

though many jurists favor such a development—because Yugoslav law is “too much in a state of flux to be amenable to any stabilization” (p. 39).

This book should be read by everyone interested in Southeastern Europe.

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IZ ISTORIATA NA INTERNATSIONALNITE VRÜZKI NA V. I. LENIN S REVOLIÜTSIONNOTO RABOTNICHESKO DVIZHENIE V BÜLGARIIA (1896–1923 G.). By *A. M. Shnitman*. Sofia: Izdatelstvo na Bülgarskata komunisticheska partiia, 1970. 509 pp.

The vaunted master-pupil relationship between Lenin and the Bulgarian revolutionary Marxists, which Bulgarian and Soviet propagandists have greatly exaggerated and distorted, has finally received a comprehensive treatment at the hands of a scholar. Shnitman, until recent years professor at the Murmansk State Pedagogical Institute and now at the University of Leningrad, manifested his interest in the subject with his *kandidat* dissertation devoted to one aspect of it and defended at that university in 1951. In the ensuing years he published a number of short investigations which he consolidated and enlarged in the original Russian version of the present work issued in Murmansk in 1967.

Lenin's advent to power in 1917 was, as Shnitman points out, the watershed in his “ties” and influence among the Bulgarians. Before 1917 his connections with the few Bulgarian Marxists he met in exile were incidental and insignificant in affecting the line the Bulgarian party followed under the leadership of Dimitür Blagoev. A member of Plekhanov's generation, Blagoev regarded Plekhanov, not Lenin, as the mastermind of Russian Marxism. In 1902, for example, he could not conceive that anyone but Plekhanov could be the author of *Chto delat'?* and assumed that “Lenin” was one of Plekhanov's pseudonyms. At the Copenhagen congress of the Second International in 1910 he finally had an opportunity to meet both Plekhanov and Lenin and remained convinced that Plekhanov was the authoritative Russian Marxist. It was not until 1914 that Blagoev came to question Plekhanov's authority regarding the desirability of a Russian victory in World War I, which Plekhanov advocated and which Blagoev dreaded as reinforcement of Russian imperialism. The ensuing estrangement, however, did not make Blagoev a follower of Lenin, and he never understood or accepted Lenin's tactical alliance with segments of the peasantry. Georgi Dimitrov, Blagoev's eventual successor as leader of the party, was not aware of Lenin's specific views until 1914 and did not meet him until 1921.

The seizure of power in 1917 changed Lenin's status from a Russian factional leader in the isolation of exile in Switzerland to head of the first Marxist power in the world and a voice of authority to be reckoned with. Still, until his first stroke took Lenin out of active public role in May 1922, the contact of younger Bulgarian party functionaries with him was minimal and the impact of his views on them remained limited by the *tesniachestvo* (narrow doctrinairism) of Blagoev. The “Leninization” (or Bolshevization, as party historiography prefers to call it) of the Bulgarian Communists belongs to the years after their unsuccessful uprising in 1923 and the deaths of Lenin and Blagoev.

In the face of these uncomfortable central facts Shnitman has elected to dwell on the various biographic and bibliographic details of Lenin's “ties” with Bulgarians

before and after 1917, such as encounters and conversations, references to Bulgaria and the Balkans in Lenin's writings, their translation into Bulgarian, and the like. Shnitman's labors over the works of Lenin and leading Bulgarian Marxists, Russian and Bulgarian archives, the contemporary press, and the publications of Soviet and Bulgarian researchers have resulted in an interesting monograph which brings together much useful information. It is, however, written in the spirit of the intense cult of Lenin and tends to becloud rather than clarify the main outlines of Lenin's relationship to the kindred Marxists of Bulgaria.

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THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE GREAT POWERS: THE GREEK-BULGARIAN INCIDENT, 1925. By *James Barros*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970. xiv, 143 pp. \$6.50.

James Barros has established himself as an authority on the League of Nations. Within the span of a few years he produced three case studies—on the Corfu incident of 1923, on the Åland Islands question, and on the role of Joseph Avenol, the League's secretary-general—all of which received scholarly recognition.

His newest effort is no less convincing. Barros has researched with painstaking detail the available primary sources, mostly archival. (The French and Bulgarian archives were not accessible to him.) The result is a concise (perhaps too short) study of the day-by-day sequence of events which unfolded as a consequence of a seemingly harmless shooting incident at the Bulgarian-Greek border on October 19, 1925, and which culminated in the rapid involvement of the great powers and the successful settlement of the dispute by the League of Nations.

The book portrays the workings of interwar diplomacy (with its formalism but also its behind-the-scenes manipulations) and evokes many leading actors of a past era, especially Aristide Briand, Austen Chamberlain, and Sir Eric Drummond, who dealt firmly and successfully with the explosive situation. No less engaging are the minor actors and particularly the Greek officials, from the prime minister, General Theodoros Pangalos, down to the Greek diplomats in Paris and London, all of whom tried to justify the Greek invasion of Bulgaria and avoid the League's sanctions, with the usual pretense of Balkan immaculateness, yet this time without success.

Barros's main purpose in analyzing the League's "greatest political success during the interwar years" (preface) is to prove that it "had been due to a unique combination of factors which would never occur again in the years that were to follow" (p. 115), to wit, a conflict involving only marginal powers, and a unanimity of great-power interests to resolve the incident as soon and as effectively as possible. While these findings are hardly novel, the author generalizes in his conclusions that international organizations such as the League of Nations or the United Nations would do better to limit their scope to social and economic matters or at least to eschew coercive political responsibilities, thus enhancing rather than eroding their usefulness.

Although generalizations are usually debatable, one can find little fault with the core of this instructive, albeit atypical, case study. Perhaps more background on the international as well as Balkan climate would have placed the course of events in a better perspective (the few sporadic references are mostly relegated to