

Soviet aim is for its armored thrust to be able to advance on an average of sixty miles a day, but the tendency to overestimate its amphibious and river-crossing capabilities is emphasized. Milsom sums up the balance sheet of armored power by commenting that the present Soviet vehicles are "technically speaking inferior to European models (tank for tank)," but adds that the Russians believe this to be balanced by their vast superiority in numbers. He has accurately hit upon the key to Soviet military thinking: simplicity and quantity, rather than sophistication and quality.

Part 2 deals with Soviet armored fighting vehicles, including certain weapons such as self-propelled guns, and is a mass of essential technical detail. The whole book is liberally illustrated with photographs—some of which have never been published in the West before—and drawings. There is also a data appendix and a most useful, two-section index, one technical and the other general. This work should be on the reference bookshelves—within easy reach—of all military students, commentators, writers, compilers, and planners. My copy will be especially well thumbed.

Equally interesting, but shorter, is *T-34 Russian Armor* by Douglas Orgill, an account of the conception, birth, development, and wartime role of the tank. Although crude by Western standards, the Russian tank tended to symbolize the spirit of the Russian struggle against Germany in World War II. What the Model T Ford was to the automobile age, so was the Soviet T-34 to the tank world, and a book entirely devoted to it should be welcomed. The T-34 was a fast, medium tank, with sloped and angled armor, an aspect to which the British and Germans had not then paid much attention (the design allowed for increased protection against antitank projectiles), and almost forty thousand were produced, survivors being in action as late as 1967 in the Middle East. On the German side, General Guderian admitted that it broke German tank superiority and that it was "very worrying," while General Mellenthin said "We had nothing comparable," and Field Marshal von Kleist reckoned it to be the "finest tank in the world." Unfortunately, though it is readable, interesting, and adequately illustrated, the book has no index. Thus, although packed with historical and technical data, it is of little use as a work of reference. Once read it will remain on a bookshelf to collect dust, though it deserves to be consulted frequently.

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DIE SOWJETUNION UND DAS DRITTE REICH: EINE DOKUMENTIERTE GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCH-SOWJETISCHEN BEZIEHUNGEN VON 1933 BIS 1941. By *Philipp W. Fabry*. Preface by *Ernst Deuerlein*. Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1971. 485 pp. DM 45.

In 1962 Philipp W. Fabry published a book on German-Soviet relations (*Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt, 1939-1941*) that, contrary to the assertion of the late Ernst Deuerlein's preface to this book, was received very critically. Although by title the new book covers the years 1933-39, it is in fact a revised and expanded version of the 1962 volume with a brief chapter on the 1933-39 period. Fabry has added many additional quotations from the sources, both published and unpublished. He has made considerable use of the Soviet memoir literature of the last decade, and he has added detailed discussion of Comintern activity. The author has also corrected some of the errors noted by reviewers of the earlier book.

Fabry's basic conception has not, however, changed. Germany was threatened by all sorts of dangers in the period under review, and Hitler reacted to foreign dangers rather than taking the initiative himself. The major decisions were all taken elsewhere. It was the British who decided that German hegemony in Europe must be broken; it was the Soviet Union that unleashed the war. Hitler had neither the intention nor a plan to seize parts of the Soviet Union until pushed into such a scheme by the Soviet government itself. In 1939 and in 1940 the key initiatives lay with Stalin. In 1939 "the decision about the fate of the small [Baltic] states was made in Moscow" (p. 124); in 1940 poor Hitler did not know what to do and had to protect German interests against Soviet aggressive designs.

Although there is much useful information in the book, Fabry's thesis is no more convincing now than before, and his methodology is as revealing as ever. By ignoring all German approaches to Poland for a joint anti-Soviet policy before January 1939, it is possible to declare them never to have been made. When the nature of American warnings to the Russian government of German invasion plans is sufficiently distorted, the passing on of significant—and reliable—intelligence can be made into a devious maneuver. If the Red Army's occupation of Petsamo in the Winter War is overlooked, Soviet interest in the nickel mines after their return to Finland can be made into an anti-German move. If the account is sufficiently juggled, Hitler's decision of July 1940 to expand Finnish territory as an aspect of the conquest of Russia can be attributed to Soviet moves of August 1940. Chronology is not Fabry's strong point. Not only are there many misdatings, such as that of Litvinov's dismissal, but there are other inversions: in October 1940 Hitler could not allow Soviet influence in Bulgaria, because he would need it in the spring of 1940 (1941 is surely meant) to rescue Italy from a disaster in Greece that had not yet occurred. An example of a different type of misconstruction is Fabry's equating of German systematic deep air reconnaissance over the Soviet Union beginning in October 1940 with three Soviet planes sighted over Rumania on June 6, 1941 (p. 357).

There are interesting materials in this book that supplement what we currently know, especially about German-Soviet economic relations. Our knowledge of Stalin's expansionist aims, however, does not have to lead to a picture of a frightened and confused Hitler driven by events over which he had no control and constantly outsmarted and pressured by his Soviet counterpart. Such drastic "revisionist" approaches are usually more revealing about the author and the times in which he writes than about the events he purports to describe. It is, therefore, not surprising that the book opens and closes with thinly disguised critical comments about the "Ostpolitik" of Willy Brandt's government.

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THE BERLIN CRISIS, 1958–1962. By *Jack M. Schick*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971. xix, 266 pp. \$9.50.

This book is the best account of United States policy in the Berlin crisis. It argues persuasively that Eisenhower was readier to concede than Kennedy, that both effectively accepted the existence of East Germany, and that Kennedy's strategy "pertained to the worst potential contingency affecting the Western position in Berlin rather than the most likely contingency at that time—Soviet and East German