

Professor Jones replies:

Hiroaki Kuromiya raises some valid questions about my article on collaboration in occupied Soviet Russia. The evidence, however, supports my conclusion that “there were strong anti-Soviet sentiments among the Don cossacks” during World War II (770).

After noting in his excellent work *Freedom and Terror in the Donbas* (1998) that the Nazis targeted ethnic Germans in Russia for their support, Kuromiya adds, “Other groups, particularly Cossacks, both local Don Cossacks and those who had returned from abroad, served as policemen” (283). He is mistaken in his letter to suggest that I rely “entirely” on this citation to conclude that cossacks exhibited strong anti-Soviet sentiments. The evidence of anti-Soviet sentiments among the cossacks comes from a wealth of evidence presented in my article.

First, I make clear that part of the basis for my argument is the history of anti-Soviet sentiments among the Don cossacks. As Kuromiya writes in *Freedom and Terror*, during the civil war that followed the 1917 October revolution, “the donbas was to become a theater of fierce battle in which . . . many Don Cossacks participated on the White side” (37; he goes on to point out that “the militant traditions of the Cossacks also helped the Reds,” while conceding that “even the Red Cossacks were not easily brought under Bolshevik control.”). I provide evidence to show a widespread perception of cossack disloyalty during World War II as well. For example, local leader Pastushenko insinuated that cossacks were disloyal and untrustworthy, and concerns were raised behind closed doors over the disproportionate number of party cards in the Gestapo files in Novochoerkassk, the former cossack capital (758). The local press, moreover, reported on treason in Novochoerkassk and described the “unmasking” of a collaboratorist *starosta* (elder) in a *khutor* (village), terms associated with cossacks in the lower Don. One article referred to the occupiers’ attempt to “poison the consciousness of cossacks” with “pernicious propaganda” (762), suggesting that the Germans perceived them as disloyal to the Soviet cause and thus targeted them.

As I note in the article, the strongest evidence regarding cossack attitudes comes from memoirs. K. S. Karol and Mary Leder both stress the strong anti-Semitic sentiments among the Don cossacks. Karol’s cossack wife, Klava, told him that they “drink of this poison along with their mother’s milk” (767; K. S. Karol, *Solik: Life in the Soviet Union, 1939–1946*, 1986, 308). Leder cites a letter from her husband at the beginning of the war advising her to “stay away from Rostov because of the Don cossacks’ well-known anti-Soviet and anti-Semitic sentiments.” She recalls a cossack woman telling her that the Germans would soon “take care of the Communists and the Jews” (768; Mary Leder, *My Life in Stalinist Russia: An American Woman Looks Back*, 2001, 192–94, emphasis added). One interviewee, Ekaterina Karot-skova, remembered that several cossacks in her native village served as loyal policemen for the Nazis (768). Thus my article presents considerable evidence demonstrating the strong anti-Soviet sentiments among the Don cossacks.

At the same time, I do not argue that *all* cossacks betrayed the Soviet cause. The article emphasizes the “gray zone” of people’s behavior and focuses on varying *perceptions* of “collaboration.” I concede the complexity of this issue and recognize that collaboration does not necessarily stem from anti-Soviet sentiments. Kuromiya stresses this point in his letter, effectively refuting an argument that I did not make (I do not argue, as Kuromiya implies, “that collaboration was a result of strong anti-Stalinist or anti-Soviet sentiments and convictions”). “Not all cossacks hated Jews or supported the Germans in the war,” I write, noting that Karol’s wife, Klava, was not anti-Semitic and that her father, who was *very* anti-Semitic, supported the Soviet cause. “Yet the *general picture* of cossack sentiments clearly contradicts the loyal image of them projected by the local press” (769, emphasis added). Thus there is no contradiction (as Kuromiya states) between my claim that the “line between heroes and villains in the [USSR] remained unclear” (749) and my subsequent assertion that “there were widespread anti-Soviet sentiments among the cossack population of Ukraine and the lower Don” (750n17)—these statements are *not* mutually exclusive.

An earlier draft of my article included additional material that further supports my conclusion regarding cossack sentiments. A Soviet pilot captured by Nazi forces, S. I. Emel’ianenko escaped in January 1943 and sought assistance from Soviet peasants (S. I. Emel’ianenko, “Traditsionnyi vopros,” unpublished memoir). One woman in a cossack vil-

lage agreed to feed him, but when her husband returned home Emel'ianenko saw that he wore a German policeman's armband. He demanded to see Emel'ianenko's documents, but after a moment of silence Emel'ianenko responded, "It's too bad that we live in a time when we Russians have no mercy for one another." That his cossack host let Emel'ianenko stay further illustrates the complexity of this issue and the "gray areas" in people's behavior: in this case a cossack collaborated with the Germans and yet also helped an escaped Red Army pilot.

In her memoir, Elena Kozhina remembers strong support for the Germans among cossacks in Kushevka, a village about eighty kilometers from Rostov where she and her mother, refugees from Leningrad, stayed with a cossack woman (Elena Kozhina, *Through the Burning Steppe: A Memoir of Wartime Russia, 1942–1943*, 2000). Kozhina's mother ardently supported the Soviet regime, and she recalls that the cossacks were very hostile to them. When the village fell to the Germans in July 1942, they were unable to escape, and she states that "the villagers greeted the Germans with bread and salt," a traditional show of hospitality. They hated the collective farms Iosif Stalin imposed on them in the 1930s, and the Germans had dropped leaflets promising to get rid of them. Once Kozhina's mother was reading a newspaper in the presence of several cossack women and proclaimed, "They say we shot down eight aircraft." After an uneasy pause the cossacks asked, "whom do you call 'we'—the Soviets or the Germans?" The cossacks asked Kozhina's mother, "Why do you stand up for your damn Bolsheviks? . . . If you want to obey such people, go ahead, but we think differently. We remember our Cossack freedom!" (Kozhina, *Through the Burning Steppe*, 11).

I apologize if I misrepresented Kiromiya's findings in any way, and I agree that this is a very complex, many-sided issue—in fact, I emphasize that point in my article. I wish to reiterate that I base my conclusion that there were strong anti-Soviet sentiments among the cossacks on a wealth of evidence to that effect and *not* solely on a single passage from his work. (On the fiftieth anniversary of Victory Day, 9 May 1995, the Rostov city government refused to allow cossack troops to march with Soviet veterans, citing the pro-Nazi "Cossack Brigade" during the war as a reason. The cossacks marched anyway, along a separate route, but were not allowed into the Central Square. This incident illustrates that the perception of cossack disloyalty during the war remains strong.).

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