

Effects of Identification with Governing Parties on Feelings of Political Efficacy and Trust*

RONALD D. LAMBERT *University of Waterloo*
JAMES E. CURTIS *University of Waterloo*
STEVEN D. BROWN *Wilfrid Laurier University*
BARRY J. KAY *Wilfrid Laurier University*

The variables of political efficacy and trust possess a special appeal for researchers interested in the political behaviour of individuals and in the content of political culture. At the level of the individual, these variables are seen to intervene between socialization processes and people's participation in the political community.¹ At the level of political culture,

* The data for this article were taken from the 1984 Canadian National Election Study which was conducted by R. D. Lambert, S. D. Brown, J. E. Curtis, B. J. Kay and J. M. Wilson and funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (grant no. 411-83-0006). The 1984 CNES data and codebook are available from the principal investigators for purposes of secondary analysis. We wish to thank the JOURNAL's anonymous reviewers who offered helpful comments on an earlier draft.

1 Lester W. Milbrath and M. L. Goel, *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* (2nd ed.; Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977), 57-58. The research on efficacy, trust and alienation in the United States is comprehensively reviewed in James D. Wright, "Political Disaffection," in S. L. Long (ed.), *The Handbook of Political Behavior*, Vol. 4 (New York: Plenum Press, 1981), chap. 1. For Canadian studies on political efficacy and/or trust, see Ronald Manzer, *Canada: A Socio-Political Report* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1974), 304-23; Lawrence LeDuc, Jr., "Measuring the Sense of Political Efficacy in Canada: Problems of Measurement Equivalence," *Comparative Political Studies* 8 (1976), 490-500; Peter Sinclair, "Political Powerlessness and Sociodemographic Status in Canada," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 16 (1979), 125-35; Edward G. Grabb, "Relative Centrality and Political Isolation: Canadian Dimensions," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 16 (1979), 343-55, and "Class, Conformity and Political Powerlessness," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 18 (1981), 362-69; Richard Simeon and David J. Elkins, "Provincial Political Cultures in Canada," in D. J. Elkins, R. Simeon, et al., *Small Worlds: Provinces and Parties in Canadian Political Life* (Toronto: Methuen, 1980), 31-76; Steven D. Brown and John McMenemy, "Generality or Specificity in Political Orientations: A Case Study," this JOURNAL 15 (1982), 365-76; Allan Kornberg, William Mishler and Harold D. Clarke, *Representative Democracy in the Canadian Provinces* (Toronto: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1982), 78-84; Harold D. Clarke, Allan Kornberg and Marianne C. Stewart, "Parliament and Political Support in Canada."

political efficacy and trust are seen as valued commodities in democratic polities because they contribute to citizen involvement and enrich the democratic process. Writing in 1963, Almond and Verba had this to say:

In many ways, then, the belief in one's [political] competence is a key political attitude. The self-confident citizen appears to be the democratic citizen. Not only does he think he can participate, he thinks that others ought to participate as well. Furthermore, he does not merely think he can take a part in politics: he is likely to *be* more active. And, perhaps most significant of all, the self-confident citizen is also likely to be the more satisfied and loyal citizen.²

Since these words were written, the questions that have been used to measure efficacy and trust have come under close scrutiny to determine precisely what, in fact, they measure.³ Although, in recent years, the questions measuring efficacy and trust have been subsumed by the theory of political support, the efficacy items remain of special interest because they reference the self, in varying degrees, along with the political system. A number of investigators have successfully demonstrated that two dimensions, and not one, underlie people's responses to the efficacy questions.⁴ "Internal efficacy," the first of these dimensions, is based upon people's beliefs about how much say they personally have in politics and about their ability to understand politics. Other researchers have called this factor "political effectiveness" or "political competence" because the referent for the two statements is thought to be a property of the respondent who supplies the answers.⁵ "External efficacy," the second dimension, is defined in terms of people's beliefs about legislators' interest in their views and whether legislators maintain contact with their constituents. This factor has also been labelled "perceived system responsiveness"

American Political Science Review 78 (1984), 452-69; Richard Apostle, Leonard Kasdan and Arthur Hanson, "Political Efficacy and Political Activity Among Fishermen in Southwest Nova Scotia: A Research Note," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 19 (1984), 157-65; Richard Johnston, *Public Opinion and Public Policy in Canada*, Studies of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Vol. 35 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 23-24.

- 2 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 257. See also Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954), 187.
- 3 For example, see George I. Balch, "Multiple Indicators in Survey Research: The Concept 'Sense of Political Efficacy,'" *Political Methodology* 1 (1974), 1-43; Stephen C. Craig, "Efficacy, Trust, and Political Behavior: An Attempt to Resolve a Lingering Conceptual Dilemma," *American Politics Quarterly* 7 (1979), 225-39; Stephen C. Craig and Michael A. Maggionto, "Measuring Political Efficacy," *Political Methodology* 8 (1982), 85-109; Alan Acock, Harold D. Clarke and Marianne C. Stewart, "A New Model for Old Measures: A Covariance Structure Analysis of Political Efficacy," *Journal of Politics* 47 (1985), 1062-84.
- 4 See, especially, Balch, "Multiple Indicators," 23-28; Acock et al., "A New Model."
- 5 Craig, "Efficacy, Trust," 226.

Abstract. The authors tested predictions concerning the effects of respondents' identification with governing versus opposition political parties on feelings of political efficacy and trust, using data from the 1984 Canadian National Election Study. Dependent variables were political competence, perceived system responsiveness, and political trust, each measured federally and provincially. Respondents who supported the party in power scored significantly higher on perceived responsiveness and trust than those who supported opposition parties, although mainly at the provincial level. Whether respondents' preferred party was in power or not interacted with strength of party identification on the responsiveness and trust measures, both federally and provincially, as expected. Effects were much less pronounced for feelings of political competence. The authors suggest an interpretation to explain the weaker and inconsistent federal results. The article concludes with some observations concerning the relationship between partisanship, on the one hand, and efficacy and trust, on the other.

Résumé. Les auteurs ont éprouvés les prédictions concernant les effets des répondants s'identifiant avec le parti gouvernant versus les partis à l'opposition, sur leurs sentiments d'efficacité et de confiance politique, utilisant les données de l'étude nationale électorale canadienne de 1984. Les variables dépendantes furent la compétence politique, la réponse perçue du système, et la confiance politique, chacune étant mesurée au niveau fédéral et provincial. Les répondants qui ont supportés les partis au pouvoir, ont marqués de façon hautement plus significative sur la réponse perçue et la confiance, que ceux qui ont supportés les partis d'opposition, quoique surtout au niveau provincial. Que le parti de préférence du répondant fut au pouvoir ou non, il fut démontré qu'il y a une interaction avec le parti d'identification sur les mesures de réponse et de confiance, tant du côté fédéral que provincial, tel qu'attendu. Ces effets furent beaucoup moins prononcés au niveau des sentiments de compétence politique. Les auteurs suggèrent une interprétation afin d'expliquer les résultats plus faible et parfois inconsistant au niveau fédéral. Cet article conclut avec certaines observations concernant la relation entre être partisan, d'un côté, et l'efficacité et la confiance, de l'autre.

because it refers primarily to features of government, and it is only incidentally descriptive of respondents themselves.

The present inquiry takes the idea of system responsiveness as its point of departure and asks about the circumstances under which a political system, whether federal or provincial, might appear more or less responsive and trustworthy. Our working hypothesis is that people will feel government is more responsive and trustworthy when what they define as their party is in power, and this quite independently of the political stripe of the party in question.⁶ To date,

6 Using data from the 1974 Canadian National Election Study, Kornberg, Clarke and LeDuc found that people who strongly identified with the Liberal party, then in power in Ottawa, were more likely to score higher on a feeling thermometer toward the federal government, than were supporters of other parties. They interpreted these findings by supposing that the "average citizens" in their study probably did not distinguish between "regime" and the "government of the day," especially since the Liberal party had "formed the national government for 34 of the last 40 years." See Allan Kornberg, Harold D. Clarke and Lawrence LeDuc, "Some Correlates of Regime Support in Canada," *British Journal of Political Science* 8 (1978), 201, 208; see also Simeon and Elkins, *Small Worlds*, 58, 62. In his 1986 book, *Public Opinion*, Johnston subsumed efficacy under the rubric of "political support," along with a wide variety of cognate variables. However, he did not take respondents' party attachments into account in his efforts to explain political support. In the United States, Aberbach found some evidence in 1958 and especially in 1964 for the partisan

the clearest evidence for this hypothesis has come from Citrin's analysis of trust in American post-election surveys conducted from 1964 to 1972. Democrats trusted government less when there was a Republican president, he found, and so did Republicans when there was a Democratic president.⁷

People who identify with a governing party, in short, will be more likely to believe that the government is sympathetic to their wishes and serves their interests. They will express a proprietary interest in their party's welfare and they will, therefore, be inclined to think kindly of its performance in government. Identification with a party that is not in power, or with no party at all, should reduce people's proprietary feelings in the government, thus undermining their belief in its responsiveness. For want of a better label, we will call this effect of identifying with the party in power a "partisan" or "partisanship effect." Inspection of the manifest content of the items measuring external efficacy and political trust, as well as previous research that has shown a positive relationship between these two variables,⁸ lead to similar predictions for the trust variable.

As a corollary to the above, we also expected that people who identified strongly with the party in power would report greater system responsiveness and more trust in government than people whose commitment to the same party was weaker. This prediction shares the same rationale as the above predictions, in that people's proprietary feelings about government are assumed to increase with the strength of their identification with the governing party.

effect on the trust variable. These effects were demonstrated without benefit of statistical controls. Also in the United States, studies by Miller on political cynicism and by Wright on efficacy and trust have failed to find any effects for partisanship. See Joel D. Aberbach, "Alienation and Political Behavior," *American Political Science Review* 63 (1969), 94; Arthur H. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970," *American Political Science Review* 68 (1974), 964; James D. Wright, *The Dissent of the Governed: Alienation and Democracy in America* (New York: Academic Press, 1976), 153-55.

- 7 Jack Citrin, "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government," *American Political Science Review* 68 (1974), 976-977. Compare Jack Citrin, Herbert McClosky, J. Merrill Shanks and Paul M. Sniderman, "Personal and Political Sources of Political Alienation," *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (1975), 10-12.
- 8 See, for example, Richard L. Cole, "Toward a Model of Political Trust: A Causal Analysis," *American Journal of Political Science* 17 (1973), 813; Balch, "Multiple Indicators," 19-23; Craig, "Efficacy, Trust," 234-36; compare, Craig and Maggiotto, "Measuring Political Efficacy," 96-98. Although our hypothesis assumes that perceived system responsiveness and political trust speak to the same condition, other studies have capitalized on the relative independence of efficacy and trust. See, for example: Simeon and Elkins, *Small Worlds*, 42-46; William A. Gamson, "Discontent and Trust," in his *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1968), 48; Jeffery M. Paige, "Political Orientation and Riot Participation," *American Sociological Review* 36 (1971), 812.

It was less clear what relationships we should expect between strength of party identification, on the one hand, and external efficacy and trust, on the other, among people who identify with an opposition party. Our hesitation in formulating a prediction stemmed from the suspicion that there might be two contrary factors operating in the case of these people. A negative relationship would be expected if strength of party identification signifies people's sense of exclusion from the government party. On this assumption, those who identify most strongly with an opposition party should experience the greatest psychological distance between themselves and the government. Although Citrin's analysis was limited to the trust variable and was performed without benefit of statistical controls, he found that Republicans and Democrats who identified strongly with their respective parties distrusted government most when the president came from the other party.⁹ However, a positive relationship would be expected if strength of party identification is conceptualized as a form of psychological participation in the polity, with resultant feelings of efficacy and trust. If the effects of these two contrary processes neutralize each other, or if the first process prevails, then we should expect an interaction between partisanship and strength of party identification. If the second process prevails, we should expect a significant main effect for strength of party identification, but no interaction effect between it and partisanship.

The effect of the partisanship variable should be different for the measure of political competence. In the case of competence, support for the incumbent party should produce a much weaker effect because the referent for the concept is more the respondent than it is the political system. Yet we could not rule out partisan effects altogether because of (a) a positive correlation between the two components of efficacy expected on the basis of previous research and (b) theoretical speculation about the linkage between perceived system responsiveness and political competence in democracies.¹⁰ In the latter case, the development of feelings of political competence in individuals is said to be at least partially a product of responsive political systems; hence there are stronger relationships between the two phenomena in democracies than in less participatory systems.

In addition to the predicted partisanship effects based upon whether the respondent's party formed the government, we made similar predictions at the constituency level in terms of whether the respondent's party held the seat in question. We were able to test the latter prediction only for perceptions of federal politics because the 1984 Canadian National Election Study contained no information about who

9 Citrin, "Comment," 976, 977.

10 Coleman and Davis, "Structural Contexts," 190-94; Craig and Maggiotto, "Measuring Personal Efficacy," 86.

or which party represented respondents' ridings in the provincial legislatures. We predicted that people who shared the same party affiliation as their members of parliament, regardless of party, would score higher on the federally-defined measures of perceived responsiveness and trust, but there should be little difference for competence. These expected effects are conceptually independent of any partisanship effects since one's MP might sit in the opposition.

Showing partisanship effects federally, however, might be interpreted as a simple effect of identifying with the Progressive Conservative party.¹¹ There are a number of reasons for believing that Conservative identifiers in 1984 probably felt more efficacious than partisans of the other major parties.¹² The constituency measure partially answers this criticism if we can show that it produces an independent effect. A more convincing answer, though, will come from the provincial analyses for these amount to 10 replications of the federal analyses on most major points. We were especially intrigued by what might emerge from the data for the provinces governed by the Parti Québécois, the New Democratic party and Social Credit, apart from the results for the seven provinces in which the Conservatives held sway at the time of the interviews. In addition, there was little doubt in the provincial-level analyses about which incumbent governments respondents had in mind when they answered the attitude statements. We could not be so sure in the case of the federal-level analyses because the 1984 election had produced a change in government. In answering the questions, respondents might be thinking of the defeated Liberals or the victorious Conservatives.

We thought it desirable to control for a number of potentially confounding variables in all of the analyses, most notably respondents' levels of education and their continuing interest in politics. Education was controlled because it indexes respondents' prior socialization and it is a measure of social stratification. On both of these counts, we expected education to be independently associated with our dependent variables. Apart from wishing to show the independent effects of partisanship, we also made predictions about the relative impacts of education and partisanship on the various dependent measures. We

11 Compare, Kornberg, Clarke and LeDuc, "Some Correlates," 201, 208.

12 These might be reflected, for example, in the dramatic changes in the parties' standings in the polls during the month prior to election day. See B. J. Kay, S. D. Brown, J. E. Curtis, R. D. Lambert and J. M. Wilson, "The Character of Electoral Change: A Preliminary Report from the 1984 National Election Study," paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, Montreal, 1985, Figure 1; Alan Frizzell and Anthony Westell, *The Canadian General Election of 1984: Politicians, Parties, Press and Polls* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1985), chap. 4. On the relationship of party identification to efficacy and trust, see Simeon and Elkins, "Provincial Political Cultures," 64-66.

expected that education would play a greater role in explaining variation in competence than perceived responsiveness and trust. There are two reasons for this. First, education provides people with some of the conceptual skills that are necessary to understand politics, as well as the accompanying self-image and feelings of personal competence. Second, education should be weaker as a predictor of perceived responsiveness and trust on the grounds that the latter two variables are influenced more by the contemporary political environment than by the socialization history of individual respondents.¹³ Partisanship, on the other hand, should be a stronger predictor of perceived responsiveness and trust than competence, for the reasons given above.

In addition to education, we thought it important to control for respondents' levels of political participation since efficacy and political participation have previously been shown to be related to each other.¹⁴ No doubt the relationship runs from participation to efficacy, as well as from efficacy to participation. This being the case, we wanted to be sure that any partisanship effect was not really attributable to greater involvement in the political process on the part of supporters of governing parties. A question asking about respondents' continuing attention to politics was used as a proxy for their involvement in politics. We chose this item because it could be employed in both the federal and the provincial analyses. There were more direct measures of political involvement, such as working for political parties and contributing financially to them, but these questions were available only for federal politics. In any event, preliminary analyses showed substantial relationships between the attention variable and the more active forms of political participation.

Data Source and Measurements

The sample design of the 1984 Canadian National Election Study was a multi-stage, stratified cluster sample of the Canadian electorate (raw $N=3377$), with systematic oversampling of the less populous provinces.¹⁵ For our analyses within each province, weights were used to make the samples provincially representative and to take advantage

- 13 Craig and Maggioro, "Measuring Personal Efficacy," 87; Kornberg et al., *Representative Democracy*, 82.
- 14 See, for example, Milbrath and Goel, *Political Participation*, 57-66; Paul R. Abramson and John H. Aldrich, "The Decline of Electoral Participation in America," *American Political Science Review* 76 (1982), 502-21; Thomas M. Guterbock and Bruce London, "Race, Political Orientation, and Participation: An Empirical Test of Four Competing Theories," *American Sociological Review* 48 (1983), 439-53.
- 15 R. D. Lambert, S. D. Brown, J. E. Curtis, B. J. Kay and J. M. Wilson, *1984 Canadian National Election Study Codebook* (Waterloo, Ont., 1986).

of the larger sample sizes available in the smaller provinces than would be justified as part of a nationally representative sample.

Dependent Variables

The provincial-level efficacy and trust items were introduced in the interviews as follows: "Here are some opinions some people hold about their provincial government here in (Name Province)." The "federal government" was specified for the federal-level items. In the following four questions, external efficacy or the *perceived responsiveness* of government was measured by the first and second items and internal efficacy or *political competence* was measured by the third and fourth items.

1. Generally, those elected to the (Province Name) legislature (In Quebec Say: National Assembly) soon lose touch with the people. [Answers to this and the remaining questions measuring efficacy and trust were as follows: strongly agree; agree somewhat; neither agree nor disagree; disagree somewhat; strongly disagree; no opinion and no answers were declared missing.]
2. I don't think the (Name Province) government cares much about what people like me think.
3. Sometimes, (Name Province) politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.
4. People like me don't have any say about what the government in (Name Province) does.

The answers to each pair of questions were summed to produce an index with a range of 0 (low efficacy) to 8 (high efficacy).

The third dependent variable, *political trust*, was measured by answers to the following four questions.

1. Many people in the government here in (Name Province) are dishonest.
2. People in the (Name Province) government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes.
3. Most of the time we can trust people in the (Name Province) government to do what is right. [Answers to this and the next question were recoded so that they were keyed in the appropriate direction.]
4. Most of the people running the government here in (Name Province) are smart people who usually know what they are doing.

The answers to these questions were summed to produce a variable with a range of 0 (low trust) to 16 (high trust). If a respondent answered three

questions, the respondent's mean score on these items was substituted for the fourth, missing item.¹⁶

In the questions on federal-level politics, the referents for the four political efficacy items were, in order, as follows: Parliament; federal government; federal politics and government; the government in Ottawa. "Federal," in lieu of "provincial," appeared in each of the four trust items.

Predictor Variables

Identification with the governing party or partisanship, our principal predictor variable, was defined in terms of consistency (coded=2) versus inconsistency (=1) between the party in power in a given province and respondents' answer(s) to the following questions in the province concerned:

Thinking of provincial politics here in (Name Province), generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as: a Liberal, Progressive Conservative, NDP, Social Credit, or what? [The options in Quebec were: Parti Québécois, Liberal, Union nationale, Créditiste.]

(If "Refused," "Don't Know," "Independent" or "None" in the preceding question:) Well, do you generally think of yourself as being a little closer to one of the provincial parties than to the others?

(If "Yes" in the preceding question:) What party is that?

To be clear, this means that self-professed Conservatives in a province governed by the Conservatives were coded as supporters of the incumbent or governing party, while respondents who identified with other parties were coded as nonsupporters. The questions for federal party identification were the customary federal versions of these questions.

The *MP* variable for the federal analyses was constructed in a similar fashion. Where respondents' federal party identifications corresponded with their MPs' parties, they were coded =2; otherwise, =1. To repeat, the construction of this variable did not depend on whether a parliamentarian sat on the government benches or in the opposition. This information was not available for the provincial-level analyses, as stated above.

It will be recalled that we predicted significant interactions between partisanship and strength of party identification for responsiveness and

16 We wished to establish that our findings were not distorted by the practice of substituting the mean value for three items when the fourth item had produced a missing value. We therefore repeated all of the analyses for each of the trust scales only for those respondents who had answered all four items comprising the scale. These analyses yielded essentially the same pattern of results described in this study.

trust, but not for competence. In addition to assessing the effects of the interaction terms, we constructed an index which included information on both partisanship and strength of identification and tested their joint effect in lieu of their separate effects. This permitted an examination of the pattern of means for each of the dependent variables across the six levels of the index. Separate versions of the index were constructed for each level of government. We also constructed an index defined by the MP and strength of federal party identification variables for supplementary federal analyses. In addition, we computed partial correlations between strength of party identification and each of the dependent measures within levels of the partisan variable. The effects of education and attention to politics, plus the MP variable in the federal computations, were partialled out.

Control Variables

The control variables and their coding were as follows: *education* (elementary and high school; high school graduate; post-secondary; university degree) and *strength of provincial and federal party identification* (very strongly; fairly strongly; not very strongly). We controlled for respondents' *attention* to politics using their answers to the following question: "Do you pay much attention to politics generally—that is, from day to day, when there isn't a big election campaign going on? Would you say that you follow politics very closely, fairly closely, or not much at all?" In the analyses of the federal data and in the national analyses of the pooled provincial data, *province and region* (Atlantic; Quebec; Ontario; Prairies; British Columbia) were variously employed as controls.

Our statistical procedures included Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA), for most of the analyses, where we tested for main and two-way interaction effects using ANOVA. We also used correlations for summarizing the relations among the dependent variables, as well as partial correlations for exploring the interaction prediction.

Findings

Since we tested predictions about the differential impact of identification with governing versus opposition parties on the dependent variables, we will consider first the relations among the three federal and the three provincial versions of these measures. As expected, the correlation for the two competence variables across the two jurisdictions was the highest at .655 ($p < .001$), compared to identical correlations of .492 ($p < .001$) for the two responsiveness variables and for the two trust variables. While all of the correlations within levels of

government were clearly significant, we note that the lowest correlations were between competence and trust provincially (.315; $p < .001$) and federally (.271; $p < .001$).

Analyses for Federal Politics

Table 1 summarizes the results of the analyses for the effects of the partisan and MP variables on perceptions of federal politics, with controls. Partisanship was significantly associated with perceived responsiveness ($F = 8.06$; $p < .01$) and political trust ($F = 5.51$; $p < .05$), and not with political competence ($F = 0.90$).¹⁷ The effects for the MP predictor were significant for responsiveness ($F = 6.68$; $p < .01$) and trust ($F = 4.89$; $p < .05$), and not for competence ($F = 1.82$). Although the effects for the partisan variable were in the predicted direction, the effects for the MP variable were contrary to what we expected. In the latter case, respondents who favoured their MPs' parties believed the political system was less responsive and less trustworthy than did respondents who favoured other parties. Given these results, it should also be noted that the partisanship and MP variables did not interact significantly for any of the dependent measures (figures not shown). Education level proved highly significant for all three dependent variables— $F = 46.34$ for responsiveness, $F = 8.62$ for trust and $F = 127.29$ for competence (all $p < .001$). The obviously greater importance of education over partisanship as a predictor of competence is also consistent with expectation (betas of .35 and .02, respectively).

Strength of federal party identification was not a significant predictor for any of the dependent variables. Neither did it interact significantly with partisanship or with the MP variable. We also remarked that none of the partisanship by region effects was significant (figures not shown). In the case of the MP by region interaction, only the effect for competence reached significance ($F = 2.63$; $p < .05$).

The inconsistent main effects produced by the partisanship and MP variables in the federal analyses were troubling. Were respondents thinking of the former Liberal government or the new Conservative government when they responded to the items measuring the dependent variables? We performed some supplementary analyses that were

17 The partisanship variable was constructed from party identification rather than how people voted so that we could test the predictions involving *strength* of party identification. We performed supplementary analyses, however, in which respondents' federal votes were used to define partisanship. This alternative version of the partisanship variable was significantly associated with system responsiveness ($F = 5.65$; $p < .05$), but not with political trust ($F = 0.32$). Neither was it related with political competence ($F = 0.05$). It does not appear from these findings that we have sacrificed stronger effects in order to test predictions involving strength of party identification.

TABLE 1

PARTISANSHIP EFFECTS ON EFFICACY AND TRUST VARIABLES,
WITH CONTROLS, FEDERAL ANALYSES (MCA)^a

	Political competence		Perceived system responsiveness		Political trust	
	(N)	Mean	(N)	Mean	(N)	Mean
<i>Partisanship</i>						
Opposition	1,401	3.08	1,371	2.71	1,392	7.65
Government	1,209	3.19	1,188	3.01	1,205	8.04
e/b=		.00/.02		.03/.07		.00/.06
F=		0.90		8.06**		5.51*
<i>MP</i>						
Different parties	1,367	3.20	1,328	2.98	1,360	8.00
Same party	1,243	3.05	1,231	2.71	1,237	7.64
e/b=		.02/.03		.02/.06		.03/.05
F=		1.82		6.68**		4.89*
<i>Strength of ID</i>						
Strong	693	3.16	680	2.82	688	7.67
Moderate	1,338	3.16	1,315	2.86	1,340	7.95
Weak	579	3.02	564	2.87	568	7.74
e/b=		.04/.02		.02/.01		.05/.04
F=		0.90		0.08		2.02
<i>Region</i>						
Atlantic	215	2.84	209	2.57	208	7.79
Quebec	646	2.98	625	2.86	637	8.73
Ontario	969	3.31	951	2.89	960	7.69
Prairies	471	3.10	464	2.99	476	7.31
British Columbia	309	3.14	309	2.67	316	7.26
e/b=		.09/.06		.07/.06		.15/.16
F=		3.32**		2.23		18.04***
<i>Education</i>						
Elementary	960	2.23	925	2.33	952	7.45
High school	585	2.99	577	2.82	582	7.90
Post-secondary	706	3.65	703	3.09	699	7.98
Degree	359	4.76	354	3.79	363	8.42
e/b=		.38/.35		.24/.23		.11/.10
F=		127.29***		46.34***		8.62***
<i>Attention</i>						
Close	480	3.81	469	3.03	483	8.05
Moderate	1,205	3.26	1,196	2.94	1,216	8.03
Ignore	925	2.61	894	2.63	898	7.44
e/b=		.24/.18		.11/.08		.09/.09
F=		46.13***		7.40***		9.53***
<i>Interactions</i>						
Partisanship- by-strength of party ID	F=	0.48		2.84		0.81
MP-by- Strength of party ID	F=	0.33		0.19		1.13

a See text for definition and measurement of variables. Dependent variables refer to federal government. Means for each variable are adjusted for the remaining variables. Analyses are based on national weights.

Significance levels: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

designed to address this problem. In order to understand how the partisanship variable was behaving, we converted it into a *party identification* variable (Liberal; Conservative; New Democratic party). Presumably respondents would be more likely to have the new Conservative government in mind the longer the interval between the dates of the election and their interviews. Therefore, a second predictor was *timing of the interview* (coded October; first half of November; second half of November; December; January 1985). We found significant party identification effects for responsiveness ($F=10.08$) and trust ($F=12.26$) (both $p<.001$). Liberals were most likely to perceive a responsive and trustworthy federal government, with Conservatives second and New Democrats third. Timing of the interview produced a significant effect for responsiveness ($F=2.47$; $p<.05$) and nonsignificant effects for trust and competence. Respondents who were interviewed in October perceived less responsiveness in the federal government than did respondents who were interviewed in January. However, the interactions between the timing of the interviews and party identification were nonsignificant for all three dependent variables.

The results for party identification reinforced our suspicion that people's perceptions of government were still largely coloured by the former Liberal government. We therefore replaced the MP variable, hitherto constructed on the basis of the 1984 election returns, with a similar measure based on the results of the 1980 general election and any by-elections that had occurred between 1980 and 1984. If respondents' feelings about their MPs were dated, the revised MP variable should produce the predicted pattern of adjusted means. We found a significant effect for this variable on responsiveness ($F=6.13$; $p<.01$), but not on trust ($F=2.24$). More important for our present concerns is the finding that people who identified with the parties of their pre-1984 MPs tended to perceive a more responsive federal government. Although the effect on trust was not significant, the adjusted means for this variable were in the expected direction, as well. To complete the picture, when we defined the partisanship variable with the Liberal party as the governing party, we found a significant effect for trust ($F=4.66$; $p<.05$) and a nonsignificant effect for responsiveness ($F=1.74$).

Analyses of the Provincial Data, Aggregated Nationally

Having coded respondents' loyalties relative to their respective provincial governing parties, we tested this predictor at the national level for the provincial versions of the various measures. National weights were used and province was employed as a control variable. The results of these analyses appear in Table 2. The evidence is clear that partisanship produced a powerful effect on responsiveness ($F=110.60$),

trust ($F=182.18$) and competence ($F=33.99$) (all $p<.001$).¹⁸ While strength of provincial party identification by itself was significant only for competence ($F=3.13$; $p<.05$), there were significant interactions between this variable and partisanship for competence ($F=9.36$), responsiveness ($F=22.50$) and trust ($F=24.81$) (all $p<.001$). Education was also significantly associated with competence ($F=154.74$; $p<.001$), responsiveness ($F=23.55$; $p<.001$) and trust ($F=2.72$; $p<.05$). In spite of the findings that partisanship predicted competence, education predicted responsiveness and trust, and the interaction effect for partisanship by strength of party identification on competence, we none the less observe that the differential strength of these relations are consistent with our hypothesis. For example, the betas for predicting the trust variable were .25 for partisanship and .05 for education. In the case of competence, the betas were .10 for partisanship and .37 for education. We also examined the interaction between partisanship and province for the three dependent measures. There was no effect for responsiveness, but there were significant effects for competence ($F=1.89$; $p<.05$) and trust ($F=2.44$; $p<.01$) (figures not shown).¹⁹

- 18 We wondered whether the federal predictors would also be associated with the provincially-defined dependent measures. The effects for federal partisanship in these cross-over analyses were $F=7.47$ ($p<.01$) for competence, $F=30.95$ ($p<.001$) for responsiveness and $F=47.87$ ($p<.001$) for trust. The F s for the MP predictor were 2.22 (ns), 3.61 (ns) and 10.50 ($p<.01$), respectively. Once again, respondents who identified with their MPs' parties trusted their (provincial) governments less than respondents who identified with one of the other parties. In still other analyses, we observed that inclusion of the federal partisanship predictors along with the provincial predictors did not seriously impair the effects produced by the latter variables. To complete the cross-over picture, the provincial partisan measure failed as a predictor of the three federally-defined dependent variables.
- 19 In supplementary analyses, we checked for the effects of gender and age (coded 18-29; 30-39; 40-55; 56+) at both levels of government. First, neither variable affected the pattern of findings reported here. Second, gender had a significant effect on competence at the federal level ($F=6.45$; $p<.01$), but not on responsiveness or trust. Women felt less politically competent than men. When we analyzed the provincial-level variables for the national sample, gender was significantly associated with competence ($F=6.12$; $p<.01$) and trust ($F=4.50$; $p<.05$), but not with responsiveness. While women were lower on political competence and trust than men, they were higher on perceived responsiveness. Third, age was a significant predictor for competence at the federal level ($F=7.26$; $p<.001$), but it was inconsequential for the other two measures. In general, the oldest respondents tended to feel less effective. For the provincial-level variables, age was significantly associated with competence ($F=7.55$; $p<.001$) and trust ($F=3.39$; $p<.05$), but not with responsiveness. Older respondents tended to feel less competent and expressed more trust. On the relationships of demographic variables, especially gender and age, to efficacy and/or trust, see, for example, Cole, "Toward a Model of Political Trust," 813; Sinclair, "Political Powerlessness," 130-31; Kornberg, Mishler and Clarke, *Representative Democracy*, 82.

TABLE 2

PARTISANSHIP EFFECTS ON PROVINCIAL VERSIONS OF EFFICACY AND TRUST VARIABLES, WITH CONTROLS, PROVINCIAL DATA AGGREGATED NATIONALLY (MCA)^a

	Political competence		Perceived system responsiveness		Political trust	
	(N)	Mean	(N)	Mean	(N)	Mean
<i>Partisanship</i>						
Opposition	1,517	3.19	1,489	2.63	1,488	7.22
Government	1,252	3.70	1,226	3.54	1,226	9.01
e/b=	.12/.10		.23/.20		.27/.25	
F=	33.99***		110.60***		182.18***	
<i>Strength of ID</i>						
Strong	809	3.57	801	3.12	799	8.01
Moderate	1,350	3.32	1,321	3.01	1,315	8.12
Weak	611	3.44	593	2.99	600	7.87
e/b=	.05/.04		.01/.02		.04/.03	
F=	3.13*		0.72		1.24	
<i>Province</i>						
Newfoundland	56	3.02	56	2.60	51	7.38
Prince Edward Island	10	3.65	10	3.63	10	9.19
Nova Scotia	89	3.75	87	3.59	87	8.59
New Brunswick	74	2.52	72	2.26	70	6.82
Quebec	709	3.14	699	2.65	696	7.80
Ontario	1,029	3.54	995	3.27	1,004	8.32
Manitoba	114	3.82	118	3.60	115	8.67
Saskatchewan	110	4.34	109	3.78	107	9.09
Alberta	269	3.33	263	3.19	267	7.99
British Columbia	312	3.45	306	2.69	306	7.24
e/b=	.15/.12		.20/.16		.18/.14	
F=	6.06***		9.14***		6.64***	
<i>Education</i>						
Elementary	1,006	2.45	983	2.67	973	7.96
High school	641	3.23	637	3.02	622	7.99
Post-secondary	754	4.03	738	3.21	753	7.93
Degree	368	5.15	357	3.75	366	8.49
e/b=	.40/.37		.17/.15		.06/.05	
F=	154.74***		23.55***		2.72*	
<i>Attention</i>						
Close	533	3.83	525	3.16	524	8.19
Moderate	1,255	3.63	1,233	3.17	1,233	8.24
Ignore	982	2.92	956	2.81	957	7.68
e/b=	.22/.15		.11/.07		.09/.07	
F=	37.41***		7.97***		8.01***	
<i>Interaction</i>						
Partisanship-by-strength of party ID	F=	9.36***	22.50***	24.81***		

a See text for definition and measurement of variables. Dependent variables refer to the provincial government. Means for each variable are adjusted for the remaining variables. Analyses are based on national weights.

Significance levels: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Analyses for Provincial Politics within Each Province

The analyses within provinces, using the provincial weights and provincial level versions of the variables, provided 10 separate tests of the partisanship hypothesis. In the case of responsiveness, partisanship was a significant predictor in the predicted direction in seven provinces at $p < .01$ or better (figures not shown).²⁰ It fell short in Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick and Manitoba, though it was borderline ($p < .10$) and in the expected direction in the latter two provinces. Partisanship was positively associated with trust in all provinces ($p < .01$ or better) except two in the Atlantic region—PEI and Nova Scotia. The direction of the difference, however, was as predicted in the case of Nova Scotia. The results for the interaction term were mixed. Education was positively related to responsiveness in four of the provinces ($p < .05$ or better) and to trust in only two, the latter being Quebec ($F = 5.01$; $p < .001$) and Alberta ($F = 3.87$; $p < .01$). The remaining relationships for education were not statistically significant.

It is more interesting to summarize the provincial findings in terms of the political colouration of the governments. Partisanship proved to be a potent predictor of responsiveness in provinces governed by Conservatives (Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Saskatchewan and Alberta), Social Credit (British Columbia) and the Parti Québécois (Quebec). The sole exception was the New Democratic province of Manitoba. The record for partisanship as a predictor was even more impressive for the trust variable. Provinces governed by all four political parties produced the partisan effect for this dependent variable.

Partisanship was positively associated with competence in only three of the provinces—Quebec ($F = 18.63$), Ontario ($F = 9.27$) and British Columbia ($F = 11.89$) (all $p < .001$). There were significant interactions between partisanship and strength of provincial party identification only in Nova Scotia ($F = 3.31$; $p < .05$) and Quebec ($F = 4.48$; $p < .01$). Education was a significant predictor of competence in each province at $p < .01$ or better, as anticipated.

Interactions between Partisanship and Strength of Party Identification

We predicted that the more respondents identified with governing parties, the higher would be their scores on perceived responsiveness and political trust. We also anticipated the opposite relationship for respondents who preferred opposition parties. Table 3 summarizes the results of the analyses at the federal level for the index constructed from the partisanship and strength of federal party identification variables. As predicted, and consistent with what we have already seen, the index was significantly associated with responsiveness ($F = 4.96$; $p < .001$) and trust

20 The three tables discussed here may be obtained from the authors.

($F=2.45$; $p<.05$), and not associated with competence ($F=0.60$). More importantly, what this index is designed to show is the pattern of means on each dependent variable, adjusted for the various control variables. It would appear that strong identifiers with the incumbent party perceived a more responsive government and trusted it somewhat more than did respondents whose identification with the same party was weaker. The opposite pattern seemed to hold for people who identified with the opposition.

TABLE 3

EFFECTS OF INDEX OF PARTISANSHIP-BY-STRENGTH OF FEDERAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION ON FEDERAL LEVEL VERSIONS OF EFFICACY AND TRUST VARIABLES, WITH CONTROLS (MCA)^a

Party identified with:	Strength of party identification:	Political competence		Perceived system responsiveness		Political trust	
		(N)	Mean	(N)	Mean	(N)	Mean
Governing	Strong	321	3.23	318	3.22	320	7.80
Governing	Moderate	655	3.23	641	3.00	657	8.26
Governing	Weak	233	3.03	230	2.72	228	7.79
Opposition	Weak	346	3.00	334	2.94	341	7.65
Opposition	Moderate	683	3.11	674	2.73	683	7.68
Opposition	Strong	372	3.09	362	2.48	368	7.55
	<i>e/b</i> =	.06/.03		.10/.10		.05/.08	
	<i>F</i> =	0.60		4.96***		2.45*	

a See text for definition and measurement of variables. Means are adjusted for the effects of MP, region, education and attention to politics. Analyses are based on national weights.

Significance levels: * $p<.05$; ** $p<.01$; *** $p<.001$.

We pursued the anomalous findings reported above for the MP variable by constructing an index from it and the strength of party identification variable. This interaction index produced a significant effect for responsiveness ($F=3.85$; $p<.01$), after controls, but not for trust ($F=1.85$) or competence ($F=0.76$). Responsiveness varied directly with strength of party identification for those who supported the incumbent MP and negatively for those who identified with another party. Although this was the expected pattern, the discrepancy between levels of the MP variable persisted.

Table 4 presents the results for the partisanship by strength of party identification index for the provincial dependent variables, with province introduced as one of the control variables. The pattern of

adjusted means across the six levels of the index was consistent with our hypothesis, except that there were stronger effects on the competence measure than expected. Among respondents who identified with their provincial governing parties, strong partisans were more efficacious in both senses of the concept and more trusting of government than were weaker partisans. This relationship was reversed for the responsiveness and trust measures among respondents who favoured opposition parties.

TABLE 4

EFFECTS OF INDEX OF PARTISANSHIP-BY-STRENGTH OF PROVINCIAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION ON PROVINCIAL VERSIONS OF EFFICACY AND TRUST VARIABLES, WITH CONTROLS, NATIONAL ANALYSES^a

Party identified with:	Strength of party identification:	Political competence		Perceived system responsiveness		Political trust	
		(N)	Mean	(N)	Mean	(N)	Mean
Governing	Strong	333	4.10	329	4.09	326	9.83
Governing	Moderate	649	3.59	633	3.50	633	8.98
Governing	Weak	270	3.46	263	2.96	266	8.15
Opposition	Weak	341	3.41	330	3.01	333	7.61
Opposition	Moderate	701	3.10	687	2.61	682	7.42
Opposition	Strong	476	3.17	472	2.38	473	6.62
	<i>e/b</i> =		.15/.13		.27/.24		.30/.29
	<i>F</i> =		10.60***		33.66***		49.40***

a See text for definition and measurement of variables. Means are adjusted for the effects of province, education and attention to politics. Analyses are based on national weights.

Significance levels: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

We also calculated partial correlations between strength of party identification and each of the dependent variables separately for people who identified with governing parties versus opposition parties. The control variables were educational level and attention to politics, plus the MP measure for the federal analyses. Table 5 presents the findings federally, nationally for the provinces, and for each of the provinces. The partial correlations for the federal responsiveness variable were in the expected opposite directions and significant, although obviously small ($r = .066$, $p < .01$, for identifiers with the incumbent party; $r = -.073$, $p < .01$, for identifiers with opposition parties). The predictions failed for the federal level trust variable.

TABLE 5
PARTIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND EACH OF COMPETENCE, RESPONSIVENESS AND TRUST FOR RESPONDENTS WHO SUPPORTED GOVERNING PARTIES VERSUS OPPOSITION PARTIES, FEDERALLY AND PROVINCIALLY^a

	Political competence		Perceived system responsiveness		Political trust	
	Opposition	Government	Opposition	Government	Opposition	Government
	Federal	-.015	-.028	.066**	-.073**	.003
Provinces pooled	.040	-.099***	.106***	-.168***	.101***	-.170***
Newfoundland	.256*	-.086	.295*	-.189	-.359**	-.122
Prince Edward Island	-.337	-.086	-.224	.248*	-.137	.000
Nova Scotia	.062	-.020	.041	-.317**	-.219	-.332**
New Brunswick	.231*	.173	.468***	-.082	-.124	-.066
Quebec	-.011	-.263***	.028	-.167**	.123**	-.240***
Ontario	.036	-.040	.073	-.089*	.001	-.090*
Manitoba	-.093	.083	-.087	.022	-.067	-.092
Saskatchewan	-.061	-.263**	.096	-.198*	.233**	-.078
Alberta	.204	-.090	.392**	-.237***	.258	-.201**
British Columbia	.093	-.214*	.236***	-.385***	.334***	-.340***

^a See text for definition and measurement of variables. Dependent variables were measured federally for the federal analyses and provincially for the pooled provincial and provincial analyses. Opposition = Support for opposition parties; Government = Support for governing parties. Education and attention to politics were controlled, plus the MP variable for the federal analyses. National weights were used for the federal and the pooled provincial analyses and provincial weights were used for analyses within each province. Significance levels: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

The partial correlations for the pooled provincial data, however, were more impressive. For respondents who supported governing parties, the correlation was .106 ($p < .001$) on the responsiveness variable, compared to $-.168$ ($p < .001$) for respondents who supported the opposition. The comparable figures for the trust measure were .101 and $-.170$ (both $p < .001$). There were also substantial provincial variations in the strength of the correlations. Even so, eight of the ten partial correlations for government supporters were negative on the responsiveness measure. This was true for nine correlations on the trust measure. The direction of the correlations for opposition supporters was more inconsistent. It is interesting to observe that the strongest support for the predicted interaction between partisanship and strength of identification occurred in Alberta and British Columbia for responsiveness, and in these two provinces, plus Quebec, for trust.

Discussion and Conclusions

Our hypothesis led us to predict significant main effects for partisanship and interaction effects between partisanship and strength of party identification on perceived responsiveness and political trust at both levels of government. There were four main departures from the predicted pattern, but none of them seriously damaged the hypothesis that gave rise to the predictions. We will review these departures from predictions before considering the theoretical significance of the basic pattern of findings.

First, contrary to prediction, reasonably strong partisanship and partisanship by strength of party identification effects were found for the competence measure in the pooled provincial data and for Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia in the provincial analyses, where little or no relationships were expected. As we have stated, though, these effects are not surprising given the substantial correlations between competence, on the one hand, and responsiveness and trust, on the other. An improved measure of competence, less contaminated by characteristics of the political system, should lower these correlations and thus clarify the pattern of effects. However, even more valid indicators of political competence will not permit these correlations to drop below some still substantial level because of the empirical linkages between them in democracies.²¹

The second departure from prediction occurred in the lack of statistically significant relationships for partisanship and responsiveness in three provinces (PEI, New Brunswick and Manitoba) and for partisanship and trust in two provinces (PEI and Nova Scotia). In

21 For example, as discussed in Craig and Maggioletto, "Measuring Personal Efficacy," 86.

addition, the record for the interaction index was more spotty, especially for supporters of opposition parties. Given the magnitude and consistency of the effects in the other provinces, we are tempted to attribute these failures to the vagaries of small sample sizes, but we have no evidence for this. In any event, we had no theoretical grounds for anticipating such interprovincial differences.²²

The third deviation from prediction was less a departure than it was a substantial variation in the strength of partisanship effects between the analyses of federal and provincial level politics. The partial correlations between the partisan measures and each of the dependent variables demonstrated much stronger provincial than federal relationships.²³

We can suggest two interpretations for the stronger provincial partisan effects. The first interpretation would argue that provincial governments are psychologically closer to people than is the federal government; consequently the provincial level should more clearly register any partisan effects.²⁴ In the second interpretation, if responsiveness and trust are reactions to whose party is in or out of power, then we should expect changes in people's scores on these variables to follow changes in government. Although we have no idea at what rate these changes occur, it appears that our federal measurements of responsiveness and trust were taken while these properties were still in flux and before they had "fully" changed following the 1984 election.²⁵ In contrast, all of the provincial governments had been in

- 22 Regional effects on efficacy and trust and differences between provincial and federal levels of these variables is the subject matter of a separate study.
- 23 We calculated partial correlations between the partisanship and dependent variables, controlling for education, strength of party identification, attention to politics, age, sex (provincially) and MP (federally). The correlations were calculated at the federal and the provincial levels with the variables appropriate to each level, and in spite of the fact that partisanship, sex and MP are binary variables. Federal partisanship was significant for responsiveness ($r = .064$; $p < .001$) and trust ($r = .037$; $p < .05$), although its impact in both cases was obviously weak. Provincial partisanship, on the other hand, was significant at $p < .001$ for responsiveness ($r = .218$), trust ($r = .249$) and competence ($r = .115$). Provincially, nine of the ten correlations for responsiveness were significant at $p < .05$ or better. Only the figure for Prince Edward Island ($r = -.093$) failed to reach significance. As well, nine of the partial correlations for provincial trust were significant at $p < .05$ or better, including correlations of .274 in Quebec, .308 in New Brunswick and .342 in British Columbia. Only the partial correlation for PEI fell short of significance ($r = .155$).
- 24 The proximity principle is discussed in Brown and McMenemy, "Generality or Specificity," 369-72.
- 25 On this point, we analyzed data from the 1974 Canadian National Election Study because the interviews were conducted following an election in which the incumbent Liberals were returned to power. The four trust items did not appear in this survey; as well, the four efficacy items were administered to only a half sample. Partisanship produced significant effects for perceived system responsiveness ($F = 16.42$, $p < .001$) and political competence ($F = 5.44$, $p < .05$). When we constructed the partisanship variable in terms of respondents' reported vote in the 1974 election instead of their

power for more than a year. As known commodities, perhaps respondents' perceptions of these governments had stabilized.²⁶

The MP variable produced effects in the federal analyses that were at odds with our predictions, this being the fourth aberration.²⁷ Respondents who supported their MPs' parties tended to see government as less responsive and to trust it less than did respondents who supported losing parties at the constituency level. Reasoning that people's perceptions of government had not fully captured the changes produced on September 4, we checked the contributions of party identification and a revised version of the MP variable in separate analyses. The new version of the MP variable was based on the party membership of MPs prior to the September general election. The finding that Liberals were more favourable toward government on the responsiveness and trust measures, and the finding that the revised MP predictor produced the expected pattern of adjusted means, suggest to us that people's perceptions of government continued in a state of flux. They make sensible the weaker federal than provincial-level findings, as well as the failure of the original MP variable to behave as expected. At the same time, they are understandable within the assumptions of the partisanship hypothesis.

In their treatment of political efficacy and trust, political scientists have routinely distinguished between support for regimes versus support for the government of the day.²⁸ They have also expended a great deal of effort to uncover the several dimensions underlying measurements of political support. Given the evidence presented here for partisan effects, however, it is clearly desirable to control

party identification, the effect was significant for responsiveness ($F=12.98$, $p<.001$), but not for competence ($F=1.52$). Analyses of the merged 1965 and 1968 data are presented in Simeon and Elkins, *Small Worlds*, 58, 62.

- 26 We assessed the effects of the partisanship variable in supplementary analyses, with "months since the last provincial election" as one of the control variables. Partisanship was unimpaired as a predictor of the three dependent variables. Since there were significant interactions between partisanship and months for responsiveness ($F=3.66$; $p<.05$) and for trust ($F=4.03$; $p<.01$), we constructed an interaction index from these two predictors. In separate analyses using this index, with controls, there appeared to be curvilinear relationships between time, on the one hand, and competence and trust, on the other, within levels of the partisanship variable. The responsiveness and trust scores were lowest for the most recent (1983) and the most remote (1981) provincial elections.
- 27 Kornberg, Clarke and LeDuc found that reported interaction with MPs and regime support were negatively associated. They speculated that this unexpected finding might be due to often unsatisfactory or mistaken attempts on the part of constituents to obtain the assistance of their MPs. See Kornberg et al., "Some Correlates," 208, 209.
- 28 See David Easton, "A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (1975), 435-57; also Kornberg, Clarke and LeDuc, "Some Correlates," 201, 208, and footnote 10 above.

statistically for such effects when analyzing the relationships between support for regimes and other variables. The results suggest that regimes and authorities are inextricably intertwined in the efficacy and trust items. In our opinion, however, this does not argue against the use of these items. Researchers who wish to relate what these variables are intended to measure to other factors must partial out the effects of partisanship in multivariate designs. Our results also suggest, of course, the importance of continuing efforts to construct measures that successfully discriminate between government of the day and regime. Given the strength and persistence of the partisan effects shown here, especially at the provincial level, this promises to be a formidable task.

At the same time, the study of support for authorities is no less interesting than the study of support for regimes. The intrusion of support for authorities into the analysis of support for regimes should not be dismissed as a source of annoying error in the measurement procedures. The provincial findings, for example, give us some idea about the relative magnitude of partisan effects that can be expected under a variety of political circumstances, such as the kind of politically polarized party system that prevails in British Columbia or where an unpopular governing party is shortly to be turned out of office, as in Quebec. The federal results are also interesting in their own right because they capture the thinking of Canadians while their feelings about an incumbent government are in the process of change.

For our own part, we believe that the significance of our results extends beyond questions of methodology. The civics approach to politics saw political efficacy and trust as indispensable resources within democratic societies. These psychological resources could be nurtured in individuals through appropriate socialization experiences and by participation in community groups.²⁹ Our findings point to more prosaic origins of responsiveness and trust in the dynamics of partisanship, at least provincially. They strongly favour the view that efficacy and trust are, to a significant degree, products of being on the winning political side. To identify with the governing party is to be psychologically closer to the political action. For people who identify with a losing party, the political world is a less friendly place. Moreover, the strength of one's identification with either side seems to magnify these effects.

We also see a certain theoretical kinship between the partisan effect described here and the kinds of processes invoked by Noelle-Neumann in her "spiral of silence" or "hypothesis of silence."³⁰ To illustrate her thesis, she observed that left-wingers in the 1960s appeared confident, articulate and able largely because they sensed the flow in public opinion

29 For example, see Manzer, *Socio-Political Report*, 322.

30 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, *The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion—Our Social Skin* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 1-8.

was in their direction. A decade later, she says, left-wingers had virtually fallen silent as public opinion seemed to ebb, leaving them isolated and robbing them of their confidence.³¹ For her part, Noelle-Neumann accords special importance to the media in expressing points of view and thus rallying people who share these views.³² In our opinion, electoral victories in democracies may also serve the same “articulation function,” so that voters who identify with one side or the other accordingly take hope or lose hope.

31 *Ibid.*, 23-33.

32 *Ibid.*, 170-73.