

USSR. The lend-lease program was beset by political factionalism and bureaucratic infighting at the policy-making levels of the Roosevelt administration. Although the president himself had "flatly rejected" Ambassador Standley's proposal to demand greater cooperation of the Soviets, and to a degree had insulated aid to the USSR from the effects of the bureaucratic struggle, he never attempted to gain acceptance of postwar aid or to use it for definite American advantage. Roosevelt's conferral of a protective executive mantle upon lend-lease to the USSR led to false hopes and unrealistic expectations in several quarters. Significantly, the attempt led by Ambassador Harriman late in the war to extract concessions or at least a more cooperative attitude from the Soviet Union on a few key issues foundered abysmally on the U.S. bureaucracy's "clumsy and unnecessarily offensive" actions. The author singles out the "serious diplomatic blunder" of Harriman and Truman in letting pass a carelessly worded memorandum, which subordinates interpreted rigidly, to stop shipments to the USSR temporarily in May 1945, thus giving the former ally a real grievance. Herring's emphasis on "poor planning and bureaucratic confusion" is remarkably well supported by hard evidence, which must have been painstakingly acquired. One of the author's accomplishments is to use the bureaucratic politics and interest-group perspectives instead of the image of elitist American policy-making toward the Soviet Union. He notes the reappearance of the popular roots of American anti-Sovietism in late 1944 and the limits it imposed on the president and lend-lease. Herring points out that not one interest group publicly supported the continuation of lend-lease—to any country.

This study uses extensive documentation, including several manuscript collections and unpublished studies of participants in the lend-lease process, records of the agencies involved, several newspapers of the period, official histories, and the major pertinent books. The author has cast his net both wide and deep, probably neglecting no current of opinion and presenting the facts in impressive array and quantity in a clear and readable style. (What we still lack is a book which is based on comparable Soviet sources and processes.) This is a serious and intelligent work with, unfortunately, meaning and implications the author has not developed as strongly as his evidence would warrant.

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AFTER YALTA. By *Lisle A. Rose*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973. vi, 216 pp. \$7.95.

Lisle A. Rose, who has recently joined the Historical Office of the U.S. Department of State, has contributed a significant volume to the better understanding of a critical phase in American diplomacy. *After Yalta* is a scholarly investigation of the domestic and foreign policies of the United States in the years 1945 and 1946. The purpose of this book is to clarify and untangle the complicated events which set the stage for the cold war era. Dr. Rose has been eminently successful in performing this function, and lives up to the highest professional expectations. The book is clearly organized—the main chapters deal with Yalta, Potsdam, the "Atomic Dilemma," "Ordeal of Peace," and the subsequent "Grand Disillusion." The style throughout is clear and colorful, the documentation extensive, and the book exceptionally well integrated. Rose has succeeded in presenting a well-balanced picture covering both European and Asian events, conventional and atomic military

matters, and military and civilian developments. The author is conscious of the greater scope of history and examines the complicated post-Yalta period from a perspective of the mid-1940s rather than performing the usual *retroactive* job of rewriting, particularly the crucial conferences at Yalta and Potsdam.

This reviewer enjoyed the author's personalized approach to diplomatic history which emphasizes the leadership roles, especially of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Harry Truman, but judiciously balances the importance of these political elites against the sweeping forces of history. This is indeed diplomatic history at its best.

Among strong features of the book, the following should be noted. In describing the post-World War II situation the author succeeds in raising the question that most worried the "anti-Russians" vis-à-vis the "pro-Russians": "Where does real self-interest lie?" He then proceeds to offer concise answers in the chapters "The Dawn of a New Day" and "From Yalta to Potsdam." The Yalta conference is brilliantly analyzed. In the second half of the book, the chapter "Grand Disillusion" is both aptly titled and fascinating in detail. For the first time in many volumes on American diplomatic history, Churchill's famous Fulton, Missouri, speech is admirably dissected and given its proper place as the initial round of the cold war. The volume ends with a multidimensional review of the establishment of Soviet influence, and of a Soviet *cordon sanitaire*, in Eastern Europe, as well as of the extension of the Soviet political and diplomatic presence on the mainland of Asia. The diplomatic events of 1946 set the stage for the intensive cold war diplomacy of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Dr. Rose shows a great deal of "sympathetic understanding" in his scholarly judgment of this era.

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THE BERLIN CRISIS OF 1961: SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN THE KREMLIN, JUNE-NOVEMBER 1961. By *Robert M. Slusser*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. xvi, 509 pp. \$17.50, cloth. \$8.50, paper.

Professor Slusser has written a detailed, closely argued, sometimes day-to-day monograph on the 1961 stage of the Berlin crisis. He concentrates on what he sees as serious, continuing factional divisions in the Soviet leadership with respect to the Soviet handling of the crisis, centering on the rivalry between Khrushchev, who consistently took a less aggressive line toward the West, and Kozlov, who took a more hostile one. Specifically, he maintains: "The actions taken by the hard-line faction during its temporary dominance in the Kremlin during the late summer of 1961 included: (1) launching a direct challenge to the Western powers' right of unrestricted access to West Berlin by air (the Soviet note of August 23); (2) reversing Khrushchev's policy of making no further build-up of Soviet armed strength (the announcement on retention of service men in the armed forces of August 29); (3) the decision to violate the de facto nuclear test ban by resuming nuclear testing (announcement of August 30); (4) the preceding clandestine report of this decision to the Chinese Communist leadership (August 26); and (5) the decision to name the principal figure in the opposition faction, Frol Kozlov, to head the Soviet delegation to the sixteenth U.N. General Assembly (announcement of September 1)" (p. 283). He concludes with an extremely detailed analysis of the Twenty-second CPSU Congress.