

precise statistics and he doesn't explain the role of the British Communists in Palestinian affairs. His observation that the Comintern had a "rather independent role" vis-à-vis the Soviet Union prior to 1928 should have been buttressed with supportive evidence.

Although this book is certainly of scholarly interest, Hen-Tov's style tends toward the elephantine and his organization toward the labyrinthine. Such a combination produces a rather tight and uncomfortable fit.

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THE ANATOMY OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVERS. Edited by *Thomas T. Hammond* and *Robert Farrell*. Foreword by *Cyril E. Black*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975 [1971]. xviii, 664 pp. \$25.00, cloth. \$5.95, paper.

This remarkably fine volume will undoubtedly be well received and widely used. With contributions by thirty American and foreign experts, it is the most convenient and comprehensive analysis yet available of the ways and means by which Communists have come to power in various countries or parts of countries since 1917. (Not included are the recent victories in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, which occurred after the book was published.) About one-third of the essays deal with Communist failures, aborted preparatory efforts, or Communist counter-revolutions. Professor Hammond introduces the volume with a lengthy chronological survey of Communist attempts to seize power, and also provides a conclusion in which he offers a "typology" of takeovers and speculates on the reasons for success or failure of Communist bids for power.

This volume is not and does not purport to be a history of world communism but of Communist takeovers. The word "takeover" is used to encompass all routes to power (genuine revolution, installation by the Red Army, free elections, and so forth) and indicates that the emphasis in these essays has been intentionally narrowed to exclude detailed treatment of pretakeover conditions and historical background as well as posttakeover transformations.

Hammond finds no less than twenty-two successful Communist takeovers (see the list on p. 643) since 1917: Russia, Outer Mongolia, Tannu Tuva, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Yugoslavia, Albania, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, North Vietnam, China, Tibet, Cuba, San Marino, Kerala, and West Bengal. The takeovers are all analyzed in the volume but with these exceptions: (1) the treatment of Russia is limited to two essays, one on the October Revolution in Petrograd and the other on the Bolshevik conquest of the Moslem borderlands, thus, unfortunately, ignoring the bulk of the former Russian Empire, and (2) no treatment other than in the introductory essay is given Tibet, San Marino, and West Bengal.

Communist failures are discussed in essays on Finland in 1918, Poland in 1920, Germany during 1918-23, the first Kuomintang-Communist alliance of 1924-27, Greece during 1942-49, the Azeri and Kurdish regimes in northern Iran during 1944-46, and Indonesia in 1965. Several other essays help to round out the picture. One is concerned with the problematic situation in Finland in 1948, and here Devlin argues that "the Finnish Communists made no serious effort to seize power" (p. 445). Another essay describes Communist efforts in Guatemala during 1951-54 to develop and expand their influence under the Arbenz regime. The Hungarian

revolt of 1956 also receives its own essay, as does Czechoslovakia's "Prague Spring" of 1968.

A fairly common observation about multiauthored volumes is that the contributions are of uneven quality. But what is impressive about this work is the very high level of scholarship that has been virtually uniformly achieved. These essays are not warmed-over rehashes of the basic story of each Communist effort to seize power, nor is the volume to be justified on grounds of convenience alone. Rather, the authors show clearly their intent to go beyond a mere descriptive recounting of familiar events. Their analyses are deeply thoughtful, free of "cold war" passion, and rich in insight and interpretation.

I found especially rewarding Keep's fresh approach to the Petrograd coup of 1917, Shoup's detailed analysis of the Yugoslav revolution, Kousoulas' conclusions drawn from the unsuccessful Greek Communist attempts, Lotarski's elucidation of the takeover in Poland, and Schneider's reappraisal of the aborted Communist effort in Guatemala. But to mention these is to acknowledge only a few of the many stimulating and helpful essays. Certainly Tigrid's reexamination of the Prague coup of 1948 in the light of Czech and Slovak Communist writings also deserves attention. Hammond, in addition to his other contributions and role as chief editor, offers a carefully detailed and provocative presentation of the takeover in Outer Mongolia, "the Comintern's only successful revolution" (p. 107), in which he argues that this experience set precedents for later takeovers at the end of World War II. While Hammond does not assert that Stalin consciously followed a Mongolian model in Eastern Europe, he obviously believes that this experience had considerable influence upon the Soviet leaders, certainly more than has previously been recognized by Western scholars.

To ask for more, when so much has been encompassed in this already large volume, may seem unfair, but an essay on the evolution of Communist theory in respect to the seizure of power surely would have been appropriate and welcome. Studies of the Communist efforts in Laos and Cambodia, as well as a comprehensive treatment of the takeover throughout the old Russian Empire, also would have been desirable.

These essays are abundantly footnoted and a brief bibliography of basic works on international communism is given at the end of the volume. All in all, this is an impressive achievement and the contributors deserve our thanks.

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STALINISM AND AFTER. By *Alec Nove*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1975. 205 pp. \$7.50, paper. Distributed in U.S. by Crane, Russak & Company, New York.

*Stalinism and After* provides an excellent introduction to the political system in the USSR. It portrays the modern political order as an outgrowth of prerevolutionary historical conditions without implying that the Bolshevik seizure of power or the Stalinist revolution from above were the inevitable responses to problems of economic backwardness and the maintenance of national security. Furthermore, Nove's analysis of the origins of Stalinism emphasizes that the economic and political conditions created by the civil war and the early years of NEP seemed to favor the dominance of Stalin and his tough-minded cohorts over the more intellectual segments of the Bolshevik leadership. This survey includes fine sum-