If he has changed his mind on anything, he does not mention it. As he says in the preface: "Looking back over my experiences of some fifty years with the Soviet Union, I find that my basic judgments remain little altered. . . ." The core of that basic judgment was formed early on, when, in the course of pursuing business deals in Russia, he concluded that "the Bolshevik revolution was, in fact, a reactionary development. The dictatorship of the proletariat, providing that the few should make decisions for the many, and that the individual must be the servant of the state, seemed to me a regressive development substantially at odds with the legitimate aspirations of mankind. That was my view in 1926. I have had no reason to change it since" (p. 51).

Yet of Stalin he says: "I found him better informed than Roosevelt, more realistic than Churchill, in some ways the most effective of the war leaders. At the same time he was, of course, a murderous tyrant" (p. 536). If his judgment of Stalin's personal qualities is favorable, his appraisal of some of his fellow Americans is not. Of Eisenhower, for example, he says: ". . . he didn't have the faintest knowledge of what was going on in the United States. Although I liked Ike personally I did not feel that he was qualified to be President" (p. 375). As for Byrnes, Harriman presents a devastating picture of him as conceited, incompetent, and unwilling to take advice.

These and other sidelights on personalities and their interplay add piquancy to the story of great power relations. Harriman's tales of his difficulties in crossing the Atlantic by air in 1940 are a reminder, also, of how much conditions of transport have changed since World War II began. But except for one or two slighting remarks about historians' ways of misunderstanding matters, the book does not enter into the historiographical debates that have raged about the breakup of the Grand Alliance. Instead, it offers the testimony of an Old Roman, firm in the right as he sees the right, regretting nothing, or almost nothing in his own or the national record during these years, and proud of what was in fact accomplished.

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DEAN ACHESON: THE STATE DEPARTMENT YEARS. By *David S. McLellan.* New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1976. xiv, 466 pp. + 24 pp. photographs. $17.50.

This study of Dean Acheson's State Department years by David S. McLellan, professor of political science at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, though carefully researched and documented, is unfortunately flawed by the author's excessive concern to defend Acheson from attacks of critics on the right and left. More serious is McLellan's failure to deal adequately with the former secretary of state's personality, with his concepts of power in the conduct of diplomacy, and with his impact on the dynamics of the Cold War. What McLellan gives us is a surface account of Acheson's life and public career, which, despite the author's labor and zeal, adds little to Dean Acheson's own Pulitzer Prize-winning memoir, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department,* or to Gaddis Smith's biography of Acheson in the series "The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy," edited by Robert H. Ferrell.

The book briefly reviews Dean Gooderham Acheson's early life; his years in Middletown, Connecticut; the strong influence of his parents, particularly his father who served for many years as rector of the Holy Trinity Episcopalian Church; and his education at Groton, Yale, and Harvard Law School. It was not until Acheson began his training in law at Harvard that he experienced an intellectual awakening and a challenge that greatly affected the future direction of his life. Three persons made deep and lasting impressions upon him: Felix Frankfurter, his law professor at

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Harvard; Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, with whom he served a two-year clerkship; and Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., whose weekly open house teas he frequently attended and with whom he became a favorite. Both Brandeis and Holmes, McLellan writes, "were austere skeptics who held to the belief that civilization depended upon the wisdom, industry, and courage of a small number of its members."

Acheson accepted this view almost literally. He never for a moment doubted that he was one of the members upon whom civilization depended. Throughout his life, Acheson remained a person of strong convictions. A strict personal code of honesty and loyalty were uppermost in influencing his decisions. Although he did not seem to care much about religion, its influence was discernible in his righteous moralism, puritanism, and idealism. To be sure, Acheson was not imbued with the "missionary fervor" of Woodrow Wilson, nor with the "religious moral dedication" of John Foster Dulles, both of whose fathers were also church ministers. Unlike Wilson or Dulles, his approach to problems was highly pragmatic, practical, and "realistic." He insisted at all times on looking at the "facts," on examining the logic of proposals, and on testing the soundness of conclusions. Acheson, much more than previous secretaries of state, was concerned with power, both as an instrument of diplomacy and as a means to maintain a balance of power, but he felt that power always had to be exercised responsibly. Impatient and irritable with trivia, Acheson at times could be sarcastic, cynical, arrogant, and even intolerant. But he could also be warm, earthy, delightfully humorous, and relaxed. In sum, one found in Acheson a combination of grace and intellectual acumen, elegance and rigid mental discipline, charm and stubborn hard-headedness.

McLellan manages to capture some of Acheson's personal qualities, but not all. What one misses especially in this book is the vital role that the former secretary of state played in the dynamics of the Cold War. The author, of course, deals with the crises that led to the breakdown of the "making of the peace" from 1945 to 1947, the period in which Acheson served as undersecretary of state, and the tension-packed years of 1949–53 when he was secretary of state. Senator Joseph McCarthy's attack against Acheson is sharply etched; so, too, are the dilemmas posed by America's China policies and the triumph of the Chinese Communists. The Korean War is, of course, fully recounted. McLellan also explains the development of European policy—the creation of the NATO alliance and the debate over German rearmament—and he deals with the Schuman Plan, the Pleven Plan, and colonial problems, particularly those relating to French Indochina, the Iranian oil crisis of 1951–54, and troubles in North Africa.

McLellan sees Acheson's successes in terms of the build-up of unity and military strength in Western Europe that proved a counter against the Soviet Union's probing of Western weaknesses. "Never before in peacetime," the author maintains, "had sovereign entities achieved such a high degree of collaboration and policy integration." McLellan also praises Acheson's effectiveness in winning support for America's positions before the United Nations. He argues that, contrary to popular beliefs, the secretary of state attained a high measure of success in his relations with the American public and with Congress. As for Acheson's failures, the author contends that these were threefold: his Far Eastern policy, relating especially to China and Korea; his inability to secure the rearmament of Western Germany; and the ineffectiveness of "his efforts to explain limited policies in limited terms," notably with regard to combating communism in Asia (which contrasted with his insistence on an all-out defense against communism in Europe).

The crux of the problem in appraising Dean Acheson as secretary of state rests on the strategic basis that he set forth in dealing with the Soviet Union. Determining the merits of Acheson's diplomacy is difficult because he and his policies are so inex-

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tricably intertwined with the Cold War. Passions have not yet cooled enough for a detached verdict. Whether the paths chosen by President Truman and his secretary of state were the only ones that were possible, or the best of alternatives that were proposed at the time, is still a matter of historical debate. What can be said with assurance is that Acheson's experience with the Russians during and after World War II invariably proved to be most frustrating. It was to instill in him the conviction that negotiations with the Soviet Union were impossible.

As undersecretary and secretary of state, Acheson was to define the premises and assumptions that shaped American foreign policy in the crusade against Soviet communism. During the critical years from 1945 to 1947, which witnessed the formation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, he became, as Gaddis Smith puts it, "the balance wheel, the coordinator, the provider of continuity and sense of direction during an extraordinarily baffling time." And Smith adds: "His ideas and direction contributed substantially and continuously to the sharpening and hardening of American policy toward the Soviet Union. . . ." The blueprint for the waging of the Cold War by the United States was subsequently set forth in NSC-68, drafted in the spring of 1950. This document reflected Acheson's strategic views, and contained the military recommendations designed to ensure the defense of Western Europe and the containment of the Soviet Union.

To Acheson, the singular threat to Western civilization lay in the danger of Soviet imperialism and its hegemony over the European continent. As he states in *Present at the Creation,* this was similar to the danger "which Islam had posed centuries before, with its combination of ideological zeal and fighting power." In that earlier time, the threat had been met by "Germanic power in the east and Frankish in Spain," both energized by military power and social organization on the continent. "This time," wrote Acheson, "it would need the added power and energy of America, for the drama was now played on the world stage."

McLellan is correct when he points out that the secretary of state's greatest success was in establishing a strategic basis for dealing with the USSR. However, to Acheson success was, in effect, tied to an ideological struggle—backed by the physical, military, and moral resources of the United States and its allies—that would be fought until a fundamental change of attitude occurred on the Soviet side. Nothing less, he believed, would guarantee freedom of conscience, individual rights, human freedom, and the treasured heritage of Western civilization. It is regrettable that McLellan largely ignores the implications and consequences of Acheson's strategic "success" in dealing with the Soviet Union. By failing to do so, in the opinion of this reviewer, he overlooks what is perhaps one of the most important aspects of Acheson's diplomacy.

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DÉTENTE AND THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN THE USSR. By *Frederick C. Barghoorn.* New York and London: The Free Press and Collier Macmillan, 1976. x, 229 pp. $12.95.

After his many years of probing Soviet society through analysis of official actions and pronouncements, Professor Barghoorn in this book examines post-Khrushchev foreign policy from the new and unique perspective provided by the critical voices of dissent. His focus, as is evident from the title, is on one key policy—détente with the West—and his sources are that part of the broad spectrum of dissent which has articulated demands for greater civil liberties and human rights. Despite sympathy for the dissenters' views and belief in their potential impact, Professor Barghoorn reluctantly concludes that repressive actions against democratic dissidents and the strength of

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