

# *Ritual Demonstrations versus Reactive Protests: Participation Across Mobilizing Contexts in Mexico City*

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## ABSTRACT

Using an innovative survey of protest participants and nonparticipants from five major street demonstrations in Mexico City in 2011 and 2012, this study tests the assumption that influences on protest participation vary across different types of events; namely, ritual demonstrations and reactive protests. The comparison is based on two assumptions: that these are two of the dominant forms of protest in contemporary Latin America, and that specifying the context for different types of social movement participation provides a better understanding of the individual mobilization process for groups seeking to defend their rights or gain new benefits. The comparative analyses reveal some crucial differences. Political interest and previous political experience are more influential in the decision to take part in reactive demonstrations. For ritual demonstrations, the decision to participate tends to be driven more by personal and organizational connections.

Over the past four decades of democratic transition in Latin America, two major forms of protest activity have often characterized social movements in the region: ritual demonstrations and more spontaneous types of collective actions. Ritual demonstrations include the traditional May Day marches of labor unions and popular sectors, as well as the annual commemorations of significant historical events and past social movement struggles, such as the massacre of students in Mexico in 1968, the October 1944 revolution in Guatemala, the 1979 *Repliegue* in Nicaragua, and the martyrdom in 1980 of Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero in El Salvador. Ritual demonstrations also include international Women's Day marches and LGBT pride parades, among many other examples. In some years, when protest levels are low in a given country, ritual demonstrations may even act as the largest mobilizations taking place. Spontaneous and reactive protests represent less-planned collective events, such as anger at austerity measures, corruption scandals, repressive state actions, contested election results, and fuel price hikes (e.g., the *gasolinazo* in Mexico in 2017 or the *Caracazo* in Venezuela in 1989).

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This study examines the differences in protest participation between ritual and reactive protests in five major street demonstrations in Mexico City. Such a comparison highlights the conditions that bring individuals into different types of contention that are commonplace in contemporary Latin America. Both types of protests provide pathways to commemorating and achieving social change for excluded groups in the Americas (Silva 2009). Comparing the microlevel context for different types of social movement participation provides a better understanding of the individual mobilization process for groups seeking to defend their rights or gain new benefits.

Given how much the tactical repertoires of social movements vary (Clemens 1996; McCammon 2003; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004), especially across Latin America (Silva 2009), participation dynamics also probably vary on the basis of the type of protest. An individual's decision to participate in an annual May Day march of the popular sectors may differ from participation in a hastily called protest against a new government corruption scandal (such as the mass mobilizations over corruption in Guatemala and Honduras in 2015). Therefore, scholars studying protest mobilization have suggested that protest activity needs to be differentiated between ritualistic and more contentious events, such as protests in response to sudden policy changes (Klandermans 2012). By distinguishing between ritual and reactive demonstrations, this study offers more precise frameworks for examining protest participation and the individual mobilization process in urban Latin America.

To test whether protest participation varies in different types of demonstrations, this study employs a unique survey sample of protest participants and non-participants conducted during three ritual demonstrations and two reactive protests in Mexico City from 2011 to 2012. Very few attempts have been made to collect systematic protest participation data in Latin America in real time across multiple demonstrations.

This study offers three contributions to the study of protest participation in Latin America. First, by uncovering differences in protest participation predictors for ritual demonstrations and reactive protests, it offers a refinement to the protest participation literature. Identifying participation pathways for different types of demonstrations allows us to better understand protest engagement and its relationship to previous political involvement and social movements.

Second, the study provides an ideal case to empirically test protest participation related to urban movements in Latin America. Mexican civil society includes a wide diversity of social movement struggles, ranging from land access and agricultural debt to human rights, sexual diversity, and labor union conflicts (Cook 1996; Williams 2001; de la Dehesa 2010). Although protest activity in Mexico City might be unique in comparison to that of other cities in the country, such a case provides new insight on protest participation dynamics in other cities in both developed, stable democracies and developing ones (Trejo 2012). Gathering and analyzing empirical evidence from such a contentious yet protest-tolerant context provides a greater understanding about protest participation dynamics in other large cities and capitals in Latin America. Highly populated capital cities are the preferred places for

activists to hold protest events. These cities not only concentrate state authorities, against whom protest activity is usually launched, but also provide social movement actors with more opportunities to raise awareness about their causes, as large urban areas also concentrate media and public opinion attention.

Furthermore, the real-time survey data on protest participants and nonparticipants improve on protest participation data provided by nationally representative sample studies. Nationally representative surveys provide general information about levels of protest in a country that can be compared cross-nationally when the same questionnaire is used. They provide information about nominal protest participation. However, they generally do not offer comparisons about participation in different types of protest events. National survey respondents are queried about their participation in protest demonstrations long after the events have occurred. This may create problems of memory error and false attribution. More important, national surveys often do not provide contextual information on mobilization channels and dynamics (Saunders 2014) or information about specific motivations to participate. Because the surveys this study uses were conducted in real time alongside street demonstrations, we can be more confident about the reliability of survey responses and the comparability of participants and nonparticipants within and across demonstrations.

McAdam's 1988 model of individual movement participation provides a rationale between the incentives for low-risk and high-risk activism. The core contribution of his seminal study was to demonstrate the microlevel conditions associated with extremely high-risk activism (in which participants could suffer bodily harm or even be killed) and distinguish them from lower-cost types of events that are more common. Thus, his contribution was to differentiate between participation in low risk/cost contexts from extremely high risk/cost political environments. We also believe that motivations and pull factors vary between ritual and reactive demonstrations, which are some of the most frequent forms of collective action in Latin America. This article tests whether this is the case and offers a more refined account of how individuals are mobilized based on the type of demonstration. Some of the implications of these findings may also be extended to explain protest participation in more spontaneous or reactive events, for which even more political information, commitment, and experience may be needed.

## **RITUAL DEMONSTRATIONS VS. REACTIVE PROTESTS**

Klandermans (2012) defines ritual demonstrations as events that are held on the same date every year. Ritual demonstrations are well-orchestrated and parade-like processions that tend to celebrate identities, traditional rights or past struggles, public performances, and anniversaries that reinforce social solidarity (Collins 2001; Johnston 2009). They are anticipated traditional demonstrations and are found throughout the Americas, such as May Day rallies, LGBT pride parades, or Earth

Day anniversaries. As such, their activities tend to be predictable and festive. Ceremonial demonstrations also offer positive incentives to participate. For example, they provide reunion opportunities among participants to take pride in their past achievements (Saunders et al. 2012). They may also become jovial commemorations of historical gains and struggles of a given social movement. As a consequence, ritual demonstrations tend to have a lower threshold for individual participation because participants face minimum levels of risk and uncertainty (Ebert and Okamoto 2013), even if they still symbolically challenge multiple societal institutions (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008).<sup>1</sup> In contrast, reactive protests tend to be more responsive to immediate changes in the sociopolitical system or in the economy, such as legislative decrees, police abuse, elections, or sudden price hikes (Tilly 1978; Meyer 2014). They are less-planned and less-structured events, providing a different mobilizing context than ritual events. In some cases, reactive demonstrations take contentious and confrontational forms (Dodson 2011). Reactive protests involve relatively higher levels of risk and uncertainty, as less information is known beforehand on the likely unfolding of events and the outcome of the mobilization.

Identifying the varying levels on which individuals engage in activist networks and information channels for these different types of events permits us to better understand individual participation in sudden upsurges in protests and differentiate it from routinelike demonstrations. The distinction between ritual and reactive demonstrations has not been widely investigated, even less so in the Latin American context, where ritual and reactive demonstrations have become the two major forms of popular movement mobilization in the twenty-first century. With this study, we address this gap in the study of Latin American political participation using urban protest events in Mexico City as an example.

## **A DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH TO ACTIVISM**

To identify the extent of different participation paths by type of demonstration, we examine the primary dimensions that constitute the mobilization process. Similar to predictions from the civic voluntarism model (Verba et al. 1995; Putnam 2000), such an approach suggests that individuals are differentially situated in terms of civic organization, political interests, interpersonal networks, information, identities, and overall prior social movement experience that shape their mobilization potential (Klandermans et al. 2008). Such a perspective combines approaches that emphasize network ties (Snow et al. 1980; McAdam 1988; Gould 1995; Krinsky and Crossley 2014), mass or social media information flows (Earl and Kimport 2011; Bennett and Segerberg 2013), collective identities (McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Klandermans et al. 2014), and political involvement (Schussman and Soule 2005). We believe that individuals vary across these core dimensions predicting social movement activism. Long-planned events should mobilize people in different ways than less-planned protests responding to issues of the moment.

## Political Involvement

Considering the civic voluntarism model, we begin by taking into account how interested people are in politics and how habitual it is for them to take part in social movement–type political activities and civic organizations (Van Dyke et al. 2007; Saunders et al. 2012). We also examine how efficacious people consider their political participation (Lee 2010). Past political involvement provides a sense of personal efficacy through protest engagement, making future opportunities to join street demonstrations much more appealing than it would be to those without such experiences. In general, we expect that protest participants show more past political involvement, interest, and efficacy sentiments than nonparticipants (Saunders et al. 2012). Nonparticipants would probably not view political protest as an effective means to express political opinions and influence social change, partly because of their lack of experience in such events.

Because reactive protests are responses to current sociopolitical and economic changes, participants in such events should be more likely to be informed about these changes. They would also be more likely to be interested in politics and may have access to the kinds of resources that encourage engaging in protest, such as civic skills and knowhow from past political participation that gives them the confidence to join demonstrations in the present (Schussman and Soule 2005; Van Dyke et al. 2007). One could then argue that their political experience assists them in overcoming the collective action problem of responding to events within a limited time frame.

Ritual demonstrations are traditional celebrations of past and present social movements. Their more festive ambience tends to attract groups of people who are either related or socially connected. As such, they provide social rewards to their attendees that may function as participation-reinforcing incentives. As a result, ritual events may attract, on average, a wider group of participants beyond the more politically engaged activists. Therefore, they require less prior political experience. Hence, we hypothesize that

*H1. Participation in reactive protests is more likely to be driven by past political involvement than participation in ritual demonstrations.*

## Personal Recruitment

Beyond prior political experience, the connections individuals maintain with others also shape protest participation. One of the major advances of social movement research in the past three decades resides in the recognition that general values and beliefs alone are usually not sufficient to explain variation in individual-level participation (McAdam 1999). Mediating between movement-sympathetic beliefs and actual movement participation are social networks and organizations (Krinsky and Crossley 2014). Personal networks of family, friends, neighborhood, and workplace (Dixon and Roscigno 2003), as well as community-level organizations, act as important reference groups in pulling receptive individuals into activism (Kitts 2000). Recruiters are especially successful in encouraging participation among people in

groups with which they share a close social connection or bond (Lim 2008; Scacco 2010).

Several studies have shown that potential movement participants are more likely to join collective action campaigns when they interact with already participating activists (McAdam 1988; Gould 1995; Snow et al. 1980; Passy 2001). Taken together, personal networks provide interpersonal relationships that facilitate personal decisions to take part in social movement activities. Being personally invited to take part in a street demonstration provides reinforcement and greater normative pressure to potential attendees at such events (Schussman and Soule 2005; Walgrave and Wouters 2014).

Because ritual demonstrations are festive events and provide positive rewards to their attendees, participants in ritual events are more likely to be invited and to attend together with their friends, relatives, peers, and colleagues. Indeed, many ritual protest participants may not even have been aware of the event until someone in their social circle invited them to participate. On the other hand, because participants in reactive events are more driven by their level of prior political involvement and awareness of the event, they would be less likely to need a direct personal invitation to take part. In other words, they do not require a new invitation or recruitment attempt to decide whether to take part in the event. Therefore, we hypothesize that

*H2. Personal invitations are more likely to influence participation in ritual demonstrations than participation in reactive protests.*

While prior political involvement and personal recruitment may offer a compelling account of the probability of joining collective action, they leave a gap in explaining individual agency. Examining personal group identifications and attachments incorporates the volitional and purposive dynamics of participation.

### **Mobilizing Collective Identities**

Personal networks and political involvement tell us little about the importance of these connections to an individual's sense of self, belonging, and personal identity (Viterna 2013). People whose self-identity is strongly tied to a political movement should be especially motivated to participate in street demonstrations of the movement or issue in question (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2014). Indeed, David Snow and Doug McAdam (2000, 47) find that "the existence of a movement provides an avenue for the individual to act in accordance with his or her personal identity."

Individuals are energized by group attachments. The collective sense of solidarity and identification motivates future rounds of protest participation (Taylor et al. 2009; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2007; Stryker 2000). In contrast, non-participants are often held back from joining nearby street demonstrations because they lack an identity and emotional attachment to the groups organizing and participating in the events. Because ritual demonstrations are often commemorative events, they play a major role in reinforcing collective identities for particular sub-groups (Collins 2004). We expect those individuals who identify with participants

and organizations of specific ritual demonstrations to be more likely to participate, since the collective event itself reinforces the identity in question (McPhail 1991). These important observations notwithstanding, because of the low risks and costs of ritual demonstrations and the immediate rewards of the festivities, many people will participate, with lower levels of a shared identity with the other participants, than in reactive protest events.

Participants in reactive protests also maintain identities with organizations and fellow protestors. However, these should be stronger in comparison to the low cost of ritual demonstrations. As already predicted, a major incentive for participation in less-planned demonstrations should be related to an individual's political awareness and experience. In addition, the participant should experience a deepening of identification and solidarity with fellow activists as risk and uncertainty increase in the type of protest activity. This activist identity is also reinforced as increasing political experience integrates the individual with other like-minded activists over time (McAdam 1988; McAdam and Paulsen 1993). Thus, we hypothesize,

*H3. Higher levels of identification with other participants are more likely to have a stronger influence on participation in reactive protests than ritual demonstrations.*

### **Informational Recruitment**

In addition to political involvement, personal recruitment, and mobilizing collective identities, becoming aware of forthcoming demonstrations and rallies from different forms of mass and online social media may also motivate individuals to participate in demonstrations (Earl and Kimport 2011). Television and newspapers provide indirect information for potential participants about upcoming protest events (Kolins Givan et al. 2010). Increasingly, scholars have recognized the role of new social media technologies in providing information about upcoming protest events and motivating participation in demonstrations (Carty 2010; Bennett and Segerberg 2013).

The influence of the media in mobilizing demonstrators is even more evident when we compare the sources of information across types of events and between protest participants and nonparticipants. We expect nonparticipants to be less aware of upcoming demonstrations from any source. This lack of awareness and information about an upcoming demonstration would greatly inhibit their participation. Since routine annual demonstrations and street marches are planned in advance, participants in commemorative events are more likely to receive information about upcoming activities through traditional mass media outlets and newer social media, as well as interpersonal contacts. In contrast, reactive events are usually convoked by organizations and groups in short periods of time. Therefore, the participants would rely more on newer social media, with their instantaneous diffusion capacity to mobilize participants, as this would require less organizational resources and time. We expect to observe participants in ritual demonstrations being influenced more through traditional media outlets and reactive protest participants being mobilized through newer media channels. We formalize these arguments in the following hypotheses:

*H4a. Conventional media are more likely to influence protest participation in ritual demonstrations than in reactive protests.*

*H4b. New social media are more likely to influence protest participation in reactive protests than in ritual demonstrations.*

## METHODS

The survey data come from five different major protest demonstrations that took place in 2011 and 2012 in Mexico City.<sup>2</sup> After analyzing the types of events included in the dataset and the contexts in which they occurred, we classified these demonstrations as two different types: ritual and reactive events. The ritual events include a commemoration of the 1968 student movement, a May Day rally, and an LGBT Pride parade. Although we recognize that ritual events also carry demands that react to events and political and policy decisions, because they are predicted events, and with the passing of time, they have become annual commemorations of past social movements. Thus, with their relative gains, we consider them ritual events. Their now-traditional festive nature also helps us to define them as such.

The reactive events include two election-related demonstrations. We define them as reactive events because they were more immediate collective responses to current political developments in the country. Both of these electoral protests occurred during Mexico's 2012 presidential campaigns and elections: a pre-electoral protest march against Enrique Peña Nieto, then presidential candidate of the Revolutionary Institutional Party (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*, PRI), and a post-electoral rally called by Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the losing candidate of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (*Partido de la Revolución Democrática*, PRD).

### Standardized Sampling Technique

The Protest Survey in Mexico followed the standardized survey sampling technique developed for the research project titled "Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation" (CCC) (Klandermans et al. 2010). The CCC project requires that the sampled demonstrations gather at least 5,000 participants. The demonstrations studied here ranged between 7,000 and 15,000 demonstrators.

Because protest participants and nonparticipants are surveyed during demonstrations, memory errors and false attributions—present in national surveys—are reduced (Opp et al. 1995). Moreover, the CCC reports the type and the precise timing of demonstrations. This allows for comparisons across different types of protests and mobilizing contexts (Walgrave and Rucht 2010).

In addition, by surveying protest participants and nonparticipants during demonstration events, the validity and reliability of the respondents' information regarding their participation, mobilization dynamics, and political attitudes is increased. Furthermore, the application of the survey during protest events decreases potential errors of misunderstanding common in mail-in surveys. According to the



Table 1. Surveyed Protest Participants and Nonparticipants, per Protest Event

Demonstration	Distributed Questionnaires: Participants	Completed Questionnaires: Participants	Distributed Questionnaires: Nonparticipants	Completed Questionnaires: Nonparticipants	Response Rate (%)
<b>Ritual events</b>					
Student Movement	165	85	55	37	55.45
May Day	280	205	90	71	74.59
LGBT Pride	240	195	80	58	79.06
<b>Reactive events</b>					
Anti-Peña march	275	199	87	47	67.95
AMLO rally	240	108	73	38	46.64
Total	1,200	792	385	251	65.80

CCC methodology, potential selection bias was resolved by employing a team of “pointers” in charge of randomly sampling protest participants for surveyors to interview (Klandermans et al. 2010). Previous fieldwork experience has shown that face-to-face interaction with the respondent has a high response rate (Walgrave and Verhulst 2011).

Because all surveyed events lasted more than five hours, survey teams had enough time to randomly sample and survey protest participants and nonparticipants, even when they were rejected. The reported response rate of the five demonstrations fluctuated between 46.64 and 79.06 percent. Table 1 shows the number of protest participants and nonparticipants sampled in each event. Furthermore, to guarantee that the same protest participants and nonparticipants were not surveyed in different protest events, surveyors asked survey respondents if they had already taken part in the study during other demonstrations.

In order to provide a context-comparable group to each protest survey, nonparticipants were also surveyed during each demonstration. Protest nonparticipants were surveyed following the same random sampling technique in a given geographic area. Nonparticipants were randomly selected from individuals passing in the streets surrounding each demonstration event. They were not bystanders but passersby (Fillieule and Tartakowsky 2013).

People near protest events in large cities provide a key comparison group of nonparticipants because of their proximity to the demonstration, and they serve as one of the publics targeted by the organizers (McPhail 1991; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Fillieule and Tartakowsky 2013). On average, between 8.23 and 13.85 percent of our sampled nonparticipants indicated that they had been invited to the demonstrations (see table 2). However, on average, they reported having heard about the different demonstrations through conventional media (22.31 percent) and the Internet (14.34 percent) in comparable rates to those reported by protest participants (26.39 percent and 39.53 percent, respectively) (averages calculated from those reported in table 3).

Thus, although nonparticipants may have heard about a given demonstration in advance, even though they were not approached by a movement recruiter, when they faced the decision to join the demonstration, they decided not to do so. Additionally, because the questionnaire that was applied to nonparticipants included most of the questions included for participants and was conducted in the real time of the demonstration, comparable information was gathered on mobilizing factors and motivations.

## VARIABLES

### Protest Participation Type

We coded three possible types of protest participation: 1 for those who participated in reactive events, 2 for those who participated in ritual events, and 0 for those who did not participate in any protest event. We use the zero category as our base category against which the other two groups are compared. After cleaning the dataset, we were able to collect complete data on all the variables involved in this study for 1,043 survey respondents: 485 ritual demonstrators, 307 reactive protesters, and 251 nonparticipants (166 ritual and 85 reactive bystanders), providing a broad representation of our three core analytical groups.<sup>3</sup>

### Political Involvement

*Organizational membership.* We used the question in the CCC survey that asks respondents if, in the last 12 months, they were members of different listed civic organizations.<sup>4</sup> We coded 1 if they responded that they were a member of any organization and 0 if they were not.

*Political experience.* We utilized the CCC question that asks respondents about their involvement in different political activities in the last 12 months.<sup>5</sup> Given that most people mentioned having taken part in only one of the different political activities, we created a dichotomous variable to indicate only whether they had taken part in any political activity in the last 12 months (= 1) or not (= 0).

*Interest in politics.* We included the CCC question that asks respondents to rate their interest in politics (not at all = 0, somewhat = 1, quite interested = 2, a lot = 3).

*Political efficacy.* We considered the CCC question that asks respondents to rank the effectiveness of their participation in the surveyed demonstration. A five-point scale was used: not at all = 0, not very = 1, somewhat = 2, quite = 3, very effective = 4).

Table 2. Personal Recruitment in Ritual Demonstrations and Reactive Protests

Participation	Invited by (percent)				Missing Values	Total
	Family and Friends	Colleagues and Peers	Acquaintances	No One		
Ritual demonstrators	72 (14.85)	113 (23.30)	15 (3.09)	212 (43.71)	73 (15.06)	485 (100)
Ritual passersby	12 (7.23)	11 (6.63)	0	99 (59.64)	44 (26.5)	166 (100)
Reactive demonstrators	21 (6.84)	22 (7.17)	14 (4.56)	218 (71.01)	32 (10.36)	307 (100)
Reactive passersby	7 (8.24)	0	0	60 (70.59)	18 (21.17)	85 (100)
Total	112 (10.74)	146 (14)	29 (2.78)	589 (56.47)	167 (16)	1,043 (100)

### Mobilizing Collective Identities

*Identification with fellow demonstrators.* We used a survey question that asks protest participants and nonparticipants alike how much they identify themselves with the people participating in that protest event and with the organizers of the event.<sup>6</sup> A five-point scale was used: not at all = 0, not very much = 1, somewhat = 2, quite a lot = 3, and a lot = 4. We worked from the assumption that varying levels of identity were established before the protest event. Due to the high correlation between these two variables ( $r = .6012$ ), we decided to include only the variable reflecting the respondent's identification with fellow participants, as it reflects better the collective identity of the group.<sup>7</sup>

### Recruitment

*Personal recruitment.* The questionnaire includes a question that asks respondents, "Which of the following people specifically asked you to take part in the demonstration?" Possible answers include (1) no one, (2) family, (3) friends or acquaintances, and (4) colleagues or fellow students.

In table 2, we can observe that among all survey participants (1,043), only 112 individuals reported being invited to take part by a family member or a close friend (10.74 percent), 146 were invited by a colleague or peer (14 percent), 29 by acquaintances (2.78 percent), and 589 reported no one asked them to take part (56.47 percent). When we compare ritual demonstrations and reactive protests, we find that 72 out of 485 ritual demonstrators (14.85 percent) were invited to take part by close relatives and friends, 113 by colleagues and peers (23.30 percent), and 15 by acquaintances (3.09 percent), and 212 participated without being invited to

do so (43.71 percent), while among 307 ritual protestors, 21 were invited by close relatives and friends (6.84 percent), 22 by colleagues and peers (7.17 percent), and 14 by acquaintances (4.56 percent), and 218 participated without being invited (71.01 percent).

The zeros reported in several of the categories made it impossible for us to run a coherent model distinguishing between the effects that different types of personal recruitment would have on protest participation in ritual demonstrations and reactive protests. We decided to construct a dichotomous variable to indicate whether respondents were recruited to participate by their close personal connections (= 1) or not (= 0). Of 1,043 protest participants included in our analysis, 273 (26.17 percent) reported having been invited to take part and 589 (56.47 percent) participated without being invited.

*Informational recruitment.* We used the question in the survey that asks protest participants and nonparticipants to state the most important source of information through which they heard about the demonstration. Possible answers included four different categories: (1) conventional news media (radio, television, and newspapers), (2) online media and social networks, (3) personal connections (partners, family, friends, acquaintances, fellow students or co-workers, fellow members of an organization or association, and (4) advertisements (flyers and posters) of an organization. From these possible responses, we constructed two different dichotomous variables to reflect whether survey respondents heard about an upcoming demonstration through conventional or new social media. We included advertisements and information distributed by an organization in the conventional media category. To avoid possible multicollinearity problems with the “personal recruitment” variable, we do not include “personal connections” in the model.<sup>8</sup>

## Sociodemographics

*Education level.* We used a seven-point scale to indicate whether respondents had no education (0), completed elementary education (1), middle school (2), high school (3), college (4), or graduate school (master’s degree 5, doctorate 6).

*Self-identified social class.* We used the survey question that asks respondents to indicate if they describe themselves as a member of the lower class (1), working class (2), lower middle class (3), upper middle (4), upper class (5), or no class (0).<sup>9</sup>

*Age.* Respondents were asked to indicate the year they were born. This variable was used to compute their age.

*Gender.* We used the survey question that asks respondents to indicate their gender (1 = male, 0 = female).

## Models

To ensure that our samples of ritual demonstrations and reactive protests were comparable groups, we ran a test of independence for complex survey data. The result indicates that they are indeed comparable, as the F-value (1.4) for 1,130 observations is 1.49, with an  $r$ -value of 0.29. Because our dependent variable is protest participation in two different types of demonstrations, the most appropriate estimation method is a logistic regression, with interaction terms to address the effects of the different protest predictors on each type of demonstration and with robust standard errors.<sup>10</sup> To better assess the effects of the different interacted predictors of protest participation in ritual demonstrations and reactive protests, we calculated their predicted probabilities, holding all other variables at their observed level (Hammer and Kalkan 2013).

## Descriptive Statistics

In table 3, we can observe that protest nonparticipants show comparable sociodemographic characteristics to those of protest participants. All groups reported, on average, a high school level of education (-3 = high school level). On average, they also self-identified as pertaining to the working or middle class (-2 = lower middle class) and gave their age as between 35 and 39 years old. According to the last wave of the World Values Survey in Mexico, in 2012, the average level of education of the two thousand surveyed individuals in the nationally representative sample was also secondary/technical education; their age mean was 37; and, on average, they also identified themselves with the lower middle class. Hence, in demographic terms, our sample is similar to the national population.

Table 3 also shows other similarities between surveyed individuals in ritual demonstrations and reactive protests. Between 3 and 24 percent of nonparticipants reported having been invited to take part in ritual and reactive events. However, between 29 and 49 percent of participants in ritual demonstrations were invited by someone close to them, while between 14 and 23 percent of participants in reactive events reported that someone in their personal networks invited them to take part. Furthermore, the proportion of participants in ritual demonstrations attending without being invited to do so ranges from 34 to 53 percent, while the proportion of participants in reactive demonstrations ranges only from 70 to 73 percent. The reported means by their nonparticipating counterparts were 60 percent and 70 percent, respectively.

In terms of how potential demonstrators received information about an upcoming demonstration, between 15 and 35 percent of participants in ritual demonstrations reported having heard about an upcoming event through conventional media, and between 7 and 48 percent of them did so though new social media on the Internet. The means reported by passersby at these events ranged between 16 and 18 percent and 3 and 19 percent, respectively. In comparison, between 41 and 75 percent of participants in reactive protests expressed having heard about an upcoming protest through new social media (Internet), and between 16 and 49 percent heard about it

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics per Protest Event: Means and Standard Deviations

Variable	Ritual Demonstrations					Reactive Protests					Max. value		
	LGBT n = 195	Nonparts n = 58	Students n = 85	Nonparts n = 37	May Day n = 205	Nonparts n = 71	Pre- election n = 199	Nonparts n = 47	Post- election n = 108	Nonparts n = 38		WVS <sup>a</sup> N = 2,000	Min. value
Organizational member	0.49 (0.50)	0.38 (0.49)	0.80 (0.40)	0.35 (0.48)	0.82 (0.39)	0.32 (0.47)	0.57 (0.50)	0.25 (0.44)	0.65 (0.48)	0.29 (0.46)	0.57 (0.49)	0	1
Prior experience	0.49 (0.50)	0.47 (0.50)	0.81 (0.39)	0.43 (0.50)	0.67 (0.47)	0.41 (0.49)	0.70 (0.46)	0.25 (0.44)	0.93 (0.25)	0.21 (0.41)	0.59 (0.49)	0	1
Political interest	1.22 (1.06)	1.27 (0.93)	1.96 (1.00)	1.24 (1.04)	1.46 (1.12)	0.98 (0.85)	2.34 (0.72)	1.40 (1.01)	2.43 (0.78)	1.26 (0.92)	2.05 (0.93)	0	3
Participation efficacy	2.52 (1.24)	2.48 (1.49)	2.49 (1.30)	1.92 (1.32)	2.47 (1.30)	2.15 (1.18)	3.31 (0.73)	2.66 (1.13)	2.98 (0.93)	2.16 (1.26)		0	4
Collective identity	2.86 (1.13)	1.71 (1.56)	2.98 (1.03)	1.40 (1.21)	2.83 (1.21)	1.21 (1.36)	3.62 (0.64)	2.17 (1.55)	3.33 (0.95)	1.53 (1.52)		0	4
Personal invitation	0.29 (0.45)	0.10 (0.31)	0.40 (0.49)	0.24 (0.43)	0.49 (0.50)	0.10 (0.30)	0.14 (0.35)	0.13 (0.34)	0.23 (0.42)	0.03 (0.16)		0	—
No invitation	0.53 (0.50)	0.71 (0.46)	0.46 (0.50)	0.65 (0.48)	0.34 (0.47)	0.48 (0.50)	0.70 (0.46)	0.51 (0.50)	0.73 (0.44)	0.95 (0.23)		0	1
Traditional media	0.15 (0.36)	0.17 (0.38)	0.35 (0.48)	0.16 (0.37)	0.31 (0.46)	0.18 (0.39)	0.16 (0.37)	0.19 (0.40)	0.49 (0.50)	0.47 (0.51)		0	1
Social media	0.48 (0.50)	0.19 (0.39)	0.12 (0.32)	0.08 (0.28)	0.07 (0.26)	0.03 (0.17)	0.75 (0.43)	0.28 (0.45)	0.41 (0.49)	0.18 (0.39)		0	1
Education	3.59 (0.83)	3.76 (0.99)	3.72 (0.94)	2.92 (1.04)	3.06 (1.05)	2.96 (1.05)	3.65 (0.91)	3.28 (1.04)	3.38 (1.38)	3.47 (0.86)	5.25 (2.33) <sup>b</sup>	0	6

(continued on next page)

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics per Protest Event: Means and Standard Deviations (continued)

Variable	Ritual Demonstrations						Reactive Protests				Min. value	Max. value	
	LGBT n = 195	Nonparts n = 58	Students n = 85	Nonparts n = 37	May Day n = 205	Nonparts n = 71	Pre- election n = 199	Nonparts n = 47	Post- election n = 108	Nonparts n = 38			WVS <sup>a</sup> N = 2,000
Social status	1.95 (1.05)	2.15 (0.89)	2.55 (1.09)	1.65 (0.89)	2.66 (0.86)	1.70 (0.92)	2.27 (0.94)	1.94 (0.84)	2.51 (0.98)	1.68 (1.04)	3.31 (1.02) <sup>c</sup>	0	5
Age	30.38 (9.98)	37.69 (13.21)	34.21 (15.37)	41.51 (17.07)	40.87 (13.43)	40.31 (15.52)	34.83 (13.78)	35.19 (12.14)	45.78 (15.98)	36.65 (13.93)	37.48 (15.18) <sup>d</sup>	16	84
Gender	0.69 (0.46)	0.45 (0.50)	0.68 (0.47)	0.51 (0.51)	0.70 (0.46)	0.28 (0.45)	0.51 (0.50)	0.45 (0.50)	0.76 (0.43)	0.50 (0.51)	0.49 (0.50)	0	1

<sup>a</sup> 2006 World Values Survey.

<sup>b</sup> Scale 1-9: 1 = incomplete primary education, 5 = complete secondary or technical education, 9 = university degree.

<sup>c</sup> Scale 1-5: 1 = upper class, 3 = lower middle class, 5 = lower class.

<sup>d</sup> Minimum = 18, maximum = 93.

Standard deviations in parentheses.

through conventional media. Their nonparticipant counterparts' respective reported means ranged between 18 and 28 percent and 19 and 47 percent.

Other differences reported in the rest of our treatment variables also make these groups interesting to study. For example, participants in ritual and reactive demonstrations show relevant disparities in terms of their political participation experience and organizational membership. Between 57 and 65 percent of those participating in reactive protests expressed having been members of civic organizations in the last year, and between 49 and 82 percent of ritual demonstration participants mentioned the same. Between 70 and 93 percent of participants in reactive protests and between 49 and 81 percent of ritual demonstration participants mentioned having taken part in political activities in the past.

All groups also reported different levels of political interest, sense of efficacy, and identification with fellow demonstrators. On average, reactive protest participants showed higher levels of political interest (2.34 and 2.43 out of 4), sense of efficacy (3.31 and 2.98 out of 4), and collective identification (3.62 and 3.33 out of 4), while nonparticipants near ritual demonstrations showed the lowest levels in all these three indicators (see table 3).

If we compare these numbers to those of the last wave of the World Values Survey in Mexico, we see that on average, 57 percent of Mexicans expressed being an active member of a civic organization, 59 percent mentioned having taken part in a political activity in the last year, and on a scale of 1 to 4, their interest in politics ranked around 2.04 (see table 3). Hence, although protest participants appear slightly more politically active than regular citizens, the percentage of all Mexicans taking part in organizations is relatively higher, while their interest in politics is comparable to that of protest participants.

## RESULTS

The results of the logistical model are shown in table 4, while table 5 presents the predicted probabilities of each influential explanatory variable for each demonstration type using the nonparticipant group as the comparison base category. These results show that there are some significant differences between mobilizing factors for ritual demonstrations and reactive protests: participants in reactive protests are more likely to be mobilized by their level of political involvement (political interest and experience), while participants in ritual demonstrations are more likely to be mobilized by their organizational and social networks, as well as by their collective identities.

The first hypothesis of this study predicted that participation in reactive protests should be driven more by past political involvement than participation in ritual demonstrations. The results show that in comparison to nonparticipants, being interested in politics and having participated in political activities in the last year has positive, statistically significant effects in influencing participation in reactive protests but not in ritual demonstrations. In table 5, we can observe that for ritual demonstrations, individuals have a relatively high probability (69 percent) of



Table 4. Logistically Modeled Results on Protest Participation Predictors  
(coefficients with robust standard errors)

Protest Participation Predictors	Coefficients (robust standard errors)
<b>Political Involvement</b>	
Interest in politics	0.002 (0.12)
Interest in politics*Reactive protests	0.73 (0.27)***
Organizational membership	1.19 (0.23)***
Organizational membership* Reactive protests	-0.44 (0.46)
Political experience	0.17 (0.25)
Political experience*Reactive protests	1.51 (0.48)***
Sense of efficacy	-0.009 (0.09)
Sense of efficacy*Reactive protests	0.23 (0.21)
<b>Mobilizing Identities</b>	
Identification with participants	0.75 (0.10)***
Identification with participants* Reactive protests	0.07 (0.18)
<b>Recruitment</b>	
Personal invitation	1.40 (0.30)***
Personal invitation*Reactive protests	-0.79 (0.78)
Traditional media	0.30 (0.31)
Traditional media*Reactive protests	-0.06 (0.55)
New social media	1.00 (0.37)***
New social media*Reactive protests	-0.11 (0.57)
<b>Sociodemographics</b>	
Education	-0.33 (0.10)***
Self-identified social class	0.45 (0.09)***
Age	-0.03 (0.007)***
Gender	0.80 (0.20)***
<b>Type of Participation</b>	
Reactive demonstrations	-2.96 (0.82)***
Number of observations: 1,043	
Wald Chi <sup>2</sup> (21): 244.74	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> : 0.4036	

taking part in the events even when their interest in politics is minimal, while in reactive protests, would-be participants have to be at least quite interested in politics for them to decide to take part, with an 83 percent chance of joining a spontaneous demonstration. Having little interest in politics only puts them at a 50 percent probability of participating. Figure 1 illustrates the effect more clearly.

The results regarding demonstrators' prior political experience seem to support this claim. In table 5 and figure 2, we can observe that the probability of participating in ritual demonstrations is already 66 percent when respondents expressed not having taken part in any political activity in the previous year, and it increases to 81


Table 5. Predictive Probabilities of Significant Protest Participation Predictors

Significant Predictors	Ritual Demonstrations	Confidence Intervals	Reactive Protests	Confidence Intervals
<b>Political Interest</b>				
No interest	0.69 (0.02)	0.65–0.74	0.23 (0.04)	0.16–0.30
Little interest	0.71 (0.01)	0.68–0.73	0.50 (0.03)	0.43–0.57
Some interest	0.76 (0.02)	0.73–0.79	0.83 (0.02)	0.79–0.87
A lot of interest	0.84 (0.02)	0.81–0.88	0.93 (0.02)	0.90–0.96
<b>Political Experience</b>				
With experience	0.81 (0.02)	0.77–0.84	0.92 (0.01)	0.89–0.95
No experience	0.66 (0.02)	0.62–0.70	0.50 (0.03)	0.44–0.57
<b>Organizational Membership</b>				
Member	0.85 (0.01)	0.82–0.88	0.89 (0.02)	0.85–0.92
Not a member	0.59 (0.02)	0.54–0.63	0.67 (0.02)	0.62–0.71
<b>Mobilizing Identities</b>				
No i.d. with protestors	0.29 (0.03)	0.23–0.35	0.08 (0.03)	0.03–0.14
Little identified	0.53 (0.02)	0.48–0.58	0.40 (0.04)	0.33–0.48
Some identified	0.75 (0.02)	0.72–0.78	0.64 (0.02)	0.53–0.66
Very identified	0.92 (0.01)	0.90–0.95	0.91 (0.02)	0.89–0.95
<b>Recruitment</b>				
No invitation	0.67 (0.02)	0.64–0.70	0.76 (0.01)	0.73–0.80
Personal invitation	0.89 (0.02)	0.86–0.93	0.88 (0.04)	0.81–0.95
Not through social media	0.71 (0.01)	0.68–0.74	0.64 (0.02)	0.59–0.68
Through social media	0.88 (0.02)	0.83–0.93	0.91 (0.02)	0.87–0.94
<b>Sense of Efficacy</b>				
Very ineffective	0.65 (0.03)	0.59–0.70	0.24 (0.06)	0.11–0.37
Ineffective	0.73 (0.02)	0.69–0.77	0.52 (0.04)	0.44–0.61
Indifferent	0.71 (0.02)	0.68–0.74	0.57 (0.03)	0.51–0.63
Effective	0.75 (0.01)	0.72–0.78	0.80 (0.01)	0.77–0.83
Very effective	0.81 (0.02)	0.77–0.85	0.90 (0.01)	0.87–0.93

percent when they did, while for reactive demonstrations, having prior political experience does make a difference in one's decision to take part. Potential participants have a 50 percent probability of taking part in a reactive event when they do not have prior political experience, while the probability increases to 92 percent when they do count with such experience.

While organizational membership is one of the factors that reflects an individual's degree of political involvement, and we have argued that participants in reactive protests tend to be more politically engaged than those engaging in ritual demonstrations, our results in table 4 show that this factor was a statistically significant predictor for protest participation only in ritual demonstrations. However, when we look at the results in table 5, we can observe that this is so because the probability of participating in reactive events is already relatively high (67 percent)

Figure 1. Interest in Politics




even without belonging to an organization. It increases to 92 percent when a person has an organizational affiliation. In comparison, in ritual demonstrations individuals have a 59 percent likelihood of taking part in the event when they do not belong to an organization. Being a member of an organization increases the probability of taking part in a ritual demonstration to 85 percent.

On the basis of Schussman and Soule's work (2005), we predicted in hypothesis 2 that while personal invitations should trigger protest participation in all types of events, their effect should be stronger in ritual demonstrations than in reactive protests. Results in table 4 confirm this. When we look at the predicted probabilities of this factor in table 5 and figure 3, potential participants in ritual demonstrators have a 67 percent probability of taking part in the event when they are not invited and 89 percent when they are, while in the context of reactive demonstrations there is a 76 percent probability of participating without an invitation and an 88 percent likelihood of doing so when invited.

In our third hypothesis, we predicted that a sense of collective identity with fellow participants should be a higher motivation to join reactive protests than ritual demonstrations. The results in table 4 add more caution and nuance to this claim. When we look at the predicted probabilities of this factor in table 5 and better exemplified in figure 4, we can observe that a collective identity begins to increase the probability of participation once individuals moderately identify with fellow protest participants: 60 percent for reactive demonstrations and 75 percent for ritual demonstrations. After those points the effect of this variable is relatively similar for both groups.


Figure 2. Political Experience



Our fourth hypothesis predicted that social media would have a stronger mobilizing effect for participation in reactive protests, while traditional media would be more influential in mobilizing individuals into ritual demonstrations. Results in table 4 show the opposite effect. However, when we look at table 5, we observe that social media had a similar effect in increasing the probability of taking part in protest events of both types. Comparing participants to nonparticipants, getting to know about a protest event through social media increases the probability of participation of ritual demonstrations from 71 percent, when not mobilized through social media to 88 percent when mobilized through that means, and from 64 to 91 percent in terms of participating in reactive protests. Figure 5 illustrates this relationship.

These results reinforce our perception of ritual demonstrations as symbolic, celebratory events that commemorate past struggles and gains and that solidify personal and organizational connections. Participants in reactive protests seem to be deciding to take part on their own, probably motivated by other considerations, such as their ongoing involvement in other political activities and social movements. This may be because participants in reactive protests aim at acting more in the role of leaders, inviting others to protest events, instead of being asked to do so. Indeed, in a separate analysis, we found that 47 percent of participants in reactive protests invited someone else to the protest event while only 38 percent of ritual demonstration participants attempted to recruit others to the demonstrations. Thus, it should not surprise us that participation in reactive protests appears to be significantly

Figure 3. Personal Recruitment




lower than in ritual demonstrations. Mobilizing leaders who are resourceful individuals are usually not in the majority. Additionally, our reactive sample is relatively smaller than our ritual one.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The protest participation literature has already demonstrated that the decision to take part in protest activity tends to be a multidimensional process of political experience, solidarity, information knowledge, and connectedness. The results show that while there are some common factors that mobilize participants across ritual demonstrations and reactive protests, such as collective identities, organizational links, and new social media, there are also different participation triggers for distinct types of protests that commonly occur throughout Latin America. By uncovering differences in protest participation for ritual demonstrations and reactive protests, this study offers a refinement to the protest participation literature.

For ritual demonstrations, personal connections appear to be relatively more important, while for reactive events, the participant's prior political involvement is the most significant mobilizing motivator. From this finding, we could conclude that participants in ritual demonstrations in Mexico City conceive of them more as social events that they attend in the company of others, while reactive demonstrators

Figure 4. Collective Identities




are less likely to need a personal invitation to take part and are largely motivated by their interest in politics and their previous experience in other political activities. This result, however, is not surprising if we consider the electoral nature of the two reactive events and the context in which these two events occurred: the 2012 presidential election that brought the PRI back to power in Mexico. Both the pre-electoral march organized by the #YoSoy132 student movement and the rally held by the losing candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, to announce his intention to form a new political party were highly politicized events. More research on other types of reactive protests in Latin America against policy reforms, corruption scandals, and economic changes might be needed to confirm this finding. We, however, believe that our arguments follow a logical rationale in which reactive protests attract more politically involved participants, while ritual demonstrations, which can also be highly politicized events, tend to be celebratory commemorations of past social movement struggles that tangentially incorporate current political demands.

We still need to deepen our knowledge about participation determinants across specific types of demonstrations and protests to better understand mobilization dynamics across events and political contexts in the Americas. Depending on the type of demonstration, different factors help protest organizers and participants overcome the barriers of collective action. The results of this study should help to begin the discussion.

These findings contribute to the political participation literature that contends that individual political participation experience is the most crucial factor predicting

Figure 5. Social Media



current political involvement by highlighting that it is more the case with reactive demonstrations than ritual ones. The prior build-up of individual political capital may enable individuals to surmount the substantial obstacles of participating in less-planned protests with uncertain outcomes in short timeframes. It is participants' political involvement that makes them more or less likely to react to mobilization efforts in favor of or against sudden political, economic, and policy changes. Perhaps even prior participation in ritual demonstrations makes one more likely to engage in more spontaneous protests. This would add another critical dimension to the contributions of ritual protests, beyond sustaining collective memories, in that they also provide an experiential resource for individuals to gain the desire to participate in reactive-type protest events.

These results also help us sustain the argument that protesters will be more likely to participate in ritual demonstrations when they are invited to do so, as observed in other, more developed and democratically stable political systems (Schussman and Soule 2005). Still, ritual participants seem to be slightly more influenced by their personal networks and their identification with other participants. Their level of connectedness through personal links and collective identities seems sufficient for them to overcome the lower collective action barriers of ritual-type demonstrations.

Finally, this study helps us challenge the notion that individual protest activity is homogenous. It found differing correlates to participation in two major types of demonstrations. This study analyzed only two types of demonstrations in Mexico.

In the world of Latin American contentious politics, there are more varieties of demonstrations, such as semiplanned protest events that are not annual ritual demonstrations, and demonstrations that occur within longer-term protest campaigns, such as current campaigns against political corruption and police abuse. Future research with an even more precise classification of a broader variety of demonstrations and the correlates of individual protest participation would enhance our understanding of the collective action recruitment process. Also, other groups of nonparticipants would be useful to compare to participants in different types of demonstrations, especially those groups of nonparticipants who identify strongly with the issues and grievances in question and have close affiliations to the organizers of the events.

## NOTES

The UC MEXUS-CONACYT Collaborative Grant Program and CIDE's Fund for Research Support (*Fondo de Apoyo a la Investigación*, FAI) funded the research for this project, in which more than 40 undergraduate CIDE students collaborated as protest surveyors. Previous versions of this analysis were presented at the 2014 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in San Francisco. We thank Marc Dixon, David Crow, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, Bert Klandermans, and three anonymous reviewers for their insights.

1. We recognize that although ritual demonstrations can often be characterized as expressive events, participants may also make instrumental demands consistent with the current political and economic context, such as calls to end specific austerity policies during annual May Day marches (Cohen 1995; Klandermans 2013).

2. See the appendix for a more detailed description of the events.

3. In 1993, McAdam and Paulsen reported similar proportions of participants and nonparticipants in their study of movement recruitment. Their original sample consisted of 720 participants and 239 nonparticipants, from which they were able to follow up their research with 212 participants and 118 nonparticipants.

4. The question reads: "Could you please tell me if in the last 12 months you were a member of the following organizations. If you are a member of several organizations listed below, please only tell me in which of them you are most active." Possible answers include (a) church/religious organization, (b) union/professional organization, (c) political party, (d) women's organization, (e) sport/cultural organization, (f) environmental organization, (g) LGBT organization, (h) community/neighbor organization, (i) charity organization, (j) peace-seeking organization, (k) antidiscrimination/promigrant organization, (l) human/civil rights organization, (m) other. The questionnaire allows respondents to define their membership as active (participating in events) or passive (paying fees or just signing up). We ran separate models with each type of participation. Our results were not significantly different. Therefore, we decided to consider both types of participation as the same. We also ran additional models filtering out cultural organizations, which could be considered as potentially nonpolitical. Again, no significant differences emerged.

5. The question reads: "Could you please tell me what other actions you have taken to promote or prevent a change in the last 12 months?" Possible answers include (a) contacted a politician/local or national government official, (b) signed a petition/public letter, (c) donated money to a political organization/group, (d) boycotted certain products, (e) wore or



displayed a campaign badge/sticker, (f) joined a strike, (g) took part in direct action (such as blockage, occupation, civil disobedience), (h) used violent forms of action (against property or people).

6. The question reads: “To what extent do you identify (a) with the other people present at the demonstration? (b) with any organization staging the demonstration?”

7. For a robustness test we ran an additional model using the respondent’s reported identification with the demonstration’s organizers. Results did not change.

8. We ran correlations between online media, personal connections, and being asked to participate in an event—our variable of personal recruitment. The results show a 28.3 percent correlation between being asked to participate and being informed about an upcoming event through another person (personal connections). However, negative correlations of 38.3 percent and 18 percent appeared between personal connections and online media and between online media and being asked to participate.

9. We are aware that this information may not truly reflect the socioeconomic status of the respondents. Yet it is the only related information the CCC survey provides.

10. As a robustness test, we also ran seemingly unrelated estimations comparing logistic regression models for protest participation in each of the five protest events included in this study. In both sets of models, robust standard errors were considered to control for potential error correlation among respondents in the same event. These models are included in the online appendix. Although some predictors appear to have different statistically significant effects across protest participation in different demonstrations, the results of the adjusted Wald tests show that the only predictors that had a significant effect across protests were the participants’ degree of political interest, their political experience, and whether or not they were personally invited to take part—confirming our previous results. Running a multilevel model differentiating each protest event was not possible (model did not converge), given that only five protest events are considered in this study and each of them has relatively small numbers of observations.

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## SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting materials may be found with the online version of this article at the publisher's website: Appendix