

counterpart would have interrupted the sense of intellectual continuity that the writing conveys and thereby obscured the main purpose of the study.

In the short space which is allotted it is impossible to do justice to the author's thorough and balanced analysis of Yugoslav literature on the central theoretical themes of enterprise behavior, price formation and factor distribution. Before the reforms of the 1960s the debate on enterprise behavior was of little practical importance since enterprise investment programs and pricing policies were determined by the planning system and enforced through the budget. As a result of the 1965 reform the enterprise has replaced the plan as "entrepreneur," and, consequently, the debate is of central significance. Dr. Milenkovitch undertakes a detailed exposition of short-run theories, devoting particular attention to the contributions of Ward, Domar, and Horvat. She also discusses the early attempts of Furotbin and Pejovitch at long-run analysis, although their more recent articles, developing and refining their ideas, appeared after publication of her study.

The pre-reform debate on price theory also receives careful consideration. But Dr. Milenkovitch sees the outcome of the more recent controversies between the ruling establishment and other groups—such as the so-called socialist humanists—over income distribution and the related topic of property rights as carrying the greatest significance for the future direction of Yugoslav economic institutions. To operate the system effectively, authorities are already accepting the idea that a decentralized market for investment funds cannot function properly without at least some concessions to the individual ownership of capital. The question is, therefore, whether market socialism can be made to work without breaching the most fundamental socialist notions about what constitutes a just distribution of income. Since publication of this volume, the conflict between efficiency and equality has, as the author rightly suspected, become more acute. Without further clues as to its likely resolution, no confident prediction about the future course of Yugoslav economic institutions can be made.

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CONTINUITATEA POPULAȚIEI AUTOHTONE ÎN TRANSILVANIA ÎN SECOLELE IV-V (CIMITIRUL 1 DE LA BRATEI). By *Ligia Bârzu*.

Academia de științe sociale și politice a Republicii Socialiste România. Institutul de Arheologie. Biblioteca de Arheologie, vol. 21. Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1973. 308 pp. + 7 pp. plates. Fold-out map. Lei 32.

Only the very fine print of the subtitle identifies this work as an excavation report rather than a general treatise on the continuity of the post-Roman population in Transylvania, such as D. Protase's *Problema continuității în Dacia în lumina arheologiei și numismaticii* (Bucharest, 1966). The title does state the theme of the work, however, while reflecting the continuing controversy over Transylvania that threatens to turn every excavation report in this field into an archaeological apologetic. Rumanian scholars have understandably favored continuity but, whatever their bias, they have, in this reviewer's opinion, shown very good evidence for continuity of life in Dacia after Aurelian's withdrawal in A.D. 271.

The heart of the book is a catalogue of 353 excavated burials from the late fourth and early fifth-century cemetery at Bratei in the northeast part of the former Roman province. The catalogue is preceded by several introductory essays. There are drawings, photographs, and a plan of the cemetery, but there is no index and no map to show the location of Bratei and other sites. A twenty-page résumé in French is also included.

In the introductory essay, "Ethnic Classification," Bârzu attempts to identify by race the people of the Bratei Cemetery. He shows that there is little correspondence between Bratei and the extensive Germanic-related Sintana de Mureş-Chernyakov culture northeast of the former province. Bratei seems free, therefore, of significant influence from invading German peoples. The expected link with Roman Dacia, however, is not so easily established, for along with Daco-Roman features, the Bratei burials show Illyrian influences, especially in the particular type of cremation ritual. Bârzu's interpretation is that these were Illyrian colonists but influenced by a residual Daco-Roman culture. However that may be, the Bratei Cemetery yields further evidence supporting the post-Roman continuity of Daco-Roman culture in Transylvania.

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THE KAPETANIOS: PARTISANS AND CIVIL WAR IN GREECE, 1943–1949. By *Dominique Eudes*. Translated from the French by *John Howe*. New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1972. xviii, 381 pp. \$11.50.

This account of the Greek Civil War of 1943–49 has particular interest as it is written from the often brushed-aside point of view of the vanquished. It begins with the birth of ELAS and the first part, "Popular Uprising of 1942–1944," is dominated by the dark, moody, bearded Aris Velouchiotis, an avowed communist (whose real name was Thanasis Klaras, his *nom de guerre* being derived from Ares the god of war, and Velouchi, the mountains where he was born). Although Aris served in the Royal Greek Army in 1925, his claim to have been a colonel of artillery was a dubious one, but there was no doubt about his aptitude for partisan warfare, his energy, positive leadership, dedicated political convictions and ruthlessness. In the tradition of the Klepht resistance to the Ottoman occupation of Greece, Aris is likened to one of their Kapetanios, the legendary chieftains who held out in the wild mountains.

Under Velouchiotis's leadership ELAS fought alone for a while against the occupying German and Italian forces. They did, however, receive some British help as the conflict expanded. When the tide of war in Europe changed, the waiting ELAS, dedicated to establishing a government of the Left, began to move into the towns. The takeover was thwarted by military action of the British, who were interested in restoring the exiled Greek king to his throne and prevented ELAS from entering Athens. In Moscow in 1944, Churchill and Stalin had cynically agreed that Britain would exert the predominant influence in Greece while Russia would have a similar privilege in Rumania. Without this agreement, the Greek tragedy might have had a different ending. As it was, Stalin showed little interest in the Greek Left and gave it no help. Only later, after Stalin and Tito fell out, did even Yugoslavia provide some aid to the Democratic Army, which, unfortunately,