

The attempt to show how Frunze's military doctrine has influenced Soviet military thought right to the present seems overdone. Even Jacobs admits that in the Finnish War, at Khalkin-Gol, and in the early stages of World War II the Red Army was not a "maneuver army" as envisioned in Frunze's doctrine. And certainly Stalin's military doctrine between 1945 and 1953 was not Frunzean. Although Professor Jacobs accomplishes the task he set for himself, in doing so he neglects the political and economic environment of the 1920s that had so much to do with the defeat of Trotsky and the victory of Frunze. Incidentally, to have well over fifty typographical errors in such a short book is inexcusable.

KENNETH R. WHITING
Air University

STALIN UND DER AUFSTIEG HITLERS: DIE DEUTSCHLAND-POLITIK DER SOWJETUNION UND DER KOMMUNISTISCHEN INTERNATIONALE, 1929–1934. By *Thomas Weingartner*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970. xii, 302 pp. DM 38.

In an interesting and provocative thesis the author traces the tortuous and complex relationship between the Comintern, the top leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the Communist Party of Germany between 1929 and 1934. Using unpublished documents from the political archives of the German foreign office and the federal archives as well as a multitude of published documents on British, German, and Soviet foreign policy and relevant documents on the Communist International, Weingartner attempts to show how specific interests of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) were coordinated with those general interests of the Comintern and ultimately of the Soviet Union. The author makes adequate use of a wealth of primary and secondary source materials to enlighten the layman concerning the complexities of Franco-German, Soviet-German, and Franco-Soviet diplomatic and economic relations during the period of the Depression and its accompanying social upheavals within Germany. He succeeds quite well in relating the attitudes and policies of the top Soviet leaders toward the pre-Nazi German governments of Brüning, Papen, and Schleicher. One obtains the impression that during the period 1929–33 the Soviet Union and the Comintern were more interested in getting on with the German leadership than in furthering the cause of Communist revolution within Germany. What the Soviet leadership wished, as expressed in the Comintern policy, was a friendly "bourgeois" Germany with no ties to any anti-Soviet bloc.

Weingartner points out adequately the shortsighted policy of the Comintern and the KPD toward the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), which, though anti-National Socialist, was nevertheless viewed by the German and Soviet Communist leadership as a greater enemy of communism than the Nazi Party. Both the Comintern and the KPD placed too much emphasis on interpreting the activities of their rivals and enemies—the SPD and the NSDAP—in terms of classic Marxist-Leninist ideology. Both failed to see that the NSDAP was the greater of the two "evils" and that once in power it would destroy both the KPD and the SPD. The author points out succinctly that the KPD's "olive branch" to the SPD after January 1933 was offered too late. But once the National Socialists had legitimately come to power, the CPSU sought to revise its foreign policy and to seek better relations with its Baltic neighbors and France. At the same time the Soviets did not fail to continue a fruitless dialogue with Nazi Germany.

Where the author and the reviewer disagree is in the former's statement (p. 217) that the National Socialist ideology was "eine Rassenideologie." It is true that much of National Socialism was racist-oriented, particularly with respect to Slavs and Jews; however, one cannot state categorically as Weingartner does that Germany's ethos under the Nazi regime was based solely on racial concepts. Certainly the concepts of class and economic divisions in Germany played an important role within the Nazi hierarchy before and after January 1933. To equate National Socialism solely with racism and to contrast it with the "class" ideology of communism is neither objective nor factual. But the author has made an important contribution to the understanding of the quite complex and often bewildering relationship of the Comintern, the KPD, and the German governments during a turbulent period of contemporary European history.

HENRY S. ROBINSON
Morgan State College

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF HITLER'S GERMANY: DIPLOMATIC
REVOLUTION IN EUROPE, 1933-36. By *Gerhard L. Weinberg*. Chicago
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1970. xi, 397 pp. \$12.75.

This volume and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen's 1968 study of the institutions of Nazi foreign policy have put research on the coming of World War II on a new and higher plane. Few relevant memoirs or monographs in Western languages have escaped the author's attention. Tens of thousands of unpublished documents have been systematically, critically, and perceptively examined, particularly those in American and West German depositories. The manuscript was completed before British archives for the period of study were opened to research. Those of France, Italy, the DDR, the USSR, and the smaller countries of Eastern Europe remain closed, but Weinberg has carefully examined the published documents of these and other countries.

The interpretation embodies both cold-blooded empirical analysis and passionate conviction. Hitler is the interpretive focal point, and Weinberg's Hitler is no domesticated *führer à la A. J. P. Taylor* but the man we all once knew and hated so well. Weinberg sees the motive force of German policy in Hitler's abiding ambition to use military might to expand Germany, first by gathering ethnic Germans into the Reich and then by conquering space for agricultural settlements in Slavic Europe. His "vision was primarily continental" (p. 20), but he expected to use Germany's enlarged power "to dominate the globe" (p. 358). For him there could be no separation of foreign and domestic policy; in the latter, Hitler sought total power in order to maximize the effectiveness of his manipulation of the national instrument he must use to realize his foreign policy goals. Neither domestic nor foreign policies were basically determined by broad economic forces; rather, they sprang from Hitler's obsession to expand German territory. Opportunistic means were blended with the constant goals in shaping diplomatic relations with specific nations, and Weinberg shows in considerable detail how Hitler first courted Poland to gain freedom for the rearmament that later would enable him to conquer Polish space; how he reluctantly restrained the Austrian Nazis in order to win Mussolini as an ally, never forgetting his intention to annex Austria; how he fostered better relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia to build up pressure on Czechoslovakia; how he accentuated divergencies between the British and the French while encouraging both in their hopes that he wanted peace as much as they did, thus