

study of the intellectual milieu in which he lived and more or less reigned. The Austrian Habsburgs of the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have not been favored with many distinguished biographies, and Rudolf II has suffered more than most for two reasons. The first of these is his own character, so complex, mysterious, almost weird. The second is that his reign has invariably been assessed in the light of the disastrous Thirty Years' War, the first all-European war, which followed shortly after. Even the ambitious two-volume work by Anton Gindely, *Rudolf II und seine Zeit* (Prague, 1862–65), concentrated on the last years, 1600–1612. The great nineteenth-century historians Moriz Ritter and Leopold von Ranke stressed, as was their wont, the political, diplomatic, and Counter Reformation aspects of his reign without fully assessing Rudolf in terms of the intellectual and cultural life of which he was such an integral part. The author of this volume offers an interpretation rather than a narrative of the times or a simple biography. From Frischlin's naïve encomium (1577) to this critical yet appreciative study, historiography has come a long way. This is psychohistory and intellectual history at their best.

The author sees the intellectual life of the period as belonging integrally to late Renaissance culture. The rationalism, balance, moderation, and classicism characteristic of the humanism of the early Renaissance had under pressure from the religious Reformation given way to other forms of thought which addressed deeper and more serious questions regarding man's place in the world of nature. The preoccupation of Rudolf and others at his court with mysticism, magic, alchemy, and occultism must be seen in this context. This striving after secret knowledge had an organic connection with Florentine Neoplatonism, hermeticism, cabalism, and the world of Jakob Boehme, and Rudolf was more an extreme case than an exception to the tenor of the times. The intellectual milieu of Prague was cosmopolitan in this Renaissance sense. Mannerism provided its natural artistic expression, for here mannerist retrospection and conscious antiquarianism were grafted onto genuine survivals of medieval motifs. Understood against this background the feeble political conceptions of Rudolf seem less perplexing, his religious understanding appears more complex and less dogmatic, and his whole mentality can be appreciated more positively in the context of the times. This book is not without its minor flaws, for the author resorts at times to a Trithemian cataloguing of illustrious men and offers adequate definitions of terms—for mannerism, for example—late in the book after using them as operative concepts throughout. But this volume sheds light brilliantly on an obscure and difficult chapter in Western history. It illustrates a point all too often lost sight of by some historians, that the interior life and inner character of rulers can have a tremendous impact on the course of events.

LEWIS W. SPITZ  
*Stanford University*

THE RELUCTANT ALLY: AUSTRIA'S POLICY IN THE AUSTRO-TURKISH WAR, 1737–1739. By *Karl A. Roider, Jr.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972. vi, 198 pp. \$7.50.

A discussion in English of Austria's military-diplomatic policies in the 1737–39 war is both unique and welcome. The volume also represents an original scholarly contribution. Roider lays bare the failures of the Austrian commanders, Neipperg

and Wallis, and shows how, for the first time, a Western power “appreciated the potential of Russia as a decisive influence in European affairs.”

The book appears to be a (revised?) doctoral dissertation and might serve as a model for others in this respect. The author organizes his material well. His prose is lean and clean. Campaign details are judiciously and even interestingly presented. Roider reveals a thorough knowledge of the basic, traditional type of German and French secondary literature and has carefully exploited certain Viennese archival sources. Altogether his work is a respectable example of the older school of historiography.

The major weakness is the one that is inherent in a strictly objective approach to the past. Mere compilation of data—however skillfully accomplished—and analysis solely on the superficial plane of human experience leave too many questions unanswered. *Why* was the Austrian army weak at this time? *Why* did the top echelons of government often function inefficiently? What was the relation between military-political problems on the one hand and the socioeconomic structure on the other? Some interesting work of this nature has been done recently, but Roider does not refer to it. One might mention in particular J. C. Allmayer-Beck, Austria’s distinguished military historian, and Fritz Redlich, the German-American who formulated the concept of the “military enterpriser.” Some source material (the *Feldakten* of the Kriegsarchiv) and at least several important Viennese dissertations (on Seckendorff and Doxat) have likewise either been overlooked or discounted. Yet another fault is the almost complete absence of titles—two Russian studies are listed—in East European languages. Even the scholar who does not know Serbo-Croatian can find ways around the problem: Though the topic is by definition Austria’s policy, it might also have been helpful to check on the possible existence of Turkish materials, at least within a bibliographic framework. The crudely drawn maps between pages 97 and 98 should never have been accepted by a reputable university press. Finally, there are a few typographical errors, something which seems unnecessary in a book of such short length.

THOMAS M. BARKER  
State University of New York at Albany

AUSTRIA, GREAT BRITAIN, AND THE CRIMEAN WAR: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONCERT. By *Paul W. Schroeder*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972. xxii, 544 pp. \$19.50.

Professor Schroeder’s title is accurate. His main subject is Austrian policy under Buol, foreign minister in the Crimean War period. His second subject is British policy and Anglo-Austrian relations. His third subject is the diplomacy of the Concert of Europe concerning the war and the Eastern Question, from 1853 to 1856. French and Russian policies per se get briefer treatment, Prussia and Piedmont appear in relation to Austrian concerns, and the Ottoman Empire is virtually ignored.

The scholarship is impressive. Schroeder has relied primarily on Austrian and British archives, and to a much lesser extent on French ones. He has used other depositories, including the papers of individuals. For Russian documents he has been limited chiefly to Zaionchkovsky’s collection and to later Russian historians. He has redone research that Harold Temperley, Gavin Henderson, and recently Bernhard Unckel had done, and challenges or corrects them on occasion. He also