

Reply to Redding, Rosen and Wood

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Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* is more than a major work of political and legal philosophy; it is a battleground for two different interpretive approaches. My *Hegel's Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Right* argues that these approaches are mistaken about their differences and that one approach offers a more compelling interpretation of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* than the other. I will briefly outline my defence of the systematic reading of the *Philosophy of Right* before replying to the constructive criticisms raised by Redding, Rosen and Wood.

I. The metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings: a misconceived debate

There are two different interpretive approaches to understanding Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. These are the metaphysical and the non-metaphysical readings. The former often highlight Hegel's insistence that some political states may be considered more 'true' or 'actual' than others. This reading also often emphasises the special place of religion in Hegel's philosophical system, for example.¹ In contrast, the non-metaphysical reading argues that such an interpretation is not only unattractive, but perhaps even unnecessary because Hegel's views on 'actuality' and 'actualization' are less controversial than traditional metaphysical readings of Hegel's philosophy have claimed.² Commentators must choose between these competing camps and interpretations of Hegel's work are conceived within these approaches. Importantly, each reading claims that its approach best captures Hegel's philosophical importance. But would Hegel endorse either the metaphysical or non-metaphysical reading?

The problem is that this debate rests on a central misconception about Hegel's philosophy. The debate is characterized as a disagreement about the role and perhaps the very existence of metaphysics in Hegel's philosophy. But this is a false impression. It is virtually nowhere in doubt that metaphysics is present in Hegel's philosophy, including his *Philosophy of Right*. Therefore, the debate between a 'metaphysical' and 'non-metaphysical' reading of Hegel's works is not a debate about whether these works contain metaphysics. The characterization of the debate invites a false impression about what is at stake.

The present disagreement has developed into a debate about how strongly metaphysical—and, more precisely, how Platonist—Hegel's philosophy is, in fact. Proponents of the non-metaphysical reading of Hegel's philosophy defend the distinction between metaphysics and ontology. Ontology is a distinctive part of metaphysics, but understood as a more reasonable or less controversial claim.³ References to 'metaphysics'

refers to less reasonable or more controversial claims. Non-metaphysical readings of Hegel's work claim that there is an ontology present, but more controversial 'metaphysical' claims may be excised if not avoided altogether. The greater promise of such non-metaphysical readings is their promotion of a more attractive interpretation of Hegel's philosophy through arguments designed to demonstrate that Hegel's claims are more compelling than often assumed. It must be said that the non-metaphysical reading has contributed to a welcome renewal of Hegelian scholarship and wider reception of his philosophy. Defenders of the metaphysical reading are either not persuaded that certain claims are too controversial as traditionally understood or that their approach yields a more accurate interpretation of Hegel's philosophy even if less attractive to contemporary readers.

There is a debate between two competing camps that offer different approaches to the interpretive study of Hegel's philosophy. These camps are self-identified as the metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings. The problem is that this characterization gives a false impression about what is at stake. This debate is not about whether Hegel's philosophical account contains metaphysics. Instead, the central issue is about the competing demands of addressing the contemporary attractiveness of Hegel's 19th Century philosophy while offering an accurate interpretation of his works. This diagnosis of the problem form the backdrop of my argument that the debate between metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings is best understood as a disagreement between a systematic and non-systematic reading of Hegel's texts (see Brooks 2007). The systematic reading claims that Hegel's texts should be understood within the context of his philosophical system. This has the deep interpretive attractiveness of adhering to Hegel's demonstrably clear self-understanding of his project. For example, Hegel says of his *Philosophy of Right*:

[It] is a more extensive, and in particular a more systematic, exposition of the same basic concepts which, in relation to this part of philosophy, are already contained in a previous work designed to accompany my lectures, namely my *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (Hegel 1991: 9).

The *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* offers an outline of Hegel's philosophical system. The *Philosophy of Right* is intended to be an elaboration of one specific part of this system. Hegel is clear that his views 'can only be justified by the exposition of the system itself' (Hegel, 1977) Moreover, the different parts of Hegel's philosophical system are meant to relate to each other in a particular view in keeping with his speculative logic presented in the *Science of Logic* (Hegel 1999). Hegel intends the *Philosophy of Right* to be understood within the context of his larger philosophical system and the speculative logic that underpins it. The systematic reading of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* claims that we should interpret this text as Hegel clearly intended in order to come closest to his self-understanding of its philosophical merits. This reading also claims that Hegel's philosophical system has explanatory power in understanding his work. Note

furthermore that the systematic reading of Hegel's texts is not exclusive to the *Philosophy of Right*: we may adopt a systematic reading of other texts, too.

The non-systematic reading of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* claims this text should be read largely independently from his philosophical system. The philosophical system and its speculative logic is often believed to be too controversial or indefensible. A non-systematic reading of the *Philosophy of Right* is an attempt to inoculate Hegel's political philosophy from the more problematic elements in his thought. This reading denies the explanatory power of Hegel's philosophical system in interpreting the *Philosophy of Right*. While the non-systematic reading is contrary to Hegel's clearly stated self-understanding, it is argued that Hegel was mistaken about the relationship between the *Philosophy of Right* and his system: it is argued that 'Hegel's great positive achievements as a philosopher do not lie where he thought they did' (Wood 1990: 5). Nor need we read understand Hegel's texts in the way he intended. For example, Frederick Neuhouser argues that 'even though Hegel's social theory is undeniably embedded within a more comprehensive philosophical vision . . . it is possible, to a surprisingly large extent, to understand his account of what makes the rational social order rational and to appreciate its force even while abstracting from those more fundamental doctrines' (Neuhouser 2000: 4).

The systematic and non-systematic readings best address the debate between the so-called metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings. The proponents of the metaphysical reading most often argue that Hegel's claims must be understood within a larger systematic context notwithstanding other differences (Beiser 2005, Dudley 2002, Houlgate 1991, Houlgate 2005, Richardson 1989, Rosen 1982, Stern 2002). The approach adopted by most metaphysical readings is best understood as a systematic reading of Hegel's texts. Similarly, most non-metaphysical readings are best understood as offering a non-systematic reading of Hegel's text (Burbidge 1981, Hardimon 1994, Knowles 2002, Steinberger 1988, Wood 1990). This new understanding about the debate has the crucial advantage of better clarifying what is at the heart of the debate.

My *Hegel's Political Philosophy* defends a weak systematic reading of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. The systematic reading is weak insofar as I begin by offering a general overview of Hegel's system and its logic that will help later inform my interpretation of several different areas of Hegel's political philosophy, including property, punishment, morality, family, law, monarchy, and war in chapter length treatments. It has been argued that we should 'buckle down to the study of the text of the *Philosophy of Right*' and that taking Hegel's philosophical system more seriously might stand in the way of our understanding his political philosophy. *Hegel's Political Philosophy* demonstrates that we may adopt a systematic reading and that it might help better illuminate the arguments in the *Philosophy of Right*. I argue that the rich literature contains important interpretive errors that a systematic reading more clearly identifies and often corrects. My purpose is to show how Hegel should be understood, but not necessarily how his ideas might be best defended.⁴ A central concern is that efforts to promote Hegel's ideas through non-systematic readings have come at the cost of sometimes moving too far from what I

believe more accurately captures his philosophical positions. A systematic reading is possible and preferable to competing interpretations. Moreover, this reading offers new insights that are closer to Hegel's self-understanding.

II. Replies to Redding, Rosen and Wood

I will now endeavour to reply to constructive criticisms raised about my *Hegel's Political Philosophy*. It is a great pleasure to receive such close scrutiny from three world-class scholars that I most admire and from whom I have learned immeasurably. My brief reply cannot offer a full response to the many constructive criticisms raised in these perceptive essays. However, I will focus my attention to the central concerns raised from each. My hope is to provide more clarification and further argumentation on important issues that illuminate features pertaining to my reading and its results beyond what I originally presented in *Hegel's Political Philosophy* (Brooks 2007a).

(a) Reply to Redding

Paul Redding (2012) raises several important concerns regarding my systematic reading of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. The first concern is that the systematic reading is uneven in its application. We might expect a systematic reading to draw special attention to the relation between a text and a larger philosophical system. This reading would demonstrate how the larger system might inform a particular text. The concern is that many of the interpretations on offer in *Hegel's Political Philosophy* focus on the internal systematic relations within one text. For example, Redding notes that my arguments in chapters on property and punishment address how the section 'Abstract Right' provides only a partial picture of Hegel's more complete theories about property and punishment. His more complete theories require our taking account of his treatment of property and punishment elsewhere, such as in the later section 'Ethical Life'. While I may provide a convincing explanation of Hegel's positions on these topics, it is unclear how this 'systematic' reading is systematic in a more substantive sense.

Redding's criticism draws attention to two different perspectives provided by a systematic reading. The first perspective is a systematic reading that considers two or more texts and interprets them from the standpoint of their systematic relation. For example, such a reading might identify how certain features in the wider philosophical system as found in one text usefully engage with features found in a second text. More specifically, it might explain how the distinctive argumentative structure of the *Philosophy of Right* is informed and explained, at least in part, with reference to the *Science of Logic* and *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. This systematic reading addresses the external relation between Hegel's texts that are located within his larger philosophical system.

A second perspective is a systematic reading that considers two or more ideas within a single text from the standpoint of their systematic relation. One illustration I offer is how Hegel's theory of punishment is best understood when we consider his discussion in 'Abstract Right' in systematic relation to his more substantive comments in 'Ethical Life'. This second perspective addresses the internal systematic relation within Hegel's texts.

Redding correctly identifies these two different systematic perspectives. One concern is that my systematic reading may be less distinctive if much of its focus is internal rather than external. This is because an internal perspective centred on a single text bears strong resemblance to the non-systematic reading that I am so quick to criticise. Moreover, there are some examples offered, such as my treatment of Hegel's theory of punishment, that appear to offer perhaps a more thoroughgoing treatment of Hegel's views albeit a treatment that is not clearly systematic.

The distinction between an internal and external application of a systematic reading are illuminating and interpretively useful. While I identify a weak and strong version of the systematic reading, it might have been helpful if I had devoted more attention to this external and internal distinction as well. One question is whether my examples, such as the discussion of Hegel's theory of punishment already noted, are consistent with a systematic reading as presented. I believe they are. This is because the systematic consideration of Hegel's views on punishment point beyond this text as well. For example, the *Philosophy of Right* is not constructed like most other philosophical works. Each section relates to one another in a particular dialectical way. Likewise, each chapter relates to other chapters in a similarly distinctive dialectical way. And so on. Together, these parts form an explanatory structure that is implicit in the *Philosophy of Right* and more explicitly defended in the philosophical system which Hegel references in support. Furthermore, the presentation of punishment in 'Abstract Right' assumes conclusions reached in 'Subjective Spirit', namely, the existence of the free will and the need for it to become grounded. The systematic reading of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* not only interprets its feature within the wider context of Hegel's larger philosophical system, but the systematic reading interprets this text's parts within the distinctive dialectical context that Hegel presents. In contrast, a non-systematic reading of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* would consider this text in general isolation from his philosophical system and interpret each section of the text in an atomistic way; the non-systematic reading moves section to section in a non-systematic way where each part is considered in its own place and often without consideration of its systematic relation *within* the text and *beyond* it (Knowles 2002). Therefore, a systematic reading can offer a compelling interpretation that provides an internal as well as external perspective. Such a reading is no less systematic for it. This external/internal distinction is useful to highlight the different perspectives that are made possible by a systematic reading and I am indebted to Redding to clarifying the need for their elaboration.

Redding raises a more potentially damaging concern. Hegel scholars know well the old yarn that if you asked two Hegel scholars for their interpretations, then you would be likely to receive three different views. This oft repeated line speaks to the rich multiplicity of reasonable interpretive differences amongst Hegel scholars concerning various features of Hegel's philosophical writings. For example, Redding correctly argues that Hegel's logic and system have been interpreted differently by many leading commentators. The problem is that much hinges on how they are understood for the systematic reading. This is because the systematic reading is premised on the fact there is an identifiable philosophical system. This raises many questions, including the worry about to what extent are systematic readings reliant on potentially controversial interpretations of Hegel's philosophical system? There might be as many different systematic readings of Hegel's theory of punishment as there are systematic readers. *Hegel's Political Philosophy* devotes a single chapter to the logic and system. However plausible its arguments, one chapter cannot hope to end all, nor even most, interpretive disagreements about how the system should be understood. Much more should then be said about how Hegel's philosophical system should be interpreted to bring greater clarity to where there is often disagreement before we might claim to have a more viable 'systematic' reading of Hegel's text. Moreover, Redding makes clear that this matters for many of the applications of my systematic reading in several cases, such as my discussion of Hegel's views on the constitutional monarch.⁵ Failing to clarify various interpretive issues concerning Hegel's understanding of logic and his philosophical system may undermine the completeness of systematic readings of the *Philosophy of Right*. Perhaps a systematic reading should ultimately be the winning side in contemporary interpretive battle: the concern is that it cannot be unless more is clarified at a more foundational level.

Hegel's philosophical system and its logic are notoriously controversial. Much of the more recent popularity of his work has been possible by avoiding deep engagement with these areas of this thought to some degree. The non-systematic (or so-called 'non-metaphysical') reading has done us all a great service in drawing greater attention to Hegel's philosophy albeit at an interpretive cost.

My concerns are at least twofold. First, I am concerned that the non-systematic reading is too far removed from a more accurate understanding of Hegel's philosophy. The cost of popularity is a somewhat distorted interpretation. *Hegel's Political Philosophy* attempts to provide a more accurate interpretation to correct this problem that has troubled me since first reading Michael Rosen's *Hegel's Dialectic and Its Criticism* in graduate school (Rosen 1982).⁶ Secondly, I am also concerned about the objection oft-stated that taking the philosophical system seriously would entail writing a book about the system and its logic rather than Hegel's political philosophy. My aim was to try to correct what I have perceived as somewhat distorted interpretations of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* by demonstrating that it is possible to take the system seriously and write a book about political philosophy.

Hegel's Political Philosophy offers a 'weak' systematic reading of the *Philosophy of Right*. This reading accepts what I believe is a relatively uncontroversial position on particular substantive issues concerning Hegel's philosophical system. These issues pertain to the philosophical structure of Hegel's system and its presentation in various texts, the philosophical terminology employed, and how the different parts of the system relate to one another. For Hegel, part of the argument must be extracted from how different parts fit together: the structure has explanatory power. On most accounts, 'Hegel is the most methodologically self-conscious of all philosophers in the Western tradition' (Wood 1990: 1). Various terms appear in multiple places and often develop in content with the text. They must be apprehended together to gain greater clarity into their character and the role they play in helping us grasp Hegel's positions. After presenting a chapter that provides a general overview of the logic and system, I then move on to demonstrate the different ways this perspective may usefully inform our understanding of Hegel's positions. The case studies I offer are examples of how a systematic reading may offer an improved understanding of the *Philosophy of Right* and how such a reading offers new interpretations about many different issues.

I avoid defending a 'strong' systematic reading. My position remains that the primary goals are to make the case for a systematic reading and show how it might improve our understanding of the *Philosophy of Right*. If the systematic reading and its results are attractive, then others are invited to join me in further elaborating the systematic reading of other texts and working out a more thick systematic reading that might better address the concerns that Redding identifies. So I don't disagree that my account leaves open many important controversies concerning the interpretation of Hegel's philosophical system and its logic. My aim was not so much to win all future battles as to change the debate. We are not locked in a debate between metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings, but rather systematic and non-systematic readings. This fact about the nature of the present debate is important. Furthermore, the first case has now been offered for an explicitly systematic reading of Hegel's texts. It is my hope that the reading will draw others into further develop the richness of the systematic perspective and its application to the *Philosophy of Right* and beyond. I have Redding to thank for his penetrating insights that have pushed me to consider these features more substantively. For this, I am deeply grateful.

(b) Reply to Rosen

Michael Rosen correctly highlights the many problems with non-systematic readings. In essence, these readings tell us only part of Hegel's story. One part concerns the positions that Hegel defends in his *Philosophy of Right*. The missing second part is why Hegel chooses to defend him and the account he offers in defence. We risk losing sight of why Hegel holds the views he defends if we avoid a systematic reading of his work. This is

because a systematic reading illuminates best Hegel's self-understanding of his philosophical project.

Rosen argues beautifully that we should leave Hegel's philosophy 'as a magnificent monument from a bygone age'. This speaks to my choice of cover. Heidelberg Castle is a common choice for many books pertaining to German Idealism not least for the reason that many leading figures one taught at Heidelberg University, including Hegel. The city's famous castle majestically sits atop a hill in clear view and the subject of much attention since it was built in the early 13th Century. It has since fallen into disrepair, but this seems only to improve its status as a 'must visit' site for anyone in the area.

My cover depicts a second and older ruined castle that is closer to home, Tynemouth Castle.⁷ The particular representation of a castle used is unimportant. But what is important is the idea that Hegel's philosophy is similar to a ruined castle on a hill. Both were once the seat of much activity, but now neither are places we may call home. This does not mean that they lack contemporary value, but rather that we should engage with them in context. It seems unimportant to me whether we must argue that Tynemouth Castle is a great castle rather than a place of historical interest from which we may still learn. Similarly, I find much that is attractive about Hegel's philosophy as an object of rich historical and philosophical interest—even if I find it deeply flawed as stated. I believe a systematic reading of Hegel's philosophy helps us get closer to a more accurate understanding and this may usefully identify new perspectives on philosophical positions. Those looking to defend Hegel's philosophy should perhaps turn their efforts to defend reconstructed positions indebted to Hegel's philosophy: instead of defending Hegel's views, perhaps our efforts should be to defend Hegelian-inspired views. The owl of Minerva has taken flight more than once. Nevertheless, we learn something important about ourselves and our relation to the world through engaging with Hegel's philosophy.

I am especially indebted to Rosen and his work. His *Hegel's Dialectic and Its Criticism* provided a major turning point in my understanding of Hegel's philosophy and it helped confirm in my mind the need for a systematic reading. It also confirmed my judgement that Hegel's philosophy may be problematic, but this does not mean it lacks deep philosophical value as well.

(c) Reply to Wood

Hegel's Political Philosophy notes in the conclusion that a principle target throughout is Allen Wood's *Hegel's Ethical Thought* (1990). I am particularly indebted to Wood for this book and related work for opening the richness of Hegel's philosophy to me for the first time. His *Hegel's Ethical Thought* was a source of particular inspiration for many years. Indeed, it was the long, torturous reflection on what might be improved in this account that led me to produce my own work on Hegel. Some say that imitation is the greatest form of flattery. In philosophy, sustained engagement is perhaps the most praise we might offer.

If this is true, then *Hegel's Political Philosophy* is a long way of offering my thanks and appreciation to Wood for inspiring me to think more carefully about Hegel. Of course, Wood may wish I thought more carefully still.

Wood does not reject the view that Hegel intends his *Philosophy of Right* to be understood systematically. Instead, Wood rejects the view that we ought to allow our interpretations of the *Philosophy of Right* to be held hostage to Hegel's self-understanding. The problem is that Hegelian ideas live on thought his speculative system lies in ruins. If we believe Hegel worth reading and learning from, then we should endeavour at appropriating his positions in a sympathetic way that yields them open to defence rather than gives the game away too quickly. The danger of a systematic reading is that the attempt to accurately grasp Hegel's positions in terms of his self-understanding may readily undermine their contemporary attractiveness and leave Hegelian philosophy on the trash heap of philosophical history. If we care about Hegel's ideas, then we view Hegel through our eyes and move beyond his mistaken philosophical system. Few take this system seriously and uncritical acceptance undermines the philosophical attractiveness of Hegel's ideas. Likewise, we should be critical about Hegel's system if we wish to mine it for items of philosophical interest. It is then a mistake to take Hegel at his word for more reasons than one. The systematic reading may 'succeed' in offering an interpretation that is closer to Hegel's stated intentions, but at the cost of presenting an indefensible philosophy that will attract little interest.

Wood's criticism is sustained and contains much compelling force. Why argue for others to accept an interpretation that may render Hegel's philosophy less attractive? The worry is that the systematic reading may do precisely this. The systematic reading reunites Hegel's now rehabilitated *Philosophy of Right* with its still unpopular and controversial philosophical system. If this reunion leads us to a more defensible position, then perhaps this move might be welcome. However, *Hegel's Political Philosophy* is not out to popularise the new interpretations on offer, but rather to highlight that a new interpretative approach to the study of Hegel's texts is on offer and that it renders interpretations which are closer to Hegel's self-understanding with greater textual support. The project is to present a more *Hegelian* Hegel warts and all. But why keep the warts if they can be excised?

I accept the general difficulty of elucidating any 'accurate' interpretation of a text. My focus has been to centre on Hegel's explicit self-understanding in opposition to much in the literature relating to his *Philosophy of Right*. There are deeper questions about how far an author's self-understanding should play in philosophical interpretation. I draw attention only to what is fairly uncontroversial, namely, that Hegel argues his *Philosophy of Right* should be understood within the context of his larger philosophical system. I attempt to demonstrate what this systematic reading of the *Philosophy of Right* might look like and how it relates to our understanding of various positions. This is a project that has never been undertaken as comprehensively as *Hegel's Political Philosophy*. So one purpose is

to offer for the first time a comprehensive interpretation of the *Philosophy of Right* from the perspective of a systematic reading.

But I have not presented a systematic reading of Hegel's political philosophy to assist critics in undermining its philosophical importance. I believe Hegel's philosophy has deep problems and I also believe Plato's philosophy has deep problems, too. However, I do not accept that they must lack problems to possess philosophical interest. The systematic reading may reignite concerns about the attractiveness of speculative logic, but it remains useful in highlighting new insights into Hegel's positions that may reveal fruitful avenues for future philosophical endeavours. A second purpose of my project is to offer several new interpretations of various positions in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. A systematic reading has value as a new interpretation and for presenting new perspectives on familiar issues, such as punishment or the family.

While I argue for a new approach to the study of Hegel and present several new interpretations, I have stopped short of offering a complete defence of these positions as philosophical positions —although I defend each as a position closest to the systematic reading of Hegel's philosophy. The reason why was to avoid diluting the central message. I did not set out to show that I might outperform non-systematic readings in making Hegel's philosophy more attractive. Indeed, a systematic reading that is closer to Hegel's self-understanding may inevitably be less attractive in some respects. I did want to show it was possible to write a book about the *Philosophy of Right* in relation to Hegel's system and logic while remaining closely focused on his political philosophy throughout. I continue to believe I succeed in this task. I further believed that the standard characterization of the interpretive debate between metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings misconceived the true difference between them —and I continue to believe I succeeded in this task, too. I hope that others feel compelled to apply a systematic reading to other parts of Hegel's philosophy beyond the *Philosophy of Right*. It remains too early to tell how successful I have been in this task. Finally, the presentation of new interpretations of Hegel's positions has opened up several fruitful avenues for future work. While Wood and I disagree, I believe there is much promise in the theory of punishment Hegel offers. My interpretation argues that he accepts a unified theory of punishment bringing together retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation into a unified framework. This idea can be reconstructed and developed for improved contemporary relevance and to speak to further penal elements, such as restorative justice and expressivism (Brooks 2012a, 2012b).

Wood is generally more optimistic about my case studies than my interpretive approach. I am extremely grateful to him for raising several interpretive issues about my overall approach and specifics pertaining to individual chapters. Yes, one goal is to present a new interpretive perspective on Hegel's philosophy. This is the project of the systematic reading. However, a further goal is to offer compelling interpretations of Hegel's philosophical positions. I accept that a stronger systematic reading might clarify certain relations between my positions and Hegel's system. But I am deeply pleased to

find that Wood has found much that is novel and useful in my account. Perhaps our differences are not as wide as I had first imagined although many deep disagreements remain. This only further inspires me to endeavour much more toward developing a more thick account that might address Wood's excellent criticisms more robustly. I am deeply indebted to him for providing such a perceptive and engaging account that has challenged me to say much more about central issues in my position.

Conclusion

I briefly conclude by thanking Redding, Rosen, and Wood for taking the time to provide this set of illuminating constructive remarks on my work. They have pushed me to better elaborate central positions presented in *Hegel's Political Philosophy* and which have helped improve my understanding of the systematic reading of Hegel's philosophy and its future promise.

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Notes

¹ Examples include Beiser (1995, 1996) and Rosen (1974).

² Examples include Engelhardt and Pinkard (1994), Knowles (2002), Neuhouser (2000), and Pelczynski (1964).

³ A similar distinction between metaphysics and ontology is offered by John Rawls (Rawls 1999).

⁴ I offer defences of Hegel's positions elsewhere (Brooks 2004, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d).

⁵ This is presented in chapter seven and originally published in Brooks (2007b).

⁶ I must also thank Brian O'Connor once more for encouraging me to engage deeply with Rosen's texts in light of what it might reveal about our understanding of the *Philosophy of Right*.

⁷ My photo of Tynemouth Castle may be accessed here: <http://the-brooks-blog.blogspot.co.uk/2007/04/tynemouth-castle-in-march.html>.

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