

work (p. 207). The very rigidity of Tolstoy's policies contributed to the failures he experienced and to the rise of opposition leading to his dismissal. As Sinel shows, despite Tolstoy's positive contributions to Russian education, he "actually stimulated the phenomenon he wished to combat, the growth of antistate sentiment among the students" (p. 213).

The book is interesting to read and adds considerably to the knowledge of the educational history of tsarist Russia. It is somewhat repetitious, but this is not a serious problem. However, the efforts to relate the nineteenth century to the contemporary era are not very felicitous—nor are the attempts to compare Tolstoy's "Boy Scout Code" (pp. 178–79) with the Twenty Commandments of the Soviet pupil, or the cheating in Tolstoy's time (pp. 199–200) with that of the Soviet period.

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THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH: AN ADVENTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. By *Eugene P. Trani*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969. xi, 194 pp. \$6.75.

This study of the negotiations that resulted in the Treaty of Portsmouth focuses on the personal diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt. As a Harvard graduate, world traveler, sportsman, and advocate of physical fitness and imperialism who could, if necessary, converse in French and who was socially at ease with old-world aristocrats, President Roosevelt was well prepared to assume the role of mediator between Japan and Russia in 1905. It was above all his initiative in bringing together the Japanese and Russians, his ties of friendship with several key Japanese leaders, and his persistence, powers of persuasion, and diplomatic skill that avoided an unnecessary prolongation of the Russo-Japanese conflict. For this achievement and for other peacemaking activities, Roosevelt received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906.

Trani's study is mainly of interest for the Russian diplomatic historian because of the details it provides concerning Japanese and American diplomacy and internal politics during 1904 and 1905. The author has used not only the available secondary literature and printed sources concerning the Portsmouth Conference but also American and Japanese manuscript and archival sources. He is therefore able to provide insights into American and Japanese attitudes and motives that usually are not to be found in Soviet and American studies of tsarist diplomacy during the Russo-Japanese War.

Trani's discussion of Russian attitudes and policy is the least satisfying part of his book. Here it is important to note that a scholarly edition of Russian Foreign Ministry documents comparable to the *Grosse Politik*, the *Documents diplomatiques français*, and the *British Documents on the Origins of the War* has yet to be published for the period 1871–1911. Trani was able to consult the Archives of the Japanese Foreign Office microfilmed by the American government after 1945, as well as State Department records and personal papers at the Library of Congress, the Massachusetts Historical Society, the Columbia University Library, and the Sterling Memorial Library at Yale. He did not have access to Soviet archives.

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