

The limitations of Fedyshyn's thesis lie first of all in his failure to investigate more carefully the German *Randstaatenpolitik*. In the diplomatic history of the Second Reich this concept could have been traced indirectly to Bismarck, who was concerned primarily not with the economic penetration of the East but with providing an alternative policy toward Russia, in case revolutionary movements or expansionist Pan-Slavist forces should gain an upper hand there, thus threatening the social and political status quo in East Central Europe. The buffer-states concept including the Ukraine was stressed in the German diplomatic correspondence at the very early stage of the war (see, for example, the documentation in P. Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik, 1918*, Lübeck, 1970, pp. 34–35), and there is no evidence that the German government abandoned its social and political criteria while building the buffer states in the East. Obviously the socialist Ukrainian state under the Rada was rather a liability than a barrier, as far as the danger of the spreading of revolutionary ideas was concerned. The Hetman's government proved hardly more productive from the standpoint of the German war economy, taking into consideration, among other things, the disruption caused by popular uprisings at the time, and the number of German casualties suffered in suppressing them. Yet the Germans supported Skoropadsky till the bitter end.

By sidetracking the political and social aspects of the German policy to a considerable degree in order to illuminate the economic concerns of the German leaders, Fedyshyn does not always succeed in giving a balanced account of some of the German political moves in the Ukraine. He pays little attention and attributes minor significance to the German long-range plans for economic penetration of Eastern Europe, which started to emerge during the occupation of the Ukraine. Yet a more intensive analysis would have provided not only some additional clues to the occupation policies but also a better realization of the precarious position of the Ukraine if the Germans had won.

Despite the limitations mentioned, the work renders correctly the general characteristics and the sequence of events in connection with the German drive to the Ukraine, and the reader will find the collection of documentary sources and the excellent bibliography useful and enlightening. This is the first comprehensive scholarly work on the topic in English, and thus provides a welcome base for a further exploration of this field.

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1919: RED MIRAGE. By *David Mitchell*. New York: Macmillan, 1970. 385 pp. \$7.50.

The year 1919 was the 1848 of the proletarian revolution—a year of galloping revolutionary infection radiated by Petrograd's example (like Paris in the earlier, bourgeois-democratic instance), a year when the hopes and fears of social overturn were never so passionately rampant, a year nonetheless ending almost everywhere in bloody cures at the hands of the counterrevolutionary establishment. The struggles of 1919 between utopian fervor and status-quo panic have acquired an almost quaint remoteness in the perspective of welfare-state evolution on the one hand, and the crimes of more recent dictators on the other. Still, the aborted or self-betrayed revolutionary upheavals of 1919 represent a critical and revealing stage

in the development of the social forces unleashed by twentieth-century industrialism.

David Mitchell, a British journalist and chronicler of feminist movements, sets himself the task of depicting the vast surge and flailing collapse of the forces of social revolution in post-World War I Europe. Vividly he describes the panoply of strikes and uprisings from Winnipeg and Washington State to Budapest and the Ukraine, but with particular emphasis on the Communist and Social Democratic attempts to rule within the territory of the former Central Powers, and the machinations of the old order—above all, the chief statesmen of the Allied Powers—to keep the lid on or restore it by force of arms. The author has achieved a literate, exciting, quick-paced evocation of the tumultuous mood of the times.

Unfortunately Mr. Mitchell's book will prove somewhat frustrating to the scholar, if not to the undergraduate. Where a work on 1919 could have been a significant contribution, pursuing the linkages between the Central and East European revolutions, the Allied governments, and the forces of counterrevolution, this book is fragmented and episodic. It makes no pretense at objective analysis, and no attempt to hide a disdain for all things bourgeois and an ardent sympathy for socialist and communist revolutions of any hue. The author would appear to be an anarchist, more than anything else; workers' control and peasant communes strike him as the ideal. Béla Kun is his hero, and perhaps Nestor Makhno, and even Gabriele D'Annunzio. The Soviet regime (above all Trotsky) justifiably slips out of the circle of grace as it starts to curb the ultraleftists outside as well as inside Russia.

The book is best for its numerous mood-sketches offering a rare, if opinionated, glimpse of what some unfamiliar events looked and felt like—the Bolshevik capture and loss of Riga, the style of life of Makhno's guerrillas, the counterrevolution in Hungary, D'Annunzio's expedition to Fiume. Acidic portraits of Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Wilson are offered from the standpoint of the vanquished revolutionaries. Trotsky gets his measure of criticism as well, though Lenin is left a little above it all.

Judging by the bibliography, *1919* was written entirely from English-language secondary sources, apart from some of the British government documents centering on the antirevolutionary views of Churchill.

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THE MAKING OF THE SOVIET STATE APPARATUS. By *Olga A. Narkiewicz*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1970. x, 238 pp. \$9.00. Distributed by Humanities Press, New York.

The thesis of this study is that during the Civil War and New Economic Policy, events at the local level had a decisive influence on shaping Bolshevik policy. The author, drawing on the Smolensk archives as well as printed sources, contends that the inefficiency of local administration, combined with rising unemployment and the mass migration to the towns of pauperized peasants in search of non-existent jobs, drove the authorities to act and, in the last analysis, made the decision to collectivize agriculture inevitable. This argument, as the author herself admits, is not new. But by focusing on conditions in the village and factory she sheds interesting light on Soviet life during the first decade of Bolshevik rule.