthitāny arūpāṇi ca / TS<sup>sv</sup> 5.3/TS<sup>Dig</sup> 5.4.* The *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya* explicitly draws a connection between the two sūtras (*etāni dravyāṇi nityāni bhavanti. tad-bhāvāvayayaṃ nityam iti ca vaksyate. TBh 5.3*).

20. However, when defining eternality (*nityatva*) as a common characteristic of all substances, the *Tattvārtha-vārtika* does allow for a conceptual separation of the components of cessation and origination from the substance for the sake of grasping the standpoint of the latter (*nityatvam api sādharmaṇaṃ dravyārthādeśāt sarva-dravyānāṃ vyayōdaya-yogābhāvāt. TV 2.7.13*).

21. *kas tad-bhāvaḥ? pratyabhijñāna-hetutā. tad evēdam iti smaraṇaṃ pratyabhijñānam. tad akasmān na bhavatīti yo 'sya hetuḥ sa tad-bhāvaḥ. SS §586 (TS<sup>Dig</sup> 5.31).*

22. *yenātmanā prāg-dṛṣṭaṃ vastu tenaivātmanā punar api bhāvāt tad evēdam iti pratyabhijñāyate. yady atyanta-nirodho 'bhinava-prādur-bhāva-mātram eva vā syāt tataḥ smaraṇānupapattiḥ. tad-adhīno loka-saṃvyavahāro virudhyate. tatas tad-abhāvenāvayayaṃ tad-bhāvāvayayaṃ nityam iti niścīyate. SS §586 (TS<sup>Dig</sup> 5.31).*

23. The example in the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* discusses an object, whose persistence allows it to be recognized. While the endurance of the observer as the bearer of the particular memory and the act of recognition can be inferred, it is not directly addressed. This topic will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

24. *tat tu kathamcid veditavyam. sarvathā nityatve anyathā-bhāvābhāvāt saṃsāra-tad-vinivṛtti-kāraṇa-prakriyā-virodhaḥ syāt. SS §586 (TS<sup>Dig</sup> 5.31).* See also Uno (1999).

25. *bhāva-śabdōpādānāt pariṇāma-niyatā gṛhyate, kūṣastha-niyatā tyajyate, anyathā 'tad-avyayaṃ nityam' iti sūtraṃ syāt. TṬ 5.30.*

26. Commonly also translated as many-sidedness.

27. For more on this, see Balcerowicz (2001), Balcerowicz (2003), and Balcerowicz (2017a).

28. *guṇa-paryayavad dravyam / TS<sup>sv</sup> 5.37/TS<sup>Dig</sup> 5.38.* The *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya* explains that this compound means either that the qualities and modes are 'of' the substance (meaning that the substance possesses them) or that they are 'in' the substance (meaning that the substance is their locus) (*guṇa-paryāyā asya santy asmin vā santīti guṇa-paryāyavat. TBh 5.37*). For a study of the Jain concepts of *dravya*, *guṇa*, and *paryāya*, see Soni (1991).

29. *dravyāśrayā nirguṇāḥ / TS<sup>sv</sup> 5.40/TS<sup>Dig</sup> 5.41.* Distinguishing between that which characterizes and that which is characterized, the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* here also states that qualities themselves are devoid of any qualities (*nirguṇa*).

30. *anvayino guṇā vyatirekiṇaḥ paryāyāḥ. ubhair upetaṃ dravyam iti. SS §600 (TS<sup>Dig</sup> 5.38).*

31. *bhāvāntaraṃ saṃjñāntaraṃ ca paryāyāḥ. tad-ubhayaṃ yatra vidyate tad dravyam. TBh 5.37.*

32. The *Uttarajihvayāna*, a Śvetāmbara canonical text, highlights this unity in multiplicity in the following way: 'Substance is the substrate of qualities, qualities rest on a single substance. But the distinctive characteristic of modes is that they rest on both (i.e. the substance and qualities)' (*guṇāṇaṃ āsao davvaṃ, ega-davvassiyā guṇā / lakkaṇaṃ pajjavāṇaṃ tu, ubhao assiyā bhava // Utt 28.6*).

33. For more on the Jaina doctrine of karma with regard to the *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, see Wiley (2016).

34. It is important to note that for the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* and its commentaries even the project of providing a systematic account of the categories of reality and their interactions is a task with primarily soteriological value (see *TS 1.1-4*).

35. *saṃsāriṇo muktās ca / TS 2.10.*

36. The *Tattvārtha-vārtika* provides a similar definition: 'Saṃsāra is the self's (*ātman*) obtainment of different births (*bhavāntarāvṛpti*) on account of the karma accumulated by the self (*ātmōpacita-karma-vaśa*)' (*ātmōpacita-karma-vaśād ātmano bhavāntarāvṛptiḥ saṃsārah. TV 2.10.1*). Among the eight types of karma, four are deemed to be destructive because they impede the operation of the living substance's qualities. These are (1) perception-obscuring karma (*darśanāvaraṇīya-karman*); (2) knowledge-obscuring karma (*jñānāvaraṇīya-karman*); (3) energy-obstructing karma (*vīryāntarāya-karman*); and (4) deluding karma (*mohaniya-karman*). The other four types of karma are non-destructive and they determine the characteristics of the living being's embodiments: (5) name-determining karma (*nāma-karman*); (6) longevity-determining karma (*āyu-karman*); (7) status-determining karma (*gotra-karman*); and (8) feeling-determining karma (*vedaniya-karman*). See Jaini (2001/1979, 117-127).

37. The *Sarvārtha-siddhi* offers the following explanation: 'Wandering (*saṃsaraṇa*) – *saṃsāra*. In other words, going round (*parivartana*). Those to whom it belongs are *saṃsārins*' (*saṃsaraṇaṃ saṃsārah parivartanam ity arthaḥ. sa eṣāṃ asti te saṃsārīṇaḥ. SS §275 (TS 2.10)*). The text also distinguishes five types of 'going round': (1) with respect to (the material) substance (*dravya-parivartana*); (2) with respect to location (*kṣetra-parivartana*); (3) with respect to time (*kāla-parivartana*); (4) with respect to birth (*bhava-parivartana*); and (5) with respect to state (*bhāva-parivartana*). The *Tattvārtha-vārtika* provides the same list in a slightly different order.

38. Deluding (*mohaniya-karman*) is divided into worldview-deluding karma (*daršana-mohaniya*) and conduct-deluding (*cāritra-mohaniya*) types. These respectively produce delusion (*moha*), which prevents right insight into the nature of reality, and passions (*kaṣāya*).

39. *yad-avaṣṭambhenātmanāḥ saṃsaraṇam - itaś cetaś ca gamanaṃ bhavati sa saṃsāraḥ - karmāṣṭaka-rūpaḥ, sa yeṣāṃ vidyate te saṃsāriṇaḥ. athavā balavato mohasyākhyā saṃsāras tat-sambandhāt saṃsāriṇaḥ, nārakādy-avasthā vā saṃsāraḥ, tad-avasthā-yogāt saṃsāriṇaḥ. mucyante sma muktāḥ. kuta iti cet? antantaravāt saṃsārād iti vācyam. ato nirdhūtāśeṣa-karmāṇaḥ saṃsārān muktā itī vyapadiśyante. TṬ 2.10.*

40. While the terms *jīva* and *ātman* commonly have the same referent, there are certain contexts in which either one or the other tends to be used. Some of the other terms that Jaina texts use to refer to living beings are *sattva*, *bhūta*, and *prāṇa*. See, for example, Ohira (1994, 103 and 113).

41. See, for example, *TBh 2.6 (gatiś catur-bhedā - nāraka-tairyag-yauna-mānuṣya-devā itī)* and *SS §265 (TS 2.6) ([. . .] gatiś catur-bhedā, nāraka-gatiś tiryag-gatir manuṣya-gatir deva-gatir itī)*.

42. Living beings that possess the mind are hell-beings, heavenly beings, and womb-born humans and five-sensed animals. See *TṬ 2.11* and *TBh* and *TṬ 2.25*. As examples of animals that possess the mind, the *Tattvārthādihigama-ṭikā* lists the cow, female buffalo, goat, sheep, elephant, lion, tiger, and so on (*pañcēndriya-tiryag-yoni-jāḥ go-mahisy-ajāvika-kari-kesari-vyāghrādāyāḥ. TṬ 2.25*).

43. *guṇa-doṣa-vicārakatvāt. SS §282 (TS 2.11).*

44. The *Gommaṭa-sāra-jīva-kāṇḍa*, for example, explains the reasoning behind their name in the following way: 'They are called "humans" (*mānuṣa*) because they always think, because they are skilled (*nīpuṇa*) with the mind (*manas*), because they are richly endowed (*utkaṭa*) with the mind, and because they all originate from Manu' (*mañṇamti jado niccam mañeṇa ñiuiṇā mañukkaḍā jamhā / mañṇubbhavā ya savve tamhā te mānuṣā bhañidā // GJK 149*). A similar explanation can be found also in the *Pañca-saṅgraha* and the *Dhavalā*. See Varṇī (2014/1972, vol. 3, 273).

45. *bhava-sṭhiti-nimittāyur-dravya-sambandha-bhāḥ puruṣasya prāṇāpāna-lakṣaṇa-kriyā-viśeṣāvyuparamo jīvitam, tad-aśeṣoparatir maraṇam. TṬ 5.20.* The *Sarvārtha-siddhi* provides similar definitions: *bhava-dhāraṇa-kāraṇāyur-ākhyā-karmōdayād bhava-sṭhitim ādadhānasya jivasya pūrvoḥka-prāṇāpāna-kriyā-viśeṣāvyucchedo jīvitam ity ucyate. tad-ucchedo maraṇam. SS §565 (TS 5.20)*. The beginning of the definition of life (*jīvita*) in the *Tattvārtha-vārtika* overlaps nearly completely with the definition from the *Tattvārthādihigama-ṭikā*, with *jīva* notably being used instead of *puruṣa*. The text then expands on this definition by drawing on the explanation from the *Sarvārtha-siddhi*. Its definition of death follows the *Sarvārtha-siddhi*. See *TV 5.20.3–4*.

46. See also note 56.

47. *tad eva hi sat tathā tathā bhavati jivādi devādi-rūpeṇa, na jātucit sattva-tyāgenānyathā bhavati. TṬ 5.30.*

48. See, for example, *SS §252 (TS 2.1) (dravyātma-lābha-mātra-hetukaḥ pariṇāmaḥ)* and the explanation in *TV 2.1.5 (yasya bhāvasya dravyātma-lābha-mātram eva hetur bhavati nānyan nimittam asti sa pariṇāma itī paribhāṣyate)*. The *Tattvārthādihigama-ṭikā* glosses them as 'inherent' (*svābhāvika*) and explains them as states that are not caused by karma (*karma-kṛta*). See *TṬ 2.7*.

49. *jīva-bhavyābhavyatvāni ca / TS<sup>Dig</sup> 2.7; jīva-bhavyābhavyatvāni ca / TS<sup>SV</sup> 2.7*. For more on the latter two, see Jaini (2010/2000). With respect to them, it is important to note that embodied living beings can possess either one or the other, and this determines their capacity for liberation.

50. See, for example *TV 2.7.1 (jīvatvaṃ bhavyatvam abhavyatam ity ete pariṇāmikā ātmanas trayo bhāvā anya-dravyāsādhāraṇā veditavyāḥ)*. See also *SS §252 (TS 2.1)* and *TV 2.1.6*.

51. *ādi-grahaṇaṃ kim-artham ity atrōcyate - astitvaṃ, anyatvaṃ, kartṛtvaṃ, bhokṛtvaṃ, guṇavattvaṃ, asarvagatatvaṃ, anādi-karma-santāna-baddhatvaṃ, pradeśavattvaṃ, arūpatvaṃ, nityatvaṃ ity-evam-ādāyo 'py anādi-pariṇāmikā jīvasya bhāvā bhavanti, dharmādibhis tu samānā ity-ādi grahaṇena sūcitāḥ. ye jīvasyaiva vaiśeṣikās te sva-sabdenōktā itī. TBh 2.7. astitvānyatva-kartṛtva-bhokṛtva-paryāyavattvasarvagatatvānādi-santati-bandhana-baddhatva-pradeśavattvārūpatva-nityatvādi-samuccayārthas ca-sabdāḥ. astitvādāyo 'pi pariṇāmikā bhāvāḥ santi teṣāṃ samuccayārthas ca-sabdāḥ. [. . .] astitvādāyo hi dharmā anyeṣāṃ api dravyāṇāṃ sādharmaṇas tatas te na sūtritāḥ. TV 2.7.12–13.* The *Tattvārthādihigama-bhāṣya* notes that unlike the non-common ones, these states are implicitly included with the word 'ādi' (*ādi-grahaṇa*) in the *sūtra*, and – following the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* – the *Tattvārtha-vārtika* suggests that they are included with the word 'ca' (*ca-sabdā*). The *Sarvārtha-siddhi* provides a shorter list of specific states but indicates that there are also others (*nanu cāstitva-nityatva-pradeśavattvādāyo 'pi bhāvāḥ pariṇāmikāḥ santi [. . .]. SS §269 (TS 2.7)*).

52. The *Tattvārtha-vārtika* provides existence as an example of a property (*dharmā*) that is shared by all the six types of substances ([. . .] *astitvaṃ tāvat sādharmaṇaṃ ṣaḍ-dravya-viśayatvāt. TV 2.7.13*).

53. For the list of the eight main types of karma, see note 36.

54. The logic here seems to be that there is no particular reason why a certain material substance connect with this immaterial substance and not any of the other kinds of substances.

55. *syād etat - āyur-dravyōdayaj jīvatīti jīvo nānādi-pariṇāmikatvād itī; tan na; kiṃ kāraṇam? pudgala-dravya-saṃbandhe saty anya-dravya-sāmarthyābhāvāt. āyur hi paudgalikaṃ dravyam. yadi ca tat-saṃbandhāj jīvasya jīvatvaṃ syāt; nanv*

evam anya-dravyasyāpi dharmāder āyuh-sambandhāj jīvātvaṃ syāt. kiñ ca, siddhasyājīvātva-prasaṅgāt. yady āyuh-sambandhāpekṣaṃ jīvātvaṃ nanu siddhasyāyur-abhāvād ajīvātvaṃ prasajyeta. tatas tad-anapekṣatvāj jīvātvaṃ pārīṇāmikam eva. TV 2.7.3–4.

56. There are ten vitalities: (1–5) five sense vitalities (*indriya-prāṇa*); (6) vitality of respiration (*ucchvāsa-prāṇa* or *ānapāna-prāṇa*); (7) vitality of lifespan (*āyu-prāṇa*); and (8–10) strength vitalities (*bala-prāṇa*) of body, speech, and mind. See Wiley (2000, 187–189).

57. *syān matam – jīvati ajīvati jīviṣyati*’ iti tri-kāla-viṣayo vīgraho dṛśyate tataḥ prāṇa-dhāraṇārthatvāt karmāpekṣatve na pārīṇāmikatvaṃ iti; tac ca na; kasmāt? rūḍhi-śabdasya niṣpatty-arthatvāt. rūḍhi-śabdesu hi kriyōpātta-kālā vyutpatty-arthaiva na tantram, yathā gacchatīti gaur iti. TV 2.7.5. The *Tattvārtha-vārtika* uses the same example in 1.4.7.

58. *caitanyam eva vā jīva-śabdārthaḥ*. TV 2.7.6.

59. *caitanyam ātmanaḥ svabhāvo ’nādiḥ* [ . . . ]. TV 2.8.1.

60. *jīvātvaṃ caitanyam ity arthaḥ*. SS §268 (TS 2.7).

61. *tatra cetanā-lakṣaṇo jīvaḥ. sā ca jñānādi-bhedād anekadhā bhidyate*. SS §18 (TS 1.4). See note 7 for an explanation of the term *lakṣaṇa*.

62. *cetanā-svabhāvatvāt tad-vikalpa-lakṣaṇo jīvaḥ. jīva-svabhāvaś cetanā, yata itarebhyo dravyebhyo bhidyate. tad-vikalpā jñānādayaḥ. yat-san-nidhānād ātmā jñātā draṣṭā kartā bhoktā ca bhavati tal-lakṣaṇo jīvaḥ*. TV 1.4.14. The text also considers a hypothetical objection from a proponent of Vaiśeṣika that the application (*upayoga*) (of consciousness) is not a distinctive characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of the self (*ātman*) because of otherness (*anyatva*). Instead, the opponent suggests, a distinctive characteristic is their joining together (*saṃbandha*). The opponent argues that this is similar to how the stick is not a distinctive characteristic of Devadatta, only their joining together is. Otherwise, another unconnected entity could also be a distinctive characteristic. The text responds that in the case of otherness, where the quality (*guṇa*) is completely different from the substance (*dravya*), its joining together with the substance could not even occur (*syān matam – upayogo lakṣaṇam ātmano nōpapadyate. kutaḥ? anyatvāt. kiṃ tarhi? tat-saṃbandho lakṣaṇam. yathā devadattasya na daṇḍo lakṣaṇam. kiṃ tarhi? saṃbandhaḥ*. [ . . . ] *tan na; kiṃ kāraṇam? anyatve saṃbandhābhāvāt. dravyād guṇo ’rthāntara-bhūto yadi syāt; tasya saṃbandhābhāva ity uktam purastāt. tasmād ātma-bhūta upayogo lakṣaṇam iti na kaścid doṣaḥ*. TV 2.8.24). For the term *upayoga*, see note 64.

63. In line with this, the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* explains the function of qualities as preventing the intermixing of substances: ‘For example, the living substance (*jīva*) is distinguished from the material substance, and so on (*pudgalādi*), by the qualities of knowledge, and so on (*jñānādi*); and the material substance, and so on, by colour, and so on (*rūpādi*). And for that reason, in the case of non-distinction (*aviśeṣa*), there would be intermixing (*saṃkara*). Therefore, from the general viewpoint (*sāmānyāpekṣā*), knowledge, and so on, are the (permanently) connected qualities (*guṇa*) of the living substance, and colour, and so on, of the material substance, and so on. Their modifications (*vikāra*), which are being variegated (*bhidyamāna*) in accordance with their own specific nature (*viśeṣātman*), are modes (*pariyāya*). Examples being: knowledge of a pot, knowledge of a cloth, anger, pride, smell, colour, intense, mild. A collection (*samudāya*), which enters a state of difference (*anyatva*) from these, in a certain respect (*kathaṃcit*), has the name “substance” (*dravya-vyapadeśa-bhāj*)” (*tad yathā – jīvaḥ pudgalādibhyo jñānādibhir guṇair viśīsyate, pudgalādayaś ca rūpādibhiḥ. tataś caviśeṣe saṃkaraḥ syāt. tataś sāmānyāpekṣayā anvayino jñānādayo jīvasya guṇāḥ pudgalādīnām ca rūpādayaḥ. teṣāṃ vikāra viśeṣātmanā bhidyamānāḥ pariyāyāḥ. ghaṭa-jñānaṃ paṭa-jñānaṃ krodho māno gandho varṇas tīvro manda ity-evam-ādayaḥ. tebhyo ’nyatvaṃ kathaṃcid āpadyamānaḥ samudāyo dravya-vyapadeśa-bhāk*. SS §600 (TS<sup>Dig</sup> 5.38)).

64. In other parts of the root text and the commentaries, the distinctive characteristic of the living substance is specified as the application (*upayoga*) (of consciousness). See, for example, *TBh* 1.3 (*jñāna-darśanōpayoga-lakṣaṇo jīva ity vaksyate*) and *TS* 2.8 (*upayogo lakṣaṇam /*) and the commentaries thereon. The *Tattvārthādhigama-tīkā* defines *upayoga* as *upalambha*, which literally means ‘obtainment’, but can also be translated as ‘perception’, ‘ascertainment’, or ‘apprehension’. See *TT* 2.8 (*upayogaḥ upalambhaḥ*). For an examination of the term *upayoga*, see Soni (2007).

65. There are several ways in which the texts examined here emphasize the persistent *individuality* of the living substance, some of which, such as otherness (*anyatva*), non-pervasiveness (*asarvagatatva*), and inherent nature (*svabhāva*), which is expressed in the substance’s distinct characteristics, have been mentioned. This complex topic will be again briefly touched upon at the end of this section and in the section on liberation, but I plan to analyse it in more detail in a future publication.

66. *jīvā* [ . . . ] *samāna-karṭṛka-kriyāḥ tat-phala-bhujāḥ* [ . . . ]. *TT* 1.4. See also the commentaries to *TS* 2.7, which define agency (*karṭṛtva*) and the state of being an enjoyer (*bhokṭṛtva*) as the inherent states of the living substance. As noted, unlike the state of being alive (*jīvātva*), these states are not unique to it but are common with other kinds of substances.

67. ‘*ātmaiva karmaṇaḥ kartā, tat-phalasya ca ātmaiva bhoktā*’ [ . . . ]. *anye tu ’traiguṇyaṃ karṭṛ, paramātmā bhoktā*’ iti manyate; *tad ayuktam; acetanasya punya-pāpa-viśaya-karṭṛtānupapatter ghaṭādivat. para-kṛta-phala-bhoge cānirmokṣa-prasaṅgaḥ syāt kṛta-praṇāśaś cēti. tasmād yaḥ kartā sa eva bhoktēti yuktam*. TV 2.10.1.

68. *yadi sarvathôpयोगस्या विनाशां स्यात्; anusmaranam na syāt. anusmaranam hīdam svayam anubhūṣyārthasya dr̥ṣṭam nānubhūṣyārthasya nānyenānubhūṣyārthasya. tad-abhāvāt tan-mūlāḥ sarva-loka-saṃvyavahāro vināśam upagacchet.* TV 2.8.23.
69. *jñāna-darśana-dāna-lābha-bhogôpabhoga-vīryāṇi ca / TS 2.4.*
70. See note 38.
71. See note 36.
72. *paraspara-vyatikare sati yenānyatvaṃ lakṣyate tal lakṣanam. bandha-pariṇāmānuvidhānāt paraspara-pradeśānupraveśād vyatikirṇa-svabhāvātve 'pi saty anyatva-pratipatti-kāraṇam lakṣanam iti samākhyāyate.* TV 2.8.2. This is also exemplified in the texts with the analogy of a mixture of silver and gold, in which each metal retains its distinctive characteristics. See, for example, SS §271 (TS 2.8).
73. *tad yathā - ekasminn asaṃkhyeya-bhāge eko jīvo 'vatiṣṭhate. evaṃ dvi-tri-catur-ādiṣv api asaṃkhyeya-bhāgeṣu ā sarva-lokāḍ avagāhaḥ pratyetyayaḥ.* SS §555 (TS 5.15).
74. See, for example, TS<sup>Dig</sup> 5.8 (*asaṃkhyeyāḥ pradeśā dharmādharmaika-jīvanām /*). See also TS<sup>Sv</sup> 5.7–8 (*asaṃkhyeyāḥ pradeśā dharmādharmaṃyoh / jīvasya ca /*) and TBh 5.9 (*lokākāśasya tu dharmādharmaika-jīvais tulyāḥ*). The cosmic part of space (*lokākāśa*) is considered to be large but limited. Beyond it is limitless cosmic space (*alokākāśa*).
75. *pradeśa-saṃhāra-visarpābhyāṃ pradīpavat / TS<sup>Dig</sup> 5.16. pradeśa-saṃhāra-visargābhyāṃ pradīpavat / TS<sup>Sv</sup> 5.16.*
76. *tad yathā taila-varty-agny-upādāna-pravṛddhaḥ pradīpo mahatīm api kūtāgāra-sālām prakāśayaty, anvīm api.* TBh 5.16.
77. *avagāhanēti. ātmanah śarīre 'vagāhaḥ - anupraveśaḥ. TṬ 10.7.* The *Sarvārtha-siddhi* describes immersion by referring to space points: 'Immersion (*avagāhana*) is pervasion of the space points by the self (*ātma-pradeśa-vyāpitva*)' (*ātma-pradeśa-vyāpitvam avagāhanam.* SS §937 (TS<sup>Dig</sup> 10.9)).
78. See TS<sup>Dig</sup> 2.43/TS<sup>Sv</sup> 2.44.
79. *audārika-vaikriyāhāraka-tajjasa-kārmaṇāni śarīrāṇi / TS<sup>Dig</sup> 2.36. audārika-vaikriyāhāraka-tajjasa-kārmaṇāni śarīrāṇi / TS<sup>Sv</sup> 2.37.*
80. *anādi-sambandhe ca / sarvasya / (TS<sup>Dig</sup> 2.41–42/TS<sup>Sv</sup> 2.42–43).*
81. As noted at the beginning of this section, Jaina philosophers hold that karma is subtle matter.
82. The discussion here focuses primarily on those aspects of this doctrine that pertain to the issue of persistence. For details on these bodies and other aspects of embodiment, see Wiley (2000).
83. Only living beings in two states of existence (*gati*) can have the gross physical body: humans (*manuṣya*) and the category of animals, plants, and so on (*tiryāṇic*). See above.
84. It is important to add that, as consisting of the material substance, all of the bodies are at the fundamental level also endowed with non-one-sided dynamics.
85. See note 36.
86. *viśiṣṭa-nāma-karmôdayâpādita-vṛttinī śīryanta iti śarīrāṇi.* SS §331 (TS<sup>Dig</sup> 2.36). The *Tattvārtha-vārtika* (TV 2.36) and the *Tattvārthādhigama-ṭikā* (TṬ 2.37) provide the same definition.
87. *sa eva punaḥ pratyāha - kiṃ-svarūpo 'sau mokṣaḥ kaś cāsyā prāpty-upāya iti?* SS §1.
88. *ācārya āha - niravaśeṣa-nirākṛta-karma-mala-kalamkasyāśarīrasyātmano 'cintya-svābhāvika-jñānādi-guṇam avyābādha-sukham ātyantikam avasthāntaram mokṣa iti.* SS §1.
89. See note 38.
90. *kṛtsna-karma-kṣayo mokṣaḥ / aupaśamikādi-bhavyatvābhāvāc cānyatra kevala-samyaktva-jñāna-darśana-siddhatvebhyaḥ / TS<sup>Sv</sup> 10.3–4. [. . .] kṛtsna-karma-vīpamokṣo mokṣaḥ / aupaśamikādi-bhavyatvānām ca / anyatra kevala-samyaktva-jñāna-darśana-siddhatvebhyaḥ / TS<sup>Dig</sup> part of 10.2–4.*
91. *karmôdaya-sāmānyāpekṣo 'siddha audayikaḥ.* SS §265 (TS 2.6). The *Tattvārtha-vārtika* generally concurs with this but specifies in dependence on the rise of which karma the state occurs at particular stages of the spiritual path (TV 2.6.7).
92. *siddhatvam api kṣāyikam āgamôpadiṣṭam asti tasyôpasaṃkhyānam iha kartavyam. na kartavyam; viśeṣeṣu nirdiṣṭeṣu tad-viṣayam sāmānyam anukta-siddham eva parvādi-nirdeśe ānguli-siddhivat. siddhatvaṃ hi sarveṣāṃ kṣāyikāṇām bhāvānām sādharanam iti.* TV 2.4.7.
93. *nanu ca siddhatvam api kṣāyiko bhāvaḥ, sa cēha na nirdiṣṭaḥ sūriṇā, ko 'bhīprāya iti? ucyate - karmāṣṭakaika-deśa-kṣayād ete kṣāyikāḥ sūtreṇa pratibaddhāḥ, siddhatvaṃ tu sakala-karma-kṣaya-jam [. . .].* TṬ 2.4.
94. For a discussion about this, see Jaini (2010/2000). See also note 49. The state of not being able to be liberated (*abhavyatva*) is not relevant in the liberated condition, since living beings that possess it are never able to attain it.
95. A formalization of the doctrine of conditional assertion (*syāt*) with seven kinds of predication that can be made about an object.
96. *idam iha saṃpradhāryam - ātmā aupaśamikādi-bhāva-parityāgī vā syāt, aparityāgī vā? kiñ ca, ato yadi tāvat paritya-jati; sūnyatā prāpnoti ātmanah; svabhāvābhāvād agner auṣṇya-svabhāva-parityāge 'bhāvavat. athāparityāgī; krodhādi-svabhāvāparityāgād ātmano 'nirmokṣaḥ prāpnoti. tan na; kiṃ kāraṇam? ādeśa-vacanāt. anādi-pāriṇāmika-caitanya-dravyārthādeśāt syāt svabhāvāparityāgī, ādimad-audayikādi-paryāyārthādeśāt syāt svabhāva-parityāgī ity-ādi sapta-bhaṅgī pūrvavat. yasyāikāntena svabhāva-parityāgaḥ syād aparityāgo vā; tasya yathōkta-doṣaḥ syāt, nānekānta-vādinah.* TV 2.1.23.

97. *naīṣa doṣaḥ; jñāna-darśanāvinā-bhāvitvād ananta-vīryādīnām aviśeṣaḥ; ananta-sāmarthya-hīnasyānantāvabodha-vṛtty-abhāvāj jñāna-mayatvāc ca sukhasyēti.* SS §927 (TS<sup>Dig</sup> 10.4).
98. See note 36.
99. These are giving (*dāna*), receiving (*lābha*), enjoyment (*bhoga*), and repeated enjoyment (*upabhoga*).
100. *yadi kṣāyika-dānādi-bhāva-kṛtam abhaya-dānādi, siddheṣv api tat-prasaṅgaḥ? naīṣa doṣaḥ; śārīra-nāma-tīrthaṅkara-nāma-karmōdayādy-apekṣatvāt. teṣāṃ tad-abhāve tad-aprasaṅgaḥ. kathaṃ tarhi teṣāṃ siddheṣu vṛttiḥ? paramānandāvyābādha-rūpeṇaiva teṣāṃ tatra vṛttiḥ. kevala-jñāna-rūpeṇānanta-vīrya-vṛttivat.* SS §261 (TS 2.4). For more on these characteristics, see Jaini (2001), Jaini (2003) and Wiley (2000).
101. This is an issue that also applies to the embodied self whose qualities are perfected.
102. *paryāvattvam api sādharanaṃ sarva-dravyānām pratiniyata-paryāyōpapatteḥ. karmōdayādy-apekṣābhāvāt tad api pariṇāmikam.* TV 2.7.13. As indicated above, the *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya* lists the characteristic of possessing qualities instead (*guṇavattvam*). The *Tattvārthādhigama-ṭīkā* does so as well.
103. I discussed this issue in more detail in the context of Kundakunda's texts in Bajželj (2018).
104. For example, the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* asserts: 'It is stated that these completely liberated [beings] have non-different performance (*atīta-bheda-vyavahāra*) owing to the non-existence of differentiating causes, such as the state of existence and the class of existence' (*āha, amī parinirvṛttā gati-jāty-ādi-bheda-kāraṇābhāvād atīta-bheda-vyavahārā evēti.* SS §936 (TS<sup>Dig</sup> 10.8)). The text continues with the sentence 'There is also difference (*bheda*) in a certain respect (*kathaṃcit*)' (*asti kathaṃcid bhedo 'pi*), after which it provides a detailed account of the ways in which liberated selves may, in fact, be differentiated.
105. See also note 65.
106. Because the size of the medium of motion (*dharma*) defines the border of the cosmic space (*lokākāśa*), the liberated being comes to a halt at the very edge of it and remains there eternally. For a close examination of the travel of liberated beings, see Bajželj (2019).
107. As noted in the previous section, liberation is possible only in a human form.
108. Following the *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya*, the *Tattvārthādhigama-ṭīkā* explains: 'In the human world, half of the third island (*ardha-tṛtīya-dvīpa*) is encircled by the mountain *Mānuṣōttara*; and the diameter [of the *Prāgbhāra*, i.e. the liberated space] is the same as that (that is, the diameter of the human world up to the mountain range). The meaning is that [its] extension (*vistara*) is forty-five lac *yojanas*. With a shape of a wide-open white umbrella (*uttānikṛta-sita-cchatrakākṛti*), beautiful, that is, characterized by beautiful form, and so on (*śubha-rūpādy-ātmika*) – above this earth (*ḥṣiti*) is the dwelling (*avasthāna*) of liberated beings (*siddha*), touching the top of the cosmos (*lokānta-sprś*)' (*nr-loke 'rdha-tṛtīya-dvīpā mānuṣōttara-mahīdhara-parikṣiptā tat-tulya-viṣkambhā, pañca-catvāriṃśad-yojana-lakṣa-vistarēty arthaḥ. uttānikṛta-sita-cchatrakākṛtiḥ śubha-rūpādy-ātmikā śubhā tasyāḥ ḥṣiter upari lokānta-sprśām siddhānām avasthānam.* TṬ 10.7.20).
109. *anākāratvān muktānām abhāva iti cen na; atītānantara-śārīrākāratvāt.* SS §927 (TS<sup>Dig</sup> 10.4). The *Tattvārtha-vārtika* slightly expands on this: 'If it be argued that there is non-existence [of liberated beings] owing to formlessness, [then we say] no, because of [their] conforming to the form of the last past body (*atītānantara-śārīrākārānuvidhāyitva*). [The following] may be [argued]: Non-existence of liberated beings, who are deprived of the [material] form (*pariyakta-mūrti*), obtains owing to the non-existence of the form. This is not [the case]. For what reason? Because of [their] conforming to the form of the last past body (*atītānantara-śārīrākārānuvidhāyitva*)' (*anākāratvād abhāva iti cet; na; atītānantara-śārīrākārānuvidhāyitvāt. syād etat - muktānām pariyakta-mūrtinām ākārahāvād abhāvāḥ prāpnotīti; tan na; kiṃ kāraṇam? atītānantara-śārīrākārānuvidhāyitvāt.* TV 10.4.12).
110. *syān mataṃ, yadi śārīrānuvidhāyī jīvaḥ; tad-abhāvāt svābhāvika-lokākāśa-pradeśa-parimāṇatvāt tāvad visarpaṇaṃ prāpnotīti. naīṣa doṣaḥ. kutaḥ? kāraṇābhāvāt. nāma-karma-saṃbandho hi saṃharaṇa-visarpaṇa-kāraṇam. tad-abhāvāt punaḥ saṃharaṇa-visarpaṇābhāvāḥ.* SS §928 (TS<sup>Dig</sup> 10.4).
111. *nāma-karma-saṃbandhāt saṃharaṇa-visarpaṇa-dharmatvaṃ pradīpa-prakāśavat. yathā pradīpa-prakāśo 'vadhṛta-parimāṇaḥ śārāva-mānikāpavarakādi-dravyōpaṣṭambhān mahān alpaś ca bhavati tathā nāma-karma-saṃbandhāt paricchinna-parimāṇo 'pi jīvaḥ saṃharati visarpati ca, tad-abhāvān na saṃhāro visarpaṇaṃ vā mukta-jīvasya.* TV 10.4.14.
112. While the *Śvetāmbara* commentaries provide limited insight into defining immersion, they introduce an unusual feature to the state of liberation. According to both the *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya* and the *Tattvārthādhigama-ṭīkā*, the liberated being retains the immersion of space points corresponding to its last body, but this immersion is one-third smaller than the size of the body. The *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya* states: "Immersion" (*avagāhana*). [. . .] With respect to that which is to be stated regarding the previous condition, one attains perfection in these [described] bodily immersions. But with respect to that which is to be stated regarding the present condition, perfection is attained in these same ones, individually, deprived of one third (*tri-bhāga-hīna*)' (*avagāhanā. [. . .] etāsu śārīrāvagāhanāsu sidhyati pūrva-bhāva-prajñāpaniyasya. praty-utpanna-bhāva-prajñāpaniyasya tu etāsv eva yathasvaṃ tri-bhāga-hīnāsu sidhyati.* TBh 10.7). The *Tattvārthādhigama-ṭīkā* follows the *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya*. The reason behind this doctrine remains unclear, as the commentaries do not

provide an explanation for it. However, Walther Schubring proposes that this idea may have originated from observing the shrinking of the corpse (2000/1935, 329). See also Ohira (1975–1976).

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- TS<sup>Dig</sup>* See SS.
- TS [Umāsvāti, *Tattvārtha-sūtra* with Śvetāmbara commentaries, includes the Śvetāmbara recension of the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* = *TS<sup>Sv</sup>*] *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra (A Treatise on the Fundamental Principles of Jainism)*, By His Holiness Śrī Umāsvāti Vāchaka, Together with His Connective Verses Commented upon by Śrī Devaguptasūri & Śrī Siddhasenagaṇi and His Own Gloss Elucidated by Śrī Siddhasenagaṇi. 2 vols. Kapadia HR (ed.). Bombay: Jivanchand Sakerchand Javeri, 1926 (Part I: chs 1–5), 1930 (Part II: chs 6–10).
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