

reader may expect an incisive and original treatise. If so, he is in for a disappointment.

Most of the volume's major themes are sound but not new. This is true of the arguments that in its relations with Middle Eastern countries the USSR has been governed not by ideology but by purely pragmatic considerations (p. 11), that in Moscow's view the Middle East is an integral part of the world-wide "cold war" competition between the superpowers, that once it has a foothold in the area the Kremlin is not likely to give it up voluntarily, and that "the irrational element of Russian anti-Semitism was strengthened by the official anti-Israeli propaganda conducted before, during and after the Six-Day War" (p. 242). The author is also correct in arguing that "to eliminate the influence of other Big Powers . . . and supplant it with its own decisive influence has been and remains the Soviet Union's basic aim in the Middle East" (p. 243).

The claim concerning "hitherto unpublished" documents is misleading. The first of the book's two parts, covering the period between 1947 and 1957, contains little that is new. Page-long quotations are taken primarily from United Nations documents that have long been a matter of public record. In part 2 (1957-67) the author does include material, based on formal and informal exchanges between Soviet and Israeli functionaries, which has not previously been made public. These documents are indispensable for any future study of the subject. Unfortunately their scholarly utility is limited, because passages of the documents reprinted are frequently omitted and the circumstances in which they were formulated are often not clear. A greater problem for the scholar is his inability to assess the completeness of Dagan's record. Are these documents the most relevant to the issues at hand, or are there others—equally indispensable—still cloaked in secrecy?

In its present form the volume is also singularly ill-suited to attract the layman. Well over half the book consists of monotonous and repetitive texts of official statements, declarations, notes, and pronouncements that are often only loosely connected by a few introductory remarks. In brief, the "scissors-and-paste" quality of the book reduces its appeal to the general public and limits its usefulness to the scholar.

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FÜHRUNGSKRÄFTE IM SOWJETISCHEN DORF: IHRE POLITISCH-SOZIALE SITUATION UND FUNKTION IN DER ÄRA CHRUSČEV.

By *Karl-Eugen Wädekin*. Veröffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Institutes München. Reihe: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, vol. 6. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1969. 357 pp. DM 58.60, paper.

It is no exaggeration to say that from now on whatever is written in the West about the Soviet countryside will either have to repeat Wädekin's work—in the book under review and in the earlier *Privatproduzenten im sowjetischen Landwirtschaft* (Cologne, 1967; a revised and updated English translation will be published shortly)—in the sense of taking fundamental issue with his interpretation of the data, or will have to proceed from the point in time where he leaves off. In preparing his account of the numbers, distribution, sociojuridical position, and recruitment of administrative personnel in the Soviet countryside, Wädekin appears to have consulted everything remotely relevant. If anything, he errs on the side of

thoroughness and inclusiveness. It will be very difficult for Soviet critics (or anyone else) to attack successfully the factual basis of his work.

The interpretation is something else again. But in order to dispute an author's interpretation, one must be at least as competent in the subject as he is. For example, though I would interpret the juridical position of the kolkhoznik somewhat differently than Wädekin (who speaks of "attachment to the soil" in a virtually feudal sense), a successful polemic against this position would once again require a considerable piece of research.

The strongest impression one receives from Wädekin's work is that Soviet society is still far from being classless or egalitarian. Social stratification seems to be, if anything, more complex in the Soviet Union, though less rigid, than in capitalist countries. This is something that has been discussed recently by Soviet social scientists—particularly Iu. V. Arutiunian. Incidentally, Wädekin seems to me to underestimate the candor, boldness, and originality of much current Soviet social science writing, and its value to the Western observer. In part, no doubt, the problem here is the familiar one: the field is moving so fast that a full-length book by a Western scholar on the subject will be out of date to a significant degree by the time it gets into broad circulation.

Wädekin is not an easy author to read or to use. This is particularly true of *Privatproduzenten*. The present work is an improvement in that respect, partly because there is less tabular data, and partly because the footnotes are at the bottom of each page rather than at the end of the book. Major sources are cited in abbreviated form in the footnotes and then listed in full in a bibliography at the end. I find this halfway use of the scientific style cumbersome and annoying. Citations should be either all one way or the other.

Wädekin's general conclusions (pp. 333–39) are sober and moderate and offer nothing startling. For example: "It is clear even today that in Moscow agrarian policy can no longer be made without regard to the reactions of the people concerned, as Stalin once did, and Khrushchev—in weakened form—once tried to do. It is also clear that these reactions must be studied concretely, instead of being deduced from the propositions of the ideology, but the question remains whether this insight has not come so late that it will make many of the recent investments futile, and will not be able to lift the rural economy out of its backwardness within a foreseeable time."

Given the extreme importance of the sociology of the Soviet countryside in terms of the theory of economic development, it is vital that the mass of data assembled by Wädekin be rapidly assimilated by scholars and interpreted from a variety of points of view. A speedy English translation of the present work would seem to be the first order of business.

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KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS. Introduction, commentary, and notes by *Edward Crankshaw*. Translated and edited by *Strobe Talbott*. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1970. xxviii, 639 pp. \$10.00.

Soon after the emergence of this best seller, a high official of the Soviet secret police wrote an article on psychological warfare and remarked that Western intelligence services "often resort to such methods as the fabrication of various 'memoirs'