

the Austro-Hungarian Empire began to disintegrate and the German Empire was threatened with revolution, it was revived by Austrian Social Democrats who, like their German comrades, were traditionally *grossdeutsch* in outlook. When Social Democrats were swept into power in Austria and Germany at the end of the war, they inserted provisions for Anschluss into their respective constitutions. An appeal was then made to the Allied Powers at the Paris Peace Conference to accord the Austrian people the right of self-determination and union with their kinsmen in Germany (a right which the Allies had accorded the oppressed peoples of the defunct Habsburg Empire). However, to permit Austria to join Germany would have resulted in the German Empire emerging from the war larger (even after territorial losses to France, Denmark, and Poland) than it had entered it. The Allied nations, which had just engaged in a desperate war to defeat Germany and restore a balance of power in Europe, could not bring themselves to allow Austrian-German unification. The Allies, in violation of their own principles, forced Germany to guarantee Austrian independence in the Treaty of Versailles, and forced Austria to agree not to "alienate" its own independence in the Treaty of Saint Germain.

Low places the responsibility for preventing Anschluss in 1919 principally on France. This is not a novel conclusion, but Low brings much new documentary evidence to support it. To write this study, the author conducted research in the foreign office archives of the Allied Powers (France, Britain, United States, even Canada, but not Italy) as well as the Central Powers (Germany and Austria). He also surveyed the press of the countries concerned with the Anschluss question (including Italy). Unfortunately, he often fails to integrate his abundant sources properly. The narrative frequently breaks down into endless quotations of who said what to whom about the events under consideration. The subordinate issues—the disposal of Burgenland, Carinthia, the Sudeten Germans, and so forth—also are not well related to the main theme of the German-Austrian Anschluss movement. Nevertheless, Low has succeeded in finding and bringing together a vast amount of new information on an important subject, one which has long needed thorough exploration. His book constitutes an important contribution to Central European history in the twentieth century.

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HUMANIZMUS, REFORMÁCIÓ, ANTITRINITARIZMUS ÉS A HÉBER NYELV MAGYARORSZÁGON. By *Róbert Dán*. Humanizmus és a reformáció, 2. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1973. vi, 272 pp. 58 Ft.

This book, edited by the Renaissance Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, is one of the most important scholarly works published in post-World War II Hungary. The author confronts a long neglected theme in the history of sixteenth-century Hungarian culture—the influence of the Hebrew language and post-Biblical Hebrew literature on the ideological views of the humanists and reformers of ancient Hungary.

Dán examines the role of the Hebrew language and literature in Hungary from the period of the Renaissance court of Matthias Corvinus to Transylvanian Unitarianism. He searches out the original Hebrew sources which served and aided Hungarian translators and reformers in their new interpretation of the

Holy Scriptures. He describes the various ideological positions existing in Protestant Hungary, from the appearance of the "grammar" of the famous humanist, János Sylvester, to the epic publication of Miklós Bogáti Fazekas. And, finally, he discovers information about the existence of generally unknown, or lost, works. Thus, as a result of his research, Dán revives the polemic of Debrecen reformer, Péter Melius against Rabbi Joseph, he analyzes statements of the "Hungarian Erasmus," András Dudith, about the Hebrew Bible, and he translates and appraises the works of the Unitarian priest, Miklós Bogáti Fazekas.

This unique book required a great amount of work and patience to gather, analyze, and develop the multitude of scattered and forgotten material on the theme. Happily, Dán, with his excellent methodological preparation and his consistent steady work, was equal to the task. Not only has he developed his material well, but he has tried to transmit the conclusions systematically, objectively, and clearly.

The book has one omission that should be noted. The author, who cites so many works in his notes, did not include a special thematic bibliography for his work, and future researchers are thus deprived of a broad scholarly synthesis of all the factual material. But this fault does not detract from the overall worth of the volume, which is an important contribution to the cultural-ideological history of sixteenth-century Hungary.

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LOUIS KOSSUTH IN AMERICA, 1851–1852. By *John H. Komlos*. Foreword by *C. A. Macartney*. Buffalo: East European Institute, 1973. 198 pp. Paper.

When news of the French revolution, in February 1848, reached the United States, Americans quickly and enthusiastically hailed the dawning of a new era in the history of civilization. The agency of the United States in this movement was unmistakable. The moral force of America's democratic example had finally penetrated the darkness of European reaction (the fact that the Paris uprising occurred on George Washington's birthday was regarded as no coincidence). When revolutionary fervor spread from France into the monarchical fastnesses of central and eastern Europe, American newspaper editors joyfully pronounced the final demise of monarchy and all the oppression that was identified with it. Europe was rising from the slumber of ages, ready to throw off the tyrant's yoke and, as the United States had done seventy-two years before, to prove that man was indeed capable of self-government. Revolutionary leaders, like the French poet-patriot Alphonse de Lamartine and the Hungarian reformer Louis Kossuth, became heroes to the American people. The wildly optimistic predictions, however, were premature. The revolutions faltered or, as in the case of Hungary, were brutally crushed. Some Americans began to question whether Europe was yet ready for democracy's blessings. When Kossuth decided to visit the United States in late 1851 to make a personal appeal on behalf of Hungarian independence, American sympathy for Europe's revolutionaries had lost much of its ardor.

Kossuth's visit, treated here in clear, straightforward fashion by an author who is himself Hungarian-born, marked both a temporary revival of the excite-