

"once and for all by our alliance with the Soviet Union and the rise of the first democratic state on German soil [that is, the East German Democratic Republic]." Presumably, this happy situation made further Czechoslovak foreign policy unnecessary. Indeed, the long-time (1953–68) Communist foreign minister, Václav David, declared: "Our role must simply be to support the efforts of Soviet foreign policy wherever we have an opportunity to do so, through our traditional relations or new contacts." The Czechoslovak Communist reformists thought differently however. When they launched the "Prague Spring" in 1968 and proceeded to define their program of domestic reforms, they also sought to formulate a distinct Czechoslovak foreign policy—within the broad guidelines of Soviet policy. Their efforts were cut short by the Soviet invasion in August 1968. Gustáv Husák, Czechoslovakia's current president and Communist Party chief, undertook to "normalize" Czechoslovak foreign and domestic policies. This did not simply mean a return to the *status quo ante*, however. For example, when East-West détente began in the 1970s, the Soviet government permitted Husák to respond to Willy Brandt's efforts to "build bridges to the east" by concluding the Czechoslovak-(West) German treaty on December 11, 1973.

Müller devotes the bulk of his study to a discussion of Czechoslovak foreign policy after 1945. He is well qualified to do so. During the 1950s and 1960s, he was an official of the Czechoslovak foreign ministry and an associate of Prague's Institute of International Politics and Economics. In 1969, in the aftermath of the "Prague Spring" and Soviet invasion, he forsook communism and left Czechoslovakia for West Germany, where he is currently a staff member of the Institut für Ostrecht of the University of Cologne. Outside observers often find East European policy declarations obscure to the point of meaninglessness. But thanks to his experience in Czechoslovakia and training in Marxian dialectics, Müller has a sharp ear for subtle meanings and policy shifts in Czechoslovak policy declarations. His book constitutes a valuable guide to the understanding of postwar Czechoslovak foreign policy.

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SOCIALIST OPPOSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE: THE CZECHOSLOVAK EXAMPLE. By *Jiri Pelikan*. Translated by *Marian Sling* and *V. and R. Tosek*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976 [Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1973]. 221 pp. \$12.95.

What could be a better example of political immobility than Czechoslovakia over the last ten years? Soviet troops are still there, the intellectuals of the "Prague Spring" are still in uncompromising opposition, the Czechoslovak population as well as the political forces of the West are still unreconciled to the situation but unable (or unwilling to take the risks) to do anything about it. And yet, the fate of this book itself testifies to the fact that something *is* moving. Published in French in 1973, it had to be considerably enriched by J. Pelikan in 1975 for the English edition in order to take into account the successive initiatives of the socialist opposition (like the statement of the Socialist Movement of Czechoslovak Citizens of August 1973, the letter of Jaroslav Sabata—one of the newer and most impressive exponents of resistance and victims of repression—to the Central Committee of July 1973, or Alexander Dubček's letter on the occasion of Josef Smrkowsky's death), the new trials and mistreatments to which they are submitted by the regime, or the reactions of the West European Left.

Read in 1978, all this new material itself looks like a preface to subsequent developments of the same nature but of a different order of magnitude: the Charter 1977 movement, the effects of Eurocommunism and of the Helsinki agreement, the impact of Soviet dissidents (particularly Solzhenitsyn) upon the West, the emergence of an active and partly successful opposition in Poland, the Committee for the Defense of

the Radom Workers, the emigration or expulsions of intellectuals from East Germany, the influence of President Carter's emphasis on human rights, the new Moscow trials, and the way in which each regime tries to isolate its respective dissidents. All these developments are foreshadowed in Jiri Pelikan's perceptive preface, and confirm his basic point, namely that opposition in Eastern Europe, and particularly in Czechoslovakia, is on the increase, and that democratic forces in the West, particularly the West European Left, should join forces with them.

Much of what has happened recently, however, tends to challenge (at least in part) one of Pelikan's implicit and sometimes explicit theses: that the significant opposition in Eastern Europe is essentially socialist, and that there is universal value in the Czechoslovak example of reform within the party leading to a new alliance with the masses. In fact, not only the great majority of Soviet dissidents (with the exception of the Medvedev brothers and their group) rejects the very idea of socialism, but in Poland and Czechoslovakia itself, liberal and nationalist forces seem as important to the new opposition movements as socialist ones. On the other hand, the idea that reform must start within the ruling Communist Party and that the hopes of democratization lie with the moderate wing of the latter has been eloquently challenged, precisely in a debate with Pelikan, by the young Polish historian and dissident Adam Michnik, at the "56" Conference held in Paris in November 1976. His thesis is that "revisionism," as it was understood in Poland in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, is dead, and that the only hope now lies in society taking the initiative and forcing the ruling elite to compromise (see Michnik's article "The New Evolutionism," in *Survey*, 22, no. 3/4 [100/101] [Summer/Autumn 1976]: 267-77).

The two theses are not exactly contradictory, but they do show a difference in emphasis between the two movements, and Charter 1977 may be seen as a Czechoslovak move in the direction indicated by Michnik. The recent accent on human rights similarly transcends the classical oppositions between right and left, socialists and nonsocialists. Similar differences or shifts of emphasis can be observed in the attitudes of East European dissidents toward Eurocommunism or toward détente: the Czechoslovaks and the East Germans seem the most favorable, the majority of the Russians the most hostile, the Poles and the Hungarians more divided or more reserved in their judgment.

One of the most interesting subjects to be studied today may be the comparison between the attitudes of the various opposition movements in Eastern Europe. Pelikan's volume has made an important, albeit partial, contribution to this study by asking all the right general questions and by providing ample documentation and a lucid analysis about the Czechoslovak answers to these questions.

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A MAGYAR KÖZIGAZGATÁS FEJLŐDÉSE A XVIII. SZÁZADTÓL A TANÁCSRENDSZER LÉTREJÖTTÉIG. By *Andor Csizmadia*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1976. 560 pp. 122 Ft.

This important, pragmatic study, published in 1976, was completed four years earlier by a civil servant of many years' standing and a lifelong student and teacher of his subject. Ever since his first article was published in 1936 (apart from a brief gap between 1947 and 1950), Andor Csizmadia has been coming out year after year with books, pamphlets, and articles on the theories, laws, institutions, and practices of Hungarian public administration, on plans for its reform, and on its successes and failures. Some of his writings have dealt with periods as early as the reign of King Matthias Corvinus (1458-90), but the focus of his interest, as in the present case, has been the years since the Compromise of 1867. He is a productive, precise, and practical