CACIQUISMO AND CORONELISMO: Contextual Dimensions of Patron Brokerage in Mexico and Brazil*

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The Latin American middlemen known as *caciques* in Mexico and *coronéis* in Brazil are one of the most widespread sociopolitical features of Mexico and Brazil in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The pervasive institutional arrangements established by such political entrepreneurs at local and regional levels, within the framework of the most "center-dominant" polities of Latin America, are well documented in the literature.[1] In this case, pervasiveness does not imply mere continuity. As changes in structure, meanings, and significance have occurred with the passing of time, the phenomena termed *caciquismo* and *coronelismo* have undergone social and semantic transformation. It would therefore be useful to begin by reviewing these historical metamorphoses.

THE HISTORICAL METAMORPHOSES OF CACIQUISMO IN MEXICO

In modern Mexico, caciquismo refers to the networks and power domains of entrenched local and regional entrepreneurs occupying informal and formal minor positions in political and administrative frameworks. Historically, however, the meaning of the term has changed several times since the sixteenth century, when it was adopted in mainland Mesoamerica during what Charles Gibson called the Hispanization of

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the social hierarchies of Indian chiefs (Gibson 1960; Alegría 1952; Enciclopedia Universal 1958, 259–60; Carrasco, Broda et al. 1976).

Mexico stood at the center of the first Spanish viceroyalty in America. But its highly developed pre-Columbian Indian civilizations collapsed, and its concentrated Indian populations dwindled following contact with Europeans and the harsh conditions they imposed. In early colonial times, Indian caciques and *principales* (a lower echelon of powerholders) acceded to municipal government positions created and endorsed by the viceroyalty, which were filled by virtue of hereditary rights. From these positions, the caciques and principales controlled royal and *encomienda* tribute-collecting from Indian commoners; caciques also administered justice. Their formal positions offered opportunities for coercion, extortion, and embezzlement. Caciques became middlemen in filling labor quotas and delivering workers in labor drafts and also collected specific tributes, in kind and in services, owed to the Spanish *encomenderos*.

By the end of the sixteenth century, the hereditary principle had begun to lose ground as the sole criterion of access to cacique status. Ambitious commoners (*maceguales*) could become caciques by engaging in commerce, adopting a Spanish life-style (under the encouragement of the friars), or being favored by the encomenderos. Thus, by late colonial times, the early form of caciquismo had been transformed to the point where most original *cacicazgos* (offices) had either ceased to exist or existed only precariously. The few powerful cacicazgos remaining were already related to the monopolistic control of lands.

The first period of Mexico's independent political life (1821–1855) was characterized by anarchy, rivalry among political leaders, and corruption and incompetence in matters of government. In such circumstances, the position of cacique lost its remaining hereditary significance and began to signify a local political boss. Thus rural caciques were seen as differing from urban-based, nationally oriented *caudillos* in the scope of their authority, the breadth of their operational base, and the actual exercise of command. The term *cacique* came to denote exploitative local figures who nonetheless seem to have enjoyed popular support and to have reflected the "state of mind" and sentiments of the popular, mainly rural population (Nason 1973; Díaz Díaz 1972).

Caciquismo flourished with the crisis of legitimacy that followed the breakdown of colonial power. The period between the 1820s and the early 1870s was characterized by two structural conditions: first, the political and social disorganization of the countryside, entrenchment of powerholders in insulated areas, and weak development of communications; and second, the state's lack of monopolistic control over means of coercion due to its being underfinanced and lacking institutional legitimacy.

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Under such conditions, state control was confined to urban centers, which began to imitate European cultural and institutional trends and to seek links with the European economies within the international division of labor (Burns 1979). The countryside was left to the rule of caciques, who built wide followings via coercion, paternalism, or both. With this backing, caciques competed fiercely to maintain or expand their domains, perhaps hoping to attain an eventual hold on the central government. Provincial caciques consequently played an important role in the political developments of nineteenth-century Mexico through infighting or siding with the liberalist and decentralist political factions. Sometimes this process broadened power domains to such an extent that caciques became caudillos, or "caciques writ large" (Joseph 1980, 4; and Wolf and Hansen 1967, 173).

The prime example of such influence is Porfirio Díaz, who became supreme caudillo between the 1870s and 1910, managing to incorporate many caciques and large landowners into a personal authoritarian rule built on friendships and contacts. Díaz distributed material rewards in return for allegiance and used the "stick" (the *palo* from the *pan o palo* formula) against disloyal powerholders and any underlings who dared to oppose his policies of advancing "small" individual landholding at the expense of Indian corporate landholding. Díaz's unwillingness to institutionalize clientelistic arrangements into a system of government, together with the lack of a workable circulation of elites, led to the collapse of his regime as soon as the masses were mobilized by disenchanted counter-elites (Meyer 1977; Purcell 1981).

The political system that arose after the 1910–1920 revolution strongly resembled the Díaz regime in being authoritarian and using patronage to reward cooperative citizens and sectors while repressing uncooperative elements. At the local and regional levels, informal leaders and contesting factions sought the support of higher political figures to legitimize their power domains organizationally and sometimes ideologically. Nomination to candidacy in a single-party system and accession to office in the state machinery became attractive means of rewarding loyal followers. After the revolution, holding office again involved the discretionary use of formal power for personal enrichment, which resulted in uncoordinated corruption on the part of petty political activists and officeholders. But in actuality, the networks of clientelism became progressively linked to wider institutional frameworks such as the government bureaucracy, the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI), and the police. The institutionalization of the revolutionary system, by including the main rural and urban sectors in corporatist organizational frameworks linked to the PRI party, led to new possibilities for curtailing the caciques' control (Bailón Corres 1982; Joseph 1980; Purcell 1981; Díaz Montes 1982). As a result, postrevolu-

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tionary caciques, even if they controlled local resources and bases of support, increasingly owed their positions to embodying offices and resources derived from above. In other words, local power domains became more dependent on support and legitimation from higher levels.

CORONELISMO IN BRAZIL AND ITS TRANSFORMATIONS

During Brazil's colonial period, and more extensively after slavery was abolished in the second half of the nineteenth century, localized dyadic patron-client relations were established between landowners and their rural workers and tenants in the various regions of the Northeast, the Campanha of Rio Grande do Sul, and, later, in the coffee-growing areas of the Brazilian South and Center-South.

As the goverrment adopted liberal institutions during the "Old Republic" (1889–1930) and developed parliamentary politics on the basis of a narrow but expanding franchise, political clientelistic networks emerged around the so-called coronéis ("colonels"). The latter bargained with political forces at the regional and state-capital levels, handing over the votes they controlled in exchange for access to office-holders and concomitant benefits like jobs, health and credit facilities, and exemption from regulations. The coronéis thus could offer various services and commodities for fostering positions of social and political authority as well as diffuse relationships with followers at municipal and regional levels. Within their sphere of influence, coronéis could obtain jobs, lend money, secure lawyers and influence judges, "persuade" witnesses, prevent the police from confiscating their clients' weapons, legalize land rights, grant fiscal exemptions, settle interpersonal disputes, act as godfathers, and give recommendations.

While the Republican system incorporated localized power domains and instituted arrangements later called the "coronelist compromise" (Leal 1978; compare Cammack 1979), the underpinnings of coronelismo predate the Republican period. The title "coronel" and lesser titles derived from the military commissions granted by the administrative center within the framework of the Guarda Nacional between 1831 and 1917 (see Uricoechea 1978). These entitlements became highly coveted by local elites as prestigious positions that could lead to public recognition and influence. Accordingly, during the first (Old) Republican period, coronelismo became one of the basic rungs in Brazil's political structure. Orienting themselves toward the political center, the coronéis attempted to influence economic policies, market decisions, loans and grants, and the direction of infrastructural development.

The political forces comprising coronelismo encompassed various styles of mutual accommodation and political incorporation. In the

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states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul, coronéis acted within the framework of the ruling Republican parties, where their base of support included workers and peasants as well as landowners, urban merchants, military men, and professionals. In other states, especially those in the North and Northeast, political leaders struggled with each other and with the state administration in a less organizationally bound way. In states like Bahia, wide structural differentiation exacerbated this trend and caused clashes between various networks led by landowners, merchants, priests, bandits, social bandits, stronghands, industrialists, and political party activists. The power commanded by the coronéis in these states ranged from economic power and political primacy in the coastal region to reliance on paternalism and coercive behavior in the hinterlands of the *sertão*. Attempts during the 1910s and 1920s to institute administrative control over these powerholders failed (see examples on Bahia and Paraíba in Pang 1979 and Lopes Rodrigues 1978). Until the crisis in Brazil's agricultural export economy initiated political change in the 1930s, the government had to seek compromises with the coronéis.

The crisis of the 1930s affected the power domains of the large landowners in the southern states and at the national level. As the national government increased its distributive and regulative functions, clientelistic networks became linked to wider institutional frames; local powerbrokers used their contacts with politicians and bureaucrats at the center to develop their own followings. The increased local followings led to greater access to power and offices, from which they appropriated resources or allocated them to loyal clients. With the crisis of the 1930s, activities traditionally handled by the coronéis were gradually taken over by social actors representing national institutions. This generalization applied to union activists and leaders until 1945 under Vargas, when workers were organized into corporative organizations. Yet while the central regime was intervening in the states at other levels and having loyal supporters appointed as governors, the domains of many rural powerbrokers remained largely untouched. No longer controlled by an elected parliament, the bureaucracy joined the executive power to become the main dispensers of resources in the wake of extensive nationalization.

The multiparty period that followed (1945–1964) witnessed the creation of networks similar in structure to clientelistic brokerage chains, brought about by *cabos eleitorais* (electoral organizers). During this period, individuals could utilize electoral or other support to extract specific favors in dealing with the administration.

When the military coup of 1964 attempted to eliminate clientelistic networks, personalistic intercession became temporarily centralized—to the point where state organs were regarded as surrogate pa-

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trons. The coronéis and their functional heirs (mostly professionals and bureaucrats) continued their activities; for example, lawyers and doctors in rural areas still gathered dispersed followings and prestige by offering their services to the rural and peripheral urban poor without payment, thereby creating ties of indebtedness that could be turned into political support when they ran for office. Politicians did the same thing within the political realm.

TOWARD A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON CACIQUISMO AND CORONELISMO

Despite the broad academic interest in caciquismo and coronelismo and their impact on the "collective consciousness" of Mexico and Brazil, few, if any, attempts have been made to compare these phenomena of similar organizational and contextual nature. The reasons for this lack of comparison may become clear by considering the academic and sociopolitical circumstances in which studies on caciquismo and coronelismo have been conducted.

References to caciquismo have abounded since the publication of Frank Tannenbaum's *Peace by Revolution* in 1933, and they extend well into the 1970s. Textbooks on Latin American politics and introductions to Mexican society and politics have cited this phenomenon as an example of the arbitrary and nondemocratic use of executive power typical of this cultural area. It was common to refer to the "small-scale caudillos, irresponsible local políticos who were immune to central regulation or control" (Fitzgibbon and Fernández 1981, 11). From this perspective arose the prevalent attitude in academic circles that "an institution peculiar to the Hispanic tradition—the cacique or local strongman—is often the substitute for legal government" (Von Lazar 1971, 45).

Yet until the 1970s, the study of caciquismo—particularly in Mexico—was a "little-explored" topic that was relegated to a marginal position in the social sciences (Kern 1973, v). One reason is that caciquismo was often assumed (not completely incorrectly) to be a phenemenon correlated with anarchy, isolation, illiteracy, and weak development of communications and means of transportation. As such, it was considered a topic for historical research on prerevolutionary and early postrevolutionary Mexico (for example, Scott 1959, 102–9), a remnant of the past doomed to disappear "naturally" as the process of national integration progressed. Typical of this attitude is Jacques Lambert's lengthy discussion of caciquismo, which concludes that it is "a local vestige of the past in backward areas," although he adds somewhat contradictorily that "in many countries these areas contain a large part of the population" (Lambert 1967, 169).

Even when caciquismo's existence was recognized, it was still viewed as an unidimensional phenomenon rather than a major chal-

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lenge in social research. Gilbert Joseph recently characterized this attitude: "Whereas many regional and national caudillos gained acceptance as 'heroes' and 'warriors' and were eventually enshrined in the national revolutionary pantheon, the local cacique has often been viewed with opprobrium, at best regarded as an undisciplined species of 'social bandits,' at worst as an out-and-out tyrant" (1980, 42). Consequently, few in-depth studies were conducted on this phenomenon, probably because of the difficulties inherent in studying networks with an aura of illegality.

The paucity of research on the subject was probably also connected with the use and abuse of the term *caciquismo* and the concomitant search for new analytical models to interpret current (and supposedly more complex) issues in Latin American politics. One such view emphasized the progression from caciques to caudillos, to populist leaders and movements, and finally to technocratic-authoritarian systems. With varying middle phases, this view emphasized the progression toward a systemic institutionalization of mass participation or mass control (Conniff 1982). From any of the above points of view, caciquismo posed a minor theoretical challenge for social scientists.

Not until the late 1960s and 1970s did new theoretical perspectives on caciquismo begin to emerge. First, the cumulative effects of literary works (see Nason 1973) and such outstanding anthropological fieldwork in rural communities as Paul Friedrich's ethnographic research in the Tarascan area (1968, 1977, and 1981) and Siverts's research on Chiapas (1965) led to the development of more complex analytical viewpoints on caciquismo. The change was also due to modifications in the political climate surrounding caciques as political middlemen in Mexico (see Reyes Heroles 1975). As criticism of the system became more open, social scientists were encouraged to analyze—or at least were not discouraged from analyzing—exploitative aspects in the role of caciques and their use of "mechanisms of value transfer" from the rural population (Bartra et al. 1976; Boege 1979).

Similarly, although Victor Nunes Leal's seminal monograph on coronelismo was originally published in 1949 (Leal 1978), two decades elapsed before additional studies on coronéis were widely undertaken. This delay was partly occasioned by the impact of Leal's work in intellectual circles, which considered it the conclusive account of a stage of Brazilian sociopolitical life that had ended. Leal's work has been characterized as "an unusually perceptive account of Brazilian politics at the municipal level" (Johnson 1958, 259); "a classic survey" of the importance of vestiges of caciquismo [i.e., coronelismo] in the countryside (Lambert 1967, 169); "the classic study of coronéis in back-country politics" (Skidmore 1967, 331); and "the standard work on coronelismo" (Pang 1973, 171).

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During the decades after Leal's work, Brazilian society developed more complex administrative and political structures that were populistic, multiparty democratic, and bureaucratic-authoritarian. Accordingly, academic interest moved away from the local and regional scene toward the national arena (with some minor exceptions).[2] Reflecting this trend was the long delay until the reissue of Leal's study and until Brazilian scholars in the 1970s addressed such issues as the clientelistic or ideological character of Brazilian politics from the perspective of local-supralocal political relations (compare Cintra 1979 and Campello de Souza 1976 with Hélio Jaguaribe's 1950 essay).

For reasons that should be explored more fully in the future, the 1970s evidenced a new interest in coronelismo as well as new approaches to the subject. Some works pursued a bibliographical search for primary sources, such as autobiographical accounts, which were important for later cross-regional analyses (Carone 1971, 1978), while others criticized the logical consistency and the empirical bases of Leal's work.

Nunes Leal described coronelismo as "the result of the superimposition of forms evolved through the representative system on an inadequate social and economic structure . . . [a] compromise, a trading of interests between the public authority, itself increasingly strengthened, and the declining social influence of the local bosses—notably the big landowners" (Leal 1978, 20). He went on to explain the so-called coronelistic compromise:

> The superimposition of a broadly based representative system on such an inadequate economic and social structure incorporated into the body of active citizens a sizable contingent of electors incapable of carrying out their political duty with any sense of conscience. Those holding public power were therefore closely tied to the leaders of this electoral herd. Hence the special weakness of public authority that led it to reach an understanding with the residual private power of the landowners in the particular compromise of *coronelismo*. By heaping all their votes on the government candidates in state and federal elections, the political leaders of the interior become entitled to a special reward, which consists of their being given a free hand to consolidate their authority in the municipalities. . . . The federal system has also contributed to the growth of the phenomenon in an important way: by making the state governments entirely elective, it allowed the setting up of solid electoral machines in the former provinces; those stable electoral machines that led to the institution of the "politics of the governors" relied precisely on the compromise of *coronelismo* (Leal 1978, 253).

Thus it seems that Nunes Leal conceptualized the emergence of a system of coronelismo as resulting from two sets of conditions: first, the relative weakness of the municipal administration and political forces at the local level vis-à-vis the state government—financially, juridically, and in terms of willingness on the part of local forces to act within the legal-administrative framework of the state; and second, the

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need of stable sociopolitical forces at the state level to rely on electoral support from the coronéis to deliver the support of the rural electorate.

Subsequent research validated Leal in emphasizing local instabilities (sometimes evidenced by harsh factionalist struggles) as well as the strong orientation of local and regional leaders toward state and national authorities committed to the formal electoral framework of the Old Republic. But criticisms were voiced of Leal's assumption that the rural electorate overwhelmingly depended on the coronéis. For instance, Maria Isaura Pereira de Queiroz claimed that Leal ignored the great bargaining power of this electorate, whose scarce votes were much sought during the Old Republic. Using documentation gathered by Lía García Fukui for the former sertões of Itapecerica and Juquitiba near São Paulo, Pereira de Queiroz asserted that politicians invested considerable efforts and resources in gaining the electoral support of the literate portion of the rural sector. Although this population of smallholders (*posseiros* or *sitiantes*), petty functionaries, artisans, minor merchants, and clerks might depend on large local landowners economically, their options for social mobility and sense of personal worth compensated for their economic dependency and projected an ethos of relative egalitarianism. This ethos was especially evident in societies in the sertão and *agreste*, in contrast with the highly stratified and hierarchical plantation societies along the coast of the Northeast (Pereira de Queiroz n.d., 167–72). Paul Cammack argued that the rural population, if not totally independent, could at least choose on whom to be dependent. Cammack claimed that some of Leal's material logically contradicted his emphasis on socioeconomic dependence in eliciting electoral compliance. For example, the widespread use of electoral fraud that Leal reported would render socioeconomic dependence meaningless as a factor eliciting electoral obedience (Cammack 1979, 5, 7–10).

Cammack also pointed out that Leal's emphasis on the monolithic front of political forces at the state level (vis-à-vis locally based factions struggling for their recognition) was illusory at best. On the contrary, the fragility of political alliances and the contest for power at the supralocal levels were the real reasons for reliance upon coronéis (Cammack 1979, 9–11; Carone 1978, 253).

In the late 1960s and 1970s, scholars conceptualized the power domains of the coronéis from broader analytical and historical perspectives (e.g., Pereira de Queiroz 1969; Schwartzman 1976; Uricoechea 1978; Pang 1979). Eul-Soo Pang provided a detailed analysis of Bahian politics during the "Old Republic," and he broadened the scope of discussion to include variants of coronelismo in Brazil. According to Pang, unstable states (Paraíba after 1915, Bahia between 1915 and 1920, Rio de Janeiro after 1919, and Ceará after 1914) probably encouraged governors to use administrative means of manipulating the local political

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scene so that favorable forces would come out on top (Pang 1979, 32–34). He also demonstrated that local-regional oligarchies were not uniform: some were based on kith and kin ("o clã brasileiro"), while others were tribal, collegiate, or personalistic (Pang 1979, 39–45). The existence of these variants, along with interstate coronéis and regional conflicts and pacts between the coronéis, reinforced the conviction that the interests of coronéis did not end at the borders of municipalities; to the contrary, they generally had to monitor and try to influence political and economic decisions adopted at higher levels of power (Love 1980; Cammack 1979). Although scholars were certainly aware of the relations between coronéis and urban politicians ("*doutores*"), surprisingly enough, they disregarded the full implications of these relations vis-à-vis Leal's "coronelistic compromise" until the 1970s.

At that time, scholars also began to point out that Leal's 1949 assumption about the decline of coronelistic phenomena after 1930 was more illusory than real. In one such study, Maria Campello de Souza showed that even in urban centers and political organizations identified as "progressive," arrangements similar to those of the "golden age" of coronelismo existed into the 1960s. This finding raised doubts concerning earlier assumptions of coronelismo's "natural" decline as a result of economic development. According to Campello de Souza, the conditions necessary for the demise of arrangements akin to coronelismo were different: "Clientelism declines in importance as a form of control and use of political resources when the structure of the state favors the consolidation of parties as articulators of national aims and alternatives. Conversely, the existence of a centralized state structure *preceding* the emergence of a party system constitutes itself a burden upon the institutionalization of the latter and a stimulus to clientelistic politics" (Campello de Souza 1976, 36, emphasis in original).[3]

Similarly, Edson de Oliveira Nunes established in his dissertation (1984) that clientelism is an institutionalized pattern that continues to structure the links between society and formal institutions in Brazil. The other patterns are corporatism, bureaucratic insulation, and procedural universalism.

Historical analyses like Pang's showed that the 1930 revolution did not change the bases of municipal politics dramatically.[4] While the form of political mediation changed in becoming connected to more extensive organizational frameworks, local power contenders continued to utilize contacts with officials and politicians at the supralocal level for maintaining local loyalties. In fact, success in this sphere still enabled patrons to gain access to positions of power and to control resources, either for themselves or on behalf of their protégés. When scholars began to realize how much of the military regime's support derived from powerful forces in Brazil's less mobilized areas, interest was rekin-

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dled in the contemporary impact of forms of patronage and brokerage similar to those of the golden age of coronelismo (Cartaxo Rolim 1979). These studies were often combined with historical accounts of localized power domains (Ferraz de Sá 1974; Silva 1975; Vilaça and Albuquerque 1978; Hurzeler 1975; Greenfield 1972, 1977, and 1979; Silva Alves n.d.).

This revitalized scholarship was supplemented by some excellent autobiographical accounts of how the coronéis operated in rural areas (Barroso Pontes 1970; Lins de Albuquerque 1976; Castello Branco 1979; see also Lins 1960). These trends converged to produce a proliferation of historical studies on these phenomena from a regional or microregional perspective (e.g., Barbosa de Souza 1972; Leal Rosa 1972, 1973; Nery 1972; Shirley 1972; Lopes Rodrigues 1978).

In the late 1970s, caciquismo and coronelismo began to be viewed from a broader academic perspective as particular cases of patronage and clientelism (Forman and Riegelpunt 1979; Wlodarski 1979; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980; Lomnitz 1982; and Oliveira Nunes 1984). The two were therefore reconceptualized less as an oddity of "Latin personalism" and more as worldwide phenomena. Their study was increasingly connected with major discussions and controversies in the social sciences (see Eisenstadt and Roniger 1981), contibuting to and benefiting from the stress placed by anthropological and sociological theory on personal relations, quasi groups, power relations, network analysis, and specific and generalized exchange since the 1960s. This new perspective has made caciquismo and coronelismo a potential focus of fruitful analyses posing central questions on the nature and transformation of hierarchical clientelistic commitments in any society as well as on the specificity of such commitments in Iberian and Latin American societies, as predicted by Robert Kern and Ronald Dolkart more than a decade ago (Kern 1973, 4).

Specifically, from the perspective of research on patronage and clientelism, studies on caciquismo and coronelismo may contribute to central issues in the social sciences. They may shed light on the interplay of power relations, hierarchy, and inequality, on the one hand, and on the symbolic dimensions of interaction, on the other. They may also highlight the possibility that such arrangements change forms and labels under particular conditions and still project similar patterns connecting distribution of power, flow of human and material resources, and structure of personal relations in society. From this analytical perspective, research on caciquismo and coronelismo may become a major focus for comparative studies on the maintenance or breakdown of mechanisms of political and socioeconomic control in the processes of development, especially with respect to the reformulation of alliances and coalitions.

As already indicated, these potential developments have not

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been paralleled by comparative studies of caciquismo and coronelismo. Indeed, a review of the literature on these two phenomena reveals striking contrasts between the research lines followed by scholars in each case. While scholars studying variants of coronelismo address such aspects as trust and interpersonal obligations, they seem more intrigued by structural aspects of variability, such as the placement of coronéis in ruling coalitions (e.g., Cintra 1979; Carone 1978) or the occupational variability of these sociopolitical entrepreneurs (Pang 1979). By contrast, academic interest in caciquismo has been directed toward a spectrum of factors including not only the above topics but also the style of leadership practiced by informal powerholders and the nature of clientelistic exchanges as perceived by those involved (e.g., Martínez Vázquez 1976; Laviada 1978; Loret de Mola 1979; Boege 1979; Rothstein 1979; and Bailón Corres 1982).

I shall attempt to bridge this gap by analyzing the nature of these middlemen and their clientelistic networks comparatively in terms of their positions within the wider sociocultural structure of Mexico and Brazil. This perspective will facilitate a new understanding of the elements they share and the distinctive dynamics of each pattern. In addition, a closer look at varieties of the Mexican pattern will clarify the structural underpinnings of the research foci utilized in studies of such social arrangements and will suggest implications for shaping research strategies on similar phenomena in other societies.

PATRON BROKERAGE: THE CORE STRUCTURE OF CACIQUISMO AND CORONELISMO

An overview of the historical metamorphoses of caciquismo and coronelismo highlights striking similarities in the clientelistic power domains of Mexican and Brazilian middlemen. The networks of both caciquismo and coronelismo reflect the configuration of personalistic power domains mastered by local and regional leaders via political, economic, and social control in their areas. Buttressed by a core network of followers, relatives, and "fighters," these leaders may use inducements, physical violence, and economic threats to enforce their wishes among the dependent population and to play a broader political role somewhat independent of formal institutions. This position allows them to be acknowledged implicitly (although not necessarily supported) as leaders of their domains by those within their spheres as well as by actors at higher, external social levels.

These relationships share common characteristics with a wide spectrum of clientelistic relations that in their fullest expression denote a distinctive mode of interpersonal and institutional exchanges between social actors (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980). In all such relationships,

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inequality and dependence are built around the monopolistic hold of patrons and brokers over key positions permitting access to the means of production, major markets, and centers of power. Accordingly, these relationships facilitate asymmetrical exchanges between patrons or brokers and clients in which clients' access to resources is mediated (while being denied to others) but in which long-term reciprocity and interpersonal credit lead to relatively long-range obligations on the part of the favored clients. The resources included in these clientelistic package deals range from land, water sources, employment opportunities, manpower, and scarce skills to favors and services in education, public health, social security, official certificates, licenses, and loans.

At the same time, the phenomena under consideration bear distinctive elements that may evince themselves in the organizational dimension, the content of the exchanges, the character of the partners in such relationships, and the ritual or "tacit" styles of setting up a clientelistic bond with a cacique or coronel. One such element in the role of caciques and coronéis is mutual reinforcement of patron roles and brokerage activities between local and extralocal levels. Caciques, for instance, have been portrayed as

> exercising political and economic power over the local authorities and over the prescription of law. They serve their communities as efficient intercessors before federal and state governments. They serve the national authorities by handling over information and by "keeping the horses quiet" in their domains. They demand and impose exclusivity in mediation between the remote rulers and the peasants. They hold a monopolistic control of harvests and commerce. They possess the best lands. They designate municipal presidents and other local officials. In order to keep and enhance such powers, they utilize any method necessary, including criminal acts. . . .(Laviada 1978, 151)

The positions controlled by caciques and coronéis in the sociopolitical and economic realms (and the structure of the cacique and coronel networks within them) deserve special attention. In the cases under consideration, the organizational structure is usually one where the networks are dispersed and formally unrelated to one another, except through the activities of the brokers. They remain dispersed despite being linked to the same institutional frameworks, which include the bureaucracy and political parties: in Mexico, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI); in Brazil since the 1940s, primarily the Partido Social Democrático (PSD) and the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), and during the military rule, the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB) and ARENA party coalitions. These institutional frameworks also include government-sponsored corporatist organizations such as the agrarian Confederación Nacional Campesina (CNC) and the so-called popular sector, the Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares (CNOP), in Mexico. Following Peter Allum (1973), this structure will be defined here as *patron brokerage*.[5]

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At this level, the similarities between caciquismo and coronelismo are striking. In both cases, the clientelistic networks of "patron-brokers" seem to have emerged and been sustained by encapsulative policies implemented by the central political elites of Mexico and Brazil. I refer here to policies that, while they incorporate local settings and model peripheral sectors, merely encapsulate lower power domains by informal alliances with local and regional entrepreneurs or by coopting prominent local figures into the administration of peripheral areas. Although these policies are usually implemented without direct interference in local affairs, they have tended to reinforce the existence of relatively narrow markets with a somewhat limited flow of resources between them, given that the local upper strata usually control access to wider markets. The central and local elites have adjusted to one another and tried not to encroach on respective power domains.

This arrangement has led to the development of different types of patron brokerage, that is, relatively dispersed clusters of patron-client networks linked to broader institutions but related only through their "heads." Social relations in these local, traditional power domains did not change substantially. Instead, they accumulated new resources and sources of influence as patrons developed contacts at supralocal political and administrative levels.

CONTRASTS BETWEEN CACIQUISMO AND CORONELISMO

Beyond this institutional dimension, one can find differences in the patterns of patron brokerage in Mexico and Brazil. One such difference is found in the formal organizational context of such networks, specifically in their relation to higher administrative levels. This already mentioned aspect is crucial in both countries because their large sizes create dynamics of indeterminancy, uncertainty, and relative "openness" in the relations between various political and administrative levels. For heuristic purposes, it may be assumed that these dynamics affect the maneuverability of patrons and brokers in their attempts to establish power domains at both local ("minor") and higher ("major") levels.[6] Because this aspect can therefore be expected to affect the stability of clientelistic networks in both countries, I shall examine this issue in detail, first in Brazil and then in Mexico.

During the Brazilian period of the "Old Republic," the federal level was governed by coalitions composed mostly of representatives from economically developed São Paulo, politically influential Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul. Representatives from the states of Pernambuco, Bahia, and Rio de Janeiro occupied secondary positions in those coalitions, their oligarchies compelled to settle for control of various ministries and influential posts in the administration. The power

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domains of factions from these economically stagnated regions were acknowledged in return for supporting political factions in the central government.[7] During this time, the ability of local and regional power domains to establish themselves was decided by the balance of power of political and social forces at the state level. Indeed, these forces could influence power positions of patron-client networks at the periphery (see the hypotheses in Cintra 1979).

Such influence was still important in Brazil during the 1950s, and even later in regions like southeastern Minas Gerais (Greenfield 1977). The increasing centralization of political decisions since the 1930 revolution affected the relative strength of regional oligarchies, and the latter came to depend on federal government agencies designed to supervise agricultural production, distribution, and export. But these processes did not signify the demise of regional oligarchies and even strengthened some of them. For example, when the sugarcane elite of Pernambuco transferred its support to Vargas's opposition (the União Democrática Nacional, or UDN), they lost autonomy. By contrast, the coronéis of the Pernambucan agreste and sertão, who until then had been economically marginal, strengthened their political status when they gained the blessing of the federal government representative in Pernambuco by joining the coalition that supported Vargas.

But because the forces that opposed Vargas enjoyed financial benefits from his policies on the division of markets (between regions close to and distant from the marketing centers), they too were able to penetrate bodies vital to their economic basis, such as the Ministry of Agriculture and the agencies that supervised the marketing of sugar. This process tended to expand during the multiparty parliamentary period, when the status of the Northeastern states in Congress exceeded their relative economic strength (Camargo 1979, 111). The political forces of these states held high offices and positions in government agencies like the Departmento Nacional de Obras contra as Sêcas (DNOCS). These positions permitted access to funds and confidential information concerning development plans that helped the occupants accumulate wealth and enhance their bargaining power in the administrative structure. This trend was maintained during the military regime, particularly during the 1970s and early 1980s, when the more developed regions and densely populated settlements in São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Guanabara, Rio Grande, and Pernambuco supported the parliamentary opposition. The federal regime was therefore induced to rely more on support from local elites and factions, especially in the North and the Northeast (Cartaxo Rolim 1979).

It thus seems that in Brazil, administrative centralization resulted in strengthening power domains in regions of secondary economic importance at the same time that the populistic "interregnum" strength-

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ened social forces traditionally excluded from ruling coalitions. This development eventually initiated the processes that led to the military coup and renewed closure of power domains, making higher politics the exclusive domain of Brazilian elites until the early 1980s (McDonough 1981). These parallel processes of adaptive encapsulation and segregation have resulted in clientelistic networks that lacked the propensity to coalesce into wider institutional frameworks that ultimately would enable them to become chains-to-center structures—despite the proclaimed aims of centralization and the metaphor of a "system" of clientelistic commitments.[8]

However Mexican implications have differed from equivalents in Brazil, relations between the various political levels have been characterized by dynamics of indeterminancy and uncertainty. Until the era of Porfirio Díaz, the power struggle for local and regional positions was an open one necessitating the inclusion of broader strata and saddling Mexico with the image of a country in conflict, governed by caudillos and caciques. During Porfirian rule, the authoritarian federal regime was based on military strength. As such, it could develop Mexico by relying on capital investment and integration into international markets. Local-regional power domains were either officially recognized or turned against one another in accordance with their stance vis-à-vis the central government. This policy was designed to achieve stability, which was obtained through personal loyalties at the expense of their institutionalization, and which entailed the constant neutralization of one political force or another. Thus influential individuals who were recognized by the central administration were able to enlarge their power domains at the expense of local inhabitants.

Following the revolution, which was characterized by decentralization of the power domains as well as political confrontation at the federal level, the regime stabilized into a two-pronged status quo. In some of the "minor" networks at the local level, the lack of competition for power positions was institutionalized, while in others a violent competition for power occurred. At the federal level, however, the corporatist methods used to build frameworks of support for the regime allowed contests for power to be conducted in an institutionalized and personalistic manner, around the election of the PRI candidate to the presidency, rather than through separate political bodies. This "dual" system guaranteed the well-known institutional "stability" that seems exceptional by Latin American standards. The way conflict is handled, so that inner factions remain undefined, "secures the system" from populist or other approaches to broader power struggles and enables certain sectors of the ruling elite to maintain themselves at the locus of federal power.

In this context, after the postrevolutionary regime stabilized, cli-

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entelistic networks tended to be affiliated with the ruling administrative and political system. The networks have often been linked in structure, as typified by relations among urban brokers, union leaders, politicians, and officials. Social and political entrepreneurs have emerged who attempted to establish separate power domains by lobbying for support from such sectors as the peasant communities. Although these seekers of power have utilized an organizational strategy in their efforts to advance themselves, evidence exists that peasants have been reluctant to support them, considering themselves obliged to develop respectful relations with governmental and paragovernmental officials who are often the targets of impressive local welcoming receptions (see Romanucci-Ross 1973, 117–29).

The ideology underlying the tendency toward centralization implies a long-term commitment on the part of the federal government to undermining local power domains in the periphery. It also requires the establishment of clientelistic mediators on a more organized basis. Thus all the above processes have worked toward bringing patron-brokers into a closer relationship to the formal channels of support for the regime.

Let us examine in detail how such organizational contexts have affected networks of caciquismo and coronelismo in terms of their stability and their perception by Mexicans and Brazilians. It has been shown elsewhere that the nature of patron brokerage renders any specific networks unstable or transient (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, 228–45). This generalization has proved to be very much the case in postrevolutionary Mexico, where local contesters, ambitious pretenders, and rival factions have attempted to undermine established domains with the explicit or tacit support of incumbents at higher levels. The latter may have been interested in weakening what they considered to be overly independent local or regional power domains by reordering social coalitions with social forces at the local level. This course was most likely to be followed in places like the Mixe, Tuxtepec, and Tehuantepec areas of Oaxaca, where stresses in clientelistic relations were already operating (see Boege 1979; Roniger 1986).

In some cases, growing uncertainty about the outcome of more open elections led central elites and their local partners to seek additional organizational forms of support. In other cases, the inability of political machines to dominate local notables with their own sources of patronage and external support led to the establishment of party-directed bosses at the local and regional levels, as happened previously in the Jalisco highlands in the 1940s and 1950s (Gándara Mendoza and Martínez Saldaña 1976). These processes have been particularly evident during the economic crises of the 1970s and early 1980s in such areas as the Mezquital Valley of Hidalgo and the Central Valley of Oaxaca, when

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the López Portillo and de la Madrid administrations reformulated policies. This entire configuration has led to new methods of party-directed clientelism that tend toward the pyramidal clustering of linked networks related to formal organizations, often within a context of factional competition over who controlled the mechanisms and resources of the Mexican state.

In the instances affected by the reformulation of coalitions, as well as in those cases where such strains did not exist, Mexican caciques have been differentially evaluated by various social actors. The caciques are reportedly feared and hated by those who feel exploited but respected and admired by those whom they have benefited. The changing line between denigrators and followers and between lenient and harsh caciques is subject to variability. On a macrosocietal scale, this variation leads to the perception of patron brokerage as a polivalent and ambiguous phenomenon in modern Mexico.

The variability in perceptions of caciquismo is related to several characteristics of this form of patron brokerage. First is the fact that individuals may be labeled *caciques* merely to denigrate or condemn them, rather than as a reflection of specific empirical correlates (on the intricacies of such a problem in other settings, see Silverman 1981 and Moore 1977; in connection with caudillos in Latin America, see Halperin Donghi 1965, 121). That is, because the labels used in caciquismo are open to manipulation by social actors, they are meaningful only in the context in which they are used and in the framework of contemporary public attitudes voiced toward caciques.

Second, these ambiguities are related to the variegated class and strata origins of the caciques. These origins make room for contrasting evaluations concerning the social position and significance of the bearers of such informal "titles."

Third, the ambiguities are related to the fact that the positions held by caciques are not anchored in the broader institutions to which the Mexican postrevolutionary center is supposedly committed. In other words, although the ambiguities expressed toward such clientelistic bonds are generally inherent in unstructured social relations (LaFontaine 1975; Sabini and Silver 1982), in the case of postrevolutionary Mexico, they are especially pronounced. To paraphrase Brown and Gilman (1972), caciquismo attempts to establish social bonds modeled by "asymmetrical semantics" in environments that support them reluctantly and often uphold countervailing codes such as equality, enlarged political participation, and the broadening of economic markets (see Roniger 1985).

In contrast, Brazil's coronelismo networks seem to have been less open to evaluative discrepancies, manipulative projections, and opposed perceptions. Anchored in the broader institutional matrix of Bra-

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zilian society, they emerge as more stable. This conclusion does not imply that coronéis were immune to intestine conflicts and attacks but that coronelismo in modern Brazil occupies a less ambiguous position than caciquismo in postrevolutionary Mexico. This lesser ambiguity is evidenced in several interconnected characteristics.

First, the label *coronel* was derived from the broader institutional complex, in which this and lesser entitlements were part of the desiderata of local and regional elites who could not claim higher titles of nobility during the Regency and the Empire in nineteenth-century Brazil. After that era, the title of coronel symbolized a confirmation of prestige and social standing. Second, high social and political position on the local or regional level has been a precondition for those wishing to compete for such titles, in open contrast to the varied social origins of Mexico's caciques. Third, the identifiable style of leadership crystallized by coronéis in the Old Republican period and even before is not peculiar to them within Brazilian society. The combination of authoritarian style, material wealth, and political power has also characterized Brazil's politicians and administrators, who revile and help undermine the power domains of coronéis while adopting the same methods of rule and acting no less arbitrarily (Lopes Rodrigues 1978, 90–95).

This style of leadership can also be traced to networks of bandits (*cangaceiros*), religious leaders (friars and sacred *beatos*, or holy men), and the strongmen of big landowners (the so-called *capangas* or *jagunços*), who together dominated the Northeast scene from 1870 to 1940, if not longer (Facó 1965; Shaker Fauzieid 1975; Pereira de Queiroz 1977; Levin 1979). From these perspectives, the style of domination adopted by coronéis seems to have been deeply anchored in the cultural idioms prevalent in Brazil and hence less open to evaluative discrepancies and misunderstandings than in the case of Mexican caciques.[9]

CONTOURS OF DIFFERENTIATION IN POSTREVOLUTIONARY MEXICAN PATRON BROKERAGE

From the different institutional contexts discussed above, coronelismo emerges as a more stable form of sociopolitical articulation than Mexican caciquismo. This conclusion implies that, on the whole, use of the label *cacique* has probably been a low-predicting indicator of patron brokerage in Mexico, where variegated forms of clientelism have coexisted that fade into one another and are often defined contradictorily according to the social forces interacting at the local level. Another implication is that the study of caciquismo becomes meaningful only when it forms part of the research involving a wider spectrum of patron-brokerage bonds.

Indeed, as was observed above, research on Mexican patterns of

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clientelism has sought to identify and explain (to a greater degree than research on Brazilian patterns and beyond the shared organizational dimension) the varying character of Mexican clientelistic arrangements and their forms of exchange. The range of variability covers the dimensions that constitute the structural underpinnings of the ambivalent labels and representations being considered. Those dimensions include several factors: first, the short- or long-term character of reciprocity that mutually binds patron-brokers and clients; second, the balance in terms of trade that sometimes favors patrons and is more equitable at other times; third, the relative saliency that instrumental considerations and elements of power and solidarity hold as elements of exchange; and fourth, the degree of mutual accountability based on a shared socio-moral model of interaction that may or may not be acknowledged by both partners.

In especially fluid clientelistic networks, such as those mentioned in relation to Mexico, the study of this variability is central to mapping patron brokerage. This dynamic and its methodological implications can be seen clearly in one aspect of variability: the relative saliency of instrumental considerations and power, solidarity, personal trust, and symbolic meaning as constitutive elements of Mexican patron brokerage during the postrevolutionary period, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s.

In some instances of patron brokerage, personal involvement in political "games" or in solidary bonds between patron-brokers and dependents were of minor importance. This situation arose when clientelistic ties were primarily economic, for example, the bonds linking peasants who produced for commodity markets with merchants who maintained a monopolistic hold on these markets (Royales González 1979; Suárez 1969). Here, the relations of clientelism aimed to ensure that subordinates would continue to be dependent on the major institutional markets and that merchants would continue to reap material gains allowing them to maintain life-styles typical of local and regional upper strata. In such cases, overt expressions of support from clients were marginal to the "games of power" engaged in by some social actors outside the local settings. Further, little personal involvement between patron and client occurred in these relations.

In most instances, considerations of power, solidarity, trust, and meaning played a more important role. Thus behavioral elements—such as display of force, the endeavor to construct personal solidarity, ritualistic expressions of support for patrons by their followers, and reflection of the patrons' "social visibility" (social distinction and political influence on clients)—were emphasized. Such emphases, along with manipulating clients as a means of attaining influence in the sociopolitical arena, indicate that the clientelistic link was conceived—by cli-

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ents, patron-brokers, or both—as a means for delayed or reflected (as opposed to direct or instrumental) benefit related to the macrosocietal order, especially in the political and sociorelational spheres.

But the patterns emphasizing personal involvement in political games or interpersonal obligations between patrons and clients vary considerably. In some cases, power elements have been particularly emphasized, as in the bonds that emerged in postrevolutionary Mexico in the Mixe and Tuxtepec areas of Oaxaca (Boege 1979), the Sierra Norte de Puebla (Paré 1976), the Mezquital Valley of Hidalgo (Calvo and Bartra 1976; Boege and Calvo 1976; Martínez Vázquez 1976), and Chiapas and multiethnic settings in Yucatán (Kelley 1974; Loret de Mola 1979). In all these cases, the caciques were either representatives of external forces who had been entrusted with formal tasks by agencies or they were local residents differentiated from the lower strata within their power domains along social (for example, ethnic) lines. They might even have been agrarian leaders who, upon being incorporated into the official power structure, strove to dissociate themselves from large parts of the local population. In the latter cases, elements of force and support from outside were also important in shaping the contours of exchange. Typical of such patron-brokers were agrarian caciques of rural *ejido* communities who despised the members, treated them as if they were still peons, and manipulated their external contacts, sources of credit, and avenues of commercialization. These caciques dominated local commerce and imposed decisions that, according to the principles of the regime, should have been arrived at democratically.

The fact that similar situations have been widely observed in rural Mexico may give the impression that they represent the only form of patron brokerage networks in the Mexican countryside. But other cases exist, such as those in the Oaxacan Zapotec area and some Yucatán and Chiapas settings, where potential and actual patron-brokers (local deputies, departmental caciques, municipal presidents, and local merchants) viewed themselves as (and were locally considered to be) members of a solidary community, as integral parts of the local population. These caciques reportedly showed goodwill toward the lower strata, were "true friends" of the common people, respected local customs, kept outsiders from encroaching on local resources, accepted invitations to act as *compadres* ("coparents"), maintained order and security, and interceded on behalf of local citizens with upper administrative echelons. In fact, these caciques could employ force against potential challengers, and they manipulated collective symbols and economic resources to attain local power and prestige; but whatever the means of control and influence employed, personal involvement and mutual solidarity were emphasized as constitutive elements of exchange between leaders and their supporters (Ugalde 1973; Loret

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de Mola 1979; Siverts 1965, particularly 351–55, on the dilemmas faced by one such cacique).

SUMMARY

This article began by noting the lack of systematic comparative analyses of the sociopolitical entrepreneurs operating under caciquismo and coronelismo. Different research strategies seemed to have been applied to the study of caciquismo and coronelismo. Most scholars working on Brazilian data have focused their attention on relatively clear-cut (for example, coalitional) variations of coronelismo, while those studying caciquismo in Mexico have concentrated on a wider range of factors, such as styles of leadership of caciques and related patron-brokers or the contents of clientelistic exchanges expressed through these relations.

This analysis has discussed the forms of clientelistic articulation shared by caciquismo and coronelismo while highlighting the striking differences in other aspects caused by the interplay of both patron-brokerage patterns within the institutional contexts of Mexico and Brazil. The position of Brazilian coronéis, anchored within the institutional framework, was regulated by behavioral definitions to a greater extent than was true of Mexican caciques. Accordingly, the characterizations and images of coronéis are relatively consistent. In contrast, more manipulation and evaluative variance occurred regarding Mexican caciques. In a sense, this ambivalence exacerbated the instability of these clientelistic networks, which are fragile despite their systemic pervasiveness.

Several implications derive from this study. Although methodological issues can be mentioned here only briefly,[10] in the approach adopted in discussing the Mexican variants of patron brokerage, I discarded the research strategy that uses vernacular labels and metaphors such as *cacique* as if they were substantive and universal correlates of the same observable phenomena. Instead, I initially opted for identifying social relationships that share an intrinsic structural dynamic. Subsequently, however, attention was given to other features of such relationships—their coercive or lenient character, short- or long-term reciprocity, and perceived fluidity—factors that, being closer to ordinary discourse, are associated with ambiguities and polivalent attitudes of those involved. These characteristics were treated as variables differentiating instances of patron brokerage, rather than as generic traits shaping definitional conceptualizations. This methodological approach seems particularly relevant when networks are not clear-cut and ties may fade into one another, as in the ambiguity or fluidity analyzed in the Mexican case.[11]

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On the substantive, structural level—and beyond its specific comparative contribution—this study stresses that the patterns of control exercised by these entrepreneurs and elites may be conducive to the reproduction of the social system. At the same time, the study indicates that this stabilizing effect may be disrupted by concomitant processes of development, and especially by a reformulation of alliances and coalitions. The varied impact of these somewhat contradictory tendencies constitutes a major challenge for systematic studies of clientelism in general and of patron brokerage in Latin America in particular.[12]

NOTES

1. In speaking of a *center-dominant polity*, I refer to a sociopolitical system where the political center plays a prominent role in determining the modes of organization of groups and strata, as well as in shaping their institutional contours (see Kaufmann 1977; Reyna and Weinert 1977). It is probably the seeming paradox of the existence of relatively strong centers, combined with the extensive networks of such middlemen, that underlies scholarly interest in these clientelistic phenomena. The many valuable contributions include Kern 1973; Díaz Díaz 1972; Bartra et al. 1976; Rothstein 1979; Lerner 1980; Friedrich 1977; Leal 1978; Pang 1979; Ferraz de Sá 1974; Greenfield 1972, 1977, and 1979; Vilaça and Albuquerque 1978; and Soiffer and Howe 1982.
2. Notable exceptions are to be found in the *Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos*, especially J. Murilo de Carvalho's studies (such as Carvalho 1966). But only in the 1970s and early 1980s were comprehensive regional histories written by scholars such as Joseph Love and John Wirth. See Love 1980, Wirth 1977, and other related titles published by Stanford University Press.
3. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss thoroughly such theses, which approximate the analysis by Shefter (1977) of the timing of political mobilization and orientation of European parties and the valuable attempt by Edson de Oliveira Nunes (1984) to differentiate Brazilian political parties according to types of mobilization and orientation. The point is that such analyses have gone beyond the classic, but schematic, characterization of Nunes Leal.
4. It is true that the agricultural export crisis hindered the patrons' ability to support their protégés, and that this situation, along with the expansion of transportation and communications, undermined the coronéis' monopoly on information for purposes of molding the social views of the locals. Coronéis were also forced to give up their firearms after the revolution, although they continued to supervise elections until 1937. During the Estado Novo, they temporarily lost this source of influence but regained it following the installation of multiparty parliamentarism in 1945. At this new stage, however, their activities were coordinated within party frameworks such as the Partido Social Democrático.
5. Other authors designate such a structure as *patron clientage* (for instance, Forman and Riegelpunt 1979).
6. The terms *major* and *minor* are from Gamer (1976) and are impressionistic, *minor* networks being defined as those removed from the sociopolitical or administrative centers, and *major* networks as those close to such centers.
7. Often, official recognition was granted after power domains were already established by various means, including violence.
8. Some networks were localized on a separate basis, while those linked to broader organizational and institutional frameworks nonetheless retained a dispersed structure of clientelistic clusters. Only when the mediatory channels were concentrated did the networks acquire an organizational brokerage style typified by the Republi-

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can party of Rio Grande do Sul in the Old Republic, some relations in the labor movement during the Vargas period, and the Sociedades de Amigos de Bairros and certain trade unions during the military rule. Detailed data on such instances are presented in my forthcoming book, *Hierarchy and Trust in Modern Mexico and Brazil*, to be published by the University of New Mexico Press.

9. This style of leadership has not been endorsed uniformly. A comparative analysis of Brazilian power domains reveals varying degrees of arbitrariness, forcefulness, and shared solidaristic orientations expressed toward clients. In addition, while descendants of coronéis and others who adopted their style of political leadership can still be found today in the Brazilian hinterlands (see Ferraz de Sá 1974 and Silva 1975), these middlemen are actually part of a wider system. Within it, their original sociopolitical significance and free will have been reduced. Similarly, because the original entitlements are no longer granted, the Brazilian magazine *Veja* published an article entitled "O Ultimo Coronel" on the demise of a political boss in Pernambuco (*Veja* 15, 18 Dec. 1968). Since then, Brazilian journalists have increasingly employed the term *cacique* to denote rural patron-brokers, which indicates the pervasiveness of the phenomenon under consideration.
10. Indigeneous role definitions and representations are open to continuous processes of structural and semantic transformation. As a result, discrepancies are likely to emerge between two analytical levels: first, the level of indigeneous role representations and definitions known in anthropology as *emic*, itself potentially contradictory and ambiguous as shown in the Mexican case; and second, the so-called *etic* level of observed behavioral regularities.
11. On a worldwide scale, twentieth-century Lebanese clientelism and late nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Southern Italian clientelism are among the cases best suited to this research strategy. While the latter has been widely studied, research has yet to be done on the former. For bibliographical references, see Roniger (1981).
12. A most valuable contribution in this direction is Singelmann (1981).

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