

alcoholic). The net effect, in my view, is to cause the price index to understate actual price increases, and therefore to overstate growth. Of course none of this applies to agriculture or to raw materials, because there one finds virtually no new products or new models.

Why is this important in the present context? Because Rosefelde believes that the correction to be made for this sort of statistical inflation (disguised price increases) is minor. He therefore believes that the official index was and is fairly close to the correct index if no adjustment is made for *tufta*. Let this be his view by all means. But he is not entitled to attribute it, or any conclusions derived from it, to me.

His methods of controversy are well seen in the claim that I somehow “reverse” my position by “denigrating [his] contention that the official 1926/7 value series are gravely distorted by *tukhta*.” But he knows that *I do believe them to be “gravely distorted,”* though for other reasons.

Or take another point. Echoing Davies, I reproached Rosefelde for not taking his overall assessment beyond 1933. His reply: that I condemn him for “overstating the negative consequences of Stalin’s industrialization drive 1928–37.” My point was that he did not (in his original article) consider any consequences, positive or negative, after 1933. Then, in summarizing the results of the second plan, Nove is guilty, according to Rosefelde, of presenting “the very same official 1926/7 value data he putatively disavows in his reply.” (I like “putatively”!) But in the very first sentence that follows the offending table in chapter 9 are the words that these data are “highly suspect.” Would Rosefelde be happier if I had written “*very highly suspect*”?

Finally, on living standards. Rosefelde has the decency to quote my words to the effect that the years to 1933 saw “the most precipitous peacetime decline in living standards known in recorded history,” but instead of apologizing for attributing to me the view that consumption did not fall he asserts that I am inconsistent. The inconsistency is only with *his* recomputations. The hardships of 1932–33 were not due only to shortages of food. The physical output data show a sharp fall in output of textiles and also of leather. If production of ready-made clothes and shoes rose, it could only have been at the cost of drastic cuts in supplies of materials to domestic processors, and I can quote some quite vivid evidence to show that this did indeed occur. Of course the official index for consumer goods must be rejected! I do reject it. So, by the way, does Davies, whom Rosefelde attacks so incontinently. By 1937 conditions improved and per capita consumption was above the abysmal levels of 1932–33, on this we all agree, just as we agree that this still left average real wages significantly below 1928 levels. So what is the target of Rosefelde’s polemics?

I still do not understand why Rosefelde chose to attack me at all. His subject, after all, was not 1926/7 prices but the credibility of physical output data. The key work on this is that of Grossman. For more years than I care to remember I have criticized the official growth indexes for the 1928–32–37 period, along with the wild excesses of what the late Naum Jasny called “hurrah planning.” I apologize to the readers of this journal for inflicting this unnecessary controversy on them. I can only claim, in extenuation, to be the victim of unprovoked aggression.

TO THE EDITOR:

I feel bound to comment on a review of the Heitman book on Soviet Germans by Michael Paul Sacks of Trinity College, Hartford, published in the Winter 1981 issue of *Slavic Review*.

Some of the points made in the brief review may be well taken, but I have to comment on one statement: “The absence of data on Germans in many census tables can

usually be attributed to their not being one of the fifteen nationalities after which a union republic has been named, rather than to special efforts to suppress data.”

This statement reflects a lack of familiarity with the literature.

The hangup that the Soviet statistical authorities seem to have about listing Germans in census tables continued to the 1979 census. The standard publication for the 1979 census results, *Naselenie SSSR* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1980) lists the following ethnic groups under Kazakhstan (p. 6):

(in thousands)

Kazakhs	5,289	Belorussians	181
Russians	5,991	Uighurs	148
[Germans	900]	Koreans	92
Ukrainians	898	Azerbaijanis	73
Tatars	313	Dungans	22
Uzbeks	263	Others	1,414

The entry for Germans is omitted in this table (I inserted it to make my point, using other sources). The omission is a glaring one on two grounds: (1) it ignores the third largest ethnic group in Kazakhstan while listing many smaller groups; (2) it certainly does not limit the listing to ethnic groups with union republics of their own, as the reviewer contends. The reasons for omitting Germans in some census tables and listing them in others is one of the mysteries of Soviet statistical practice. The only explanation I can offer is that the authorities, for obscure reasons, have a feeling of discomfort in listing Germans in Kazakhstan and some other Asian republics, since the Germans, unlike other ethnic groups exiled in World War II, have not been permitted to return to their Volga homeland. In any event, I thought the point should be made since Sacks seems to absolve Soviet statisticians too easily.

It might be mentioned that an updated article on the Soviet Germans by Sidney Heitman, perhaps better organized and more to the point, appeared in *Soviet Geography*, November 1981.

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TO THE EDITOR:

In his reply to my letter (*Slavic Review* 41, no. 1 [Spring 1982]), John B. Dunlop failed unfortunately to address any of the essential issues under discussion. Instead, he added to his previous *ad hominem* a few — quite a few I must say — new ones, including even rumors. This kind of polemics speaks for itself and does not deserve a rejoinder. There was, however, one statement in Dunlop’s reply which is too important to let pass. He considers my failure “to distinguish [in Russian nationalism] hopeful, inward-looking, isolationist elements from expansionist, neo-fascist ones” politically dangerous “since the post-Brezhnev leadership is likely to be increasingly Russian nationalist in orientation” (p. 199, emphasis mine).

It is this statement, not the name-calling, which compels me to write this letter. All the more because Dunlop is not alone in his hopes. Many American sovietologists (indeed, a wide spectrum beginning with Richard Pipes on the one pole and ending with Jerry Hough on the other) seem to be flirting with a similar method of distinguishing the good guys from the bad guys among Russian nationalists. There are also powerful politicians in this country who believe that Russia is headed for an imminent economic collapse and it is the duty of the United States to do everything possible to accelerate this