

PS Appendix

APSA Awards Presented at the 1986 Annual Meeting

DISSERTATION AWARDS

(Each award includes a cash prize of \$250.)

Gabriel A. Almond Award, for the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1984 or 1985 in the field of comparative politics.

Recipients: **Michael Loriaux**, University of Utah, "International Change and Political Adaptation: The French Overdraft Economy in the Seventies," submitted by Princeton University.

James Tong, Michigan State University, "Collective Violence in a Pre-modern Society: Rebellions and Banditry in the Ming Dynasty (1364-1644)," submitted by the University of Michigan.

Selection Committee: Lewis A. Dexter, Brock University; Ronald Inglehart, University of Michigan; and Jorgen Rasmussen, Iowa State University, chair.

Dissertation Chairs: **Robert Gilpin** for Michael Loriaux. **Michel Oksenberg** for James Tong.

Citation: The Gabriel Almond Prize Committee was reluctant to defy one of the most basic injunctions of comparative political inquiry: Don't compare apples with oranges. The two dissertations which finally emerged as contenders for the prize each were impressive examples of a particular type of research. Yet they so varied in their methods, circumstances of research, and objectives that to have selected one over another would have been to have done a disservice to all concerned. Therefore, the Committee decided to make a joint award.

One co-winner is Michael Maurice Loriaux's *International Change and Political Adaptation: The French Overdraft Economy in the Seventies*, submitted by Princeton University. This dissertation grows with rereading and ought to be of influence for decades to come.

The study is concerned with the way a particular nation and economy responded to the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system

and of the assurance by the United States that it would support fixed, but adjustable, exchange rates. The theoretical interest is that of how international political change affects the capacity of a state to implement policy. Loriaux persuasively argues that France had adapted to the Bretton Woods system by creating an "overdraft economy" in which the conventional capitalistic, asset-based economy was replaced by the presumption of assured borrowing power, guaranteed by the state. Although the situation changed, the presumption, resting on perceptions and interests, continued. Accordingly, proposals from responsible officials for new programs, policies, and responses were, in general, ineffective and, in practice, were not necessarily heeded even by those who advanced them.

This picture of a politico-economic process would alone justify great attention to the dissertation. Far beyond that, Loriaux stimulates reconsideration of the nature of political economy and, indeed, of the varying and often unique nature of capitalist political culture in the different countries of the modern world. He frequently contrasts France with, for instance, West Germany or the U.S., regarding the relationship of government and banks to each other and to the economy. Contrasts and comparisons with Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and, above all, the overdraft economies of Finland and Japan are made; the transactional relationship between the credit system and the purchasing habits of different consumer groups also enters the portrayal.

Aside from this general contribution to the understanding of economic political culture, Loriaux has borrowed several notions from economic theory, e.g., "moral hazard," to utilize in a political context. Just in passing, he redefines the political notion of leadership. Because the thesis is developed in an original fashion and deals with policy issues unfamiliar to most political scientists, the study is hard reading, but well worth the effort. The dissertation is likely to lead to other studies and analyses of importance, not to mention being of some value to international investors and financiers.

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The research for *Collective Violence in a Pre-modern Society: Rebellions and Banditry in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644)* required James W. Tong of the University of Michigan to organize a sizeable research team to code data from a hitherto untapped source—local gazetteers from the Ming period. From a comprehensive survey of alternative theories of social violence, he derives a number of explicitly stated hypotheses which might help to explain the incidence of violence during the Ming Dynasty. An often inventive operationalization of variables enables him to test alternative explanations.

In analyzing his data Tong demonstrates an impressive familiarity with a variety of techniques and approaches. He is careful not to employ statistical methods beyond what the data will bear. He employs rational choice analysis not just in a generalized, illustrative fashion, but to make detailed, empirical application of this technique.

Collective violence during Ming proved to be most common in peripheral regions least integrated into the central political system and was especially prevalent during times of agrarian hardship and rule by corrupt and ineffective administrations. The violence is best understood as a rational response to economic and political conditions, rather than as the clash of opposed classes or the anomic behavior produced by the breakdown of traditional society. Thus the research disconfirms familiar generalizations about social discontent.

Tong's research makes a significant data source accessible, elucidates the background of contemporary Chinese civilization and politics, and contributes substantially to the literature on collective social violence. Many long-established scholars would be happy to have achieved as much as he has in his dissertation.

William Anderson Award, for the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1984 or 1985 in the field of inter-governmental relations.

Recipient: Gregory R. Weiher, University of Houston, "A Theory of Urban Political Boundaries," submitted by Washington University.

Selection Committee: Martha Derthick, University of Virginia, chair; Martin Sheffer, Cornell University; Thomas Vocino, Auburn University at Montgomery.

Dissertation Chairs: Robert H. Salisbury and John Sprague.

Citation: Daring to build on the simple, obvious observation that boundaries of local places influence where people live, Gregory

Ross Weiher has constructed a dissertation of rare power and elegance. We enjoyed reading "A Theory of Political Boundaries," and take pleasure in commending it.

Weiher's claim for his results is circumspect and modest: "This understanding of boundaries is not revolutionary. . . . What this dissertation adds is a self-conscious focus on formal boundaries as the central, least ambiguous fact of urban fragmentation. In this it differs from the literature that does not distinguish between the workings and effectiveness of formal and informal boundaries; or which indiscriminately refers to boundaries, the jurisdictions defined by boundaries, governments that are autonomous within those jurisdictions, and the communities that the governments serve as though one were synonymous with the rest and none had any importance independent of the others."

But this is a significant achievement indeed, and is attained with compactness, lucidity, and an impressive array of refined and imaginative techniques of research and analysis. Whether working with mathematical models, historical data, or interview anecdotes, Weiher has a sure touch. He is also at home in the literature of several disciplines. This work draws on and contributes to sociology, economics, psychology, and history while not losing sight of the political core of the subject, and not failing in the end to attend to the policy implications of the findings. We congratulate the author on a job superbly done.

Edward S. Corwin Award, for the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1984 or 1985 in the field of public law.

Recipient: Susan E. Lawrence, Rutgers University, "The Poor in Court: The Legal Impact of Expanded Access," submitted by Johns Hopkins University.

Selection Committee: John Agresto, National Endowment for the Humanities; Michael Combs, Louisiana State University; Susetta Talarico, University of Georgia.

Dissertation Chairs: J. Woodford Howard, Jr. and Francis E. Rourke.

Citation: This study assesses the impact of the legal services program of the Office of Economic Opportunity on the Supreme Court's development of the law of poverty. Prior to 1964, when the legal services program was established, no legal aid society had ever appealed a case to the Supreme Court. Yet this controversial program financed by federal funds, was specifically designed to help the poor litigate civil claims, often against the government itself. Focusing on cases

appealed to the Supreme Court in the decade 1964-74, Lawrence demonstrates the reasons for the extraordinary success of this program and the public policy consequences of its activities. Indeed, the victories of the legal services program brought about significant changes not only in the area of poverty law but also in our general understanding of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

Ms. Lawrence writes fine, narrative history, combined with careful legal analyses. This study is solid research, sound history and jurisprudence, it is important in what it teaches, and it is exceptionally well written.

Harold D. Lasswell Award, for the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1984 or 1985 in the field of policy studies.

Recipient: **H. Jeffrey Leonard**, The Conservation Foundation, "Pollution, Industrial Development, and Comparative Advantage," submitted by Princeton University.

Selection Committee: Laura Katz Olson, Lehigh University; James L. Payne, Texas A&M University; Peter Sperlich, University of California, Berkeley, chair.

Dissertation Chair: **Henry Bienen**.

Citation: Hugh Jeffrey Leonard's dissertation deals with a topic of great importance: whether and to what degree the costs and logistics of complying with environmental regulations of the various countries are significant new factors in determining the competitiveness and locations of industries. It has been a frequent theme in recent debates of international industrial policy that strong environmental regulations push industries out of the advanced nations, while the less developed countries seek to attract multinationals by imposing fewer environmental safeguards. It has often been thought that the combination of "flight from regulation" and search for "pollution havens" would be a powerful determinant of industrial location and third world development strategies.

Dr. Leonard's dissertation presents a thorough examination of these factors, in the context of general political and economic theories that seek to explain international trade and investment. The dissertation analyzes import and investment trends by U.S. firms to discover whether domestic pollution and health standards have caused industrial relocations and, thus, negatively affected U.S. industrial base and balance of trade. The dissertation also includes case studies of four industrializing nations—Ireland, Spain, Romania, and Mexico—to determine whether their efforts

have been aided by "pollution haven" strategies.

Dr. Leonard's careful evaluations convincingly support the conclusions that "costs and logistics of complying with environmental regulations are not emerging as a decisive factor in most industrial decisions concerning desirable plant locations, or in the international competitive picture of most industries. Industrial flight [has not] diminish[ed] the comparative advantage of the advanced industrial powers [nor have] pollution havens enhanc[ed] their comparative advantage." Ongoing industrial relocations, as in the steel industry, do not seem to be "significantly heightened by stringent environmental regulations in the most advanced countries." This is not to say, of course, that environmental regulations never influence siting decisions. It is to say that "the differentials in the costs of complying with environmental regulations . . . have not been strong enough to offset larger political-economic forces shaping aggregate international comparative advantage."

Dr. Leonard's dissertation is an important contribution to the literature on international industrial policy and national development strategies. It is with great pleasure that we present the Harold D. Lasswell Award to Hugh Jeffrey Leonard for the best doctoral dissertation in the area of policy studies.

Helen Dwight Reid Award, for the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1984 or 1985 in the field of international relations, law and politics.

Recipient: **Michael Mastanduno**, Hamilton College, "Between Economics and National Security: The Western Politics of East-West Trade," submitted by Princeton University.

Selection Committee: Milton Feder, Beloit College; James O'Leary, Catholic University; Glenn H. Snyder, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, chair.

Dissertation Chair: **Robert Gilpin**.

Citation: The subjects of economic warfare and economic sanctions have tended to fall into the "crack" between international political economy and security studies. Michael Mastanduno's dissertation, "Between Economics and National Security: The Western Politics of East-West Trade," goes far to correct this neglect. Focusing on Cocom, the organization through which the U.S. and its European allies regulate the export of security-related goods to the Soviet Union, it brilliantly clarifies the range of policy objectives that such regulation can and has pursued, and the conflicts between the allies concerning them. The possible objectives are

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defined as (1) strategic embargo—restrictions of exports of items that would directly enhance Soviet military strength, (2) economic warfare—restraints intended to weaken the Soviet economy generally and hence indirectly their military power, and (3) tactical linkage—the use of economic rewards and punishments to influence Soviet foreign policy. The Europeans (and the Japanese) have been willing to follow the U.S. lead when it has been limited to the objective of strategic embargo but they have successfully resisted U.S. attempts to expand alliance policy to embrace the other two objectives. Mr. Mastanduno's fascinating account of the intra-alliance conflict and bargaining over these issues is one of the very few studies of NATO politics based on the detailed analysis of cases. It makes clear that the U.S. does not call the tune in the alliance when that tune is not in harmony with fundamental European interests.

The study concludes that neither economic warfare, Reagan style, nor tactical linkage, a la Nixon-Kissinger, are likely to work, largely because of the difficulties of multilateral coordination, but also because the Soviet Union is relatively invulnerable or resistant to both. A policy limited to strategic embargo is at once the most effective and the least disturbing to the alliance and to domestic interests. A problem for the future, however, is the American tendency to control high tech exports to Western Europe in order to prevent their transfer to the Soviet Union.

The dissertation does not pretend to theoretical innovation of the abstract kind. However, it does make an important contribution to international relations theory in the way it illuminates the uncertain boundary between security and economic policy. It also contains much analytical and factual material of direct relevance to theories of collective goods, alliance bargaining and trans-governmental and bureaucratic politics. It highlights the tensions in U.S. foreign policy between domestic politics, international trade policy, defense doctrine and alliance politics. Finally, it is beautifully written: the style is both graceful and incisive, and although it is a long dissertation, there is scarcely an excess word.

E. E. Schattschneider Award, for the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1984 or 1985 in the field of American government.

Recipient: **Mark Alex Peterson**, Harvard University, "Domestic Policy and Legislative Decision-Making: Congressional Responses to Presidential Initiatives," submitted by the University of Michigan.

Selection Committee: John Johannes, Mar-

quette University; Ethel Klein, Columbia University; Russell Murphy, Wesleyan University, chair.

Dissertation Chair: **John W. Kingdon**.

Citation: "Our understanding of how the president and Congress interact can best be advanced by . . . viewing them as tandem institutions in a single decision making system," Mark Alex Peterson suggests at the outset of his "Domestic Policy and Legislative Decision Making." The proposition is straightforward enough and on first impression may not seem all that promising a point of departure for studying the consequential ways in which these two complex institutions interact. But the simplicity belies the sophisticated perspective Peterson brings to bear on the subject, and the rich and rewarding analysis he gives us.

Peterson's study is a systematic analysis of the various ways Congress has responded to the domestic policy initiatives of the seven presidents who served the nation between 1953 and 1981. This was a formidable task and one that required an extraordinary degree of scholarly dedication, care, and ingenuity. The data base alone was a major challenge. During this twenty-eight-year period, there were, by Peterson's count, some 5,000 discrete presidential policy initiatives, a figure arrived at through a painstaking review of the legislative record and presidential papers. Peterson sampled 111 of these initiatives, and compiled detailed information on their programmatic content, their legislative histories and the political and economic context within which Congress responded to each. This information was supplemented by some 107 interviews with former or current members of the Executive Office of the President, with members of Congress and their staffs, with members of the Washington press corps, and with two former presidents, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter.

All this was merely preparatory to the main task, namely showing precisely how and in what ways congressional and presidential interactions are structured. That they are structured, or structured in any meaningful way, is, as Peterson notes, a matter of some dispute. There are many, both inside the Washington establishment and out, who insist each case is unique, and that systematic comparisons across presidents, congresses or even legislative proposals are simply out of the question.

Peterson demonstrates otherwise. In his carefully crafted study, he shows convincingly that there are clear regularities in congressional behavior, and that Congress' responses to presidential initiatives are both patterned

and predictable. Broadly stated, Congress deals with presidential initiatives in six ways, including the simple tactic of ignoring them. More to the point, Peterson shows that the likelihood of any one of these responses is a function of such factors as the substantive content of the proposal, institutional arrangements in Congress, and the economic conditions prevailing at the time. He shows, additionally, that many of the elusive variables in the policy equation are, given sufficient imagination and hard work, measurable. And he shows, finally, that comparative, quantitative analysis of how presidents and Congress respond to each other is not only possible, but possible without sacrificing any of the qualitative richness usually associated with case studies.

This, then, is no ordinary study of American political institutions and the governmental process. Even in a field where quality is the norm, Peterson's analysis stands well above the mean. It is firmly rooted in rich literature on Congress and the president, and whether challenging or certifying conventional wisdom, or whether offering his own insights, Peterson's analysis is innovative and informative, and his presentation clear, gracious and confident. These qualities derive in no small measure from the thoughtful and thorough way in which the study was conceived and executed. The 1986 Schattschneider Committee, consisting of Ethel Klein, Columbia University, John R. Johannes, Marquette University, and Russell D. Murphy, Wesleyan University (Chair) is honored to bestow this year's Award on Mark Allen Peterson.

Leo Strauss Award, for the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1984 or 1985 in the field of political philosophy.

Recipient: **Steven Forde**, University of Oregon, "Thucydides' Alcibiades: A Case Study of the Place of Alcibiades in Thucydides' History," submitted by the University of Toronto.

Selection Committee: George Armstrong Kelley, Johns Hopkins University, chair; Christopher Bruell, Boston College; Frederick G. Whelan, University of Pittsburgh.

Dissertation Chair: **Clifford Orwin**.

Citation: Before presenting my citation for this award to a distinguished young scholar, I would like to say that the original chairperson of this jury is no longer with us. Elaine Spitz, a remarkable human being and teacher of political science, died this past January from an incurable illness that she had waged a brave struggle against for several years. She was the author of an important book, *Majority*

Rule. She was also my dear friend. I only wish that I did not have to fill her shoes this evening. She brought the highest honor to our profession, and was keenly at work up to her last days. Her memory fortifies all of us and is appropriately revived in the granting of the Leo Strauss Award.

The 1986 Leo Strauss Award is presented to Steven Forde of the University of Toronto for his doctoral dissertation "Thucydides' Alcibiades: A Study of the Place of Alcibiades in Thucydides' History."

As one might expect in the rich field of political theory, the jury had a hard task in bestowing a single award. Dr. Forde's thesis impressed us the most because, like his subject and his author, he chose a mighty theme, dared a great deal with it, and achieved a novel, but closely argued, interpretation of a mysterious figure as presented in a monumental and equally mysterious classic of political literature.

In his bold reading of Thucydides, Forde decenters more traditional notions of the structure of *The Peloponnesian War* away from the drama of the majesty and fall of Athenian imperialism toward the ambiguous hope of Athenian recovery, especially as expressed in the figure of Alcibiades, Athenian and cosmopolitan, tyrant and democrat, harbinger of a new imperialism based on the restoration of political leadership in an erotic bonding of empire and chief, a sign of the future.

Though unquestionably controversial, Forde's interpretation is solidly backed by textual argument and a coherent grasp of Thucydides's plausible intentions. He deals powerfully and consequently with many of the major agenda of political theory—"nature," "power," "persuasion," "honor." Working on a subject where, in each generation, only the brave and the skilled will venture, he has managed to construct a view of Thucydides's Alcibiades (and, incidentally, of the work as a whole) that will challenge future scholars of that text as well as future political philosophers who meditate on political power and its relationship with both personal destiny and public persuasion. In both senses, Dr. Forde raises original and absorbing issues.

Dr. Forde's dissertation admirably shows the inexhaustibility of Thucydides and the capacity of political theory to draw new resources from its most ancient texts without ideological simplification. Our jury is proud to recognize these achievements in presenting him with the Leo Strauss Award.

Leonard D. White Award, for the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted

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during 1984 or 1985 in the field of public administration, including broadly related problems of policy formation and administrative theory.

Recipient: **Elisabeth Hollister Sims**, "Rural Development and Public Policy: Agricultural Institutions and Technological Change in the Indian and Pakistani Punjab," submitted by the University of California, Berkeley.

Selection Committee: Robert Golembiewski, University of Georgia; Jack Knott, Michigan State University; Mitchell Rice, Louisiana State University, chair.

Dissertation Chair: **Jyoatirindra Das Gupta**.

Citation: In 30 months of field work and a survey of 240 farmers, Sims insightfully investigates and examines the differences in agricultural productivity and rural development between the Indian (East) Punjab and Pakistani (West) Punjab and demonstrates the impact of different government policies and administration on agricultural performance. Through extensive interviews Sims was able to assess the contribution of organizations to agricultural development and the impact of Indian and Pakistani farm lobbies upon agricultural policies. Her qualitative methodology is balanced with quantitative data comparisons.

Sims' major contention is that divergent patterns of growth, in this case agricultural growth and rural development, result from national leaders' policies and programs which represent sharply different responses to broadly similar domestic and international problems. She shows the liabilities of the centralized and autocratic administration in West Punjab in comparison to the less autocratic administration in the East Punjab which sought to facilitate the development of decentralized markets in agriculture. She carefully and methodically investigates and examines the results of different policies with respect to infrastructure, credit and irrigation.

The dissertation makes a significant contribution to comparative public policy and administration and to comparative methodology.

BOOK AND PAPER AWARDS

Franklin L. Burdette Pi Sigma Alpha Award (\$250), for the best paper presented at the 1985 Annual Meeting.

Recipient: **Robert Axelrod**, University of Michigan, "Modeling the Evolution of Norms."

Selection Committee: James Lengle, Georgetown University, chair; Kristin Monroe, University of California, Irvine; Dianne Pinderhughes, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

Citation: The Franklin L. Burdette Pi Sigma Alpha Award for the best paper presented at the 1985 American Political Science Association Convention is awarded to Robert Axelrod for his paper, "Modeling the Evolution of Norms." Professor Axelrod proposes a formal game theoretical model to explain the emergence, maintenance, and decay of behavioral norms. Computer simulations over many generations demonstrate that boldness, or willingness to punish violations, increases. As boldness drops due to vengefulness, vengefulness subsequently declines as real costs for enforcing norms increase. Finally, as vengefulness disappears, boldness returns and norms collapse. Professor Axelrod then discusses eight mechanisms which sustain norms. He includes one mechanism, meta-norms, or the willingness to punish those who fail to punish violators, in his model. The results demonstrate unambiguously its utility in maintaining norms. Finally, Professor Axelrod explores characteristics of behavior that are likely to develop into norms.

Although his substantive findings are tentative, Professor Axelrod's approach and model are significant. His approach extends the rational actor tradition by considering how goals and values develop, an area traditionally excluded from such models, and by showing how chance and limited rationality can be integrated into a rational decision-making calculus. Because norms govern the behavior of individuals, groups, institutions, and states in a wide variety of social, economic, and political settings his model transcends interdisciplinary subfields in political science, lending itself to central questions in sociology, economics, anthropology, and psychology.

"Modeling the Evolution of Norms" is theory building at its best; simple in its conception, creative in its approach, and far-reaching in its explanatory power. The American Political Science Association is pleased to honor this study and to recognize Professor Axelrod for his important contribution to our understanding of human behavior.

Ralph J. Bunche Award (\$500), for the best scholarly work in political science published in 1984 or 1985 which explores the phenomenon of ethnic and cultural pluralism.

Recipient: **Paul R. Dimond**, Wayne State University, *Beyond Busing: Inside the Challenge to Urban Segregation*, University of Michigan Press.

Selection Committee: Lucius J. Barker, Washington University; E. Wally Miles, San Diego State University; Donna Shalala, Hunter College, CUNY, chair.

Citation: *Beyond Busing: Inside the Challenge*

to *Urban Segregation* examines the segregation issue since *Brown v. Board of Education*. Paul Dimond skillfully details the extraordinary legal struggle carried on to challenge racial segregation in schools and housing in the North despite changing public attitudes and ambiguity on the part of government leaders.

This is an insiders view—of the major lawsuits of the 1970s. Dimond's brilliant political and legal analyses brings us a story which has not been told before.

This is a major contribution to understanding the politics of race and law.

Gladys M. Kammerer Award (\$1,000), for the best political science publication in 1985 in the field of U.S. national policy.

Recipient: **David A. Baldwin**, Columbia University, *Economic Statecraft*, Princeton University Press.

Selection Committee: Charles Levine, Congressional Research Service; Sarah M. Morehouse, University of Connecticut at Stamford, chair; David Vogel, University of California, Berkeley.

Citation: The Gladys M. Kammerer Award Committee chooses David A. Baldwin's *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton University Press) as the best political science publication of 1985 in the field of U.S. national policy. Honorable mention goes to Lenore J. Weitzman, *The Divorce Revolution* (Free Press), and John F. Witte, *The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax* (University of Wisconsin Press).

Economic Statecraft dares to challenge conventional wisdom which proclaims that economic techniques of foreign policy do not work. In an interdependent and dangerous world, a study of alternatives to military violence undertaken with such care and responsibility commands our hopes and our respect.

David Baldwin dedicates himself to the challenge by examining theories of power and setting forth in clear and crisp terms those principles which guide his research. His choice of case studies, those which have received much attention as classic failures of economic statecraft, is a tribute to honest scientific analysis. With logical clarity he describes the pitfalls in the methodology which delimits the boundaries of a particular case. Throughout the book the reader is delighted with such human wisdom as: "Whether a telescope makes things larger or smaller depends on which end of it one looks through, and whether a case of economic statecraft succeeds or fails depends on which actor's perspective one adopts" (p. 149).

His writing style is sensible and compelling. His commitment to his task never wavers. His tools of analysis hold steadfast throughout. And the footnotes are at the bottom of each page.

In the end, after diligence has brought about conclusions which overturn conventional wisdom, he modestly claims that each future use of economic statecraft must be rooted in a careful scrutiny of the particular case at hand. David Baldwin has provided us with the tools to organize our knowledge in pursuit of our own survival.

Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award (\$2,000), for the best book published in the U.S. during 1985 on government, politics or international affairs.

Recipient: **Peter Katzenstein**, Cornell University, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*, Cornell University Press.

Selection Committee: Andrew S. McFarland, University of Illinois at Chicago; Norton Long, Otis, MA; Philip Siegelman, San Francisco State University, chair.

Citation: Peter Katzenstein's *Small States in World Markets* has the great merit of comparing a set of states with respect to critically important dimensions: the functioning of their economies and superiority of economic performance. With the unprepossessing record of corporatism before World War II, it comes as something of a surprise that Katzenstein uses a variant of corporatism to explain the superior performance of the small states of Europe, compared to many larger European nations and even Japan. Specifically, their democratic corporatism, a cooperative relationship of government, business, labor and, on occasion, agriculture, has enabled these states to have stable politics and flexible economies that could cope with and accept sectoral decline humanely while effectively adapting to new and promising ecological niches in the world system. Katzenstein explains small states' political stability and economic flexibility as resulting from the political shock of their pre-World War II and World War II experiences and the common realization of all the parties in these states that they were for better or worse on one economic boat and must pull together. This realization leads to the view that it is better to cooperate in policies to expand the social product rather than to endanger its growth by quarreling over its divisions.

Small States in World Markets opens up a line of inquiry into the study of comparative political economy that promises to have valuable lessons for public policy. One can hope that the author and others will pursue

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the inquiry into the factors making for the combination of stable democracy and functional economic adaptability. It is an encouraging finding that these small states with open economies can achieve so much. We need to know whether the experience of these small states depends on peculiar and unreplaceable factors or whether, as we hope, their experience can be imitated.

CAREER AWARDS

Charles E. Merriam Award (\$500), presented to the person whose published work and career represents a significant contribution to the art of government through the application of social science research.

Recipient: **Thomas Cronin**, Colorado College.

Selection Committee: David Adamany, Wayne State University, chair; Gwendolen Carter, University of Florida; Alexander Heard, Vanderbilt University.

Citation: Thomas E. Cronin has richly combined scholarship, especially on the American presidency, with civic education about the nation's political system and active participation in public affairs. In this blending of scholarship, teaching, and political participation, Tom Cronin fulfills the aspiration of the Charles E. Merriam Award that political scientists should contribute significantly to the art of government through the application of social science research.

Tom Cronin's *State of the Presidency*—now entering its third edition—has for more than a decade been a standard appraisal of the American presidency for students and scholars alike. In four edited volumes and in an extraordinary collection of essays, articles and book chapters, Tom Cronin has assessed almost every aspect of the presidency: the president's relations with political parties, Congress, and the Supreme Court; methods of nominating and electing presidents; the presidential advisory system; presidential terms of office; the presidential veto power; the symbolic and leadership roles of the president; and the origins of the modern presidency. He has been especially concerned with presidential leadership—what it is and how it works—as well as the leadership of particular presidents, in essays on Franklin Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy.

This body of scholarship has gained wide circulation and attention among students and citizens. Tom Cronin has joined Jack Peltason and James MacGregor Burns as co-author of the nation's leading textbook on American politics, *Government By The People*. His articles in the popular prints—the *New York Times Magazine*, *Science*, *The Saturday*

Review, *The Washington Monthly*, and *Transaction*, to name only a few—join with lectures on more than two hundred college campuses and innumerable appearances on public affairs programs on radio and television in a sustained, thoughtful effort to inform his fellow citizens about public affairs.

As a Democratic candidate for Congress in Colorado, a delegate to three national conventions and platform committee member in two, member of the Hunt Commission on Presidential Nominating Rules, staff assistant in the White House, and state and local political activist, Tom Cronin has tested his scholarship and teaching in political fray and has brought the methods and insights of formal political study to electoral campaigns, party affairs, and government.

Because of this rich, and increasingly unusual, combination of scholarly endeavor, broadly conceived civic education, and participation in public affairs, the committee is confident that the choice of Thomas E. Cronin fulfills the spirit embodied in the American Political Science Association's Charles E. Merriam Award.

Carey McWilliams Award (\$500), presented each year to honor a major journalistic contribution to our understanding of politics.

Recipient: **Neal R. Peirce**, syndicated columnist, Washington Post Writers Group, and contributing editor, *The National Journal*.

Selection Committee: Edie Goldenberg, University of Michigan; Michael Robinson, George Washington University, chair; Leon V. Sigal, Wesleyan University.

Citation: This year's Carey McWilliams Award goes to Neal Peirce, a journalist whose work exemplifies the standards of his profession: timely yet thorough research on matters of public moment. Peirce's journalism does not stop with who, what, where, and when, but attempts to fill in the why as well.

While many political scientists know Neal Peirce primarily for his work on the fifty states and his coverage of modern federalism, and some have used his research on the electoral college, the committee would like to recognize his achievements at *Congressional Quarterly* and *The National Journal*.

Neal Peirce, by his journalism, helped to shape those two institutions—institutions so important in informing the work of others. As political editor of *Congressional Quarterly* throughout the 1960s and then as contributing editor to *The National Journal* since 1969, he was present at the creation of both. Colleagues at both journals credit him with help-

ing shape the way they report about public affairs.

His reportage for "CQ" and *The National Journal* qualify Peirce as a journalist's journalist and as a political scientist's journalist as well. Journalists and political scientists alike rely on these two publications for their own work. So Neal Peirce's contribution to political science and journalism goes beyond the direct contribution his written words have made and extends to his important role in establishing institutions that practice the kind of journalism so useful to teachers and students of American politics.

John Gaus Lecture (\$1,500), presented each year to honor a scholar who best embodies the joint tradition of political science and public administration and, more generally, to recognize achievement and encourage scholarship in public administration.

Recipient: **Herbert Kaufman**, Boston College. (Professor Kaufman delivered the Gaus Lecture, "The End of an Alliance: Public Administration in the Eighties," at 5:30 p.m., Friday, August 29, in the East Ballroom, Washington Hilton Hotel.)

Selection Committee: Naomi Caiden, California State University, San Bernardino, chair; Larry B. Hill, University of Oklahoma; Dwight Waldo, Syracuse University (emeritus).

Citation: The John Gaus Lecture has been established through the generosity of the late Professor John Gaus, who provided a bequest to further cooperation between and encourage scholarship in the fields of political science and public administration. The APSA Council decided that the most appropriate way to accomplish this objective was to institute a special Lecture to be given at the Annual Meeting of the Association by a scholar who best embodies the joint tradition of political science and public administration. More generally, the Lecture is intended to recognize achievement, to stimulate interest, and to encourage scholarship in public administration.

This is the first year that the Lecture has been given, and the Selection Committee agreed that the Lecturer should be a scholar whose work spanned the disciplines of political science and public administration, who had made a sustained and recognized contribution to their development, and who could be counted on to deliver a lecture that would not only reflect on past accomplishments, but would also encompass fresh ideas and perspectives. The Committee's choice is Professor Herbert Kaufman, whose scholarly contribution over a quarter of a century has left a lasting influence on both disciplines.

Herbert Kaufman's interests have ranged from the United States Forest Service to the government of New York City, from administrative feedback to organizational evolution. Kaufman applies insights about administrative behavior to the operations of governmental organizations and exploration of their consequences for the conduct of public policy. His early landmark study, *The Forest Ranger* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1960), is considered one of the best studies of administrative behavior and one of the few that focus on public administration. Later, in *Administrative Feedback* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973), this work was expanded to analyze the mechanisms of formal and informal communication between top officials and their subordinates in nine federal organizations.

A second theme is that of the relationship of politics and public administration, evident in *Governing New York City*, with Wallace Sayre (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960). The special difficulties of government organizations are dealt with in *Red Tape: Its Origins, Uses and Abuses* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977) and *The Limits of Organizational Change* (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1971). More general questions of organizational theory, involving organizational evolution and succession, are the subject of *Are Government Organizations Immortal?* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976) and his most recent book, *Time, Chance and Organizations* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1985).

In the long run, scholars in the social sciences are remembered less for the answers they supply than for the questions they ask, the manner in which they pursue their research, and the illuminating concepts they create. Herbert Kaufman has been a trailblazer in the areas of the influence of politics on administrative practices, the role of informal processes in organizations, the implications of organizational behavior for public policy, and the relationships of organization and environment, all of which are now taken for granted as serious fields of study. He has demonstrated the potential of empirical research to gain knowledge of how public organizations work, their possibilities and their constraints. Throughout, his work has been infused by a lively curiosity, a sobering realism, and above all, an optimism spiced with skepticism about the ability of the social scientist to further understanding of the political and administrative world which plays so large a part in all our lives. He thus gains recognition not only for his own considerable contribution, but also for those who come after him.