

# MAPPING AN AUTHORITARIAN POWER STRUCTURE: BRAZILIAN ELITES DURING THE MEDICI REGIME\*

*Peter McDonough*  
*University of Michigan*

## INTRODUCTION

This study concerns the structure of power in Brazil during the early seventies, when economic growth, and political repression, were at their height.<sup>1</sup> The objective is not to discover the power structure, as if there were serious doubt about its existence or even much mystery about its composition. For all the curiosity value of first-hand information about elites in a virtually closed political setting, there is a danger of confirming what is already known about the workings of authoritarian rule. The point of departure here is that “what everybody knows” about the Brazilian power structure is not so much wrong as it is limited and in some ways misleading. In order to understand this, it is first necessary to outline the common ground among scholars regarding interelite relations in Brazil and then to suggest how this view might be modified.

### *Three Dimensions of the Power Structure*

Many observers would agree that, in broad terms, the Brazilian power structure is founded on two dimensions. A primary cleavage is one of class, separating the establishment proper from urban labor, for example. Another cleavage operates within the establishment itself, dividing the state—for example, the military and their technocratic allies in the civil service—from elites “on the outside,” principally, industrialists and financiers.<sup>2</sup> As rudimentary as this characterization is, it is nevertheless more sophisticated than a one-dimensional rendition in which there are no basic tensions among the elites themselves. Agrarian bu-

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reauracies governed by a comparatively homogeneous elite may approximate this ideal-type. The Brazilian developmental dictatorship does not.<sup>3</sup>

At the same time, there are sound reasons for skepticism about the two-dimensional, upper-class-versus-lower-class/state-versus-society portrait. Not only may some detail be lost, as is indisputably the case, but certain key parameters may also be missing. A central thesis of this study is that the church-state nexus or, more generically, the nature of relations between religious and civil authorities, constitutes one of these parameters.<sup>4</sup> Since the idea is unorthodox, its plausibility may be enhanced by considering briefly a comparison of the Brazilian power structure with that of Spain.

While both Brazil and Spain have had long authoritarian episodes, and while rough similarities may be detected in their economic histories, fairly sharp differences in their political cultures and elite structures persist. In particular, the penetration of the larger society on the part of the Brazilian Church has been rather thin, whereas in Spain the identification of the Church with the fate of the nation and the hold of the Church on the educational system traditionally have been strong.<sup>5</sup> Discrepant patterns of association between civil and religious institutions in Brazil and Spain may thus help account for differences in the substance and style of elite conflict in the two countries. Several observers have noted that Brazilian politics, even during authoritarian periods, has a relative softness to it—relative to the Spanish experience, for example, of bitter and often bloody extremism.<sup>6</sup> The notion advanced here is that the origins of such differences can be traced, in large part, to differing trajectories of church-state relations rather than to supposed idiosyncracies in national character or temperament.<sup>7</sup>

An empirical sign of the lower propensity of elements within the Brazilian establishment to engage in winner-take-all combat is the virtual separation of the Brazilian bishops and clergy from the two "secular" cleavages mentioned earlier. Conversely, if the Church in Brazil were traditionally tied to the state, as has been true in Spain, the susceptibility of the interelite system to explode in deep-seated antagonisms with a clearcut ideological, or religious, flavor would be greater.<sup>8</sup>

### *The Multiplex Nature of Interelite Linkages*

If one reason why the relations between religious and civil authorities are ignored in the study of Brazilian authoritarianism is that they are not easily reducible to economic or class-fraction models, it can also be argued that a similarly narrow view overlooks the importance of the fact that all but the simplest of elite networks are multistranded. Not only

should the proximity and distance among several actors, including the Church, be examined but the probability that the ties between them may be of several kinds and therefore capable of generating alternative networks should also be analyzed.<sup>9</sup>

The first qualification to a two-dimensional mapping of the Brazilian power structure is that it fails to include potentially crucial, if not all-powerful, interests. The second objection differs from this in that it is directed not at the number of actors, and hence at the possible number of meaningful axes around which the power structure is built, but at the possible variety of linkages among a given set of actors.

Less abstractly, the configuration of power produced by mapping a single strand—say, kinship ties—need not be the same as that yielded by plotting friendship linkages, for example, or indeed by charting attitudinal clusters across elite groups. Multiple ties of different kinds—of kinship, friendship, organizational dependence and the like—bind the Brazilian elites together. These networks overlap, but only loosely. It is the partial differentiation among various linkages that permits the power structure to absorb ambitious candidates by offering alternative channels of mobility, and it is this flexibility that, in turn, prevents the system from becoming easily vulnerable to attack from below. It allows mobility at one level and promotes stability at another.<sup>10</sup>

### *Organization of the Analysis*

I shall examine first the question of the formation of class alliances among the elites by way of marriage. Endogamy—intraclass marriage—tends to be more common among Brazilian economic elites than among the state managers and the politicians. Control over large amounts of wealth is liable to be at stake in marriages in which business families enter. While this is not a timeless law, it seems to be sufficiently prevalent among Brazilian industrialists and bankers to set them apart from the noneconomic elites. For this latter group, the marriage contract may also represent a social risk or opportunity. Yet political power is a more nebulous and less transferable quantity than property, so that it enters less certainly into the calculus of marriage. Aside from its substantive interest, the purpose of this part of the analysis is to establish that certain kinds of ties have differential significance for various elite groups.<sup>11</sup>

Marital linkages are specific instances of a broader set of mechanisms by which the Brazilian establishment renews itself.<sup>12</sup> The second stage of investigation entails an analysis of multiple linkages, principally of kinship and friendship, that develop over the career-cycles of the elites, from childhood through the university to the present time.<sup>13</sup>

Configurations of functional or organizational—that is, working—ties within and between elite groups are also examined. A basic purpose of this part of the analysis is to establish the multidimensionality of the power structure.

Another major hypothesis is that a series of complementary mechanisms preserves the position of the inner core of the capitalist class while facilitating the mobility of “deserving elements” from below. Not only is endogamy typical of the marital patterns of Brazilian industrialists and financiers; these men are also amply endowed with the most intimate sort of intralite linkages—that is, kinship ties. On the other hand, although the state managers do not start out with comparable class advantages, or marry into the inner sanctum of business families with great frequency, or enjoy so many blood ties with the economically powerful, they cultivate bonds of friendship and close working contacts with powerful individuals and groups at the various peaks of the Brazilian hierarchy.

In summary, my concern is with both the shape and the substance of the Brazilian power structure. The shape of the power structure is its outward form, the visible configuration of dominance. It is composed of three main polarities. A fundamental cleavage, which insulates the elites as a whole from urban labor and its leadership, is one of class. Another major division is the one between those who manage the state, the military and the civilian bureaucrats, and those in whose presumed interest it is run: the industrialists, bankers, and landowners. While the military and the government may not be autonomous in any definitive, long-term sense, the state managers are neither recruited from the dominant economic strata nor are they accountable to them in any institutional fashion. A third line of demarcation within the Brazilian elite is constituted by the peninsula-like position of the Church, with the bishops and the clergy practically off in a corner of their own away from the other elites.

A clue to what has been termed the substance of the power structure, how it holds together without ossification, is the “division of labor” between kinship and friendship ties. The importance of kinship ties relative to friendship linkages is greater for the businessmen and for the upper-class elites generally than for the middle-sector state managers; the density of kinship is thicker among the former and thinner among the latter. Conversely, while the elite estates maintain a certain distance among themselves through class-selective marriage and related means, the proliferation of friendship linkages is a critical element in the mobility and the power of the state managers.

## MARRIAGE AND MOBILITY

Elites, like ordinary people, tend to marry within their own class. To the extent that this is true, it is natural to expect the distributions of occupations among fathers and fathers-in-law to be similar. In principle, a significant amount of interclass marriage may underlie this similarity, just as the relation between two variables is constrained but not determined by their marginal distributions. But a stronger case can be made for exogamy when the distributions of occupations are discrepant. If more fathers-in-law than fathers are drawn from among leading industrialists and bankers, while most of the fathers are of middle sector origins or below, the putative evidence for upward mobility is compelling even before the relative frequency of shifts from one category to another is ascertained.

When the respective distributions are examined side-by-side, within none of the elite groups do significant differences emerge between the occupations of fathers and fathers-in-law. Even if the incidence of exogamy is considerable, it has not resulted in a set of fathers-in-law much different occupationally from the fathers of the elites. By and large, the elites do not seem markedly upwardly or downwardly mobile through marriage.

With this overall pattern in view, table 1 broaches the question of endogamy/exogamy directly, depicting the incidence of within- and between-strata marriage for the entire sample.<sup>14</sup> Endogamy is most common at the lower, manual end of the occupational spectrum. More than three-quarters of the elites born to fathers designated as manual workers marry into working class families, and none of them marries above the middle sectors. Endogamy is also very common at the upper class end of the hierarchy, while a bit more movement is visible along the middle ranges. Tracing the probability of endogamy from the bottom of the stratification system to the top produces a U-shaped curve, high at the extremes and lower in the middle. Where class positions are well-defined, within-class marriage is the dominant pattern.<sup>15</sup>

Yet there is also appreciable movement among segments of the upper class. For example, the relationship between the landed and the industrial-banking families is asymmetrical. Landed families are more likely to marry into industrial-banking families than vice-versa, in part because backgrounds in large-scale business are more common than proprietorship over land among both the fathers and the fathers-in-law of the elites. This is less likely to have been the case a generation or two ago in Brazil.<sup>16</sup>

Furthermore, on the assumption that the landed class is not so powerful as it once was, elites from this stratum have an incentive to

TABLE 1 Father-in-Law's Occupation by Father's Occupation: Seven-Category Scales

Father's Occupation	Father-in-Law's Occupation							Totals
	Manual	Routine Non-manual	Middle Class	Professional	Large Industry & Finance	Landowner	Top Military, Political	
Manual	76%	12%	12%	—	—	—	—	100% (26)
Routine Nonmanual	44	13	25	13	—	5	—	100 (16)
Middle Class	4	12	52	16	4	8	4	100 (77)
Professional	8	5	31	28	10	10	8	100 (39)
Large Industry & Finance	—	—	12	29	29	24	6	100 (17)
Landowner	—	—	—	29	50	14	7	100 (14)
Top Military, Political	—	6	13	31	25	13	13	100 (16)
Totals	17 (34)	8 (17)	31 (63)	19 (39)	11 (23)	9 (19)	5 (10)	100 (205)

exogamy with members of a class on the rise, like the industrial-banking community. Elites from leading military and political families also show a tendency to marry into industrial-financial families. Conversely, the scions of the business elite proper, those born into industrial and banking families, are the least likely of all genuinely upper-class elements to marry outside their stratum, although they show some inclination for marriage into landed as well as professional families. In brief, within the upper class, there is a tendency for the elites to marry into families who exercise control over investment and production.


However, while 60 percent of the upper-class elites marry within their class, close to a third of them report having married into families identified with the liberal professions. The offspring of professional fathers may enter upper-class families with greater ease than the children of the plain middle sectors. If a family has professional status, and especially if this status goes back to the father, the members of the family participate in a transitional stratum linking the middle sectors and the upper class.

The role of education in promoting limited exogamy deserves emphasis. Figure 1 presents the correlations between the occupations of

fathers and fathers-in-law for the three main levels of parental education. The pattern is linear: exogamy is most common among the most highly educated families. To be sure, all correlations are positive; it would be unrealistic to suppose that education reverses the trend toward endogamy. But it is equally clear that higher education erodes class-based barriers to exogamy.<sup>17</sup>


It should be remembered, however, that the businessmen are exceptional among the true elites in their comparatively low levels of formal education. Since education increases the chances of exogamy, the businessmen should be the most endogamous of the elites. Figure 2 documents the endogamous inclinations of the businessmen. The two elite groups most clearly defined in class terms, the businessmen and the labor leaders, are also the most endogamous. The civil servants and the politicians are also more endogamous than not, but the tendency is less pronounced in these sectors. The businessmen form the elite estate that is least permeable by way of marriage.<sup>18</sup>

FIGURE 1 *Correlations between Father's Occupation and Father-in-Law's Occupation, by Father's Education\**



\*Correlations are based on five-point occupational scales. The correlation for entire sample, regardless of father's education, is .69.

FIGURE 2 Correlations between Father's Occupation and Father-in-Law's Occupation, by Elite Sector\*



\*All correlations were computed using the five-category occupation scales.

One important qualification needs to be made to this pattern. Among the younger businessmen, there is a slight but significant trend toward greater exogamy; the tradition of endogamy within the capitalist class has probably eroded during the postwar period.<sup>19</sup> But on the whole it is precisely among the sectors where formal education counts for little, among the businessmen and the labor leaders, that within-class marriage is most prevalent. Like the labor leaders, the businessmen are still a more clannish group than the politicians and the state managers.<sup>20</sup>

Intra- and interclass linkages by way of marriage are a particular instance of the variety of bonds among Brazilian elites; we are now in a position to consider a fuller array of interelite relationships.



## INTERELITE NETWORKS

*The Shape of the Power Structure*

The safest and least interesting assumption about elite networks in Brazil and elsewhere is that their full complexity will always be shrouded from view. Not even the members of these networks, much less outside analysts, can be expected to be aware of all the ramifications of social ties, even when they agree on the basic contours of the power structure. This observation relieves us of the naive assumption that a conspiratorial consciousness guides whatever regularities are encountered in elite linkages. Instead, it turns analytical interest toward the structures of elite relationships that do not depend on purposeful manipulation and that abide after the intrigues of powerful individuals are long forgotten.

The allied assumption that elite networks are powerful to the degree that ties among elites are close is also probably fallacious. Inferences of this kind imply a tenuous extrapolation from the individual, or dyadic, to the structural level. An elite system in which practically all ties are strong might be imposing yet brittle, lacking the capacity to absorb vigorous candidates from below and inclined toward an isolation with diminishing resources for adapting to a changing environment.<sup>21</sup> This perspective sets the point of departure for my approach to the complementary functions of kinship and friendship bonds.

Indicators of kinship and friendship were elicited by asking the elites about three time periods: childhood, the university, and the present. They were asked whether they had friends and/or relatives in each of thirteen groups, ranging from politicians ("governors, senators, and federal deputies") through "large industrialists" to "lower- or middle-level public functionaries." Information on kinship was obtained for  $t_1$  (childhood) and  $t_3$  (present); information on friendship is available for  $t_2$  (university) and  $t_3$ .<sup>22</sup> The items generate an enormous amount of data. For each of the first two time-points, there are thirteen variables, corresponding to the number of groups. For the present time, there are twenty-six variables, split between kinship and friendship linkages. The number of possible correlations between these indicators is a multiplicative function of their number.

Because the data are complex, it is helpful to keep the main lines of analysis plainly in view. The basic expectation is twofold. First, the Brazilian power structure is formed around three major cleavages: one between urban labor and the elites as a whole; another between those who run the state and those, like the businessmen, who might benefit from bureaucratic-authoritarian rule but do not necessarily control it; and a third separating the Church from the establishment and urban labor alike. In the second place, there is a class-specific division of labor

between kinship and friendship linkages such that the density of kinship ties among the truly upper-class elites, like the businessmen, is greater than among the elites of predominantly middle-sector origins, like the civil servants, where friendship ties prevail.


Let us start with a summary test of the first hypothesis. For the sake of simplicity, information from the three time periods is pooled and the distinction between kinship and friendship ties ignored. Now, networks are constructed not from the mere number of elite relationships but from the relations between relations—that is, from the propensity for ties with one key group to lead to ties with other significant actors and from the tendency for these linkages to cluster apart from those joining the lesser figures.

Figure 3 locates the groups according to their proximity to one another, the proximity between any two groups being defined as the probability of having a linkage with one, given a linkage with the other.<sup>23</sup> Thus, smoothing over differences in the period of ties and in the type of linkages, the sociogram is a condensed rendition of the relative distances between the groups with whom the elites have contact. The sharpest division is between the labor leaders and the rest of the elites; the division is plainly one of class. The members of the establishment cluster to the right, yet within this grouping they are differentiated in significant ways. The military are located at some remove from the civilians. The politicians and, to a lesser extent, the top civil servants are positioned midway between the military and the economic elites. There are also small but consistent distances between the higher and lower echelons within each of the functional groupings. The state managers are separated from the mere functionaries, the bankers from the merchants, and so on.

Two further aspects of the configuration should be noted. On the one hand, its real-world flavor is encouraging as a sign of the validity of the data.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, the diagram elides some important details. For example, the “top civil servants” are not so bloc-like as they appear. Although the distance between the civilian and the military cadres captures the differentiation between the security apparatus and the bureaucratic management, there are also factions and functional divisions within these groups. As will be shown, one that is particularly consequential is the divide between the “noneconomic” bureaucracy, the men responsible for the caretaking and cultural operations of the state, and the “economic” bureaucracy, those charged with the developmental push of the country.<sup>25</sup>

Second, the bishops and the ordinary clergy do not fit neatly along the labor-versus-elite or state-versus-society coordinates. While they are not so isolated as the labor leaders, they are not really inte-

FIGURE 3 Two-Dimensional Smallest-Space Diagram of Pooled Kinship and Friendship Relations for Pre-Adult, University, and Present Time\*



Dimensionality of Solution  
 One Two Three

Kruskal's Stress Coefficient  
 Guttman-Lingoes' Coefficient of Alienation

.20 .11 .06  
 .24 .15 .09

\*The diagram is equivalent to a sociogram in which the relative distances between groups represent the degree of contact between them; to eliminate clutter, lines are not drawn between pairs of groups.

grated with the other elites. A more precise depiction of the power structure would involve a three-dimensional contour mapping, with the Church off on a mountain of its own.

Several factors contribute to the odd-man-out position of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Although most of the bishops supported the anti-communist tone of the 1964 revolution, they have become increasingly alienated by the poor human rights and social welfare record of the regime. More generally, the Brazilian clergy forms a humanistic as well as spiritual estate that falls in the interstices of the secular and largely economic parameters of the power structure. In one sense or another, all of the elites except the bishops and the priests are public men, and the divisions among them are broadly recognizable as matters of public policy. The Church, however, has a moral and private mission that cannot be reduced to the usual political conflicts. This virtual apartness of the religious corporation from the "affairs of the world," always excepting "moral" issues such as divorce and abortion, has a fairly long history in Brazil. To the extent that this is so, the locus of the clergy in the Brazilian power structure is ambiguous.<sup>26</sup>


### *Kinship and Friendship Ties*

What of the mechanisms from which the power structure is built? Two propositions can be extracted from the argument that kinship and friendship linkages fulfill complementary functions among Brazilian elites. One, at any point in time, kinship ties should be more abundant within sectors populated by elites from upper-class families than within groups where elites are recruited from the middle sectors. Two, over time—that is, during the career cycles of the elites—upper-class sectors such as the businessmen should continue to rely on kinship linkages, and especially on kinship linkages with the upper class, whereas the middle-sector, education-dependent civil servants should rely more on friendship as a primary device of mobility.

A central feature of both propositions is the "density" of kinship ties, computed simply as the ratio of kinship to friendship linkages; analytical interest is in the *relative* number of kinship bonds, not in their absolute quantity. Figure 4 gives the results of an exact test of the idea that kinship ties are comparatively numerous among the upper-class elites. Within each of the principal groups, the kinship/friendship ratio has been correlated with the total number of ties reported by the elites. A strong positive correlation indicates that as the absolute number of linkages increases, so does the density of kinship ties.

As the lower and lower-middle class labor leaders gather more linkages, they collect a disproportionate number of friendship ties rela-

FIGURE 4 Correlations between Kinship/Friendship Ratio and Total Number of Ties by Elite Sector\*



$$*\text{kinship/friendship ratio} = \frac{\text{number of kinship ties}}{\text{number of friendship ties}}$$

tive to their small base of kinship connections. The businessmen, on the other hand, start with an ample supply of familial linkages, and those with the largest number of ties have very dense kinship networks. While the politicians, many of whom are from landed families, approach this pattern, it is the businessmen who have the least incentive to expand their networks of nonfamilial connections: their fundamental problem is not mobility but the protection of property. Finally, there is essentially no association between the proliferation of ties among the civil servants and their kinship linkages. Although they are not destitute of such connections, neither are they especially well-endowed with them.

This basic pattern can be extended to the dynamics of network-

building. Upper-class elites enjoy a cumulative advantage insofar as they build on their kinship ties over time. This is not to claim that they neglect other types of connections but only that the largely middle-sector elites do not catch up with the comparatively well-born, like the businessmen, in the density and amplitude of their kinship networks, especially with the upper class itself.

A straightforward way to demonstrate the cumulative nature of kinship ties is to calculate a dynamic ratio—for example, of present-day kinship ties relative to childhood kinship ties. The higher the ratio, the greater the cumulative density of these linkages. Furthermore, kinship (as well as friendship) bonds can be subdivided into those with upper-class groups (large bankers, large industrialists, top civil servants, etc.) and those with middle-class groups (*comerciantes*, medium-to-small industrialists, and so on). A ratio can then be formed, for example, between present-day kinship linkages with upper-class groups and childhood kinship linkages with middle-class groups. The higher such a ratio, the greater the growth of kinship ties with key sectors of Brazilian society.


Figure 5 plots two patterns of “upwardly-mobile” linkages for five elite groups. The overall trend is unequivocal. The businessmen are the most successful in building their networks with upper-class elements, and their networks tend to be of the best—that is, the presumably strongest—kind, favoring kinship relative to friendship. The accumulation of upper-class kinship linkages is considerably more modest among the other elites, especially among the civil servants, the bishops, and the labor leaders. The politicians are the only elite sector that can compete with the businessmen in the cultivation of the most intimate ties with the upper class, and even they come out in second place.

In brief, while it would be erroneous to claim that middle-sector mobility into the Brazilian elite is purely nonparticularistic, following exclusively the meritocratic route of formal education, it is clear that a dominant mechanism of sponsored mobility works through the cultivation of friendships, sometimes with upper-class individuals but often with individuals of less than truly upper-class standing. With the still rare but important exception of the sons of the “respectable” (professional) middle sectors who marry into the landed, industrial, or banking families, few middle-sector elites establish the tightest kind of bonds with the inner sanctum of the upper class.

#### *A Note on Working Contacts*

The quotidian maneuverings of the elites may appear more haphazard and generate more intricate configurations than their kinship and friendship linkages. Nevertheless, it is improbable that they violate the

FIGURE 5 Selected Upwardly-Mobile Linkages over Time: Mean Densities by Elite Sector



———— =  $\frac{\text{Upper Class Kinship } T_3}{\text{Middle Class Kinship } T_1}$        $\text{ETA}^2 = .08$

- - - - =  $\frac{\text{Upper Class Kinship } T_3}{\text{Middle Class Friendship } T_2}$        $\text{ETA}^2 = .07$

\*Too few cases for analysis where base equals middle class friendship T<sub>2</sub>

general thrust of networks based on kinship and friendship.<sup>27</sup> The advantage of registering the working contacts of the elites is the fine-grained resolution they provide of groups within groups, for example, within the "top civil service" and the "top military." The materials also transmit a feel for the similarities between the interorganizational and interpersonal relations among elites in a semi-institutionalized regime.

When the elites were asked to nominate the "five or six men with the greatest influence in matters of national importance," the qualification "within your own area of interest" was added to make the responses less obvious. Even so, the president himself and Finance Minister Delfim Neto received many more citations than any other individuals. The pattern reflects the enormous concentration of power in Brazil during the Medici years.<sup>28</sup>

Altogether, the elites nominated thirty individuals, including the president and the finance minister, as having great influence in their own fields of activity; in addition, the elites reported the frequency of their contact with these individuals.<sup>29</sup> It is possible but inelegant to trace the prodigious number of direct and indirect linkages between the persons cited. This yields a highly and, for present purposes, too detailed picture of the power structure. It is also a transitory snapshot, for most of the personalities who figured among the mighty in 1972–73 have since left the scene. However, they can be grouped in functional clusters. This aggregation captures the principal coalitions and subcoalitions without loss of verisimilitude.

The thirty individuals were sorted into eight categories. Since they were mentioned so often, the president and the finance minister each form a minority of one, and there is no need to align them beforehand with other individuals. Aside from these two men, there are six significant groupings. The first can best be described as "the presidency," that is, the men directly attached to the executive office—principally, the chief of staff of the military, the head of the civil office, the director of the security apparatus, the generals of the standing armies, and the heads of the three armed services. This is the cockpit of the Brazilian state, inhabited almost exclusively by repressive forces.

Another set of actors comprises the economic bureaucracy: men such as the minister of planning and coordination, the minister of industry and commerce, the minister of transport, and the heads of the state-owned industries and banks. A third set of state managers makes up the noneconomic bureaucracy: all of the civil servants whose main responsibilities have to do with education, foreign and labor relations, the judiciary, and the like. The economic bureaucrats form the entrepreneurial core of the state; their role is to drive Brazil toward great power status. The functions of the noneconomic bureaucracy are not entirely



routine, yet they spend a good deal of time in what amounts to cleaning up after their developmental colleagues: assuaging, controlling, and servicing clients who are victims or innocent bystanders of the great leap forward.

The three remaining groups are businessmen, politicians, and "others," this last group a residual miscellany gathering in ecclesiastics, labor leaders, journalists, members of the liberal professions, and the like. All in all, the eight-part categorization brings a preliminary order to the dispersion of influence and contacts among individual elites. However, it is only a classification, and the question remains as to the extent to which the various groups and persons interact with one another. To some degree, they deal with separate clienteles, and their patterns of working contacts should mirror this differentiation.

The appropriate method for summarizing the networks of operational linkages is to reduce the twenty-eight pairwise connections between the eight actors to the coordinates underlying them. The factor analysis in table 2 does this.<sup>30</sup> The three dimensions that emerge from the analysis crystallize the main lines of the working relationships within and between the nexus of technocratic power, represented by the finance minister and his minions in the economic agencies, and the political sector generally, including the titular supporters as well as opponents of the governments. The economic planners move in a world largely separate from that of the elected representatives. On occasion, the politicians may be consulted, but this is the exception rather than the rule, certainly during the Medici regime.

The president and his entourage also occupy a distinctive place in the power structure. There is some overlapping between this institutional clique and the economic bureaucracy, and it also maintains some contact with the politicians—of the government party, as will be shown. The presidency is most remote from "the others," the collection of virtually powerless figures in the Church and the labor syndicates.

The third dimension of operational contact divides the businessmen and to a lesser extent the politicians from the noneconomic bureaucracy. The axis has a state-versus-society flavor. Although the business leaders are fairly close to the economic bureaucrats, they apparently have little use for the rest of the governmental apparatus, especially as it interferes with their freedom of action and in general complicates their affairs.

However, it is not clear why the politicians are aligned with the industrialists and bankers in a proto-clique apart from the noneconomic agencies. Nor is it certain that both the ARENA and the MDB can be located at the same remove from the bureaucracy. Table 3 resolves these ambiguities. Factor scores were computed for each dimension, and their

TABLE 2 Factor Analysis (Varimax Rotation) of Working Contacts with Eight Major Groups: Normalized Factor Loadings

Contacted Groups	Factors			Communalities
	I	II	III	
Economic				
Bureaucracy	.81	-.03	.07	.67
Finance Minister	.73	.39	.12	.69
President Medici	-.02	.77	-.20	.64
Presidency	-.01	.71	.15	.53
Business	.06	-.21	.73	.57
Other				
Bureaucracy	.06	-.19	-.69	.51
Politicians	-.55	.14	.30	.41
Others	-.30	-.37	-.04	.23
Sum of Squares	1.59	1.49	1.17	
Percent of Variance	19.9	17.7	14.6	

Factor I: Technocrats vs. Politicians  
 Factor II: The Presidency-Security Axis  
 Factor III: Businessmen/Noneconomic Bureaucracy

Note: The computational algorithm was originated by Henry F. Kaiser, "The Varimax Criterion for Analytic Rotation in Factor Analysis," *Psychometrika* 23 (1958): 187-200.

mean values are presented for each of the elite groups. The scores indicate how the various sectors are linked to the diverse spheres of day-to-day influence.

The ordering of the elite estates along the first dimension specifies a primary cleavage within the Brazilian establishment: the technocratic-business alliance stands apart from the politicians, the bishops and the labor leaders. The split is not only between the technocrats and the politicians; it divides business from labor as well. The supremacy of the technocrats is more than an intralite problem, for it entails the domination of one class over another as well as the internal hierarchization of the elites proper.

The second axis of working contacts reveals the coercive element behind the exclusion of lower-class groups. Political power emanates from the presidency, and both the labor leaders and the Church are isolated from this center.

The third orbit of contact revolves around the noneconomic bu-

TABLE 3 Mean Standardized Factor Scores on Three Dimensions of Working Contacts, by Elite Sector

Elite Sector	Factor Scores		
	I	II	III
MDB	-.81	.06	.23
Church	-.69	-.78	-.12
Labor	-.41	-.41	-.57
ARENA	-.20	.90	.02
Business	.28	-.01	.43
Civil Service	.43	.01	-.15
ETA <sup>2</sup>	.17*	.17*	.14*

\* $p \leq .01$ 

reaucracy. It is the only one in which the bishops and the labor leaders move with ease. The labor leaders depend on the syndical bureaucracy in numerous ways—e.g., for the allocation of union funds controlled by the government. Much of the Church's dealing with the state involves coping with human rights violations.<sup>31</sup> The noneconomic bureaucratic network may thus be characterized as one of patronage and administrative control. For this reason, the ARENA politicians are more closely enmeshed with it than the representatives of the MDB, while the businessmen try to avoid the underside of the state machine altogether.

The common denominator of all three networks is that they converge on the state. If the government can be termed autonomous in any meaningful sense, it is as a derivative of the multiplicity of functions it carries out and the corresponding proliferation of its clientele. No single institution or organization on the outside has the capacity to monitor or effectively counterbalance the activities of the Brazilian government. The one sector that may qualify as a quasi-equal partner is the business community. The alliance of the technocrats, the military, and the large businessmen against the politicians and urban labor is the foundation of the authoritarian power structure in Brazil.

## CONCLUSION

At first glance, nothing seems enigmatic about the overall structure of power in Brazil, at least during its frankly authoritarian incarnation of the Medici period. It is an exclusionary, developmental dictatorship run by the military and the *técnicos* to the benefit of capitalist interests, both foreign and domestic. Yet much is missing from this summary, and

some of what is omitted is not merely detail but instead certain factors that may help explain why Brazilian authoritarianism has usually drawn back from the excesses committed elsewhere, as in Spain, in the name of antipopulist order.

One of these factors is the comparative lack of penetration of Brazilian society by the Church, together with the Church's relative dissociation from the governmental apparatus. The weakness of the Church's societal presence and its distance from the state have probably contributed to the often-noted absence of ideological combat in Brazilian politics, as well as to the customary reluctance of Brazilian elites to pursue their differences *à la outrance*.<sup>32</sup> Occasionally, some powerful actors in Brazil behave like crusading fanatics but such behavior, especially if it persists, is generally considered illegitimate.<sup>33</sup> While the present study is far from being an account of civil-religious politics in Brazil, the finding that the ecclesiastical hierarchy constitutes a third parameter within the power structure, beyond the more familiar upper class-lower class/state-society axes, is quite compatible with this interpretation.

A second feature of the power structure is one that, even though it can scarcely be called distinctively Brazilian, serves to demarcate authoritarian regimes like the Brazilian from tight-knit political formations in which all elite members are family. The system renews rather than simply reproduces itself. Although many of them receive enormous advantages from their forebears, not even the businessmen form a strictly hereditary caste. Compared to their fathers, almost all Brazilian elites are upwardly mobile. The state managers conspicuously exemplify this success story. Born in general to families of modest status, they have reached the command posts of Brazilian society through their educational attainment, their technical credentials, and, it may be supposed, their competence, however narrowly defined. In the process, they have not been averse to exploiting personal contacts, but for the most part they have had to work at these connections, since they are not typically brought up among, nor do they usually marry into, the *gente bem*, the best families.

There is, then, a division of labor among the ties that bind Brazilian elites. Although the capitalist class is well-knit through endogamy and other kinship linkages, the less ascriptive channels of mobility are open to the well-educated sons of the middle sectors who find their way into the public bureaucracy.<sup>34</sup>

At the same time, the compartmentalization of the elite estates is hardly total. Differences in the kinship and friendship networks of the upper class and middle sector elites do not prevent them from coalescing in the management of authoritarian development. The predominantly

upper-class businessmen have few qualms about developing close working contacts with the largely middle-sector bureaucrats in charge of capital accumulation, while they have little use for the noneconomic civil servants or for the politicians, even though the family background and networks of the latter group are quite respectable.

Two further points should be noted. It is possible, although I think misguided, to infer from these results that the gears of the Brazilian power structure grind very smoothly. This would be to confuse ordered sociometry with stability. The parameters of interelite relations are not the only components of political stability in Brazil.

For example, while the evidence supports the hypothesis of a certain separation between state and society—less grandly, of a division in the backgrounds and mechanisms of recruitment of businessmen and civil servants—the question remains of whether this phenomenon is peculiar to authoritarian, as opposed to previously democratic, Brazil. Is it a new trend that distinguishes the Brazil of the post-1964 period from earlier times? I suspect that the movement, though genuine, is not especially novel, and that the renovation of the elite—in particular, the ascendance of the *técnicos* and the demise of the politicians—can be characterized in part as a response to cyclical blockages among cohorts of elite incumbents and elite candidates.

Besides protecting established capitalist interests and institutions, the regime opened up opportunities for the middle sectors. It also removed many representatives of the older upper strata, most notably the politicians, who had been associated with Brazil's earlier bourgeois revolution engineered by Getúlio Vargas in 1930.<sup>35</sup> While considerable research into the social composition of Brazilian political and economic elites from 1930 onward would be required to verify the existence of "disordered cohort flows," the notion of generational renewal within the bourgeoisie as contributing to the dynamic, rather than purely reactionary, character of Brazilian authoritarianism is entirely plausible. In any event, the orderliness of the Brazilian power structure cannot be viewed as timeless; flexibility in recruitment need not be self-perpetuating, and the distribution of power within the establishment is imbalanced rather than automatically self-correcting.<sup>36</sup>

Finally, there is a remarkable similarity between the three-dimensional sociometry of the Brazilian power structure and the ideological cleavages dividing Brazilian elites. Elsewhere I have shown that attitudes with respect to the various policy issues that confront the elites can be sorted along three main axes: one composed of "moral" controversies over the legalization of divorce, for example, and the government's role in family planning; another involving social issues such as agrarian reform and income distribution; and a third tapping orienta-

tions toward explicitly political issues, such as the autonomy of labor, freedom of political opposition, and the power of the executive vis-à-vis the representation of interests. Furthermore, it can be demonstrated that attitudes on these issues follow a hierarchy of polarization, with the moral issues generating the least, and the political issues the most, antagonism.<sup>37</sup>

The correspondence between the sociometry and the ideology of the power structure matters not only because it indicates, unsurprisingly, that structure conditions the belief systems of the elites but also because it confirms the multidimensionality of the ideological as well as the institutional order in Brazil. Cleavages do not overlap, or they do so only loosely. This has behavioral consequences, as suggested by the following abbreviated chronicle of recent changes in Brazilian and Spanish policy ventures.

If one examines shifts in Brazilian politics since the miracle years of 1968–73, not only does a certain relaxation of authoritarian strictures emerge but a more intricate, sequenced pattern becomes evident. At the World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974, and with its maternal-child health care initiatives of 1977, the Brazilian government began to revise its long-standing pronatalism. Increasing dissatisfaction with the maldistribution of the fruits of economic growth caused the government to ease the more Draconian of its wage policies. Steps toward a political opening have also been taken, such as the lifting of the ban against multipartism.<sup>38</sup>

For all this, it is crucial to note what has not happened. The government and the opposition have yet to come to terms about what is probably the touchiest issue in Brazilian politics: the role of the military or, more precisely, the balance of power between military and civilian forces. It is probably no accident that Brazilian elites have managed to come to tentative accords on the less polarized issues, and have still to come to a settlement about the more truly polarizing issues.

Something like the reverse sequence seems to characterize Spanish politics since the death of Franco.<sup>39</sup> The first reforms of the Suarez regime entailed what were, for the time, drastic changes: the legalization of the Communist party, amnesty for political prisoners, concessions to regional interests such as the Basques and the Catalonians, abolition of the corporatist labor structure, and so forth. Again, however, it is interesting to observe what has not yet happened. The subsidies of the Spanish government to the Catholic school system continue, and neither divorce nor abortion has been legalized. Moreover, even though the government legalized the sale of contraceptives in 1978, it has shied away from providing health services that would include the dissemination of contraceptives, much less the provision of elective abortion. In

November 1979, 400,000 Spaniards assembled in Madrid to honor the memory of Franco and deplore pornography, divorce, abortion, and "the dismemberment of Spain."

It would be stretching a point to conclude from this condensed account alone that elite politics in Spain and Brazil change according to different clocks. Nonetheless, the discrepant sequences of policy movement across particular issues are almost certainly not random, and they offer a *prima facie* case for tracing the inhibiting and facilitating conditions of reform to the cross-cutting as compared to overlapping nature of structural and ideological cleavages.<sup>40</sup>

#### APPENDIX. THE ELITE SAMPLE

The principal characteristics and limitations of the elite sample can be summarized as follows. First, although some retired military officers appear among the top civil servants, there is no sample of the active military command. Second, sampling procedures varied with the internal structure of the elite sectors. For some groups, such as the industrial and the financial, hierarchies by size can be clearly discerned. Size was measured by liquid assets for the industrial firms (the top 500) and by deposits for the banks (the top 200). Cutoff points for defining the universe to be sampled in the civil service are more problematic. They are obscured by the marked power differences between ministries (the ministry of finance, for example, being closer to the center of action than the ministry of health) and the occasional incomparability of similar-sounding job classifications, among other factors. We settled on the rank of "national institute director" as the minimal level in order to restrict the government sample to the higher reaches of the executive and the judiciary (ministers and secretaries-general of the ministries, supreme court judges, and executive officers of public companies).

The overall response rate was 41 percent, with considerable variation among the elite groups. The sample of labor leaders is the most complete. Primarily because of their geographic dispersion, the bishops turned out to be the least accessible of the elites.

Given the political and technical difficulties of conducting such research in Brazil, the sampling results compare favorably with those obtained from the few large-scale elite surveys conducted elsewhere.<sup>41</sup> Most important, there is no indication that any of the sector-samples is biased in such a way as to prevent valid inferences about the target population. The representativeness of the sample is maintained even within the subsectors, such as the church and the MDB, where the number of interviews is small. In part, this is because the logic of sampling elites tends to be the reverse of that involved in sampling larger populations. Large samples of elites are not necessarily more representative, since elites are by definition few in number.

Finally, since the study is politically sensitive, it is worth mentioning how the elites were credibly assured of anonymity. Contacts were first established with a small number of respondents, often by interviewers (all of them Brazilian) related to the elites. Once a few interviews were completed, many of the elites called or wrote to prospective respondents assuring them of the scientific merit of the research. No tape-recorders were used during the interviews.

NOTES

1. Data are drawn from interviews conducted in 1972–73 with over 250 leaders of six major groups: (1) businessmen—bankers and industrialists, both domestic and multinational ( $n = 84$ ); (2) labor leaders (53); (3) top civil servants (56); (4) bishops (11); (5) senators and deputies of the government party, ARENA (33); and (6) politicians of the opposition MDB party (14). Sampling procedures are outlined in the appendix. The period of the early seventies, during which General Emilio Garrastazu Medici was president of Brazil (1969–74), is covered in Alfred Stepan (ed.), *Authoritarian Brazil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
2. This conceptualization implies neither that the two axes are equally important nor that they are orthogonal—that is, completely independent from one another. As the evidence to be presented shows, the second inference is false. Moreover, in the course of the analysis, no hard-and-fast distinction is made between “the state” and “the regime,” even though some observers consider the refinement to be of theoretical consequence. See Fernando Henrique Cardoso, “On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America,” in David Collier (ed.), *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); compare Peter Gourevitch, “The International System and Regime Formation,” *Comparative Politics* 10 (Apr. 1978): 419–38.
3. The comparison with agrarian bureaucracies is merely illustrative; their elite structures may be simpler than those of developmental dictatorships but they are prone to elite factionalism all the same. Small-scale communal societies may exemplify the ideal-type more closely. See Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
4. More elaborate treatments of this idea can be found in Andrew Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978) and Robert N. Bellah, *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), especially pp. 64–73.
5. For Brazil, see Thomas C. Bruneau, *The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974) and Ralph Della Cava, “Catholicism and Society in Twentieth Century Brazil,” *LARR* 11 (1976): 7–50. For Spain, see Norman Cooper, “The Church: From Crusade to Christianity,” in Paul Preston (ed.), *Spain in Crisis* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976) and the literature cited therein.
6. Compare Carlos Guilherme Mota, *Ideologia da Cultura Brasileira, 1933–1974* (São Paulo: Editora Atica, 1974), José Honório Rodrigues, *Conciliação e Reforma no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965) and Edward E. Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Civil War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). This interpretation need not entail a stereotypical contrast between Brazilian and Spanish “temperaments.” Instead, it refers to distinctive institutional histories that facilitate or impede the expression of political conflict in “fanatic” as compared to “pragmatic” terms. Nor does it imply that the styles of either Brazilian or Spanish politics are unchanging. Indeed, the Spanish case—specifically, the period of post-1950 Francoism—furnished evidence for the seminal argument that Spanish politics is less than fully ideological. The *locus classicus* is Juan J. Linz, “An Authoritarian Regime: Spain,” in Eric Allardt and Yrjö Littunen (eds.), *Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems* (Helsinki: Academic Bookstore, 1964). For all this, it does appear that Spanish politics, at least at the elite level, has a greater propensity toward intransigence than is the case in Brazil. See Bartolomé Bennassar, *The Spanish Character* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). One crucial institutional factor distinguishing the Spanish and Brazilian “styles” is that, in Spain, the Church has long been influential in the educational system, with Church schools continuing to receive government subsidies. In Brazil, the hold of the Church on the schools has been much less firm. The hypothesis that different educational experiences contribute to differential propensities toward ideological combat is eminently plausible.
7. At first glance, this hypothesis seems to stand in direct contrast to the explanation of the severity of bureaucratic-authoritarian rule as a function of the perceived threat of



- populist mobilization, joined with inflationary pressures and the bottlenecks associated with the changeover from light to heavy industrialization. See Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1973) and "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," *LARR* 13, no. 1 (1978):3–38. But this is not necessarily the case. "Severity" is a fuzzy dependent variable: it may refer to the durability as well as the onset of authoritarianism. See John Sheahan, "Market-Oriented Economic Policies and Political Repression in Latin America," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 28 (Jan. 1980): 267–91. In the long run, cultural-institutional tradition may constitute a swing factor, at least as significant as economic conditions, in influencing the harshness of authoritarian episodes. Some discussions of Latin American authoritarianism recognize this possibility even when they do not pursue it. See for example Robert R. Kaufman, "Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule in Latin America," in Collier (ed.), *The New Authoritarianism*.
8. The implications of this hypothesis stretch back to the debate over the relative effects of cultural versus class factors in accounting for the authoritarian renaissance in Latin America. See inter alia Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) and Howard J. Wiarda, "Corporatism in Iberian and Latin American Political Analysis," *Comparative Politics* 10 (Jan. 1978): 307–12. A major point of the present article is that the either-or nature of much of this debate is misguided especially insofar as the *explicandum*—the onset, the durability as well as the decline of authoritarianism—is ill-defined. Compare David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simons, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain," *Comparative Politics* 11 (Jan. 1979): 127–45.
  9. Many scholars of Latin America have noted that elite as well as nonelite networks may be composed of several kinds of linkages. But it is rare to encounter a formalization of the idea that different ties may produce different networks. A seminal work for the understanding of social networks in Brazil is Anthony Leeds, "Brazilian Careers and Social Structures," *American Anthropologist* 66 (1964): 1321–47; for comparative analyses, see Steffen W. Schmidt et al. (eds.), *Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
  10. Compare Ellen Kay Trimberger, "A Theory of Elite Revolutions," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 7 (Fall 1972): 191–207.
  11. Because of space restrictions, analysis of the socioeconomic backgrounds of the elites—their class origins and their education—is omitted. Briefly: most Brazilian industrialists and financiers are not self-made men; many of them are the sons of prominent figures in industry and banking. At the other extreme are the labor leaders, who are almost exclusively of working-class provenance. It is primarily among the civil servants and, to a lesser extent, the politicians that formal education assumes a crucial role in mobility. Most of the state managers are from the middle sectors, and they depend on higher education to overcome their class origins. For a fuller discussion, see Peter McDonough, *Accommodation and Confrontation among Brazilian Elites* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).
  12. Compare the studies conducted by Maurice Zeitlin and his colleagues in the United States and Chile of family ties among elites: e.g., Zeitlin and Richard Earl Ratcliff, "Research Methods for the Analysis of the Internal Class Structure of Dominant Classes: The Case of Landlords and Capitalists in Chile," *LARR* 10 (Fall 1975): 5–61 and Zeitlin, "Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class," *American Journal of Sociology* 79 (Mar. 1974): 1073–1119.
  13. See Lois M. Verbrugge, "Multiplexity in Adult Friendships," *Social Forces* 57 (June 1979): 1286–1308.
  14. An index of endogamy has been devised which can be used with the type of data presented in table 1; see David J. Strauss, "Measuring Endogamy," *Social Science Research* 6 (1977): 225–45. However, percentage differences are adequate to the task of assessing the extent of endogamy/exogamy, and they focus attention on the shifts between specific occupational categories. The seven-category occupational classification is a simplified version of an original 20-category code. "Manual" includes urban

and rural labor, both skilled and unskilled; "routine nonmanual" includes low-level public functionaries, elementary school teachers, enlisted men, salesmen, etc.; "middle class" includes shopkeepers, highschool teachers, middle-level government functionaries; "professionals" are doctors, lawyers, engineers, accountants, university professors, etc.; and the top categories are largely self-explanatory. "Top military/political," for example, takes in nationally known politicians, ministers, generals and admirals. Later on, the three highest categories are collapsed into one to form a five-point scale, since it is impossible to rank-order these categories. The name given this grouping is "upper class."

15. Endogamy within the upper class may appear to be lower than it actually is because table 1 retains the tripartite disaggregation of this stratum. When the categories are joined, it can be seen that endogamy at this level reaches 60 percent.
16. See Warren Dean, *The Industrialization of São Paulo, 1880–1945* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969).
17. Technically, it is possible for correlations between the occupational rankings of fathers and fathers-in-law to be quite high even though elites do not marry within the same class. There could be a constant difference between the rankings, such that the manual category regularly into the routine nonmanual; the routine nonmanual into the middle sectors, and so on. But inspection of the empirical distributions shows that this is not the case. Hence, the correlations shown here (and in figure 2) are proper measures of endogamy, and they permit a more economical presentation than a series of crosstabulations. The role of education in breaking down barriers to mobility is not, of course, uniquely Brazilian. Compare, for example, Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921–1934* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
18. To say that businessmen are inclined to marry within their class does not mean that they all marry into business families. It does mean that they are less mobile by way of marriage than the other elites. In principle, this suggests that the occasional businessman who rises from working class or routine nonmanual origins is more likely to have married into a family of similar background than into a "business family." In practice, there are very few businessmen from the lower classes. It is their "studied" lack of education which seems to be the key factor in the relative immobility of the industrialists and bankers.
19. The relevant correlations drop from .62 within the oldest cohort of businessmen (those 61 years of age and older) to .44 within the youngest (the 31 to 40 year-olds). I do not press this trend because of the possibility that it may reflect life-cycle rather than intergenerational changes, even though ancillary evidence indicates that a historical interpretation is most probably correct.
20. Compare Peter H. Smith, *Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 205–16. See also Merilee S. Grindle, "Patrons and Clients in the Bureaucracy: Career Networks in Mexico, *LARR* 12, no. 1 (1977):37–66.
21. See Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 78 (May 1973): 1360–80.
22. The questions are as follows: (1) "When you were growing up, before you reached the age of 18, do you recall if any of your relatives or members of your family belonged to the following 13 groups?" (2) "Could you tell me if any of your colleagues from the university now occupy positions in the following 13 groups?" (3) "Could you tell me if any of your relatives or friends currently occupy any position in the following 13 groups?" When responses were positive to (2) or (3), the elites were asked whether they had contact with their friends and/or relatives in the groups. In addition, for (3), kin were divided into *familiares* (immediate family) and *sogro ou cunhado* (father-in-law or brother-in-law). These distinctions have been abandoned in the analysis because they are practically nonexistent empirically: that is, contact is almost always maintained, and degrees of *parentesco* (kinship) are almost never distinguished.

23. The method used is smallest-space analysis. It generates results similar to those of factor analysis without some of the latter's restrictive assumptions (e.g., interval-level measurement). The coefficients at the bottom of the diagram indicate the success of the technique in reducing the 13 ties to one, two, and three dimensions: the lower the coefficients, the better the fit. The one-dimensional solution is unsatisfactory. It would reduce the power structure to a split between the labor leadership and all other groups. The two-dimensional solution, shown here, is acceptable. The three-dimensional rendition, which would place the church on a separate axis, is even better. The fact that the ecclesiastical hierarchy forms the basis of the third, but still significant, axis of the power structure is, of course, quite in line with theoretical expectations. For a lucid presentation of the method, see Kenneth B. Bailey, "Interpreting Smallest-Space Analysis," *Sociological Methods and Research* 3 (Aug. 1974): 3–29.
24. The results correspond to informed observations about the configuration of power in post-1964 Brazil; see for example Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *O Modelo Político Brasileiro* (São Paulo: Difusão Européia do Livro, 1973) and Helio Jaguaribe, *Brasil: Crise e Alternativas* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1974).
25. See Celso Lafer, *O Sistema Político Brasileiro* (São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1975).
26. See Charles Antoine, "L'Église Catholique: De la Résistance à l'Opposition," *Le Monde Diplomatique* (Feb. 1980): 4–5. The important point is that, while the Church in Brazil has from time to time sided with both conservative and progressive currents, as an institution it has not been bound to one camp or the other for extended periods. This is the long-term context of the Church's present endorsement of liberation theology as well as of the internal factionalism that this change has precipitated. For diverse interpretations, see Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, "Anos de Crise," *Isto É*, 2 June 1980, pp. 58–65; Ralph Della Cava, "Church Leads the Cause of Human Rights in Brazil," *International Development Review* 22 (1980): 40–43, and Penny Lernoux, "Latin America: The Revolutionary Bishops," *The Atlantic* 246 (July 1980): 6–14.
27. The underlying orderliness of day-to-day interactions among Brazilian elites is a significant pattern, for it is not at all obvious to the casual eye, nor is it derivable from the more schematic macro-models of Latin American politics. For a discussion of this problem, see Linn A. Hammergren, "Corporatism in Latin American Politics: A Reexamination of the 'Unique' Tradition," *Comparative Politics* 9 (July 1977): 443–61.
28. President Medici was nominated as "most influential" by 41 percent of the elites, and Delfim Neto by 17 percent. No other individual approaches these men in the hierarchy. Correcting the power rankings in light of reported contact restores some balance to the hierarchy. The president is more powerful than the finance minister, but the elites have more contact with the latter. This does not work for any other individuals, because they are cited so rarely.
29. Actually, the elites nominated many more than 30 individuals as influential; the total figure is close to 200. However, if a person was not cited by at least two percent of the elites, he was grouped with other persons in his own field (e.g., business, government) rather than treated individually. In short, only 30 individuals were nominated as influential by two percent or more of the respondents.
30. The variables entered into the analysis are the measures of contact, scored from "1" (no contact) to "4" (frequent contact). Virtually identical results are obtained when the influence measure is used, because the two variables are highly correlated. In this case "greatest influence" (that is, cited at the top of the list of the "five or six" most powerful figures) received a score of "6," the second-to-the-top a score of "5," and so on, with "0" representing "not mentioned as influential."
31. The fact that the labor leaders and the bishops are both enmeshed in the noneconomic bureaucracy does not mean that they have joint interests, even though a tentative alignment has emerged between them (and the peasantry). See Warren Hoge, "Brazilians Battle over Land, with Church Backing Poor," *New York Times*, 4 March 1980, A2, and "A Face Cruel do Brasil," *Veja*, 16 July 1980, pp. 84–92.
32. To take only two indicators of the weakness of the Church's presence: in Brazil there

- are about 12,000 priests to minister to a population of over 100 million, and half of these priests are foreigners. See David E. Mutchler, "Roman Catholicism in Brazil," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 1 (1968): 104–17.
33. For documentation, see Peter McDonough, "The Developmental Priorities of Brazilian Elites," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (forthcoming).
  34. It seems probable that local politics in Brazil is even more strongly influenced by parentesco ties than we have plotted at the national level. See Linda Levin, "Some Historical Implications of Kinship Organization for Family-based Politics in the Brazilian Northeast," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21 (Apr. 1979): 262–92.
  35. See Glaucio Ary Dillon Soares, *Sociedade e Política no Brasil: Desenvolvimento, Classe e Política durante a Segunda República* (São Paulo: Difusão Editora do Livro, 1973), pp. 36ff, and Boris Fausto, *A Revolução de 1930* (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1970). Compare D. A. Brading, ed., *Caudillo and Peasant in the Mexican Revolution* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
  36. Studies of cyclical blockages in mobility have grown in recent years, and some of them are plainly relevant to the succession problem among elites. See Joan M. Waring, "Social Replenishment and Social Change: The Problem of Disordered Cohort Flow," *American Behavioral Scientist* 19 (Nov.–Dec. 1975): 237–56; I. William Zartman, "The Study of Elite Circulation," *Comparative Politics* 6 (Apr. 1974): 465–88; Valerie Bunce, "Leadership Succession and Policy Innovation in the Soviet Republics," *Comparative Politics* 11 (July 1979): 379–401, and John D. Nagle, *System and Succession: The Social Bases of Political Elite Recruitment* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977).
  37. McDonough, *Accommodation and Confrontation*.
  38. See Peter McDonough and Amaury DeSouza, *The Politics of Population in Brazil* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980).
  39. See Juan Linz, "Europe's Southern Frontier: Evolving Trends Toward What?" *Daedalus*, no. 108 (Winter 1979): 369–91, and Peter McDonough, Antonio López Pina, and Samuel H. Barnes, "The Spanish Public in Political Transition," *British Journal of Political Science* (in press).
  40. See for example Stein Rokkan, "Nation-Building, Cleavage Formation and the Structuring of Mass Politics," in Rokkan et al., *Citizens, Elections, Parties* (New York: David McKay, 1970). In Brazil, such a line of investigation would lead to an analysis not only of the ambiguous history of church-state relations but also of the almost equally complex ambivalence of the military with respect to economic and political goals. Rather like that of the Brazilian Church, the role of the Brazilian military has not been uniformly reactionary through most of its history. See Edmundo Campos Coelho, *Em Busca da Identidade: O Exército e a Política na Sociedade Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Forense Universitária, 1976) and Paulo Mercadante, *A Consciência Conservadora no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, Editora Saga, 1965).
  41. See Allen H. Barton and R. Wayne Parsons, "Consensus and Conflict among American Leaders," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 38 (Winter 1974): 509–28. 1974):509–28.