
REVIEW ESSAYS

THE CHILEAN ROAD TO SOCIALISM REVISITED

Lois Hecht Oppenheim
Whittier College

- CHILE: EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY.* By SERGIO BITAR. (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1986. Pp. 265. \$33.00.)
- THE MURDER OF CHILE.* By SAMUEL CHAVKIN. (New York: Everest House, 1982. Pp. 286. \$13.95.)
- THE LAST TWO YEARS OF SALVADOR ALLENDE.* By NATHANIEL DAVIS. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985. Pp. 480. \$24.95.)
- THE NATIONAL UNIFIED SCHOOL IN ALLENDE'S CHILE.* By JOSEPH P. FARRELL. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986. Pp. 276. \$11.95.)
- THE RISE AND FALL OF CHILEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY.* By MICHAEL FLEET. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985. Pp. 274. \$35.00 cloth, \$14.50 paper.)
- CHILE Y EL MUNDO, 1970-1973.* By JOAQUIN FERNANDOIS. (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1985. Pp. 444.)
- LA UNIDAD POPULAR Y EL CONFLICTO POLITICO EN CHILE.* By MANUEL ANTONIO GARRETON and TOMAS MOULIAN. (Santiago: Ediciones Minga, 1983. Pp. 168.)
- FIDEL CASTRO ON CHILE.* Edited by NATIONAL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY. (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1982. Pp. 158. \$5.00.)
- MOBILIZATION AND SOCIALIST POLITICS IN CHILE.* By BENNY POLLACK. (Liverpool: Latin American Centre of the University of Liverpool, 1980. Pp. 72.)

SEARCH FOR JUSTICE: NEIGHBORHOOD COURTS IN ALLENDE'S CHILE.

By JACK SPENCE. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979. Pp. 206. \$16.50.)

WEAVERS OF REVOLUTION: THE YARUR WORKERS AND CHILE'S ROAD TO SOCIALISM. By PETER WINN. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. Pp. 328. \$19.95.)

The Chilean road to socialism still captures our attention fifteen years after the violent overthrow of Salvador Allende's government. Although a poor, dependent country, Chile in 1970 had a political tradition quite different from that of its neighbors, one that included competitive elections, a vital multiparty system, and a record of two strong Left parties allied in long-term electoral coalitions. The Left had emphasized working within the democratic system in order to change the nature of the economy, class relations, and, ultimately, power relations. The military coup in 1973 brought this democratic system to an end, and subsequent analysts have raised questions about the relation between the earlier democratic politics and the bloody coup that ushered in fifteen years of military rule and unfettered market organization of the economy.

In the first years after the 1973 coup, a plethora of books and essays were produced. Most of them, as Arturo and Samuel Valenzuela noted in their 1975 review,¹ reflected the political divisions that existed in Chile before the coup, from maximalist Left to the Right. A "second wave" of literature is now appearing, much of it more balanced and nuanced or at least less rhetorical in style. Most of the more recent studies concentrate on a particular facet of the political process during the three years when Unidad Popular (UP) explored this relatively uncharted road to socialism. Some studies examine an area of attempted social transformation, such as the economy (Bitar), education (Farrell), worker organization (Winn), and the judicial system (Spence). Others examine social class and party behavior and their impact on the stability of the political system (Fleet, Pollack, and Moulián and Garretón). A third set of works explore the nature of Chilean relations with the United States and probe the relative weight of external versus internal causes of the coup (Davis, Fermandois, and Chavkin). Thus the books range from microhistories to macroanalyses.

Despite differences in emphasis and political perspective, all these works again raise fundamental questions about what led to the coup in 1973, but the focus here is on the unusual character of the *vía chilena*. The analyses center around the conflicts, constraints, and contradictions inherent in Chile's "second route to socialism" and provide a more complex view of dynamics of the Left, Center, and Right that led to the overthrow. The studies raise similar—and crucial—questions. What was the role of intracoalition conflict in ending the Chilean ex-

periment? What was the role of the middle classes or sectors, and their main political representative, the Christian Democratic party (Partido Demócrata Cristiana), during the Allende period? Was it possible for Unidad Popular to have reached agreement with the Christian Democrats, and when did it become less likely or impossible? What part did the United States play, and how generally significant were internal versus external causal factors? Was the coup inevitable? If not, what might have prevented it? These books thus offer the opportunity to reflect once again on the possibility for peaceful social transformation in Latin America.

INTRACOALITION CONFLICT

Many of the studies under review assert that conflict within Unidad Popular over tactics was the major problem of the period, and they detail harsh and often public clashes among UP parties that had severe consequences for the revolutionary process. The Unidad Popular coalition basically split into two groups of radicals and moderates between 1970 and 1973: the moderate camp consisted of Allende Socialists, the Radical party, MAPU-Gazmuri, and Communists; and the radicals comprised the Altamirano Socialists, MAPU-Garretón, and the Izquierda Cristiana (Christian Left).² The two camps diverged on a number of critical points concerning the process of transition to socialism, such as the stages of the revolution, the nature of the state, the role of workers, and strategic or tactical alliances with middle sectors during the process of social change. Much of the debate was public and ideologically charged. The radicals adopted the slogan *avanzar sin trazar* (advance without compromise) while the moderate's position was *consolidar y seguir avanzando* (consolidate and continue advancing). In the end, however, neither group was able to dominate the coalition.

The fact is that Unidad Popular was a coalition of independent parties with long-standing ideological differences.³ The status quo was formalized in a political pact drawn up in 1970, which included a quota system apportioning positions in the state administrative apparatus. The quota system divided up the ministry heads among Unidad Popular parties as well as apportioning positions vertically within ministries with the intention of maintaining a balance among the differing parties.⁴ The results, however, were not what the architects of Unidad Popular had intended. As Farrell notes, the "effect was to build in from the very inception . . . a systematic inability to arrive at a single clearly defined . . . policy regarding any of the . . . propositions in the Basic Program" (p. 46).

Substantial agreement exists in these works as to the negative consequences of internal UP divisions, despite other differences in per-

spective. The split within Unidad Popular and its intracoalition conflicts were critical factors in creating an atmosphere propitious for a coup. Conflicting UP policies resulted in contradictory or ambiguous signals being sent to the opposition. These messages were then used to portray Unidad Popular in the most extreme light possible and characterize the government as disorganized and incapable of reaching and executing decisions. Even when a decision seemingly had been made, such as after the UP Political Committee evaluation meeting at Lo Curro in June 1972, those who disagreed with the decision continued to publicly expound and push their own position. Farrell provides graphic examples in connection with the education issue, as does Bitar for the economy. My dissertation on the politics of the socialization of the economy demonstrates the same point,⁵ as do Davis, Winn, and Pollack. Fidel Castro, during his 1971 visit to Chile made much the same argument, mentioning the "fragmentation of the Left" and the need to "prevent disunity."⁶

These studies also shed light on the role of Salvador Allende with regard to intra-UP conflict. Davis cites Allende's inability to make a decision when faced with a divided coalition, as does Bitar, albeit more discretely. Winn describes Allende's anger over coalition members' foreknowledge and behavior regarding the Yarur worker action. Overall, the image of Allende that emerges from these pages is a man who was adept at day-to-day political manipulation but could not impose his vision on the coalition. For Allende, maintaining coalition unity came first, even at the cost of coherent decision making.

The degree of "culpability" on the part of Unidad Popular—or any subset like the radical or moderate wings—for the demise of democracy and constitutional rule is still in dispute. Moreover, the relative blame apportioned to the Christian Democrats, other domestic opposition groups and social classes, and the United States also varies greatly. But virtually all the studies cite the lack of internal coherence within the UP coalition as a debilitating factor, and one that the opposition exploited effectively.

UP POLICYMAKING AND CONSTRAINTS ON CHANGE

The first group of books examine specific policy issues and the relative success of Unidad Popular in carrying out its peaceful route to socialism. Sergio Bitar, author of *Chile: Experiment in Democracy*, is an economist and engineer, a Left Christian who headed the Ministerio de Minería during the last year of Allende's government. Bitar's purpose is to draw lessons from the second route to socialism. He examines the interaction of a complex set of economic and political variables and demonstrates that the economic policy of Unidad Popular was unwise. One of his major themes is the persistent clash within Unidad Popular

between the desire for long-term structural transformations of the economy and perceived short-term needs, mainly increasing electoral support through its income redistribution policy. The inherent contradiction between the push for structural transformation and the “redistributive and expansive” policy led to “severe disequilibria” in the Chilean economy. Unidad Popular tried to push ahead on all fronts, when prudent analysis would have shown this approach to be impossible, especially given the limitations built into the Chilean route to socialism. Bitar asserts further that Unidad Popular had no coherent economic plan, and that the political leaders of Unidad Popular and their economic team did not mesh well. But he disputes the idea that Unidad Popular destroyed the Chilean economy, noting that despite all the difficulties, production in agriculture, copper, and manufacturing did not decline until 1973, and then due to a set of factors not totally within the control of Unidad Popular.

Bitar also ties his economic analysis to political analysis. He argues that loyalty to individual UP parties conflicted with adherence to overall coalition needs and severely hurt the government’s ability to make decisions. Many governmental decisions were made for political, not economic, reasons. Second, the decisions often represented “compromises” between UP moderate and radical views that were inherently incompatible. These attempts to reconcile the two positions proved worse than selecting either strategy. Third, these political difficulties within Unidad Popular made for delays in decision making because Allende was unable or unwilling to override such differences by imposing a coherent set of policies on the coalition (p. 89). Last, the lack of economic training among UP leaders meant that they did not always comprehend the economic consequences of their decisions. In sum, UP decisions, or lack of decisions, had disastrous economic consequences and ultimately helped to bring down the government.

One of the most crucial issues of the Allende administration was creating a socialized sector of the economy. The basic program of Unidad Popular set forth in 1970 called for a gradual transition to socialism. It was predicated on structural changes in agriculture, by using the land reform law passed in 1967 under the Frei administration, and in industry, by having the state take control of the “commanding heights.” How the latter goal was to be accomplished was less clear because no ready-made law existed for Unidad Popular to utilize. Nevertheless, the Basic Program of Unidad Popular stated clearly that three sectors of the economy were to be developed and that the social sector (*área de propiedad social*) lay at the heart of any social transformation process.

Perhaps more than anything else, it was the issue of the social sector that raised the fundamental question of power in Chile and led to the constitutional crisis that helped bring down the government. Bitar

asserts the critical importance of the social sector, noting that "What was at issue was nothing less than a revolutionary transformation, one which was changing the structure of power and would open the way for control by the state and the workers over a decisive sector of the economy" (pp. 94–95). In this context, intracoalition disputes were deadly for the government. One example cited by Bitar is that Unidad Popular delayed presenting a bill on socializing the economy until October 1971, fully a year after Allende took office, because of lack of consensus within the coalition over its content. In the meantime, Unidad Popular was faced with an increasingly obstructionist Christian Democratic party and, in October 1971, with a competing social-sector bill presented by Christian Democrats Renán Fuentealba and Juan Hamilton. Bitar believes that Unidad Popular would have been better served by an early agreement among its constituent parties about which industries to socialize, followed by negotiations with a still-flexible Christian Democratic party in 1971. In this manner, the social sector could have been rapidly put in place. With the limits clearly defined and strictly followed, creation of a strong social sector of the economy could have been the centerpiece of the UP government's program of structural transformation. Instead, the drawn-out nature of the process gave the opposition a chance to mobilize, turned small and medium-sized business owners against the government, and ultimately led many to question the legitimacy of the government.

Moreover, the unresolved conflict over the social sector led to replication of the class conflict in Chilean society within the state, that is, to a growing polarization within the institutional framework, with the courts and the controller general pitted against the executive branch. As a result, according to Bitar, "the degree of flexibility of the Chilean institutional order did not depend on the letter of the law, but . . . on the political power which each of the forces struggling within the state apparatus could muster up" (p. 94).

While critical of both moderates and radicals within Unidad Popular, Bitar's analysis more often supports the position of moderates in terms of what was economically and politically possible, given the constraints within which Unidad Popular operated. These constraints included partial attainment of political power, tripartite division of political forces necessitating agreement with the Center in order to pass legislation, adherence to constitutional limits, and the attitudes of the United States and the Chilean military. He reserves his most severe criticism for the radicals, who he believes had a simplistic faith in the power of *poder popular* and change in property ownership per se to improve the correlation of forces. Bitar also notes that Unidad Popular held a generally economic view of the world, with little awareness of the strength of bourgeois ideology and cultural values, a theme that

recurs in a number of the volumes under review. Bitar believes that what occurred was not inevitable: the UP strategy of a second route to socialism was correct, and the insurrectionary strategy was doomed to failure. The tragedy, then, was that the institutional strategy was not adhered to consistently, largely because of disunity within Unidad Popular (p. 228).

Despite the fact that Bitar was a minister in the Allende government, his book is dispassionate in tone and relatively terse, sometimes overly so. He usually does not name individuals or political parties, relying instead on a description of substantive differences, especially when discussing intra-UP conflict. Allende is criticized not directly but implicitly.⁷ Bitar is in an extraordinary position to comment on the UP experience. His book consequently makes a significant contribution to the literature on Chile in its analysis of the interplay between economic and political factors in Chile, the weaknesses inherent in the UP coalition, and the lessons about the limits within which a democratic socialist project must operate.

Jack Spence's *Search for Justice: Neighborhood Courts in Allende's Chile* and Peter Winn's *Weavers of Revolution: The Yarrur Workers and Chile's Road to Socialism* both detail aspects of the "revolution from below." Spence looks at the judicial system, while Winn outlines worker power in industry. Both works are microhistories that add depth to understanding of the Allende years.

The meaning of justice is explored in Spence's work, which recounts efforts by Unidad Popular and the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) to reform or transform the existing judicial system. The first was a minor reform of the judiciary called *audiencias populares*, which was proposed by Unidad Popular after its draft law for creating neighborhood courts had to be withdrawn due to vehement opposition. The second effort was organized by inhabitants of the poor neighborhood of Nueva Habana, a militant *campamento* in southeast Santiago largely controlled by the MIR. Spence's study demonstrates how Unidad Popular's desire for social transformation was constrained by the limitations of the second route to socialism. Lacking a majority in Congress and faced with severe opposition to any significant modification of the existing judicial system, the Allende government opted to concentrate its efforts elsewhere—on economic restructuring in agriculture and industry. Structural transformations in the economy were to be the first steps toward a transition to socialism. In contrast, transforming the judiciary and the educational system were not given high priorities by the Allende government. Herein lies validation of Bitar's point about the economic thrust of Unidad Popular.

Spence describes how the Allende government proposed a modest judicial reform to the Chilean Supreme Court that would make the

lower courts somewhat more accessible to the working class by allowing judges to devote voluntarily one day a week to hearing problems brought in by residents of working-class neighborhoods. But according to Spence, the small number of judges participating in these *audiencias populares* (three or four in all of Santiago) and the maintenance of traditional legal decorum with its hierarchical tone rendered the experience less than satisfactory. Finally, Spence views the proposal for *audiencias populares* as closer in values to the Christian Democrats than to *Unidad Popular* because it sought merely to extend the services of the existing judicial system to working-class Chileans while maintaining it as legitimate. Thus the proposal created no new values and reinforced the old ones.

The MIR effort was unofficial and involved the creation of popular neighborhood courts in several MIR-organized *campamentos*. Staffed by local lay judges, the *justicias populares* were part of a larger *campamento* system of self-government and political education and were intended to change the concept of justice and create new values in accord with a workers' society. They conveyed no sense of judges as higher authorities who were owed special deference. Spence concludes, however, that although *justicia popular* was more successful than the *audiencias populares*, it was not an unvarnished success story. Moreover, after a case of popular justice was picked up in the newspaper *El Mercurio*, the popular court of Nueva Habana was attacked in the media, the judicial system began an investigation, and local participation in the system declined.

Search for Justice is based on Spence's field research in Chile. He observed *audiencias populares* in session and interviewed participants in the popular court in the *campamento* Nueva Habana, which was not open to the public. His section on the *audiencias populares* provides more detail on their functioning and physical layout because the author observed them directly. Spence describes and analyzes the kinds of cases presented—mostly family or neighborhood disputes—and the decisions rendered in both types of courts. He notes the positive attributes of the popular courts, especially their spirit of egalitarianism and their emphasis on education and the creation of new law, but concludes that the *audiencias populares* were a failure because they did not challenge the dominant values of bourgeois justice. Here Spence overlooks a critical point because he judges the *audiencias populares* by the criteria of the popular courts. The Allende government never intended the *audiencias populares* to challenge basic values. Spence is actually echoing the views of the UP radicals and the Miristas who wanted to push ahead on all fronts and viewed the popular courts as representing the correct ideological position.

In sum, *Search for Justice* gives readers an unusual look into a

little-studied aspect of Allende's Chile—the changes attempted in the judicial system. It raises significant questions about the nature of justice from a social-class perspective as well as about the dynamics of grass-roots organization during a process of rapid social change.

Peter Winn provides a look at the social-sector issue from the workers' perspective, detailing another aspect of the "revolution from below" as enacted in the Yarur textile mills. This industry passed from the hands of highly autocratic private owners to collective worker control during the Allende years. One of the strengths of *Weavers of Revolution* is the well-written story it tells, largely through interviews with Yarur factory workers. As Winn explains, the Yarur workers began as cowed individuals, controlled by the Taylor system of worker productivity and Juan and Amador Yarur's autocratic style. But over time, the workers were able to organize a union, strike for higher wages and benefits, and eventually force the UP government to intervene in the factory.⁸

Winn's analysis emphasizes heightened worker consciousness that pushed the government toward a more sweeping socialization process, hence the term "revolution from below." He describes the changes in worker consciousness over time, asserting that the Yarur case served as a model for other workers and helped radicalize workers during the Allende period. The change in worker attitude and self-esteem is similar to that found in Spence's descriptions of changes among the *pobladores* of Nueva Habana.

Both Winn and Spence home in on a major dilemma for the Left during the Allende years—the relationship between the grass roots and the political elite. Winn argues that the Yarur case raised the "crucial questions of revolutionary leadership and strategy. . . . [I]t was unclear who was determining the pace and direction of the revolutionary process and who was deciding its strategy and tactics" (p. 7). Spence concludes that Unidad Popular viewed the pobladores mainly as important sources of electoral support, given the UP strategy for change, rather than as active or coequal participants in creating a new society. Both studies indicate that Unidad Popular—at least its moderate wing—tried to place limits on worker organizations that were outside their party control. These books reveal the tension between changes proposed from above and those impelled from below, which was exacerbated by intra-UP party competition and sectarianism.

One critical point cannot be overlooked, however. Worker action at the base cannot be comprehended in isolation. It was the changed political environment that created the environment for a workers' victory at the Yarur factory. Winn recognizes this reality and states that workers would probably not have won their strikes against Yarur under a different government. Moreover, workers who wanted to organize got

help early on both from the Central Unico de Trabajadores (CUT) and the Socialist party. Thus the workers were not acting in a purely autonomous fashion but as part of a dynamic between those acting at the base level and political elites who supported direct worker action. Winn's account of how Minister of the Interior José Toha, a Socialist, dealt with the Yarur workers is illustrative. After speaking for Allende with worker representatives of Yarur (that is, opposing socialization of the factory), Toha then counseled them as a representative of his party and directly contradicted Allende. Winn concludes that the workers felt that these conflicting messages freed them to act as they wished. Spence's study leads to the same conclusion. The pobladores who developed the popular justice system lacked support from the major parties of the Left, which made them vulnerable when they were attacked by the Right.⁹

Winn's book also discusses divisions among the Yarur workers, mainly between longtime employees and more recently hired workers. He emphasizes heavily their differing experiences: more experienced workers had suffered through a number of labor defeats at the hands of the Yarurs and were therefore cautious at best, while newer hires with varying experiences were more likely to organize and strike. One major difference between the two groups was that the older workers were mostly women, while the new hires were men. Although Winn discusses possible consequences of the gender difference and the historically different treatment of men and women by the Yarurs, this area merits further exploration. The implication of *Weavers of Revolution* is that women are less likely to be militant. The question of under what circumstances women in Chile are more likely to organize is significant both historically and today, given increased women's participation in agriculture (especially in the fruit export sector),¹⁰ as well as the growth of women's organizations.¹¹

Overall, *Weavers of Revolution* is well-written and accessible for a general audience. It tells the story of the Yarur factory, interwoven with a description of the general situation in Chile, in a manner that enables the reader to put the Yarur events in context. The book treats one of the extremely critical issues of that era—the socialization of the economy and worker participation in this process.

Joseph Farrell's *The National Unified School in Allende's Chile* is a valuable case study of educational policy, another area that has been little investigated despite the torrent of material on the period. Farrell traces educational policy in Chile mainly from the Frei period on. He documents the historical disinterest of the parties of Unidad Popular in educational reform, with the exception of the Radical party, whose stress on secularism led them to focus on educational matters. Then Farrell discusses the genesis of the Allende government's proposal for a

national unified school (*escuela nacional unificada*). This idea was pushed by radical Socialists within the education ministry, despite misgivings in UP's more moderate wing, especially the Radical party.

Farrell is critical of the radical position within Unidad Popular. He believes that their pushing the national unified school yielded disastrous consequences. Radical statements about education scared the middle sectors, even while Allende, the Radical party, and others sought to reassure these same groups about the UP's education policy. In fact, it was the issue of the national unified school that finally forced the Catholic Church to join in the political fray and brought out the military as well. Thus the national unified school was responsible for mobilizing three potentially powerful political forces against Unidad Popular. Farrell also focuses on the internal conflicts between radicals and moderates that not only resulted in an unwise policy but undercut public statements by government officials, thus weakening the image of the government. He believes that even though education was not of major significance to Unidad Popular in its initial phase of transition to socialism, the national unified school issue became a significant factor in creating a pro-coup atmosphere and also provided a case study of the errors of Unidad Popular.

Farrell's critique also extends to Unidad Popular as a whole. He faults the coalition for pushing projects of drastic social transformation while commanding only a minority of the vote, claiming that such tactics raised the question of the government's legitimacy. *The National Unified School in Allende's Chile* does a good job of examining this catastrophe, especially in analyzing intracoalition conflicts and their effects on the middle class. But Farrell's critique of Unidad Popular policymakers for being what they claimed to be—that is, revolutionaries—is overly harsh. Most twentieth-century governments in Chile have been elected with a minority of the vote, so UP's position was not unusual. But Farrell is right to criticize Unidad Popular for not being more attentive to the urgent need to capture middle-sector support and forge a majority alliance. To do less was to threaten the viability of the revolutionary project.

POLITICAL PARTIES, SOCIAL CLASS, AND REVOLUTION

The *vía chilena hacia el socialismo* required attaining a majority for socialism. But moderates and radicals within the UP coalition had divergent understandings of what this goal implied. According to moderates, attaining a majority called for achieving an electoral majority, which necessitated winning over at least segments of the middle class. For UP radicals, in contrast, it involved mobilizing the working class through revolutionary action that would then attract elements of other

classes to its cause, although the leading edge would continue to be workers.

The issue of the middle sectors is one of critical importance on this subject. First of all, Unidad Popular assigned these sectors a significant role in its strategy for peaceful change, in which they were to be part of a broad alliance against large-scale landowners, industrialists, and financiers. Second, Chile had a more complex social structure than less-developed countries. The size of its middle sectors was not insignificant, which made them a force to be reckoned with. In addition, the historical role of the political Center in Chile cannot be overlooked. The pivotal role of this political bloc is noted by Farrell as well as Garretón and Moulián in their analyses of Chilean political history. In sum, the UP strategy for a democratic road to socialism, given its partial political power, necessitated forming an enduring alliance with the Center, however this goal might be understood by UP moderates and radicals. The Left's inability to form an alliance with the Center or to reach firm agreements with its major political party, the Christian Democratic party, doomed the Chilean experiment. As the elections in March 1973 clearly showed, Chile had reached an impasse, divided between those supporting and opposing Unidad Popular. The result was increasing political agitation that eventually led up to the military coup.

Most of the studies under review accept the critical importance of an alliance between Chilean workers and middle sectors for the success of the UP's peaceful transition to socialism. The Chilean political system in 1970 was a tripartite one made up of three viable political blocs: the Right, spearheaded by the Partido Nacional; the Center, dominated by the Christian Democratic party; and the Left, made up of Unidad Popular and the MIR.¹² Over the course of three years, however, the system polarized into two contending groups. How did this schism occur, given that all parties in the Unidad Popular coalition agreed that the middle sectors were vitally important? The answer is that UP errors in dealing with the middle sectors combined with skillful manipulation of the mass media by the Right (who exerted ideological and cultural dominance during the period) to alienate the middle sectors from the Left. Bitar, Garretón and Moulián, Spence, and Farrell all present instances of this behavior. Many cases of UP ineptness and disregard in dealing with the middle sectors can be cited. Farrell's analysis of the national unified school issue posits that the radical wing of Unidad Popular misunderstood its effect on the middle sectors. Bitar cites a number of cases where Unidad Popular reassured the middle sectors with its words but alarmed them with its deeds. A clear case was the government's inability to delimit clearly the boundaries of the social sector and protect small and medium-sized businesses. These business owners believed that, despite economic prosperity under Unidad Popu-

lar, their fundamental well-being was in jeopardy. To make matters worse, Unidad Popular or its constituent parties sometimes used highly charged rhetoric that served only to frighten the middle sectors. The use of such phrases as “dictatorship of the proletariat” and the public debate about the nature of an alliance with the petty bourgeoisie certainly cast doubts in their minds about the place of the middle class in a future Chile controlled by the Left.

The Right was able to take advantage of these blunders. Farrell details how the Right skillfully preyed on the middle sector’s fear of Marxist indoctrination in schools to not only defeat the national unified school but weaken belief in the legitimacy of Unidad Popular and thus pave the way for a military coup. Farrell documents the role of the opposition media in propagating unwarranted fears by citing lengthy passages from opposition newspapers, graphic evidence of how the Right utilized the national unified school issue in its scare campaign against the supposed “Marxist totalitarian” government of Allende. Spence shows how the right-wing press played on public fears of popular tribunals—which were characterized as “firing squads tribunals”—to force Unidad Popular to withdraw its bill proposing neighborhood courts in April 1971. Bitar too demonstrates the ways in which the Right was able to press forward with this ideological campaign, as do Garretón and Moulián. In general, however, not enough attention has been paid to the significance of the mass media as a factor in creating the conditions that brought down Allende (one exception is Donald Freed’s and Fred Landis’s *Death in Washington: The Murder of Orlando Letelier*).¹³ Last, the serious differences within Unidad Popular over policy were exploited by the opposition in focusing on the most extreme UP positions for right-wing attack. The result of all these factors was that by 1972, the petty bourgeoisie represented in the *gremios* and other middle-class groups had combined in active opposition to the Allende government.

The middle sectors’ increasing disenchantment with the Left can also be plotted by following the behavior of the Christian Democrats, and several of the volumes under review take precisely this approach. Michael Fleet’s *The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy* examines the Christian Democratic party from its origins in the 1930s through the contemporary military period and describes the party’s change of behavior during the Allende period. Manuel Antonio Garretón and Tomás Moulián analyze the 1970–1973 period in *La Unidad Popular y el conflicto político en Chile* to show how, despite ideological differences between the Christian Democratic party and the Partido Nacional, an alliance was forged that changed the political landscape and created the possibility for a military coup.

It is generally agreed that Unidad Popular had a genuine oppor-

tunity to make firm agreements with the Christian Democrats during the first year of Allende's rule, although neither side was interested in forming a more permanent alliance. By the end of 1971, however, the atmosphere began to change. According to Fleet, the attitude of the Christian Democrats changed from one of "constructive opposition" to "obstructionist opposition." Garretón and Moulián stress instead the Christian Democrats' desire to be the majority opposition party independent of the Right and their support of social change through the constitutional process to argue that specific agreements with the party were still possible in 1972. As a result, the Christian Democrats swung back and forth in pendular fashion between the Right and the Left. For example, in 1972 several rounds of negotiations took place between the party and Unidad Popular over the social sector.

The general consensus is that the likelihood of agreement declined precipitously in 1972, and by October, the chances for agreement between Unidad Popular and the Christian Democrats were slim. Bitar comments that by that point, Unidad Popular had lost the "battle for the middle class." By 1973 the likelihood of agreement on critical issues—above all, on the social sector—was virtually nil. Allende was the only one negotiating seriously in the last round in July and August 1973. By this point, Christian Democratic participation was just a cover because the party was actually supporting direct military intervention. Some disagreement exists on this last point. Farrell is more optimistic, citing the last-minute compromise on educational policy as an indication that agreement on other issues was still possible at this late date. The most positive view of the Christian Democrats is Davis's in *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende*. He grants them the status of loyal opposition throughout and assumes that agreement with Unidad Popular was possible even in 1973.¹⁴ Davis blames Unidad Popular instead, particularly faulting left-wing "extremists" who wanted armed confrontation. Both Farrell and Davis are excessively sanguine on this point, however. By 1973, especially after the congressional elections in March, the Christian Democrats had clearly opted for a *golpista* solution to Chile's political crisis.

The nature of the Christian Democratic party as well as the attitude and behavior of the major social classes in Chile are examined by a number of authors. Was the Christian Democratic party petty bourgeois in character, or did it have strong connections to the bourgeoisie that account for its behavior? What was the nature of the electorate and the working class in particular?

Fleet tries to put these questions to rest once and for all by using survey data from Eduardo Hamuy (the father of Chilean survey research) and the Centro Bellarme to trace Chilean class attitudes over time. Fleet undertook his macro-level analysis of social class attitudes to

clear up what he considers misconceptions about the nature of the Christian Democratic party, especially its social-class base. His theses in *The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy* are evident: the Christian Democratic party was a petty bourgeois party, with significant worker support. Second, workers were not increasingly radicalized during the 1960s and 1970s. The 1970 election results were not proof of class polarization; workers voted for all three candidates. Last, workers voted according to bread and butter issues, not according to larger ideological perspectives.

Fleet's view of Christian Democracy is not universally shared, however. His book engages in a debate with other scholars who take differing views of the party, particularly those who he feels take a Marxist perspective and "incorrectly" posit a connection between the bourgeoisie and the Christian Democrats. Opinion on this point is split among the other books under review. Most of the studies assert a relationship between segments of the bourgeoisie and the Christian Democrats. Bitar, Garretón and Moulián, and especially Pollack note that the Christian Democratic party had connections with the bourgeoisie in terms of voters and political elite ties. For example, Pollack states that the heterogeneous nature of the Christian Democratic party included middle-class groups, workers, and managerial groups, with the last group having ties to "construction industry, finance, and new forms of imperialist penetration" (p. 4). Actually, one could argue that the modernization premise of the Christian Democratic party meant working with progressive sectors of the bourgeoisie.

Disagreements also emerge about the nature of the working class beyond the general premises that the working class split its electoral loyalty and that significant numbers voted for the Christian Democrats, which should not surprise those who have studied Chilean politics. Farrell agrees with Fleet's claim that Allende's election in 1970 did not signal a dramatic electoral shift toward the Left, but Winn, Spence, and Pollack take a different perspective. Pollack bases his chapter entitled "Political Strategies and Mobilization in Chile, 1963–1973" on the thesis that the Christian Democrats' grass-roots mobilization during Frei's government began a process of increasing popular participation that continued during the Allende government. Pollack perceives a direct line between the Christian Democrats' fomenting participation and participation during the UP period. Winn and Spence focus their micro-studies on the working class to attempt to demonstrate increasing militancy and revolutionary consciousness among industrial workers and the urban marginal pobladores. Their perspective sharply contrasts with that of Fleet, who tries to use survey research data to prove the opposite: that no radicalization of the working class occurred that could account for Allende's election or the March 1973 congressional election

results. While the perspective taken by Winn and Spence has validity, it should be noted that the Yarur workers and the inhabitants of Nueva Habana constitute special cases. Nueva Habana has long attracted attention precisely because of its atypically high level of organization.¹⁵ The same could be said for the Yarur workers, who were the first to agitate by means of a labor strike for inclusion of their factory in the social sector. Here the questions raised earlier about “revolution from below” and “from above” are significant.

Fleet’s argument about worker attitudes and behavior is nevertheless weakened by several factors. First of all, he defines workers as including both white-collar workers (*empleados*) and blue-collar workers (*obreros*). Although he sometimes separates these categories in his statistical tables, many of Fleet’s conclusions about worker attitudes and voting preferences are based on joint responses from *empleados* and *obreros*. But white-collar workers, with incomes more in keeping with a middle-class standard of living, often aspire to and consider themselves part of the middle class, as Bitar asserts. Winn’s description of the Yarur employees notes the critical difference between the Yarur *empleados* and *obreros*—their separate unions, different kinds of jobs, training and education, as well as differing self-perceptions.¹⁶ As for Pollack, he classifies white-collar workers in the private sector as part of the middle class (p. 18).

Second, Fleet had to use extant survey data. Although he is cognizant of the data’s several limitations, one must be careful not to overstate the reliability of the conclusions he has drawn from the data, especially his time-series data taken from different samples that have very small numbers in some of the cells.¹⁷ Curiously, these studies (except for Pollack) virtually ignore the explosive growth of the electorate as a factor affecting the electoral success of the Right, Center, and Left in Chile. Such dramatic changes cast doubt on Fleet’s use of time-series data because he does not take into account the vast numbers of new voters.

What conclusions can be drawn about the nature of working-class behavior? Overall, workers were divided in voting allegiance among the three political blocs, but especially between Unidad Popular and the Christian Democratic party before and during the Allende government. While the assertion that radicalized workers were responsible for Allende’s victory has not been proven to date, it can be said that the revolutionary consciousness of some workers was raised during the period between 1970 and 1973.

Fleet completes his discussion of the Chilean Christian Democratic party by analyzing its behavior since the coup, which evolved from a more constructive position to one of outright opposition. He then compares Chilean Christian Democracy with other such parties in

Latin America and Western Europe and ends by speculating about the future of the party. Throughout *The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy*, Fleet emphasizes the differences within the party, between its progressive and more right-wing factions. He believes that this history of internal conflict will end up dividing the party. While it is true that the divisions Fleet describes still exist and were reflected in the July 1987 elections of a new party president, I find it a curious prediction. As he himself has ably demonstrated, these factions have existed within the party since its founding. Intraparty and intracoalition conflict is certainly not unusual in any of the forces in Chilean politics. Some Christian Democrats abandoned the party in 1969 and 1971 to eventually unite with Unidad Popular through either MAPU (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria) or the Izquierda Cristiana. Those were unusual conditions, however, where the situation of the Left was enhanced. In 1970 the Left was forming a broader coalition than had existed before, in a climate relatively open to socioeconomic change. In 1971 it constituted the government in power. Similar conditions will most likely not obtain again in the near future. In addition, the importance of partisan loyalty is not to be overlooked as a factor that holds political parties together.

Garretón and Moulián's *La Unidad Popular y el conflicto político en Chile* offers a fine analysis of the political forces that led to the fall of Allende. This study, which was carried out during the first few years after the overthrow of Unidad Popular, traces the political behavior of the major political parties in Chile from 1970 through 1973. Although the international factor is significant, the authors choose not to deal explicitly with this aspect. In the first part, "El marco de análisis," Garretón and Moulián provide an incisive sketch of the economic and political context of the Allende years. They assert that between 1970 and 1973, Chile changed from a country in partial crisis to one in total crisis. The authors define the partial crisis in Chile before 1970 as a crisis of capitalist dependency and the legitimacy of the state; that is, the country's dependent economy could not provide for the increasingly mobilized population. Yet the democratic political system itself was not questioned before 1970. Garretón and Moulián posit two major solutions to the crisis that was facing Chile. One was the route of non-capitalist democratization, which the Christian Democrats had originally proposed but discarded during the Frei presidency, or democratic socialism, which Unidad Popular offered. The second alternative, which we see implemented in Chile today, was to reverse the process of democratization and stress capitalist accumulation without interference from participatory or redistributive forces. The second part of the book, "El desarrollo de la lucha política," traces the events from 1970 to 1973, showing how the original tripartite division of Chilean politics—Right,

Center, and Left—polarized and how a situation of total crisis emerged in which the legitimacy of the political institutions themselves came under threat, resulting in the military coup. Garretón and Moulián point out the harmful consequences of UP disunity, critiquing the radicals and portraying a situation of UP paralysis in the last days. In this perspective, their analysis has much in common with Bitar's account.

In the last section, "Los bloques políticos y los procesos globales," Garretón and Moulián analyze the nature of the three major political blocks. They describe the Right as a group that understood from the beginning the significance of Allende's political victory and acted throughout on the basis of its perceived class interests, rather than party interests. Put simply, the Right worked from the beginning for military intervention. The Left also acted on the basis of class interests. But the leftists were hampered by internal divisions and a penchant for revolutionary rhetoric, which impeded formulation of a coherent leftist ideology. The authors also discuss the characteristics of the Christian Democrats and the Armed Forces, noting the impact of U.S. anticommunism and national security doctrine, which they deem to be of great import. In sum, Garretón and Moulián describe the circumstances that led to a political polarization in Chile. They contrast the logic of the UP project, which was to expand the limits of the state, with the logic of the Right, which was to support democracy as long as it coincided with the maintenance of capitalism. The direct conflict in the two positions led, over the three-year period, not only to polarization but to deinstitutionalization and delegitimation of the political system.

Benny Pollack's *Mobilization and Socialist Politics in Chile* comprises a set of three essays on the Chilean political process and the role of the Socialist party. In the first essay, Pollack examines the strategies of the various political parties between 1963 and 1973. Regarding Unidad Popular, he takes the now-familiar stance that its internal divisions crippled the government, prevented it from developing any strategic model for change, and left it vulnerable to attacks by a more united opposition. In his analysis of the Christian Democratic party, Pollack notes the heterogeneous social base of the party and the divisions among the Christian Democrats. He describes the Christian Democrats as representing the "revolution of rising expectations" and claims that they wanted not to change the structures of the capitalist economy but merely to increase everyone's access to and participation in it. Here his position resembles Jack Spence's argument that the Christian Democrats wished only to increase popular access to the existing judicial structures, as with the social sector.

Pollack's second and third essays deal specifically with the Socialist party. In the second, he tries to apply a political party typology to this party and concludes that it was a class-based mass party. In the

third essay, Pollack extends this argument, using data he collected in 1973 on Socialist party officials. Here he demonstrates that the Socialist party extended its representation of working-class sectors in the early 1970s, along with increasing its percentage of the vote.¹⁸ Pollack has many insights to share, based on his Socialist party data, but his study is sadly marred by a murky writing style and overuse of jargon, which impedes comprehension.

FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON THE CHILEAN REVOLUTION

The last major issue that these volumes probe is the question of foreign influences on the course of the Chilean Revolution, one that continues to be a point of dispute. Unidad Popular's strategy of a non-violent route to socialism aroused worldwide interest, and many viewed Chile as a possible model for the Third World. Several of the books reviewed raise the question of U.S. influence and, not surprisingly, differ in their assessments. Some minimize U.S. intervention as a causal variable and tend to build up the role of Cuba (Fernandois and, to a lesser extent, Davis) or other Latin American countries like Brazil (Davis). A second group of analysts place heavy blame on the United States, replaying much of the earlier debate on this topic. A third perspective places weight on U.S. actions as a significant factor but not the primary cause of the fall of Unidad Popular. Given the often polemical tone of writings on the subject, this more realistic assessment is a welcome point of view.

Nathaniel Davis, the U.S. Ambassador to Chile from 1971 to 1973, presents an insider's view of Allende's rule in *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende*. His stated purpose is to give an objective account of what happened, as he probes the causes of the coup and the role of the United States. His underlying purpose is also clear: to demonstrate that the United States was not responsible for the coup in Chile and that he personally was not involved in any untoward actions. The most important aspect of this book, given the author's position at the time, is its strong defense of U.S. actions (or lack of action) toward the Allende government. Davis carefully recounts the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the sordid International Telephone and Telegraph affair in late 1970, acknowledging Nixon's and Kissinger's strong aversion to Allende. He asserts that the major covert activity occurred before he became ambassador and that, despite Nixon's and Kissinger's continuing hatred of Allende, no covert plans to destabilize the country or violently overthrow the government were carried out while he was ambassador. Davis is joined in this judgment by Joaquín Fernandois, although even Fernandois admits to a U.S. "credit squeeze" but not a blockade (p. 312). Davis's claim is understandable, but he never satis-

factorily explains why U.S. hostility should have abated after 1970 and been replaced by cool, but correct, behavior. Chavkin in *The Murder of Chile* and Elizabeth Stone in the introduction to *Fidel Castro on Chile* are much harsher in their indictments of the United States for its covert activities.

These clashes of opinion clearly result from divergent political perspectives that allow the authors to interpret even similar data differently. The example of U.S. funding of opposition newspapers and economic groups is illustrative. It is generally agreed that the United States funded these groups throughout the three years of Allende's government. Some of the books cite this practice as an example of U.S. efforts to destabilize Chile and encourage a coup. Davis, however, argues that without U.S. support of *El Mercurio*, the newspaper would have succumbed to Unidad Popular's totalitarian program to destroy the free press in Chile. Thus Davis turns the other side's argument on its head in claiming that the United States acted to preserve democracy, not to destroy it. Likewise, Davis claims that the United States did not normally fund the strikers, although he admits that money given to other groups might have found its way to the strikers, unbeknownst to the U.S. government.

Davis also refutes the charge that the United States was involved in planning the military coup, yet he admits to foreknowledge of the event, which was unavoidable because of continuing U.S. intelligence gathering. He justifies his refusal to tip off Allende with the belief that the United States should not intervene every time it hears rumors of a coup and with the fear that Allende might have used this knowledge to mount a "self-coup."

Another example of differing interpretations is the issue of the warm relations between Fidel Castro and Salvador Allende. Joaquín Fernando in *Chile y el mundo, 1970–1973* focuses on a supposed UP adherence to the "Cuban paradigm." Both Davis and Fernando express skepticism regarding the Allende government's adherence to constitutional rule: Davis stresses left-wing paramilitary organization, while Fernando concentrates on proving that Unidad Popular consisted of undemocratic Marxists enamored of Cuba's vision for change. Fernando's discussion of Chile's relations with Cuba provides a useful example. He describes the reestablishment of Chilean-Cuban diplomatic relations and speculates on Cuban influence in Chilean politics from 1970 to 1973. While he views U.S. actions as relatively benign, he casts Cuba as a villain who intervened in Chilean internal politics by sending arms and training paramilitary groups. Likewise, Castro's visit to Chile is described as basically an effort to intervene in domestic politics by selling Chileans on the Cuban model. Fernando portrays the Chilean response as positive acceptance of the Cuban "paradigm," despite other

ideological differences between the Socialist party and the Communist party.

Whatever the arguments on each side, the facts are clear. The United States did channel significant sums of money to domestic opposition groups in Chile, some of which went to aid opposition strikers, and it exerted its considerable influence to dry up credit sources for the Allende government. Allende's belief in constitutional rule held firm; any depiction of Allende as a closet totalitarian is not borne out by the evidence of his three years in office. U.S. aid to right-wing groups—for media campaigns and gremio strikers—was an important factor in creating a domestic atmosphere propitious for a military coup. Last, the portrayal of Cuba as the villain is more speculative than factual. This view seems designed to appeal to anticommunist sentiments and justify the overthrow of Unidad Popular.

On the subject of the coup itself, Davis focuses on domestic dynamics rather than on U.S. actions. His general chronology is accurate, as is much of his analysis. Like Bitar and others, he discusses divisions within Unidad Popular and Allende's inability to overcome them, concluding that "democratic socialism" would have been possible in Chile if only Allende had been more persistent in applying this model rather than giving in to the radicals within his coalition or equivocating between the two positions.

Davis's *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende* is in many respects an admirable work. But his claim to a balanced presentation is marred by his heavy use of centrist and rightist secondary sources, such as the works of Robert Alexander,¹⁹ Robert Moss,²⁰ and *El libro blanco*,²¹ and by systematic misciting of a book that is sympathetic to the Left.²² Also, Davis's analysis takes the word of certain groups, like CIA officials and Christian Democrats, at face value yet is very skeptical of statements by the Left. His analysis tremendously overplays the organizational ability of the extreme Left, especially the extent to which these groups were armed and organized, while giving very short shrift to the seditious acts of Patria y Libertad, the Partido Nacional, and the Christian Democrats (in 1973). Davis's assumption that Marxist totalitarianism from the left-wing of Unidad Popular and the MIR constituted the imminent danger to Chilean democracy is not convincing, given all that is known about what happened in Chile. In fact, Peter Winn's book on the Yauru workers, who were part of a militant *cordón industrial*, argues against the idea of widespread left-wing organizing and stockpiling of weaponry before the coup.

What is perhaps most disappointing about Davis's book is that he appears in it largely as an observer of the dramatic events of 1972 and 1973. While he provides interesting information on continuing U.S.–Chilean negotiations over the copper expropriations, in which he

participated actively, Davis otherwise comes across as an innocent abroad. He adds almost no new information to what is already known about this period and depends heavily on secondary sources in his description of events. Moreover, inside information that he might have provided is often just mentioned. For example, he alludes briefly to meeting regularly with Eduardo Frei, although not in Frei's home, which might have aroused suspicion. But Davis barely touches on the content of these discussions or the general significance of his continuing contacts with important opposition figures.

Davis also seems concerned with demonstrating a moral weakness among leftists and the relative uprightness of the military under the circumstances. These efforts do not add stature to his story. For example, he spends an entire chapter refuting claims that Allende was killed by the military and arguing that the president indeed committed suicide. The point is unprovable, and one wonders at the weight placed on it here. Furthermore, even if the military did not kill Allende and sincerely offered to fly him out of the country, it is reasonable to ask whether they would have let him live very long in exile. Other individuals around whom the opposition might have rallied were brutally silenced, such as General Carlos Prats and Orlando Letelier. How long would Allende have survived? This question is not raised by Davis. Last I would note the derogatory comments about the Left and Allende that are skillfully woven into the narrative, such as the following sentence about the day of the coup. "It is alleged that alcohol flowed freely within the Moneda [presidential palace], and well it might have, for alcohol helps dull anguish—as the president had long known" (p. 262). In an otherwise amply footnoted book, one finds no citation here.

Davis's *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende* is nevertheless useful reading as an account by a major actor. It takes a position somewhat at odds with the Nixon administration's negative obsession with Allende and shows far greater insight into Latin American politics than current administration figures do. For this perspective, the book is to be commended.

From an opposing point of view, Samuel Chavkin's *The Murder of Chile* offers a vivid account of Allende's overthrow and the terror that followed. Chavkin does not pretend to be balanced or neutral about his subject. He deals mainly with events surrounding the aftermath of the coup, such as Swedish Ambassador Harald Edelstam's efforts to save Chileans from torture and death (for which the military declared him *persona non grata*), life on Dawson Island for high-ranking UP leaders and former government ministers held captive under primitive conditions, actions by Chile's women and inhabitants of the *poblaciones* (poor urban neighborhoods), and the deaths of poet Pablo Neruda and singer Víctor Jara.

Yet Chavkin's analysis of why things happened suffers from a simplification of reality. He makes some extreme statements, such as leaving the impression that right-wing hoarding caused all the shortages during 1972 and 1973. Davis and Chavkin in some ways counterpose each other: while Davis focuses on leftist paramilitary organization (Comandante Pepe et al.), Chavkin zooms in on right-wing violence.

Although Chavkin overplays the role of right-wing hoarding in causing scarcity, he is correct in focusing on right-wing media scare tactics, which were underwritten by U.S. secret financing of *El Mercurio* and other publications. As noted earlier, skillful use of the mass media, with financial assistance from the United States, helped turn the ideological tide against Unidad Popular. What is most valuable about Chavkin's book is the collection of first-hand accounts of the coup and its immediate aftermath, which gives the reader a "you are there" feel for the situation.

Fidel Castro on Chile is essentially a selected recompilation of his speeches and dialogues during his trip to Chile in November and December of 1971. For anyone wishing to evaluate Castro's behavior in Chile and his attitude toward the Chilean experiment, the book is worthwhile reading if one is willing to wade through some rhetoric. It also provides insights into Castro's interpretation of the Cuban Revolution because Castro was prone to draw on the Cuban experience when asked to comment on aspects of the transition to socialism and the challenges confronting Chileans. Elizabeth Stone's introduction takes a radical left view of the Chilean process and U.S. actions.

Joaquín Fernando's *Chile y el mundo, 1970–1973* proposes to examine Chilean foreign policy under Allende. He covers a broad spectrum of issues, including Chile's relations with the United States and other Latin American countries, the issues of U.S. intervention through multinationals and the CIA, copper nationalization, and debt renegotiation. Although this book offers much valuable information on Chilean foreign policy, it is nonetheless flawed by the author's insistence that the Left in Chile was ideologically dependent on Cuba.

In sum, these works discussing relations between Chile and the United States have much in common with the earlier debate on U.S. actions in Chile and fall into predictable categories. The most nuanced view, which will be discussed below, balances internal and external factors.

CONCLUSIONS

In trying to gauge the importance of external and internal factors leading to the 1973 coup, the more recent studies focus on internal dynamics of the Chilean process as significant factors in accounting for

the 1973 coup. These factors include divisions within Unidad Popular itself, the nature of the Christian Democratic party, actions by the Right (especially the virulent and well-publicized campaign against Allende that helped alienate potential UP middle-class support), and the interplay between the Right, Center, and Left in Chile. Studies like those by Bitar, Farrell, Winn, Garretón and Moulián, and others help flesh out our understanding of the Allende period. The picture that emerges is far more complex than any unicausal explanation.

These studies disagree about how much weight to put on internal coalition difficulties, the role of the opposition, and the role of the United States. Some authors, like Davis, place virtually all blame on Unidad Popular, emphasizing the Christian Democrats' role of "loyal opposition" and portraying a distant—if not neutral—United States. Bitar stresses internal UP difficulties and their consequences, coming to many of the same conclusions as Farrell in terms of conflicting signals and ineffective policymaking by the Allende government. Bitar, however, also cites U.S. actions as an important element. Farrell and especially Garretón and Moulián demonstrate the dynamic at work among the three political blocs, including the way that the opposition seized on the most extreme statement by UP representatives to place the government in the worst light possible and how the Christian Democrats and the Partido Nacional gradually formed a united opposition. A point to be clearly emphasized, however, is that a basic distrust of Unidad Popular existed that had been born of decades of anticommunist propaganda and aided by the United States, especially through CIA efforts and U.S. training of the Chilean military. This ideological and cultural hegemony was neither fully understood nor dealt with capably by Unidad Popular.

How might things have been different? A more unified Unidad Popular might have been able to deal more effectively with the middle class, especially if it had been able to agree early on about the dimensions of the social sector and use of the plebiscite to resolve major issues. Small efforts were made to create a unified UP party, but they were too meager and too late to solve the basic dilemma of multiple voices speaking for the Left.²³

The Chilean Left historically has been prone to ideological debates, sectarian behavior, and factionalism, even during periods when the Socialist party and the Communist party were formally allied. Staking out ideological positions and then debating them with other Left parties or factions was part of the Chilean elite political culture and served the function of helping the electorate differentiate among Left parties, despite the fact that none of the language was suited to capturing middle sectors. The Left's proclivity toward ideological sparring also resulted in its devoting much energy to revolutionary rhetoric, some-

times with questionable application to the Chilean case. Perhaps it was the very openness of the political system in Chile that allowed the Left to debate ideological issues so freely and to forget about the power of language in creating cultural and value symbols, as forces mobilizing not only support for revolution but adamant opposition as well. Moreover, the preoccupation with ideological issues concerning the transition to socialism meant that the Left did not spend as much time considering other issues that proved to be singularly important to the success of its nonviolent route to socialism, such as how to deal with the Armed Forces and the United States. It is worthwhile to note that this behavior has continued to the present, despite changed circumstances, and with very negative impact on the Left's chances of ending Pinochet's rule and attaining power in a democratized Chile in the future.

One dilemma built into the UP strategy for legal revolution was its need to set priorities among revolutionary goals and to admit that the revolution might involve sacrifices as well as popular gains. In other words, how could Unidad Popular expand its base of support and simultaneously enact profound socioeconomic changes? As Bitar notes, Unidad Popular wished to do many things at once—raise the incomes of working-class citizens and peasants and implement sweeping changes in the economic system—without considering whether or not these goals were compatible. Aside from misreading the middle sector, which was more worried about its long-term survival as a class than its short-term economic prosperity, Unidad Popular perhaps underestimated Chilean workers' understanding of the significance of the structural changes inherent in their project. Furthermore, the Left's insistence on a revolution *con vino y empanadas* implied a revolution that required neither cost nor sacrifice. Thus UP supporters were not psychologically prepared to tighten their belts for the revolution or to accept the idea that a revolutionary transformation of Chilean society would be an arduous struggle.

In sum, Unidad Popular might have been able to forge a unified course of action around the strategy of the second route to socialism by clearly delineating the details and sequence of change, recognizing the long-term nature of the transition process, considering middle-class support as strategically vital, and downplaying the heavily charged revolutionary rhetoric that alienated middle-class groups and the military as well. Under these conditions, a united Unidad Popular speaking with one voice might have been able to reach agreement with the Christian Democrats in 1971 over specific structural changes.

The role of the United States is important, too, in assessing how events might have been different. A more positive U.S. stance would have taken some of the steam out of the opposition, instead of giving

support to seditious behavior like the outrageous reporting in *El Mercurio* and the call for a new “government” by the Partido Nacional during the 1973 election campaign, to mention just two cases. As Garretón and Moulián so aptly point out, the Right acted from the beginning strictly according to its perceived class interests, which it believed to be imperiled by Allende’s victory. Nor were right-wingers averse to using extraconstitutional means to achieve their purpose—the elimination of the Allende experiment. CIA contacts with disgruntled members of the military and with right-wing paramilitary groups in the months between the 1970 presidential elections and the congressional vote to choose the president²⁴ only served to encourage those elements in the future. How could violent activities be wrong when the United States had given support to one such effort (the kidnapping of General René Schneider in 1970) and was continuing to finance the Right during the three years of Allende’s government?

These books demonstrate that the military coup that overthrew Salvador Allende and ended democracy in Chile was not inevitable. They prove amply that a complex set of factors, internal and external, led to this lamentable result.

NOTES

1. Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, “Visions of Chile,” *LARR* 10, no. 3 (1975):155–75.
2. In 1970 Unidad Popular was formed by six constituent parties or movements. This coalition was an expansion of the previous Socialist-Communist coalition, the Frente Revolucionario de Acción Popular (FRAP), which had formed in 1957 and twice fielded Salvador Allende as its presidential candidate. The parties joining the Communists and Socialists included the Radical party, purged of its right-wing element (which had been expelled several years earlier); MAPU (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria), which had formed in 1969 after splitting off from the Christian Democrats; the Partido Social Demócrata; and Acción Popular Independiente, essentially the creation of Senator Rafael Tarud. During the UP government, these six parties or movements were subject to great stress. MAPU split, although both wings remained within Unidad Popular. (The party divided in March of 1973. The faction agreeing with the moderate view within Unidad Popular had to change its name. It became MAPU–Obrero y Campesino, or MAPU-O y C, led by Jaime Gazmuri. The other faction was able to keep the official name MAPU and was headed by Oscar Guillermo Garretón.) The Radical party also divided, but one of the splinter groups, the Partido de la Izquierda Radical, abandoned Unidad Popular in April 1972 to join the opposition. One other group, the Izquierda Cristiana, split off from the Christian Democrats in late 1971 and joined Unidad Popular. At this point, a number of MAPU members changed party affiliation and entered the Izquierda Cristiana.
3. For a discussion of the ideological differences within the Left, see Lois Oppenheim, “The Quest for Unity on the Left: Allende’s Chile and the Socialization of the Economy,” Ph.D. diss., Washington University, 1980. A large body of literature either reflects or examines ideological position among leftist parties. For the Socialist view, see Julio César Jobet, *El Partido Socialista de Chile*, 2 vols. (Santiago: Ediciones Prensa Latinoamericana, 1971); Alejandro Chelen Rojas, *Trayectoria del socialismo* (Santiago: Editorial Austral, 1966); *Pensamiento teórico y político del Partido Socialista de Chile*, edited by Julio César Jobet and Alejandro Chelen Rojas (Santiago: Editorial

- Quimantu, 1972); and Raúl Ampuero, *La Izquierda en punto muerto* (Santiago: Editorial Orbe, 1969). Carlos Altamirano, Secretary-General of the Socialist party during the Allende years, presents the radical Socialist view of the possibilities of the “peaceful route” in his *Dialéctica de una derrota* (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1977), although it should be noted that he has since repented of this position and taken a more social democratic line. Paul Drake analyzes the Socialist party in *Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932–1952* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978). For the Communist view, see these examples: Hernán Ramírez Necochea, *Origen y formación del Partido Comunista de Chile* (Santiago: n.p., 1965); and Luis Corvalán, *Camino de victoria* (Santiago: Impresora Horizonte, 1971), and *Nuestra vía revolucionaria* (Santiago: Impresora Horizonte, 1971). Kyle Steenland examines the conflicts within Unidad Popular over the implementation of agrarian reform in *Agrarian Reform under Allende* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1977). Joan Garcés, a Spanish advisor to President Allende, analyzes intra-UP conflict, especially Socialist-Communist conflict in *Allende y la experiencia chilena* (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1976).
4. In late 1969 and early 1970, several agreements were reached during the negotiations that preceded the formation of the UP coalition. These agreements formed the core of UP rules for decision making, governance, and division of power. One was the political pact, which consisted of several major points. The first set up the Political Committee of Unidad Popular, consisting of one representative of each party and movement in the coalition. Second, to avoid the establishment of “zones of influence” in the bureaucracy, all UP parties were to be represented in each area of state administration, supposedly to act as a “check and balance” on other party functionaries. Last, ministerial posts were apportioned among the six parties by a fixed formula or quota in the following ratio: 3:3:3:2:2:1. The three largest vote-getters at the time, the Socialists, Communists, and Radicals, were to have three cabinet posts each. MAPU was to have two, and the remaining three positions were to be divided between the Social Democrats and Acción Popular Independiente.
 5. See Oppenheim, “Quest for Unity.” In this study, I analyze the speed and scope of social-sector formation, the means used to socialize industries, and worker participation among socialized industries.
 6. *Fidel Castro on Chile* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1982).
 7. For example, when referring to unresolved conflicts within Unidad Popular, Bitar states, “nor did there exist an authority strong enough to resolve the controversies” (p. 89).
 8. Because of the lack of a relevant law, Unidad Popular relied on a series of administrative measures to socialize most industries. One of these measures involved the use of Decree-Law 520, dating from 1932 and further validated by later decree-laws. It permitted the government temporarily to intervene in, requisition, or expropriate an industry under well-specified conditions: in an attempt to alleviate any irregularity in the production or distribution of essential goods; in an industry suffering from severe labor problems; or in one whose normal production was disrupted, thereby creating serious supply problems. The Yarur textile mills constituted the first case where the government was forced to use these decree-laws because of worker-precipitated disruption in production, rather than owner desertion or sabotage. The important point to note about the use of intervention and requisition measures is that they did not constitute definitive socialization of the industry. Thus even if workers considered their factory to be part of the social sector, it was really in a kind of limbo status legally.
 9. The issues raised by Winn and Spence about semiautonomous worker organization and self-government are somewhat analogous to the current debate in Chile over the degree of autonomy of contemporary grass-roots organizations, such as the *organizaciones económicas populares* (OEPs) and other similar organizations. While some laud these as examples of autonomous efforts by workers and *pobladores*, others note the links with social service organizations, academic institutes, and even foreign funding sources. The social service workers in private institutes and in the Vicaría de Solidaridad whom I interviewed raised the issue of grass-roots organizational autonomy. A large and growing literature on the topic of grass-roots organizations

- paints different pictures of their degree of autonomy. What follows is a brief, suggestive list: Luis Razeto Migliaro, *Economía de solidaridad y mercado democrático*, 2 vols. (Santiago: Programa de Economía del Trabajo, 1984, 1985); Clarisa Hardy, *Estrategias organizadas de subsistencia: los sectores populares frente a sus necesidades en Chile*, Documento de Trabajo 41 (Santiago: Programa de Economía de Trabajo, 1985); Eduardo Walker, Marisol Saborido, Carmen Tardito, Pablo Astaburuaga, and Ximena Valdés, *Planificación desde la comunidad, ampliando el campo de lo posible* (Santiago: Equipo de Vivienda y Gestión Local, CIPMA, 1987), especially the article by Ximena Valdés, "Metodología de planificación: una herramienta para la organización de pobladores," 21–42; Bernardo Gallardo, *Las ollas comunes de La Florida como experiencia de desarrollo de la organización popular*, Documento de Trabajo 248 (Santiago: Facultad Latinoamericana de las Ciencias Sociales, 1985); Teresa Valdés E., *El movimiento poblacional: la recomposición de las solidaridades sociales*, Documento de Trabajo 283 (Santiago: Facultad Latinoamericana de las Ciencias Sociales, 1986); Rodrigo Egana B., *Las instituciones de apoyo y las OEP: problemas y dilemas que emergen en esta relación*, Documento de Trabajo 50 (Santiago: Programa de Economía del Trabajo, 1986).
10. There have been dramatic changes in the structure of agriculture since the 1973 coup. The cultivation of crops, especially fruit, for exportation has transformed the countryside. A number of studies have been published on women in agriculture and in the rural sector. See, for example, the issue of *Agricultura y Sociedad* entitled *Organizaciones femininas del campo: problemas y perspectivas* (Santiago: Grupo de Investigaciones Agrarias, May 1987).
 11. One of the most impressive developments in Chile since the coup has been the emergence of a strong women's movement. Many groups formed to help solve the daily problems that women faced—housing, food, employment, and human rights. Feminist and more overtly political groups also formed, as well as groups that fit into both categories. There are currently two women's houses in Santiago where women's groups meet and classes are held. The latter cover such issues as sexuality, male-female relations, and acquiring employment skills. Also, many teams or individuals studying women operate within the numerous private social science institutes in Santiago, and the Centro de Estudios de la Mujer (CEM) is dedicated entirely to this project.
 12. See, for example, Joan Garcés, *1970: la pugna política por la presidencia en Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1971).
 13. Freed and Landis describe a process of U.S.-fomented psychoterror in which horrifying stories were planted in the newspapers to create a sense of unease and fear. See Donald Freed and Fred Landis, *Death in Washington: The Murder of Orlando Letelier* (Westport: Lawrence Hill, 1980). One such story was that of the *descuartizado*, a "quartered man" whose discovery was recounted in right-wing newspapers. Although this thesis is highly speculative, articles describing the *descuartizado* did appear in the Chilean right-wing press. Moreover, the CIA is known to conduct disinformation campaigns.
 14. Davis notes laconically a change in Eduardo Frei's attitude toward military intervention in 1973 but does not comment further: "By the time of the coup it had become clear that Frei and his party had concluded that a military solution was the only possible way out of the crisis. . . . Frei never advocated a coup to me in our talks, however, and I never supported the idea in talking to him" (p. 147).
 15. I should also note here that since the coup, pobladores as well as academics have participated in a process of reevaluating the Allende experience. For example, those who still live in Nueva Habana (now renamed Nuevo Amanecer) are divided in their assessment of this experience in self-government. Some look back on it with nostalgia, but others feel that the highly ideological leadership prevented the campamento from becoming truly democratic. This information comes from my interviews with pobladores in Nuevo Amanecer and from a team of social workers who are conducting a project there.
 16. There were also cases of obreros having their legal classification changed to empleado once their factory had been transferred to the social sector. For a discussion of this phenomenon in two industrial enterprises, see Lois Oppenheim, "Quest for

- Unity," 339–46. These cases also conflict with Winn's more positive assessment of worker attitude, as presented in *Weavers of Revolution* and in "Loosing the Chains: Labor and the Chilean Revolutionary Process, 1970–1973," *Latin American Perspectives* 3, no. 1 (Winter 1976):70–84; and "Oral History and the Factory Study: New Approaches to Labor History," *LARR* 14, no. 2 (1979):130–40.
17. In attempting to analyze the attitudes of subsets of the survey sample, such as Christian Democrats and UP workers, Fleet was left with very small numbers in some cells, ranging from six to twenty individuals. Cognizant of this problem, Fleet used tau beta instead of chi square to determine levels of significance. Nevertheless, some of the levels of significance provide very weak support for Fleet's generalizations.
 18. Pollack's essay also contains some debatable points. He appropriately raises the question of how the party system absorbed the spectacular increase in new voters, especially in the period after 1958. His answer is that new parties arose and existing parties had to restructure themselves. But his conclusions are speculative and not well supported, even by his own data.
 19. Robert Alexander, *The Tragedy of Chile* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1978).
 20. See Robert Moss, *Chile's Marxist Experiment* (Newton Abbot, England: David and Charles, 1973). This book was also published in Spanish.
 21. Secretaría del Gobierno, *Libro blanco del cambio de gobierno en Chile: 11 sep. 1973* (Santiago: Empresa Editora Nacional Gabriela Mistral, n.d.). This work was published shortly after the coup by the Chilean junta in order to justify its military intervention and the brutality that followed.
 22. Davis cites Freed and Landis's *Death in Washington* erroneously throughout chapter 10, which chronicles the day of the coup. Davis cites it where Chavkin's book should have been listed, an apparent mix-up. But in other notes, both Chavkin and Freed and Landis are cited. Thus the misciting of Freed-Landis cannot be explained as a mechanical error. In all cases, the information cited is not in Freed and Landis's book. This repeated error is surprising in an otherwise carefully footnoted work, unless Davis perhaps wanted to show greater support for his description among writers sympathetic with the Left.
 23. For example, Unidad Popular created the Partido Federado de la Unidad Popular to confront the opposition electoral coalition, the Confederación Democrática (CODE), in the March 1973 elections. The Partido Federado de la Unidad Popular was constituted in July 1972, complete with officers. But aside from drawing up a single electoral slate for the 1973 parliamentary elections, this new party gained few party prerogatives from UP member parties. Perhaps more significant was its much-postponed first congress held in 1973 to discuss creating a more integrated party. The congress was held in late June of that year, preceded by regional meetings in May. But the UP Congress was overshadowed by the attempted coup of 29 June and the worsening political crisis after that date.
 24. Under the Chilean Constitution of 1925, in cases where no candidate received an absolute majority of the popular vote, Congress was empowered to select the president by choosing between the two highest vote-getters. Because of Chile's multiparty system, this recourse was not uncommon. But an unwritten norm applied in these cases, which was that the Congress would choose the individual who had received the most votes to be president, even though it had the constitutional authority to choose either.