

SUMMARIES

Understanding Regulatory Growth in the European Community

by Giandomenico Majone

The paper deals with the apparently unstoppable growth of the regulatory policies within the European Community, trying to define the extension of the phenomenon and to explain it. After discussing some examples related to the qualitative and quantitative growth of EC regulation, the author discusses the most important theories about the growth of the European policy making, from the inter-governmentalist to the neo-functionalist perspective. Starting from this theoretical debate, an interpretative model is developed, focusing particularly on the problem of policy process in the Community. This model has among its main variables the limited size of the EC budget. Some interesting implications derive from this analysis: in particular, the capacity of the Commission officials as «policy entrepreneurs» to play a crucial role in the EC policy making.

The paper concludes with some remarks on institutional reform, linking the theme of the regulatory growth with the problem of the «democratic deficit» within the EC.

The Presidency of the European Commission. Constraints and Resources

by Ken Endo

This article highlights the underlying institutional structure of the Commission presidency which clearly exists, despite the contested and malleable nature of the office.

There are at least three important aspects of the Commission President's leadership. The first is to build an administration, or improve it, thereby founding an effective power base to exercise other aspects

of leadership. Second, to build coalitions or effect compromises through which the President attempts to make the Community function, whilst upgrading the common interests among the member states. The third is to set and expand agendas in order to deepen integration.

For these leadership roles, the Commission presidency is given important resources. Internally, the position as the chairman of the College, the possession of the largest *cabinet*, cooperation with the Secretary General, and other in-house organs and channels under presidential control, help the President to mobilise the College and the Commission apparatus. This mobilisation in turn allows him to exert influence outside the Commission.

Externally, the President's membership of the European Council is a key to understanding his potential to exercise agenda-setting and mediative leadership. The Council presidency, the Council Secretariat and the Franco-German axis may also be turned into his resources when he manages to ally himself with them. Lastly, the international standing of the Commission President helps (or hinders) him in exercising leadership, since prestige in the international arena can be a resource for the constantly contested office of the President. Success in mobilising these external resources can facilitate enhanced utilisation of his internal resources.

However, the Commission presidency is circumscribed by constraints. The office of the Commission President is not intended to be, nor is it, equipped with democratic legitimacy, lacks the important resource of a political party, and is characterised by meagre links with peoples. Moreover, the internal standing of the Commission President within the Commission is also partly designed and partly obliged to be modest, given the rule of collegiality, the lack of power to hire and fire the Commissioners as well as other key in-house posts, and the fragmentation and heterogeneity of the Commission apparatus.

Reasoning voters in multiparty systems

by Franz Urban Pappi

«Reasoning voter» is a term coined by Popkin to describe a situation in which voters do reason about parties, candidates and issues in order to come to terms with a low-cost decision. The acquisition of perfect information and its processing are too expensive so that reasoning voters use information and calculation shortcuts to approach rationality in their choice.

In a field where research agenda focuses heavily on the American two-party system and its presidential election, this paper is about preference formation and party choices of reasoning voters in a multipar-

ty system. More specifically, the Author discusses a model of voting decision which is built on the assumption that party preference profiles of voters are the crucial link between the factors influencing the reasoning about parties and the final voting decision in a multiparty system.

The first section deals with the concept of party preference in multiparty system, its theoretical status and the different devices to collect data on party preference profiles (paired comparisons, rankings, ratings). The second section discusses the factors influencing the preference formation. From those factors, issue proximities and retrospective evaluations are selected as the factors most proximate to the process of preference formation in the assumed funnel of causality. The Author also takes into account future expectations too, but they are more difficult to integrate into models for multiparty systems, since the future government does depend not only on election results but also on future coalition building. The third and last section focuses on voting behavior. In the analysis of the decision problem itself the concept of habit, the expressive consideration together with the instrumental one and the distinction between voters as consumers and voters as investors are considered.

The final question is about the voter paradox, that is participation in an election with an infinitely small impact on the outcome, appears as paradoxical as ever. The Author argues that, since continental European democracies have developed parliamentary systems in which governments are usually formed by coalitions, it is very difficult for voters to anticipate future governments, and this constitutes a further element against the decisiveness of voting. Thus instrumental rationality is more downgraded in multiparty systems than in two-party systems. But multiparty systems on the other hand facilitate political orientation by providing ideological signals.

The Italian transition: the regional elections of april 23

by Roberto D'Alimonte

The article is about the new electoral system for the regional elections and their outcome. The electoral system is a mix of PR and plurality: 80% of the seats are assigned by PR in multi-members provincial districts and the remaining 20% are allocated to the party or coalition of parties that wins the plurality of the votes at the regional level. The most important feature of the system is that a majority of the sets are guaranteed in any case to the party or coalition of parties that wins the plurality competition. This is done through the allocation of additional sets. The second part of the article deals with the outcome of the elections. The center-left coalition has won 9 out of

15 regional governments. From this point of view its performance has been considerably better than in the parliamentary elections of March 1994. Yet, this outcome is influenced by the low turn out and particularly by the extraordinary difference between the valid votes in the PR and plurality arena. Both factors have helped the center-left. The last topic discussed has to do with the structural weakness of the center-left coalition in the plurality context. Systematically, as it happened also in the parliamentary elections of 1994, this coalition gets fewer votes in the plurality competition than in the PR arena. This is explained by the existence of a «summability problem»: because of its size and the persistence of ideological voting the center-left is unable to keep together its different electoral components in plurality elections.