

STATE CORPORATISM
IN ARGENTINA:
Labor Administration under Perón and Onganía*

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State corporatist representation of organized labor interests has been an enduring characteristic of modern Latin American politics, transcending differences in national ideologies and political regimes. In recent years, much attention has been devoted to analyzing various corporatist experiments that have emerged in the region and elsewhere. As a result, it is now possible to distinguish among corporatist systems that are state or societal, Ibero-Catholic, traditional, or modern "rationalist," inclusionary or exclusionary, bifrontal or segmental; and analysts have moved on to "disaggregate" the structure of corporatism in a variety of political contexts.¹

Even so, the study of corporatism remains incomplete. Analyses have generally concentrated on the "external" dimensions of corporatism, that is, the legal and administrative instruments projected outward by the state to structure corporatively the representative organizations of specific social groups, to regulate formally and define the scope of their activities (usually along functional lines), and to channel their interests and demands before the state. Although critical to understanding the dynamics of corporatism, these "external" dimensions do not by themselves suffice to explain the totality of the corporatist experience. To do so requires examination of another, "internal" dimension that is as essential to the establishment of corporatism as it is obvious and underresearched: the organization of the state apparatus responsible for administering the interests of specific social groups.

Just as corporatist and pluralist group representation before the

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state differs significantly, so does the organization of state agencies responsible for administering the interests of social groups under both systems. Moreover, differences in the type of corporatist approach being attempted should be reflected at an organizational level as well. This paper therefore will examine the "internal" dimension of national labor administration within the Argentine state under the regimes headed by Juan Perón (1946–55) and Juan Carlos Onganía (1966–70).

My reason for choosing these particular regimes is simple. They represent opposing ends of the state corporatist continuum, at least in regard to their structuring of organized labor interests.² As such, they provide good case studies of inclusionary and exclusionary state corporatist systems of labor administration that operated sequentially within one national context.³ Examining national labor administration under each regime will allow direct comparison of the effects of two divergent corporatist experiments on the same institutional framework; it can thus be determined whether internal differences emerged within this framework as well.

Generally speaking, in an external dimension, inclusionary state corporatist systems employ a broad array of inducements coupled with the selective application of constraints to encourage and reward labor cooperation with government.⁴ These systems have been primarily identified with regimes that use organized labor as a main base of political support, such as the populist-authoritarian regime headed by Perón that will be examined here.

Exclusionary state corporatist systems are believed to be promoted by regimes that view organized labor as a major opposition group. They attempt to impose a wide variety of constraints while offering selective inducements in order to divide and weaken the labor movement and thereby reduce its overall political impact. These systems have been identified with military-authoritarian rule and analyzed in light of recent South American experiences with a new variation on this theme—bureaucratic authoritarianism—for which the Onganía regime provided the first case study.⁵

This examination of the internal face of state corporatism under the Perón and Onganía regimes will proceed by first describing in general terms the basic orientation of labor administration in each case. It will then move on to analyze in detail three organizational variables: structure, budget, and personnel employed in national labor administration. The analysis of structure will consider the hierarchical ordering of centralized agencies within national labor administration, the functional relationship between them, and the overall status of labor administration within the state apparatus. Budgetary allocations destined for labor administration will be evaluated, as will the distribution of financial resources among the centralized agencies within it. Finally, person-

nel backgrounds and turnover will be considered in order to determine who actually was involved in this crucial area of state activity.

Before continuing, a small caveat regarding these observations is needed. Despite its focus, this essay assumes that institutional reforms alone do not constitute a conclusive basis for analyzing regime performance or the totality of state activities in a given functional area. A host of other factors both internal and external to regimes, which together comprise the environment within which regimes operate (using the state as the instrument of application of their decisions), play a far larger part in determining regime performance and the daily machinations of the state apparatus.

Nonetheless, an excellent measure of a regime's intentions and commitment in specific functional areas is the kind of changes it proposes for agencies responsible for implementing regime policies in those areas. Moreover, because state corporatist systems are distinguished by their extensive use of formal mechanisms to regulate the activities of social groups, institutional reforms should provide a good indication of the basic outlines of each regime's corporatist program.

THE PERONIST REGIME, 1946–1955: EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS

By the time Perón assumed the presidency in June of 1946, the institutional apparatus responsible for administering labor interests within the state was well established. On 27 November 1943, a month after Perón was named as head of the *Departamento Nacional de Trabajo*, the department was elevated to the rank of *Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión*, with status analogous to that of a ministry.⁶ With its promotion came a broad expansion of the domain of the former department into a variety of labor-related areas, including legal, health, pension, and social security programs. Expansion was accomplished by incorporating responsibilities and agencies previously within the purview of regional, provincial, or other governmental jurisdictions.⁷ More importantly, this process gave Perón the opportunity to enact progressive labor legislation as well as to enforce existing laws (which he later claimed were the keys to his success), the better to cultivate labor support.

Perón used his position in the *Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión* to build the foundations of the political movement that was to bring him eventually to power. "With Perón at its head, the *Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión* was granted both executive and judicial functions, and expeditive powers not subject to recourse. . . . The operative rule was the worker was always correct, and the *Secretaría* always sided with the workers. This approach helped perpetuate a mythos around the *Secretaría*. . . . Perón had only one objective: to capture the sympa-

thy and support of the masses. Laws were dictated regarding the registration and legalization of unions depending on their degree of support for the authorities. Unions that supported the regime were awarded registered status; others were not."⁸ As a result, when Perón took office as President, he did so secure in the knowledge that an extensive apparatus existed that was responsible for organized labor and had mutually supportive ties with that sector.

Upon becoming President, Perón's basic objectives did not vary. He wanted to continue to garner labor support by bestowing handsome material benefits and legal protection upon unionized workers through designated state agencies. To do so, he arranged these agencies into a vertical framework that centrally and exclusively controlled the organized labor movement from above. He achieved this goal via the imposition of labor legislation that precluded outright union independence as well as through a direct chain of command extending from the executive branch through the *Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión* and his personal emissaries into the union leadership, particularly that of the one national labor confederation, the *Confederación General de Trabajo* (CGT).⁹

The functional aspect of this approach was of paramount importance for Perón.¹⁰ To perform as designed, his program required the mutual support of the regime and labor through the state agencies that connected them. In his view, "the Justicialista state defends union organizations, and these sustain the Justicialista state," in which national labor administration embodied a "profoundly patriotic humanism that makes it distinct from all other public agencies."¹¹ In response to his overtures, the Argentine laboring masses for the first time identified with the regime in power and viewed the state, especially labor administration, as an ally rather than an adversary.¹²

Perón made clear, however, that it was the state, not the unions, who was the dominant partner in this alliance and who therefore ultimately controlled the fortunes of the working classes. He demonstrated this attitude when as *Secretario de Trabajo y Previsión*, he extensively organized workers while simultaneously undermining the position of established union leaders. Perón gave the workers in months what they previously had been unable to achieve in years, a lesson not soon forgotten.

Most important in a process begun before and continued after his election, Perón passed a series of measures designed to bring the labor movement entirely under state control. He enacted legislation that gave the state the exclusive right to recognize unions formally at all levels (one per industry and level of activity) and that vertically linked those unions and labor federations granted legal recognition by

the state.¹³ Legislation was passed authorizing state-approved “legal” strikes but outlawing all work stoppages that were not state sanctioned as crimes against the security of the state.¹⁴ The encapsulation of labor was completed with the passage of measures that allowed the state to preside over and mediate collective bargaining agreements, supervise union elections, finances, and membership lists, confer subsidies, withdraw the legal status of unions, confiscate union property, and otherwise punish dissent.¹⁵

These external measures had the effect of subordinating the labor movement to the state by reducing the scope of legitimately negotiable labor issues and the universe of political actors with whom to negotiate.¹⁶ They were accompanied by many inducements (legal and other kinds) for those who accepted this subordinate status and by coercive constraints for those who did not. The principal instrument applying these measures was the *Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión*.

The restrictive features of Perón’s design were evident as early as 1943, when he stated that “workers cannot expect the trade union to be supreme and take the authority that is the exclusive property of the state.”¹⁷ Labor acceptance of this view was won by conferring handsome material and legal benefits on those who were in agreement. As a tradeoff, however, the legal framework erected to administer the interests of organized labor and the domain of the Peronist state precluded any form of legal autonomy for labor organizations. If they were to be independent, they would be forced to operate outside the official framework provided by the state and without the protection provided for officially recognized unions. This distinction placed them at a serious disadvantage when competing with the state-sponsored unions.

In sum, the Peronist state was conceived as being paternalistic, tutelar, nationalistic, redistributive, and above all superordinate, as befitted the preeminent social instrument in Argentine society. This approach constituted an inclusionary state corporatist vision par excellence, in which the corporative structuring of organized labor interests represented a fundamental pillar upon which the organization of Argentine society rested, despite the negative implications for union independence and autonomy that this vision entailed.¹⁸

Peronist Labor Administration: Internal Organization

At the time of Perón’s election, the *Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión* was organized according to the framework established by Perón through a series of measures issued between 1943 and 1946.¹⁹ According to the last of these, the “organic structure” of the secretariat included the secretary, the assistant secretary, four general directorates,

two directorates, one legal advisor, one sergeant-major, and a press office, plus a dozen other minor agencies and their respective dependencies.²⁰

Each general directorate included a “techno-administrative” team consisting of a general director, an assistant director, and a secretary. Directorates included a general secretary or assistant director and an administrative secretary. Below this managerial level were arrayed technical and general laborers, whose numbers depended upon the exact responsibilities of each agency. The organization of the secretariat was formally structured along pyramidal lines, with the secretary’s offices on top, descending through the general directorates and directorates into various specialized departments, offices, and sections.²¹

Despite the fact that the formal structure generally divided the work of the secretariat among the four equally ranked general directorates, only one of these, the Dirección General de Trabajo y Acción Social Directa (DGTASD), handled most of the responsibilities directly concerned with the interests of organized labor groups. The other general directorates were primarily responsible for administrative and legal tasks or for providing social welfare and material benefits to the working population. The DGTASD oversaw the administration of union affairs *per se*.

This arrangement included all the regulatory powers delegated to the secretariat by the measures enacted from 1943 to 1946 and was expanded to include broad powers of intervention a short time later.²² Matters related to collective bargaining, labor law enforcement, union registration, dues deductions from wages, legal recognition, disputes between workers and employers, work accidents, provincial labor authorities and regulations, as well as a host of related issues all fell within the jurisdiction of the DGTASD. Because other general directorates did not have direct contact with the representatives of organized labor or were responsible only for the distribution of welfare benefits (as inducements established by the DGTASD), the DGTASD was exclusively responsible for structuring and administering labor interests, and it therefore enforced the legal and *de facto* constraints that accompanied the material and legal inducements designed to secure union loyalty and compliance with the Peronist program.

In practice, then, the structuring of labor interests within the Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión was not so much pyramidal as it was linear, with most enforcement powers and related oversight functions consolidated within one agency directly responsible to the secretary’s office, and through him, to the president. This framework was confirmed following the constitutional reform of March 1949, which increased the number of ministries from eight to twenty and greatly enhanced the powers of the executive branch at the expense of the other

two.²³ The law that subsequently elevated the secretariat to ministerial rank defined the full extent of the Peronist state's authority in labor-related matters. This area included "all that concerning relations between capital and labor, and the integral and legal protection of workers," specifically:

promoting social legislation and enforcing compliance; maintaining relations with professional associations of employers and workers; intervening in collective bargaining and mediating labor conflicts; maintaining the labor police; coordinating offer and demand for labor; protecting workers' rights, full employment, and standard of living; legally assisting workers and providing a conciliatory role in individual labor conflicts; providing social security, social welfare, and loans to workers; promoting savings, cooperation, and mutualism; promoting economical housing; professionally orienting workers; promoting the defense and enjoyment of the working classes, the family, the elderly, women, and children; granting, legitimizing, and withdrawing union status; and imposing wage scales.²⁴

Aside from the softer, "humanist" provisions were those that directly concerned the regulation of labor interests, which all fell within the duties assigned to the DGTASD. The compulsory nature of the state's role in structuring labor interests should be noted, as well as its tutelar and interventionist stance and its lack of procedural neutrality in administering labor affairs. Most important for the institutional focus being employed here, it was the DGTASD that was responsible for determining the parameters of state-labor relations, as defined by this new law. The law also recognized the special place occupied by the DGTASD within labor administration by elevating it to the newly created level of national directorate, as one of only two such superordinate agencies (the other being the Dirección Nacional de Servicio de Empleo).

The centralization of primary functions related to labor within the DGTASD did not end with the passage of the 1949 constitution. In 1953 the Dirección General de Asuntos Gremiales (DGAG) was reorganized "in order to achieve a more direct intervention by the DGTASD in considering the problems pertinent to that agency."²⁵ The result ensured closer supervision of the daily activities of specific unions by the state, which by that time had begun to experience the first stirrings of dissent within the labor movement. In any case, the organizational prominence of DGTASD continued without interruption until the Peronist regime was overthrown.

Meanwhile, the social welfare responsibilities that had been a major concern of the Secretaría during the early years of the Peronist regime (which were a major reason for Perón's success) were gradually distributed among three separate agencies, one of which was a semiautonomous organization created mainly for research purposes. The Dirección General de Asistencia Social and the Dirección General de Pre-

visión Social shared major responsibilities with the Instituto Nacional de Previsión Social, a process accelerated after the announcement of Perón's second five-year plan in 1953. By means of a law passed to facilitate achievement of the objectives laid out in the second five-year plan, the structure of national welfare services was decentralized, with the provision of social security benefits falling primarily to the semiautonomous Instituto Nacional de Previsión Social.²⁶ In addition, after 1949 another organization existed that had assumed a major role in the provision of welfare services to the nation, the Fundación Eva Perón. Even after her death, this quasi-public agency continued to be the major purveyor of welfare services to the Argentine masses.

The combined effect of the measures mentioned above was to reinforce the functions of centralized control of the Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión while at the same time divesting it of many of its original welfare responsibilities. The agencies responsible for welfare services within the ministry decreased in importance, while the DGTASD assumed an even greater role in conducting ministerial business. In effect, direction and control of the labor movement, rather than its protection and care, were now the explicit primary functions of the ministry, tilting the balance of what had initially been a more equitable distribution of labor within it.

In 1954 the state apparatus was reorganized once again, further formalizing the trends described above. A Ministerio de Asistencia Social y Salud Pública was created that assumed most of the welfare- and health-related duties connected to the workplace that still remained within the Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión; and an inner circle of executive secretaries in the office of the President was established that included a union secretary to provide a direct link between Perón and the union membership. With the latter move, the centralization of control over the labor movement was concentrated within the executive branch.

Ostensibly responsible for the social activities of the President in the labor field, the union secretary in fact provided a direct channel of communication between El Líder and the working masses that bypassed the bureaucratic labyrinth. There was little feedback upward from the unionized "bases" due to the personalist character of the state-supported union leadership, whose tenure hinged on their degree of loyalty and their ability to please Perón. The creation of the union secretary therefore allowed Perón to appeal directly to the workers when necessary, thus circumventing the formal channels established between the Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión and the union leadership. Because these groups remained in the hands of loyal Peronists, this arrangement may well have reflected Perón's increased concern with the downturn in his political fortunes (which by 1954 had been seriously eroded

by economic stagnation, public mismanagement, Eva's death, growing public and military dissent, and his personal misconduct). His concern may have been translated into a desire to rekindle his charismatic bond with the masses.

As a result of these moves, the Peronist party and state

began structurally to resemble each other more and more visibly. The Ley de Ministerios of 1954 not only continued distancing the ministries from legislative control, as had been done since 1949 (when the tendency was to strengthen the executive), but it went a step further and accentuated the hierarchical structure within the executive branch by placing the president above the ministries, thus giving him complete autonomy. For the most important [executive] secretaries, a type of central council presided over by Perón was formed that made all important decisions, which were to be implemented subsequently by the ministries. The latter were limited to functioning as auxiliary organisms of the executive branch. The state apparatus was thus centralized to serve Perón as a political instrument that could be easily and quickly manipulated.²⁷

Two additional points deserve mention. First, Eva Perón occupied offices in the Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión from 1946 to 1949, which allowed her to monitor the activities of this branch, cultivate followers, interject her own programs, and weed out dissent. Despite the dubiousness of the claim that she exercised *de facto* control over the Secretaría during the first half of Perón's first term in office,²⁸ her presence did provide Perón with a trusted contact inside national labor administration. Second, after Eva's departure to the Fundación Eva Perón in 1949, Perón enacted legislation granting himself broad and virtually unchecked powers to appoint and dismiss public officials.²⁹ This move enabled him to keep a tight rein on his subordinates and ensured that they would follow his directives. Moreover, Article 86 of the 1949 constitution specifically limited the operative range of his ministers, stating that "ministers cannot by themselves make decisions, except those concerning economic and administrative matters within their respective departments."³⁰

As a result, Perón was able to concentrate decision-making authority within a cadre of trusted officials in the President's office and to emphasize informal methods of decision making rather than formal mechanisms. This approach limited state agencies to enforcing and implementing, but rarely initiating, public policy. With the 1954 reorganization, this informal, personalist, and radial pattern of decision making was solidified, paralleling the more rationally drawn, formal pyramidal structure of the ministries. After the 1954 reorganization, the "organic structure" of the Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión included two national directorates, nine general directorates, one legal advisor, one inspector-general of regional delegations, one directorate of regional delegations, three commissions, one council, and one institute. The role of these regional delegations provides a little-known, but interesting,

study of federal versus provincial disputes under Perón, as well as further proof of the thrust of the Peronist labor policy.

Few decisions met such concerted resistance as did the 1943 decision to transfer provincial and regional labor authorities to the *Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión* as "regional delegations." This decision was energetically opposed, first at the judicial level (where the Supreme Court ruled against it in 1946 on the grounds that it usurped the authority of the provinces, something that "even the Congress could not have done"³¹), and then by opposition members of Congress after the elections of 1946.

Perón's response to these challenges was to draw regional delegations even closer to centralized authority. In 1945, after the first challenges began to surface, he ordered the delegations elevated from a division to a directorate under the control of the DGTASD, in the *Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión*. At the same time, he appointed a personal ally as general director of regional delegations. Then, after the Supreme Court's adverse ruling and his rise to the presidency, Perón placed the regional delegations under an inspector-general who was to be directly responsible to the *Secretario de Trabajo*; Perón also divided them into seventeen geographic zones that did not follow provincial boundaries in order to facilitate their administration by the central government.³² Finally, the 1949 constitution ratified the status of regional delegations as national law, formally establishing the authority of national labor administration over the entire country. It took another regime to rescind this legislation, and even then it was reinstated later on.³³ Perón's actions in this regard were significant because it was the first time that the central government had challenged provincial authorities regarding questions of jurisdiction in the labor field, thus providing strong proof of Perón's expansionist and centralizing design for national labor administration.

In summary, centralization and linearity of control within the state agencies directly responsible for administering labor interests were the hallmarks of Peronist labor administration. The administration of labor and the provision of welfare services, which had been part and parcel of the original Peronist labor program, increasingly diverged as two separate issues after 1949, with the former gradually outweighing the latter within the ministerial organization. The centralization of control mechanisms within the DGTASD was paralleled by a decentralization of welfare services provided by the ministry, followed by the eventual transfer of many of these services entirely. In a sense, then, the course of the state's institutional approach toward labor interests had been set in the direction of control.³⁴


Branch Allocations, 1947–55

Branch allocations from general funds earmarked for centralized agencies in national labor administration slowly decreased throughout the years when Perón was in power, declining from 2.42 percent of central administrative allocations in 1947 to 1 percent in 1955.³⁵ It was the distribution of budgetary allocations within the Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión, however, that offers the most revealing financial picture of Peronist labor administration. The most striking feature of the ministry's budget is the large portion that was given to the DGTASD and offices of the secretary-minister, which averaged 21 percent of the ministry's budget for the entire period and accounted for over twice the totals of the next three highest-ranking agencies combined. Given that neither office was responsible for the distribution of material benefits or welfare services, the size of these budgets is all the more remarkable, particularly in view of the fact that salary allocations as a percentage of the total outlay designated to these agencies, regardless of yearly fluctuations, decreased markedly after 1948. This trend was in contrast with the fairly even distributions of personnel and nonpersonnel outlays in other agencies. Although a reversal of this trend occurred in the DGTASD in the last budget formulated by the Peronist regime, it peaked that year in the minister's office. The relative stability of the total number of employees after 1948 raises further questions about the destination of the monies allocated to these agencies.

Allocations to agencies formally responsible for the distribution of welfare services peaked in 1947, then dropped off, with salaries constituting the bulk of the allocations.³⁶ An interesting exception took place in 1948, when the nonpersonnel expenditures of the Dirección General de Asistencia Social soared. It is difficult to ascertain exactly why this increase occurred, although it is widely recognized that at that time, Perón was actively promoting his constitutional revisions, which spoke broadly of massive social welfare programs for the working masses. This outlay may therefore have represented a kind of inducement for popular support of his program. In any event, with one exception, the allocations to those agencies formally concerned with the distribution of welfare benefits within the Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión were considerably smaller than those not involving welfare benefits, a rather curious distribution in light of Perón's purported aims in the area of social welfare for workers.

As for the costs of operating the ministry, those destined for the Dirección General de Administración and the Dirección General de Personal displayed a fairly high degree of consistency. It should also be noted that allocations to the Instituto Nacional de Previsión Social were not included in the main budget of the Ministerio de Trabajo y Previ-

TABLE 1
Distribution of Budgetary Allocations Within National Labor Administration, 1947-1955



Figures refer to current peso Allocations destined for centralized agencies only. Data for 1949 is unavailable.

Source: Argentine Republic, *Presupuesto General de la Administración Nacional*. Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Hacienda, for the years cited. Change from chronological to fiscal year are those of the budget.

sión, being listed instead as a separate, “decentralized” item. This arrangement tends to confirm the idea that a process of decentralization of welfare services was occurring following the organizational reforms of 1949 and 1953.

The overall financial picture of Peronist labor administration therefore denotes a linear organization with top-heavy outlays for non-designated purposes in nondistributive agencies. Those agencies directly involved in regulating the activities of organized labor—not those responsible for labor’s welfare—were given the largest share of the ministry’s yearly allocations, over half of which went toward unspecified ends. This amount may well have been the price for labor’s cooperation in the Peronist program.

Personnel

The total number of employees discharging responsibilities in centralized agencies of the Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión remained relatively stable throughout the duration of Perón’s tenure, ranging

from more than six thousand in 1948 and to less than twenty-five hundred in 1950.³⁷ Employee totals remained constant for all agencies, although the number employed in welfare agencies apparently declined slightly. This pattern follows the trend of expenditures in these agencies, which rose in the period 1946–48, then gradually declined until 1955. Most of those employed in the ministry were assigned to the two dominant agencies, the minister's office and the DGTASD. The staff of the minister's office ranged from 504 to 301 and that of the DGTASD from 858 to 554.³⁸ Overall, these offices contained nearly half of the total number of employees in centralized agencies of the *Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión*.

The magnitude of the DGTASD is striking because it suggests the extensiveness of the state's involvement in the management of labor affairs. The mediation, liaison, and related functions of the DGTASD may account for the large number of employees. Equally plausible is the view that it was used to bestow patronage jobs on loyal unionists. Whatever the reason (probably a combination of both explanations), the DGTASD was not only hierarchically dominant on paper but controlled a majority of jobs as well. As in the case of allocations, those employed in strictly administrative capacities remained at stable levels that accounted for about half of those assigned to the two major agencies.

Juan Perón was the first Argentine President to bring labor leaders into government. His first ministers of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Labor and Welfare were all representatives of labor unions whom Perón had met and befriended while he was *Secretario de Trabajo y Previsión*.³⁹ Not surprisingly, the *Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión* became a haven for loyal Peronist union leaders, particularly those loyal to Eva Perón before her death. In fact, her ties to the majority of the Peronist administrative elite caused one observer to characterize her political influence as approaching the Weberian ideal of "charismatic domination" operating within a rational administrative framework.⁴⁰ Although this characterization is exaggerated, it accurately captures the managerial image that Eva attempted to impose on agencies such as the *Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión*.

The Peronist administrative team consisted of first-generation immigrants who were equally divided between those of Spanish and Italian descent with middle- and working-class backgrounds and those who had previously held legal, military, or political positions.⁴¹ Despite the heterogeneous nature of the persons recruited into administrative positions in 1946, those who remained by 1951 were united by a single factor: ideological allegiance to Perón. "In this sense, [the state leadership] was a self-sustaining organization. Its laws and principles obeyed the political structure. From that foundation developed a certain 'esprit de corps' that excluded all those who were opposed. This 'esprit de

corps' did not refer to employees of the same rank or working in the same agency but was based instead on their political ideology. The affinity between the bureaucracy and certain sectors of the dependent middle classes springs to view: these classes represented the most important bureaucratic recruiting ground within Peronism."⁴²

The Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión offered a good example of this "esprit de corps." Even after unionists were elevated to important positions, outside the Ministerio de Trabajo they remained a minority in the larger Peronist administration, where they were superseded by those with management-oriented and professional backgrounds. Organized labor was the fundamental political base supporting the regime, however, and as such, the Ministerio de Trabajo was "their" ministry, a fact constantly emphasized by Perón. For loyal union leaders, it represented a means of upward mobility as government officials, a status that often entailed a substantial improvement in their standard of living. The bureaucratization of labor leadership promoted by the vertical structure of state-controlled labor organizations eased the way for their incorporation into the ministry: first through consulting, advisory, and other related functions, and eventually through their formal appointment to positions within the ministerial apparatus. Given the organization of the ministry, it is not surprising that most of the union leaders found their way into the agencies that needed personnel with such "expertise" in union matters—the DGTASD and the Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión.

Within the highest echelons of the ministry, incumbent turnover rates were low. The position of minister changed only once, when A. B. Giavarini replaced J. M. Freiré in 1953. Although the additional positions attached to the minister's office (which initially included only an assistant secretary, but eventually incorporated a secretary-general, pro-secretary, and private secretary) led to a slightly higher turnover rate among them, even this rate amounted to only one change every three years. Except for some initial unrest immediately following Perón's entering office, the period from 1946 to 1953 was marked by a high degree of continuity of personnel employed in upper-level positions within the Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión. In 1953, after Eva Perón's death, a general reshuffling of personnel occurred within the ministry that some attribute to a purge of those most closely associated with her.⁴³ It may also have reflected Perón's desire to exert more direct control over labor administration through the appointment of personal loyalists at a time when labor dissent and economic problems were on the rise.

One agency that evidenced a significant degree of turnover was the Dirección General de Asuntos Gremiales, which had five different directors. The fact that these changes were directed from the president's

office may be indicative of Perón's fear of challenges to his absolute authority over labor matters. He may have been using these changes to prevent any persons with direct links to the unions from acquiring a substantial following of their own. Otherwise, Perón used personal loyalists in strategic positions to maintain a firm grip on the activities of labor administration. The heads of all the major agencies, particularly the DGTASD, its dependencies, and the Dirección Nacional de Servicio de Empleo, were all longtime associates of Perón, some dating back to his days as a junior officer.⁴⁴ Likewise, both Ministers of Labor were former union leaders who owed their ascension to Perón's influence on their union careers.

In this regard, the Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión operated within the personalist, cooptive guidelines for personnel recruitment set for the entire state apparatus. "The selection of personnel began to depend on exogenous factors. That is to say, on norms exclusively elaborated by the regime. Cooptation ruled . . . [and] was accomplished in bureaucratic fashion and within bureaucratic boundaries."⁴⁵ In this way, Perón attempted to maintain through the state agencies responsible for administering the interests of organized labor the special bond that tied him to the working classes.

THE ONGANIA REGIME, 1966–1970: EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS

When the armed forces overthrew President Arturo Illia on 28 June 1966, after months of speculation about the possibility of a coup d'état, they did so in order to end the chronic political chaos and social strife that had plagued Argentina since Perón's ouster eleven years before.⁴⁶ With General Juan Carlos Onganía as President, the new regime proposed a three-stage process of national reconstruction. First would come an economic phase, in which a program of stabilization and growth based on attracting foreign investment would overcome the serious problems afflicting the national economy. Then would follow a social phase, in which Argentine society would "reencounter" itself and pave the way for a broad public consensus about the future course of the nation. Finally, having successfully completed the first two phases, a third stage would begin in which gradual political normalization leading to democratic elections would be implemented.⁴⁷

Needless to say, conditions in the labor field at the time that Onganía assumed power differed vastly from those surrounding Perón's election. Perón had won an electoral victory provided by a mass-based political movement that he had already begun to organize and direct during his days as Secretario de Trabajo y Previsión. Using the legal instruments described earlier and rewarding labor support with redistributive policies financed by revenues from a large postwar trade

surplus, Perón was able to mold a previously divided working class into a coordinated, centralized, and mobilized political movement acting at his behest. The working class owed their improved status to Perón, and they repaid him by overwhelmingly supporting his candidacy, and later his administration.

Onganía, in contrast, was confronted by a vertically organized labor movement united and mobilized against the regime preceeding his own, one that, despite divisions in its leadership, remained publicly loyal to the exiled Perón. Using a "battle plan" devised by the Confederación General de Trabajo (CGT) in 1962, the Peronist labor movement successfully staged a series of factory takeovers, work stoppages, and strikes to protest and thwart Illia's economic program. In addition, with other legal outlets for political expression proscribed, the labor movement had become the main conduit for the political as well as economic demands of the Peronist masses. Its nationalist tendencies on both political and economic questions therefore transformed the labor movement into a major obstacle to the new regime's program of economic stabilization.

Not surprisingly, organized labor was perceived by Onganía and his cohorts as the most dangerous opponent of the regime. Creating the proper investment climate for attracting foreign capital required a docile labor movement that was unable or unwilling to defend itself against unfavorable policies and hence would not present a serious threat to the regime's program.⁴⁸ Because the labor movement had already contributed to the deterioration of the economy through its intransigent and disruptive activities, it was initially the most pressing of the Onganía regime's concerns. These concerns centered on developing the precise strategy to be used in coping with the "labor problem."

The Onganía regime at first adopted a coherent exclusionary approach toward the labor movement in order to satisfy the requirements of the economic stabilization program. To do so, it essentially used the same legal and administrative instruments previously used by Perón, but with far different content. Upon seizing power, the regime suspended the right to strike, authorized the arrest and dismissal of strikers, sanctioned government intervention in unions and the inspection, freezing, and confiscation of union finances without warning, eliminated the existing system of deducting union dues from wages, prohibited labor assemblies, and declared its intention to review and reform the existing trade union law (the *Ley de Asociaciones Profesionales*). Moreover, the regime enforced these measures with a level of coercion seldom seen before.⁴⁹

The most notorious of these measures was the use of powers of intervention to assume control of opposition unions, including unions representing railroad, chemical, dockyard, metallurgical, sugar, and

textile workers (and eventually the entire CGT itself). Before long, some 930,000 workers found themselves represented by unions under government intervention, which meant that 45 percent of the organized labor force was operating under such restrictions.⁵⁰

The main difference between Perón's use of intervention and that of the Onganía regime, other than the political allegiance of the unions that were being controlled, was that Perón used intervention selectively while Onganía systematically intervened against the majority of Peronist unions that represented the largest segments of the working classes. By silencing them (and hoping eventually to force them to seek moderate and integrative channels of expression), the Onganía regime was attempting to reduce the ability of the unions to bring concerted pressure to bear on it.

Along with these antiorganizational measures, the regime also took steps to reduce labor's freedom of action under the economic program. After a period of grace immediately following the coup, the regime imposed mandatory state arbitration on all collective bargaining, decreed strict wage controls for a period of eighteen months, then suspended collective bargaining entirely. In this sense, the exclusionary program was as economic as it was political. This scenario was in fact the minimum exclusionary "ceiling" required by the regime to ensure labor acquiescence with the first, economic phase of the process of national reconstruction. Beyond this point, however, serious divisions emerged within the regime over the question of how to approach labor when moving on to the second, social phase of the reconstruction process.

The differences between the major factions in the Onganía regime have been well elaborated elsewhere and will therefore not be discussed in detail here.⁵¹ Instead, I will attempt to summarize the major differences between the "paternalist" and "liberal" factions within the regime over how best to handle labor once the economic phase was completed. Briefly, Onganía and his "paternalist" coterie advocated an inclusionary state corporatist approach by which cooperative unions would be brought under the control of the state. They believed that the selective awarding of state benefits and the eventual success of the economic program would encourage mass defections to these unions, which would then become primary instruments for completing the integrative tasks announced for the social phase.⁵²

This approach was opposed by the "liberal" economic team and their supporters outside the regime. Under the division of labor within the regime agreed upon when it assumed power, the liberal economic team was to be responsible for formulating and implementing the economic stabilization program. These economists advocated major reforms that would have atomized (or as they termed it, "democratized")

the existing union structure. In their view, "with simple administrative measures," they could "disarticulate the entire syndical, political, economic, and financial apparatus that the labor movement had erected since 1958, when it reconstructed its organizations."⁵³

These differences prevented the regime from adopting any external measures other than the minimum exclusionary ceiling agreed to at the time that it assumed power. Each faction was prevented from pursuing its approach by the opposition of the other, which thwarted the consolidation of labor policy beyond the promulgation of short-term constraints designed to prevent labor disruption of the economic program. More importantly, these differences festered to such a point that they prevented the regime from taking decisive action when a wave of violent protest broke out in the industrial city of Córdoba in May of 1969. Unable to cope with this and subsequent outpourings of popular resentment against authoritarian rule, Onganía was deposed by his erstwhile comrades-in-arms in June of 1970, and the process of voluntary withdrawal from power leading up to elections was begun.⁵⁴

For the purposes of this essay, the significant fact is that although Onganía occupied the office of President and had direct influence over his paternalist supporters in the Ministries of the Interior and Social Welfare, he had no operative control over the Ministerio de Economía y Trabajo, of which labor administration was part.⁵⁵ As will be shown, this lack of control had a decided effect on the way in which labor administration was organized under this regime.

In short, although control of the labor movement remained the main objective of both the Perón and Onganía regimes, their approaches reflected markedly dissimilar relationships with organized labor. Moreover, the degree of commitment to these approaches also varied, with the Peronist regime being much more united on ideological and practical grounds than its eventual successor eleven years later. Differences in the external dimensions of each approach, however, were the factors that came to identify their respective use of inclusionary and exclusionary state corporatist frameworks for organizing labor interests vis-à-vis the state.

National Labor Administration, 1966–1970: Internal Organization

From its onset, the Onganía regime proposed to eliminate the existing organizational scheme and restructure the entire state apparatus, the better to achieve the objectives imbedded in the three-part task of national reconstruction. Article 2 of the Estatuto de la Revolución Argentina affirmed as much when it announced "a new law to establish the number of ministries and Secretariats of State that would be entrusted with the affairs of State, as well as their functions and interde-

pendence."⁵⁶ This proclamation was made despite the fact the constitution already had established the number and responsibilities of the ministries.⁵⁷

Within months, the full extent of the regime's reorganizational program became apparent. In September of 1966, the number of ministries was reduced from eight to five (said to be a magic number in military tables of organization).⁵⁸ Although the number of Secretariats of State increased from twelve to fifteen, one of these was the former Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, now demoted to subcabinet level within the restructured Ministerio de Economía y Trabajo (MET).⁵⁹ As such, it was just one of seven functionally defined secretariats operating within a ministry that acted as an "overlord" of economic policy and development.⁶⁰

The subordination of labor administration to the larger requirements of the regime's economic program was referred to in a letter by Interior Minister Enrique Martínez Paz that introduced the law of reorganization.

It has been taken into account that the dynamism of the modern State, and the speed and efficiency required for its conduct, suggests a redistribution of the tasks assigned to the ministries and Secretariats of State. Ministries will be responsible for the *formulation* of national policies, strategies and planning at the highest level and will subsequently establish the particular policies of the secretariats within their jurisdiction. In addition, they will supervise and coordinate the functioning of these secretariats. For their part, Secretariats of State will be the organs of *application* of policies and *execution* of plans and programs by means of the agencies under their jurisdiction and will *orient* the private sector. . . . In regards to the MET, an attempt has been made to gather into one single ministry all that is related to the nation's productive capacity in order to promote and protect these activities with unified criteria, thereby facilitating development.⁶¹

This reorganizational plan was novel on a number of points. First, it represented the first time that the armed forces had attempted to implement such a comprehensive program of organizational reform within the state. Second, it explicitly stated the instrumental character of secretariats, which unlike ministries (and previous secretariats), were not perceived as arenas for policy formulation in which influences from society as well as government were entertained. Instead, secretariats translated policy directives from above into concrete programs of action. As a result, the former Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social had less capacity to assimilate societal influences than it had under the previous regime.

Third, organized labor was now strictly considered to be just one of many "productive activities" in the nation. Social welfare concerns, including those of labor, were not considered relevant to productive activities and were consequently excluded from the range of issues ad-

dressed by national labor administration. In effect, labor issues were defined in narrowly economic terms, which considerably reduced the scope of formal state involvement in providing welfare services exclusively for labor. Finally, the demotion of the labor portfolio openly signaled the regime's basic attitude toward the labor movement long before it implemented the external measures mentioned earlier. This early proof that organized labor's interests would be subordinated to larger economic concerns and that its main referent within the state apparatus was being demoted and stripped of many of its responsibilities was an omen that went unheeded by the divided labor leadership. Their failure to recognize its significance contributed to their initial inability to mount an effective campaign against the regime's policies.

Within the regime, the broad policy-making responsibilities awarded to the ministries meant that the MET was almost exclusively responsible for the formulation and subsequent implementation of labor policy. Because it was designed to be under the control of the liberal economic team, labor administrators were largely influenced by their perceptions of the labor-state relationship and were insulated from Onganía's perspective as well. This fact became amply evident in the organizational reforms made in labor administration over the following three years.

Although a broad mandate stated that the responsibilities of the Secretaría de Estado de Trabajo (SET) would be those "that corresponded to the former Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social" and would include "all that involved the relations and conditions of work, and the legal status of worker and employer professional associations,"⁶² a three-stage plan was put into effect that drastically reshaped and curtailed the SET's range of action. In the first phase, which began in the months following the coup and continued throughout 1967, the SET was stripped of all its previous social welfare responsibilities and dependencies, including its semiautonomous agencies. In October of 1966, most were transferred to the newly created Ministerio de Bienestar Social.⁶³ A year later, the Dirección General de Mutualidades was transferred to the Secretaría de Estado de Promoción y Asistencia de la Comunidad in the aforementioned ministry.⁶⁴ Soon afterwards the Dirección General de Préstamos Personales y con Garantía Real was moved to the jurisdiction of the Secretaría de Estado de Vivienda, again in the Ministerio de Bienestar Social.⁶⁵ By the end of 1968, the SET was no longer responsible for providing any welfare-related services, these having been transferred to a cabinet-level agency expressly designed for that purpose.

Throughout this period, the formal role of the state in more narrowly defined labor matters continued unchanged. In May of 1967, the competency of the SET was established, and except for limitations on its

mandatory mediation services (only in public service industries) and no specific mention of the power of intervention, it closely resembled previous legislation on the subject.⁶⁶ In terms of keeping a register of recognized bargaining agents, promoting labor legislation, coordinating offer and demand for labor, and protecting workers' rights, the language of this law was nearly identical to Peronist laws regarding the role of national labor administration. This continuity appears to indicate an underlying belief in the centrality of the state's role in structuring labor interests, regardless of regime. Direct, active involvement consequently has become a salient organizational objective and *rasgo estructural* of Argentine national labor administration.

The second phase of the regime's reorganizational program for the Secretaría de Estado de Trabajo was begun in August of 1968.⁶⁷ In it, the new structure of the SET was announced, and the full extent of the regime's plan was formally unveiled. In addition to reducing the number of agencies included within the SET by eliminating welfare services and three hierarchical levels, the various responsibilities directly connected with administering labor interests were separated and functionally compartmentalized. This action had the effect of decentralizing and horizontally expanding labor administration while at the same time narrowing the scope of its activities.

In terms of organizational hierarchy, a number of posts in the secretary's office were eliminated,⁶⁸ as were the supergrade-level Direcciones Generales and Direcciones Nacionales (these terms thereafter were applied to distinguish between different, but hierarchically equal, directorates). Offices were fused with departments, which eliminated an entire group of agencies at the lowest hierarchical level of operation as well. All remaining agencies took a step down the hierarchical ladder, due to the demotion of the former ministry to subcabinet level. Redundant personnel were either transferred out of the SET or dismissed. Otherwise, the internal organization remained the same, but with six, rather than nine, levels of operation.

The most significant changes occurred in the way the SET organized the administration of labor interests. Various functionally defined tasks (registration of unions, mediation and arbitration services, inspection and labor police duties, studies and investigations, and legal matters) were divided and encapsulated within their own administrative "cylinder," which was to be headed by a directorate. They were horizontally, but not vertically, related, and final authority for supervising and coordinating their activities rested in the secretary's office. The arrangement forced labor organizations to divide their attention when addressing the SET because they had to deal with different agencies on specific issues. Concerted pressure could only be brought to bear at the subcabinet level or higher, which given the regime's objectives, worked

against a favorable response. Cloaked in this legal-functional division of labor was the intent of the regime (or at least the economic team) to prevent labor from gaining an organizational toehold within the SET, much like the DGTASD had been under Perón. No one agency could handle the full range of issues that labor wanted addressed, much less guarantee the treatment that labor would receive on each one.

The sum effect of these changes was to promote a mirror image of the liberal economic team's external approach toward labor: the structure of national labor administration was decentralized and functionally compartmentalized along horizontal lines, as it was hoped that labor organizations themselves eventually would be. Combined with the system of intervention, this arrangement prevented labor from effectively presenting comprehensive demands on the state, forcing labor instead to address on an individual basis and in piecemeal fashion various narrow, functional concerns.

The third stage of the regime's reorganizational program was oriented toward consolidating the authority of the SET over labor matters throughout the nation. As a source of constant juridical disputes since the Perón era, the scope of national authority on labor questions had varied considerably. At the time Onganía assumed power, it was severely constrained by federal laws that had restored provincial jurisdiction over labor matters within their territorial domain. It was the intention of the regime to reverse these laws and restore the preeminence of national labor authorities over labor-related matters throughout the Argentine territory.

This stage was begun with the creation of nine regional *comisiones paritarias* that were to be responsible for rural labor administration. These commissions were to be overseen by the Comisión Nacional de Trabajo Rural, a dependency of the Dirección Nacional de Delegaciones Regionales.⁶⁹ It was hoped that the creation of these agencies would lead to a more effective and coordinated administration of rural labor matters. A few years later, the number of these commissions was increased to twelve.

The process of consolidation was accelerated after the violence of 1969. Late that year, the SET's formal role in collective bargaining was extended to cover the entire nation.⁷⁰ Shortly thereafter, the power of national labor authorities was expanded to cover labor police duties throughout the nation in all industries involved in interstate commerce or government contracts and property, or those that were considered to be of "national importance." This program included the authority to perform inspections and audits and to levy penalties.⁷¹ To coordinate and supervise these new obligations, the Servicio Nacional de Inspección was incorporated as a dependency of the Dirección General de Higiene, Inspección y Seguridad de Trabajo.⁷²

In spite of another ministerial reorganization in 1969 that raised the number of ministries back to eight,⁷³ the SET remained largely unchanged until after Onganía was removed from office.⁷⁴ Interestingly enough, one of the first moves his successors made as they prepared to return national authority to an elected government was to restore the SET to ministry status, as if recognizing the leading role that labor would play in returning democracy to Argentina.


In summary, the approach adopted by Onganía's liberal economic team in reorganizing labor administration included the following: subordinating labor interests to larger economic problems (evident in the demotion of the former Ministerio de Trabajo to subcabinet level); eliminating welfare services provided exclusively to organized labor; functionally dividing and compartmentalizing fundamental labor issues in order to prevent labor from making comprehensive demands of the state and gaining an organizational toehold within the SET; and consolidating national labor authority throughout the country in order to better monitor labor questions in the provinces. Decentralization and horizontal expansion were the primary structural changes promoted by these measures, in marked contrast to those promoted by the Peronists.

*Branch Allocations, 1966–1970*⁷⁵

At a general level, the Secretaría de Estado de Trabajo was classified within the budget as being part of general administration in 1966 and 1967, a carryover from its classification during the Illia years. In 1968 the SET was reclassified as part of the economic development sector of the state, where it remained until Perón's return in 1973.⁷⁶ As part of the economic development sector, the SET's allocations never exceeded .3 percent of the total received by that sector (which consisted of all those agencies under the jurisdiction of the Ministerio de Economía y Trabajo, other semiautonomous agencies, and state enterprises). Because this sector was only the third-largest employer of central administrative personnel and because personnel costs consumed the largest part of the national budget,⁷⁷ it is clear that national labor administration was financially a low priority of the regime. In fact, of the secretariats under the jurisdiction of the MET, the SET consistently ranked fifth or sixth out of seven such agencies in allocations received, garnering less than .01 percent of the total central administrative budget.

As for the distribution of funds within the SET, the growing importance given to administration, inspection, and research-related functions is clearly paralleled by reduced allocations to labor-related agencies. By 1970 the two agencies that provided the main points of contact with organized labor—the Dirección Nacional de Asociaciones Profesionales and the Dirección Nacional de Relaciones de Trabajo—together

TABLE 2
Distribution of Budgetary Allocations
Within National Labor Administration
1966-1970



Figures refer to current peso Allocations destined for centralized agencies only. Budgetary breakdowns for 1967 and 1968 are unavailable below the sub-cabinet level.

Source: Argentine Republic, Presupuesto General de la Administracion Nacional. Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Hacienda, for the years cited.

received less than either the Dirección Nacional de Recursos Humanos (primarily research-oriented) or the secretary's office (which was now mainly concerned with internal administrative responsibilities). Their individual budgets exceeded only that of the Dirección General de Asuntos Legales, an agency with less than half as many employees and considerably fewer obligations.

The elimination of welfare services is evident after 1968, when they were no longer included as a category within the SET. Accounting procedures for nonpersonnel allocations were tightened considerably after 1966. Nonpersonnel costs were explicitly documented in the SET's budget, and they generally covered capital investments in infrastructural necessities, such as equipment and office supplies. As of 1969, directorates, as the lead agencies in their respective functional areas, became responsible for administering their own nonpersonnel allocations (which were previously administered by one central fund). This rearrangement supports the view that a decentralizing trend was at work within the SET at this time. In contrast with the Perón years, nonpersonnel outlays under the Onganía regime were highest in those agencies that had substantial material requirements for performance of their respective tasks, particularly administrative and inspection services.

The overall financial picture of the SET confirms the organizational changes mentioned earlier. On a general level, it received relatively low priority within the regime's economic program, where it was placed after being stripped of its welfare responsibilities. Within the SET, the decentralizing and compartmentalizing trend was supported by budgetary outlays for the agencies involved, with emphasis on more "neutral" functions (such as research, administration, and inspection) while outlays to more "political" agencies (like those on labor relations and professional associations) were reduced. Salary and other personnel-related costs occupied most of the outlays for all agencies, and the ratio of personnel to nonpersonnel expenses remained constant for the entire period.

Personnel

As the most important part of the first "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regime to appear in Argentina, the Onganía administration is said to have consisted largely of "incumbents in technocratic roles." That is to say, "higher government positions were usually occupied by persons who came to them after successful careers in complex and highly organized organizations—the armed forces, the public bureaucracy, and large private firms."⁷⁸ Although civilian technocrats predominated and were largely recruited from private business backgrounds (one study

asserts that 76 percent of the Onganía regime came from such backgrounds),⁷⁹ the regime contained a healthy contingent of armed forces personnel as well. Of eighty-three "top-level functionaries" in 1967, twenty-four were retired military officers and four were on active duty (as representatives of their respective services within the defense ministry). In addition, nineteen of twenty-four provincial governorships were held by military officers, eleven by the army, and four each by the navy and air force. This situation reflected an effort to "distribute influence among the three services."⁸⁰ For civilians, the criteria for selection to such positions included being firmly anticommunist, having been uninvolved in government and politics in the years prior to the coup, and having technical expertise in specific areas.⁸¹

Not surprisingly, the MET was headed by professional economists with previous experience in private enterprise, public administration, or higher education. Of the three *Ministros de Economía y Trabajo* who served Onganía, the first (Jorge Salimei) came from private business, while the last two (Adalbert Krieger Vasena and José María Dagnino Pastore) listed prior experience in government and academe.⁸² None of them had any experience in labor affairs, however, a fact that was to influence the selection of upper-echelon personnel in the SET.

Contrary to expectations created by the practice of the previous military regime (that of General Pedro Aramburú from 1955 to 1958), no individual with private sector or military background was appointed to any high position within the SET. Instead, promotions occurred from within, as individuals with extensive experience in national labor administration were named to key posts. The secretary, assistant secretary, and most of the directors-general of the various directorates were all either carried over from the previous regime or had served in some related capacity under previous administrations.⁸³ In the few instances where personnel from outside the SET were brought in, they were generally lawyers with prior experience in labor relations, either as academics or as labor lawyers (this category included both the assistant secretary and the director-general of the *Dirección Nacional de Asociaciones Profesionales*). Previous experience in labor administration was shown even by the interventor in the CGT named by Onganía in 1969. Valentín Suárez, who at the time of his appointment as interventor was serving in a similar capacity in the *Asociación del Fútbol Argentino*, had previously served as subdirector of the DGTASD and as the *Director Nacional del Servicio de Empleo* under Perón.⁸⁴

The significance of this emphasis on experienced personnel derives from the fact that although career public servants were only a small minority within the Onganía administration (amounting to just 6 percent of all high-level officials),⁸⁵ they nonetheless constituted a distinct majority within the SET. In an area of extreme sensitivity where

unpopular policies were being implemented, the consensus was that this task would be best handled by those with extensive experience and contacts with labor affairs and labor groups. Instead of appointing regime stalwarts who would have been likely to become the focus of public criticism (as was indeed the case with the *Ministros de Economía y Trabajo*), the Onganía regime selected career public servants for the SET, demonstrating a more subtle approach to the "labor problem."

Because the *Secretarías de Estado* were authorized only to implement, rather than formulate, policies, these officials could efficiently discharge policies emanating from above without becoming the focus of discontent. Moreover, because their policy-making obligations were restricted, they had little overall impact at that level. Thus, while their previous experience and contacts with labor organizations allowed them to implement policies in an effective fashion, formal constraints on their policy-making role precluded their having a decisive impact on overall policy making in the labor field. In a sense, they were perceived as a buffer between labor and the regime, with their long-term experience being used to ease the painful acceptance of regime dictates.

One possible result was that personnel turnover within labor administration was very low. After the first minister, J. P. Tamborena, resigned in protest in October of 1966 when the ministry was demoted to subcabinet status, no changes in higher-echelon personnel occurred until Onganía was deposed. For three and a half years, despite a number of resignations and reorganizations within the MET and elsewhere in government, the same cadre operated the SET.

This continuity was extraordinary because rapid personnel turnover had become an inherent weakness of the Argentine state in the years following Perón's departure. It is even more remarkable in view of the fact that despite the lack of familiarity with labor affairs exhibited by the *Ministros de Economía y Trabajo* and despite the grave internal tensions that caused the turnover in the Economy portfolio, the stability of SET personnel allowed the regime to maintain a high level of continuity in an area of critical importance. Had turnover been as rapid in the SET as elsewhere, it is doubtful that the regime could have maintained its exclusionary, external corporatist dimensions as well or as long as it did. Not only did the use of career public servants help the implementation of policy and contribute to personnel stability within national labor administration, it also presented labor with a façade of continuity and strength that masked the serious tensions between different factions within the regime.

The total number employed in central agencies of the SET was reduced from 1,754 in 1966 to 1,425 by 1970. This reduction accorded with Onganía's much-heralded "rationalization" plan for the state apparatus, which was designed to eliminate or transfer to the private sec-

tor all redundant personnel. Yet despite these reductions in the SET, the number of employees in central state agencies actually increased from 446,265 to 621,766 in 1970.⁸⁶ It should not be entirely surprising that the labor agencies were targeted for reductions in force.

Most of the positions eliminated were transferred out along with the welfare agencies in 1966–67. Those remaining were mostly occupied in administrative agencies. In contrast to the Perón era, the agencies directly connected to labor did not employ large numbers of personnel. After 1966 a sizable decrease occurred in employees occupied in these agencies, indicating that they no longer served as vehicles for incorporating or coopting union leaders with public service aspirations. The systematic use of interventors and the elimination of collective bargaining in 1967 also caused reductions among those employed in labor-related agencies. Personnel were primarily drawn from within the SET, with the highest positions occupied by those experienced in labor administration and law.

In sum, a remarkably homogeneous group ran the Secretaría de Estado de Trabajo during Onganía's term, which may well have contributed to the initial success of the regime's labor program. If nothing else, the distribution and background of these individuals demonstrates the "depoliticizing" program at work within the SET. Evidence at organizational and financial levels was presented earlier; now it becomes apparent in the division of personnel within various functional units as well.

CONCLUSION

Although observations drawn from two case studies are neither axiomatic nor sufficient to form the basis for a general comparative theory, they can point the way toward possible avenues of research. Such is the case here, where the examination of the internal dimensions of two state-corporatist experiments in Argentina provides an analytical referent for the study of similar arrangements in other political contexts, both within and without Latin America.

It has been shown that just as inclusionary and exclusionary state corporatism differ widely in regard to the external dimensions that each uses to structure the interests of organized labor relative to the state, they also differ in regard to their internal dimensions. The organization of national labor administration under each system evidences tangible dissimilarities, something that directly influences their ability to apply and maintain the external dimensions they use to control the labor movement. Major "internal" traits exhibited by each approach are identified in the figure.

FIGURE *Internal Characteristics of State Corporatist Approaches under Perón and Onganía*

	<i>Inclusionary</i>	<i>Exclusionary</i>
Organization		
Internal structure	Centralized, vertical	Decentralized, horizontal
Hierarchy	Linear-radial	Pyramidal-cylindrical
Management style	Personalist	Bureaucratic
Budget		
Size	Large	Small
Distribution	Narrow, top-heavy	Broad, equitable
Emphasis	Labor relations, nonpersonnel costs	Administration, research, personnel costs
Personnel		
Background	Union	Public service, law
Mode of recruitment	Cooptation, ascription	Promotion, merit
Size	Large	Small
Turnover	Low	Low
Area of concentration	Labor relations	Administration
General Traits		
Scope of activities	Wide	Restricted
Jurisdiction	National	National with limitations
Intervention	Selective	Systematic
Portfolio	Cabinet level	Subcabinet level

Despite some areas of similarity, different corporatist experiments clearly promote varying types of organization within the state apparatus responsible for administering organized labor interests. In each case, the organization of national labor administration is designed to facilitate the implementation and maintenance of the external dimensions of a specific type of state-corporatist approach. From the observations made here, one can now assume that corporatism does in fact have both distinct internal and external faces and that they are closely interconnected. That is to say, it appears that specific internal traits are related to specific external traits and that together they help define the particular type of corporatist experiment at work in each case. In a field

that has yet to be fully explored, this insight opens up a whole new area that may well be a valuable addition to understanding the dynamics of the corporatist phenomena. At the very least, it demonstrates that corporatist state organization is far from immutable, existing instead *mutatis mutandis* under very different types of regimes.⁸⁷

NOTES

1. A good grasp of the literature on corporatism can be obtained by reading the following works, a list that is not meant to be comprehensive. On the general characteristics and typologies of corporatism in Latin America, see *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, edited by James Malloy (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1977), especially the essay by Guillermo O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the State"; also, Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), chaps. 2 and 3; Howard Wiarda, *Corporatism and National Development in Latin America* (Boulder: Westview, 1981); *The New Corporatism*, edited by Fredrick B. Pike and Thomas S. Stritch (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), which contains Philippe C. Schmitter's seminal essay, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" On "disaggregating" corporatism, see Ruth and David Collier, "Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism'," *American Political Science Review* 73, no. 4 (Dec. 1979): 967–86. For a state-of-the-art corporatist survey of Europe, see *Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making*, edited by Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe C. Schmitter, Political Sociology Series no. 2 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982).
2. The notion of state corporatism as a continuum is derived from Collier and Collier, "Inducements versus Constraints," pp. 977–80; and Stepan, *State and Society*, pp. 73–81.
3. Both Stepan's *State and Society* (pp. 74–78) and O'Donnell's "Corporatism and the Question of the State" provide good definitions of "inclusionary" and "exclusionary" state corporatism.
4. Among major inducements offered by the state are legislative and administrative measures beneficial to working-class welfare, economic measures that promote income redistribution toward wage-earning sectors, and preferential treatment for cooperative unions. The latter may be manifested both in terms of union demands (through the enactment of legislation facilitating the financial and organizational growth of favored unions—including monopoly of representation, official registration, right of combination, compulsory membership or minimum-wage standards for represented workers or both, extension of union benefits, state subsidies, favorable rulings by the state in labor disputes, and so on), as well as in terms of individual labor leaders (formal or informal access or incorporation into decision-making spheres, codification of internal regulations and mechanisms favoring incumbents over challengers in union elections, material benefits, and so on). Constraints may include legislation that undermines the strength and legal position of unions in general or those of specific unions and union leaders in favor of other, more cooperative labor groups; state controls on union finances, the scope of permissible activities and negotiable issues, the right to strike, and grievance procedures; the rescinding or ignoring of labor and welfare legislation; intervention in collective bargaining and establishment of wage and benefit ceilings; outright control of unions through government intervention; and coercion. See Collier and Collier, "Inducements versus Constraints," pp. 980–81; Alessandro Pizzorno, "Los sindicatos y la acción política," *Economía y política en la acción social*, Cuadernos Pasado y Presente no. 44 (Córdoba: 1973), pp. 75–106; Jorge Correa, *Los jerarcas sindicales* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Obrador, 1974), pp. 109–10; and Sebastião C. Velasco e Cruz, *Inestabilidade Política: O Caso Argentino, 1955–1970* (Rio de Janeiro: IUPERJ, 1977), pp. 81–85.
5. Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South*

- American Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 115–68.
6. Decreto 15,074 (law 12,921)/27 November 1943. *Anales de legislación argentina* 3 (1943): 4591. By provisions in the 1853 constitution, amended in 1898, the number of ministries was fixed at eight. This number was changed by the 1949 constitutional reform. See Jerónimo Remorino, *La nueva legislación social argentina* (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, 1953). For a general description of Argentine labor laws at the time, see Ernesto Krotoschin, *Tratado práctico de derecho de trabajo*, vol. 1 (Buenos Aires: DePalma Editores, 1977), pp. 544–51.
 7. See Remorino, *La nueva legislación*, pp. 52–55; and Santiago V. Liñares Quintana, *Gobierno y administración de la República Argentina*, vol. 2 (Buenos Aires: Tipográfica Editora Argentina, 1946), pp. 91–92.
 8. Victor Alba, *Historia del movimiento obrero en América Latina* (Mexico, D.F.: Librerías Mexicanas Unidas, 1964), p. 363.
 9. See Robert Alexander, *Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), pp. 172–209; also his *Juan Domingo Perón: A History* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 79–81. Also see Roberto Carri, *Sindicatos y poder en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudestaba, 1967), pp. 37–41.
 10. Juan D. Perón, *La organización a través del pensamiento de Perón* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Freeland, 1973), p. 13.
 11. *Ibid.*, pp. 54, 57; and Juan D. Perón, *Conceptos políticos* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Argentinas, 1973), p. 52. “Justicialista” was the name Perón gave to the Peronist party in reference to the equitable social basis of his ideology.
 12. See George Blanksten, *Perón’s Argentina* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 261–71; Alexander, *Labor Relations*, pp. 173–78; Silvia Sigal and Juan C. Torre, “Los sindicatos y la clase obrera argentina, primera parte” (Buenos Aires, mimeo, n.d.), pp. 17–19; Marcello Cavarozzi, “Sindicatos y poder en la Argentina, 1955–58,” *Estudios CEDES* (Buenos Aires) 2, no. 1 (1979): 9–11; and Juan J. Sebreli, *Buenos Aires, vida cotidiana y alienación* (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veinte, 1964), p. 183.
 13. The most important of these measures was Decreto 23,852/2 October 1945 (the Ley de Asociaciones Profesionales), which along with Decreto 536/9 January 1945 established a registry for officially recognized unions at all levels. For discussions of the effects of these measures, see Alexander, *Labor Relations*, pp. 177–78; Carri, *Sindicatos y poder*, pp. 28–29; and Edward Epstein, “Control and Cooptation of the Argentine Labor Movement,” *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 2, no. 2 (Apr. 1979): 449.
 14. Decreto 23,852/1945, Decreto 536/1945, and Decreto 26,008/28 August 1948 are complementary legislation that require state approval of “authorized” strikes by officially recognized unions. All other strikes were declared illegal. See Pedro F. Prado, *Leyes y decretos de trabajo y previsión*, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Librería y Editora Alsina, 1949), pp. 613–18; Alba, *Historia del movimiento obrero*, pp. 363–66; Carri, *Sindicatos y poder*, pp. 28–29.
 15. See Samuel Baily, *Labor, Nationalism, and Politics in Argentina* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967), chap. 5; and Blanksten, *Perón’s Argentina*, pp. 261–71.
 16. Cavarozzi, “Sindicatos y poder, 1955–58,” p. 9.
 17. Juan D. Perón, *Perón Expounds His Doctrine* (New York: AMS Press, 1948), p. 36.
 18. See Collier and Collier, “Inducements versus Constraints,” for the effects of inclusionary state corporatism on union independence. Also see Carri, *Sindicatos y poder*, pp. 28–41, for the exact effects of Peronist labor legislation.
 19. Decreto 15,074/27 November 1943, Decreto 4,925/1944, resolutions of the Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión 48 and 60 of 1945, and Decreto 1,594/January, 1946. See Remorino, *La nueva legislación*, pp. 52–55; and Juan D. R. Gronda, *Leyes nacionales de trabajo*, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Ideas, 1949), pp. 437–40. Also see *Anales de legislación argentina* 3; and for Decreto 1,594/1946, see *Anales de legislación argentina* 6 (1946): 73.
 20. These agencies included the Cámara de Alquileres, the Consejo Agrario Nacional, the Comisión Nacional de Aprendizaje y Orientación Profesional, the Administración Nacional de la Vivienda, the Caja Nacional de Ahorro Postal, the Dirección General de Asistencia y Previsión Social para Ferroviarios and that for Obreros de la

- Industria del Vidrio, the Dirección Nacional de Servicios de Empleo, the Comisión Nacional de Precios y Salarios, the Dirección Nacional de Asistencia Social, and the Consejo Nacional de Relaciones Profesionales. For the laws that created them, see Remorino, *La nueva legislación*, pp. 65–70; and Ernesto Krotoschin and Jorge A. Ratti, *Código de trabajo* (Buenos Aires: DePalma Editores, 1956), vol. 1, pp. 612–38.
21. Gronda, *Leyes nacionales de trabajo*, pp. 452–53.
 22. See the laws cited in note 14.
 23. See *Constitución de la nación argentina* (Buenos Aires: Subsecretaría de Informaciones de la Presidencia de la Nación, 1949), Artículo 83.
 24. Ley 13,529/8 July 1949, *Anales de legislación argentina* 9 (1949):196.
 25. República Argentina, Presidente, *Mensaje el inaugurar el 88° período ordinario de sesiones del honorable congreso nacional*, part 2, “Reseña oficial de actividades” (Buenos Aires: Subsecretaría de Informaciones, 1 May 1954), p. 446.
 26. Ley 14,236/16 October 1953, “Organización del Instituto Nacional de Previsión Social,” *Anales de legislación argentina* 13 (1953):164–68. As mentioned in note 20, the Instituto Nacional de Previsión Social formally fell within the jurisdiction of the Ministerio de Trabajo, having been created by Decreto 29,176/27 October 1944. *Anales de legislación argentina* 4 (1944):602. It was, however, a decentralized agency.
 27. Peter Waldman, “Los cuatro fases del gobierno peronista,” *Aportes* 15 (Jan. 1971):103.
 28. Baily, *Labor, Nationalism, and Politics*, p. 100; Alexander, *Perón*, pp. 79–81, and *Labor Relations*, pp. 179–80.
 29. Decreto 5,311/1946 eliminated Artículo 8 of Decreto 33,827/1944, which protected state employees from arbitrary or politically motivated dismissal. Perón based Decreto 5,311/1946 on the precedent established by Artículo 83, Párrafo 10, of the 1853 constitution, which allowed the president to appoint and dismiss public officials. This provision was one of the few in the 1853 constitution that Perón allowed to stand after the 1949 constitutional reform. See Daniel Tieffenberg, *Legislación obrera en la era peronista* (Buenos Aires: Editoras Populares Argentinas, 1956), pp. 39–126; and Liñares Quintana, *Gobierno y administración*, vol. 1, p. 357.
 30. *Constitución de la Nación Argentina*.
 31. Suprema Corte, Caso Cia. Dock Sud de Buenos Aires, Ltd. 12 January 1946. *La ley* 41: 260; and *Fallos de la Corte Suprema*, 1946, pp. 23–30. For a discussion of early resistance to these centralizing moves, see Krotoschin and Ratti, *Código de trabajo*, p. 617.
 32. Resolution 171/1946 of the Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión.
 33. Decreto 5,205/1957 rescinded the Peronist legislation concerning regional delegations. For an overview of various aspects of the federal-provincial disputes about jurisdiction over labor matters, including the Onganía regime’s decision to recentralize and reconsolidate national labor authority, see Antonio Vázquez Vialard, “La intervención del estado en las relaciones laborales,” *Legislación de trabajo* 19, no. 227 (Nov. 1971): 987–95; and “Jurisdicción nacional o provincial del contralor administrativo laboral,” *Legislación de trabajo* 21, no. 245 (May 1973):385–404.
 34. Julio Mafud, “Los nuevos controles,” in *Sociología del peronismo* (Buenos Aires: Editora Americalee, 1972), pp. 91–92.
 35. Observations in this section are based on an examination of budgetary allocations to centralized agencies of the Secretaría-Ministerio de Trabajo announced in the *Presupuesto general de la administración nacional* (República Argentina, Ministerio de Hacienda) for the years 1947–55. Figures refer to current pesos derived from general funds.
 36. There were, however, several special accounts that provided nonpersonnel allocations to these agencies. The most important special account was controlled by the Instituto Nacional de Previsión Social as a separate item in the budget, rather than a redirected item in the labor ministry’s account.
 37. Personnel numbers are taken from the *Presupuesto general* for the years cited (see note 35).
 38. *Ibid.*
 39. Baily, *Labor, Nationalism, and Politics*, p. 101; and Jean-Claude García-Zamor, *Public*

- Administration and Social Changes in Argentina* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Mory, 1968), p. 17.
40. José L. de Imaz, *Los que mandan* (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1964), p. 41.
 41. Ibid. Chapter 1 contains a broad biographical and sociological sketch, complete with data tables, on Argentine administrative elites from 1936 to 1960. See Mafud, "Los nuevos controles," pp. 131–32, for a description of the middle-class orientation of the Peronist bureaucracy.
 42. Mafud, "Los nuevos controles," p. 132.
 43. See Alexander, *Perón*, pp. 79–81.
 44. To cite but one example, such was the case of Hugo Mercante, head of the DGTASD until 1953, who was a brother of Colonel Domingo Mercante, Perón's coconspirator, onetime Secretario de Trabajo y Previsión, and governor of the province of Buenos Aires. Both brothers were among the first to share Perón's vision of Argentine society.
 45. Imaz, *Los que mandan*, p. 14.
 46. See the statements to this effect offered in the various proclamations issued by the junta, including "Acta de la revolución argentina" (29 June 1966), "Mensaje al país del Presidente de la Nación Teniente General Juan Carlos Onganía" (30 June 1966). Good analyses of the motives for the coup are found in O'Donnell, *Modernization*, pp. 116–17, 152–63; and in J. W. Rowe, "Onganía's Argentina: The First Four Months," pts. 1 and 2, *American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, East Coast South America Series*, vol. 12, nos. 7–8 (Argentina).
 47. See the section on "Fines políticos" in the "Acta" and "Mensaje de la Junta," note 46.
 48. O'Donnell, *Modernization*, pp. 92–97; and Gary Wynia, *Argentina in the Postwar Era* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978), pp. 168–72, 184–85.
 49. A good summary of these measures, as well as labor's response to them, is found in Carri, *Sindicatos y poder*, pp. 145–87; Santiago Senén González, *Breve historia del sindicalismo argentino* (Buenos Aires: Alzamor Editores, 1974), pp. 113–28; and Rubén Rotundaro, *Realidad y cambio en el sindicalismo* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Plenamar, 1971), pp. 317–45, 379–85. On the use of repressive measures, see O'Donnell, *Modernization*, pp. 96–98; and Wynia, *Argentina*, pp. 184–85.
 50. For the total number of major union affiliates at the time, see Juan C. Torre, "La tasa de sindicalización en la Argentina," *Desarrollo Económico* 48 (Jan.–Mar. 1973):903–13.
 51. In a book to be published by the University of California Press, O'Donnell presents what is likely to be the definitive study of the first bureaucratic-authoritarian period in Argentina. In it, he offers a detailed examination of the divisions and factions existing within the Onganía administration.
 52. O'Donnell, manuscript cited in note 51, chap. 3, pp. 8, 15–16.
 53. Carri, *Sindicatos y poder*, p. 185. In his manuscript, O'Donnell outlines the liberal economic team's basic attitude toward organized labor (chap. 3, pp. 12, 16–17).
 54. I have examined this process in more detail in "'Voluntary' Abdication of Authoritarian Rule: The Case of the Onganía Regime in Argentina, 1966–70," a paper I presented at the Southern Political Science Association Annual Meetings in November 1980.
 55. The division of labor in the Onganía administration is briefly described by O'Donnell in his manuscript, chap. 3, pp. 1–2 (see note 51).
 56. "Estatuto de la Revolución Argentina," cited in *Legislación de trabajo* 15 (1967):173.
 57. By the constitution of 1853, amended in 1898 and restored by the constitutional convention in 1957, the number of ministries was fixed at eight.
 58. Rowe, "Onganía's Argentina," pt. 2, p. 4.
 59. Ley 16,956/27 September 1966, *Boletín de legislación* 8, no. 9 (Sept. 1966):519–27.
 60. *Buenos Aires Herald*, 23 October 1969, p. 10.
 61. *Boletín de legislación* 8, no. 9 (Sept. 1966):523. Also see *Legislación de trabajo* 15 (1967):173. Emphasis added.
 62. Ley 16,956/1966, *Boletín de legislación*, and Decreto 2,870/19 October 1966, Artículo 6. *Legislación de trabajo* 15 (1967):176; and *Boletín de legislación* 8, no. 10 (Oct. 1966):606–7.
 63. Ley 16,985/25 October 1966, *Boletín de legislación* 8 (Oct. 1966), no. 10:606–7.

64. Decreto 7,536/13 October 1967, *Boletín oficial*, 20 October 1967.
65. Decreto 9,316/27 December 1967, *Boletín oficial*, 24 January 1968.
66. Ley 17,272/27 May 1967, Artículo 10, *Boletín de legislación* 9, no. 5 (May 1967):240–41.
67. Decreto 5,373/30 August 1968, *Boletín de legislación* 10, no. 9 (Sept. 1968):551–86.
68. Among the positions eliminated were those of the secretary general, pro-secretary, adjunct secretary, and one of the assistant secretaries.
69. "Resolución" of the Secretario de Trabajo, 23 October 1967, *Boletín de legislación* 9, no. 10 (Oct. 1967):240–41.
70. Ley 18,416/20 October 1969, Artículo 21, *Boletín de legislación* 11, no. 10 (Oct. 1969):519–21.
71. Ley 18,608/6 February 1970, Artículos 1–4, *Boletín de legislación* 12, no. 2 (Feb. 1970):78–80.
72. Ley 18,692/29 May 1970, *Boletín oficial*, 3 June 1970.
73. Ley 18,416/20 October 1969, *Digesto de trabajo* 29 (1969):778; and *Boletín de legislación* 11, no. 10 (Oct. 1969):519–21.
74. This statement does not imply that other organizational reforms were not attempted. Particularly significant were Onganía's attempts to impose his inclusionary corporatist reforms within the framework of national labor administration. The major attempt to do so came through the creation of a number of "community councils" that were designed to bring together business, labor, and community leaders to discuss questions of common concern. Included as semiautonomous agencies under the formal jurisdiction of the SET were the Tribunal Nacional de Relaciones Profesionales; the Consejo Nacional de Salario Mínimo, Vital, y Móvil; the Tribunal de Trabajo Doméstico; the Registro Nacional de la Industria de la Construcción; and the Tribunal Bancario y de Seguros, Reaseguros, Capitalización y Ahorro. Few of these agencies actually began operations, however, and none had any tangible influence over labor or economic policy because both the labor movement and the economic team that controlled labor administration perceived these instruments as running contrary to their respective interests. For an outline of the corporatist design of Onganía (and the paternalist faction), see the speech given by Interior Minister Guillermo Borda, on 24 April 1968, reprinted in *La Nación*, 25 April 1968. Also see *Primera Plana*, 16 March, 1 April, and 13 May 1969, for a general discussion of Onganía's corporatist program.
75. Data on branch allocations are derived from the *Presupuesto general* for the years cited (see note 35). All figures refer to current pesos designated for centralized agencies from general funds in the budget.
76. Compare the classification of the SET found in the 1967 budget (p. 24), with that in the 1970 budget (p. 90). The 1973 budget signed by Perón includes the Ministerio de Trabajo under the heading of "Bienestar Social."
77. Defense employed 30.8 percent of those on the state's payroll in 1969 and 1970, followed by Culture and Education (24.4 percent), and Economic Development (20.4 percent, for a total of 126,637 employees). Personnel costs amounted to 61.0 percent of the budget for central administrative agencies for both years, with the total number of state employees reaching 621,766. With 1,425 employees, the SET employed a tiny fraction of the public work force. See República Argentina, *Folleto de divulgación del presupuesto de la administración nacional* (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1971), pp. 25–26, 47–48.
78. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," *LARR* 13, no. 1 (1978):6. For a more complete description of the characteristics and position of "incumbents of technocratic roles" in bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, see his *Modernization*, pp. 76–85.
79. Jorge Niosi, *Los empresarios y el estado argentino* (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1974), p. 218, table 21.
80. Mariano C. Grondona, "La estructura cívico-militar del nuevo estado argentino," *Aportes* 6 (Oct. 1967):74.
81. See Rowe, "Onganía's Argentina," pt. 2, p. 4, and *Area Handbook for Argentina*, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1969), p. 327.
82. All biographical references in this section have been compiled by first looking up the

names of incumbents in key positions for the period 1966–70 as they appeared in the *Anuario Kraft* (Buenos Aires: Guillermo Kraft Limitada), and the *Guía interacción de administración pública* (Buenos Aires: Organización Markas, 1968 and 1971), then cross-referencing them with the biographies offered in *Quién es quién en la República Argentina, 1968* (Buenos Aires: Guillermo Kraft Limitada, 1968) and those appearing in *La Nación* on various dates.

83. For example, both Secretary of Labor Rubén San Sebastián and Assistant Secretary of Labor Hector Villaveirán had begun their careers in labor administration many years before (Villaveirán began during the first Peronist administration and San Sebastián during the Aramburú regime). At the time of their appointments, they were serving in important positions in labor administration (San Sebastián as director general of labor relations, and Villaveirán as honorary counsel to the minister).
84. Valentín Suárez was named interventor in the CGT by Ley 18,281/14 July 1969, *Boletín de legislación* 11, no. 7 (July 1969):326–27.
85. Niosi, *Los empresarios*, p. 218, table 21.
86. Personnel figures are taken from the *Presupuesto general* for the years cited (see note 35). For 1969–70, see also the *Folleto de divulgación*, pp. 47–48 (see note 77).
87. Another critical question that remains to be explored is that regarding the different degrees of success encountered by the Peronist and bureaucratic-authoritarian corporatist experiments. Beyond the fact that the former regime was far more homogeneous on practical and ideological grounds, it remains to be determined whether inclusionary corporatist systems are inherently more likely to succeed than exclusionary corporatist systems, and if so, exactly why.