

movements of figures such as Daniel Bell, Richard Hofstadter, and Seymour Martin Lipset. The paradigm had a psychological approach to politics and saw the resentment of rightwing and populist movements as entirely irrational. In the 1970s this paradigm was subjected to strong criticisms and intellectual analysis saw a decline in the use of resentment as an explanatory factor. In recent years, however, we have seen a return of the use of “resentment” to explain rightwing populism. Schneider notes—and applauds—the fact that contemporary commentators, in contrast to the earlier resentment paradigm, do not simply write off the resentment of rightwing groups as irrational but rather take their grievances seriously. Thus, we are to some extent back to the Butler/Smith view according to which resentment can be a response to moral injury, which should not be ignored. At this point in the book, Schneider even suggests that resentment can be one of the “weapons of the weak” (p. 112).

Interwoven with the intellectual history of the concept, the book includes a history of actual cases of resentment. Schneider is not concerned with individual experiences of resentment but with its collective and political manifestations. We learn, for example, about resentment as the background for witch hunts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and Luddism at the dawn of the industrial age in England. There is a fascinating discussion of the connection between resentment and revolution, including a fine analysis of Albert Camus on rebellion. The historical examples of resentment end with (all too brief) discussions of Islamic fundamentalism and Vladimir Putin’s nationalism. However, the historical epoch that is closest to the heart of the author is clearly the 1960s. Schneider argues that there are two sixties, one without and one with resentment. The leftwing countercultural movements of the sixties were certainly full of emotions but “resentment [was] not one of them,” he argues (p. 137). But “the other sixties,” that of Richard Nixon and “the silent majority” certainly was resentful.

At this point, the book runs into conceptual difficulties. For in which sense were Nixon and his followers resentful and the countercultural movement not so? And doesn’t Schneider commit the error that he warns against, that is, using resentment as a label for others and exempting oneself? (Schneider took part in the countercultural movement of the sixties and writes about it as a participant observer, p. 139). It is as if Schneider cannot quite decide on how to define resentment. Indeed, in the Conclusion, he acknowledges that the book has taken two paths and operates with two models of resentment: the “Left Behind/Threatened Model” and the “Comparison/Discrepancy Model.” In the first model, resentment involves bitterness and a reactionary desire to turn back to a better time. In the second model, resentment “serves as an alert to injustice or inequity that can and should be rectified,” which shows that resentment “can be aspirational” (p. 219).

The reason why Schneider does not see the countercultural sixties as in the grip of resentment is that it was “underwritten by a strong measure of hopefulness, utopian aspirations, and often wildly radical expectations” (p. 139). Why does this not fit with the second model of resentment, which exactly explains resentment with the comparison of ideal and reality and finding a discrepancy—and which we just saw “can be aspirational”? Moreover, insofar as the book understands resentment on the first model—“as a sense of being disposed, left behind, or demoted” (p. 138), which it does in the analysis of Nixon and contemporary populism—the connection to the democratic culture of equality becomes less clear. Schneider argues that both of his models of resentment are reactions to moral wrongs and “assume a level of equality” (p. 219). However, we should be careful not to assume that just because people are concerned with their status and not being wronged, they are concerned with equality. Resentment can also be directed against equality.

Schneider has done a superb job of discovering sources dealing with resentment, and *The Return of Resentment* covers an extraordinary amount of historical, philosophical, literary, and sociological material. However, while the research and learnedness of the author is a true strength of the book, parts of it read too much as a survey. Nevertheless, this is a much-needed book, which provides us with a nuanced and historically informed understanding of resentment, from which we can learn a great deal about contemporary politics.

Trading Futures: A Theological Critique of Financialized Capitalism. By Filipe Maia. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2022. 224p. \$94.95 cloth, \$25.95 paper.
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In short scope and lucid prose, Felipe Maia’s *Trading Futures* makes a provocative argument about such fundamental topics as justice, capitalism, theology, and time. The book’s central claim is that finance and theology are in competition today with each striving to imagine, define, and produce radically different futures. The double entendre of the book’s title neatly captures its argument: on the one hand, “trading futures” stands in metonymically for the larger scheme of financial capitalism; and on the other hand the text urges that we “trade futures” by exchanging what financial capitalism threatens in exchange for what a theology of hope promises for the future. This book is a pleasure to read: the text is generally insightful, efficiently crafted, creative, well-constructed, and well-informed; it is also speculative, suggestive, at turns elliptical, and impressionistic. Compositionally and argumentatively, the text seems to owe a distinct debt to Jacques Derrida (which some readers will appreciate and others not).

The book's argument suggests a neat division of its chapters into two parts: the first addresses "future-talk" within financialized capitalism (Chapters 1–3); and the second constructs an alternative kind of future-talk drawing from (mostly) Christian eschatological forms of hope (Chapters 4–6). Maia relies extensively on existing scholarship to develop the book's argument: he draws on both popular and specialized studies to portray the logic of financialization (prominently including Thomas Piketty, David Graeber, Donald MacKenzie, Martijn Konings, and Ivan Ascher); he takes cues from established figures currently or recently at work in and around political theology for much of his theoretical orientation (primarily Catherine Keller, Adam Kotsko, and Jacques Derrida); and he arrives at his conclusion through engagement with contemporary work in the ambit of Black studies (drawing from Fred Moten, Calvin Warren, Vincent Lloyd, and Joseph Winters). And some of the book's most original moments can be found in its original readings of Latin American liberation theologians, Franz Hinkelammert and Rubem Alves, as well as in the argumentative structure that conjoins this disparate material. In what follows I try to indicate the broad outlines of the argument before concluding with an assessment of the project as a whole.

While financialization might refer merely to the recent growth of the financial sector (*vis-à-vis* other aspects of the economy), *Trading Futures* argues that the growth of finance represents a qualitative transformation of capitalism that produces catastrophic changes at all levels of contemporary political-economies. For Maia, financialization produces new means of generating profits, new means of exercising control over humanity, and most fundamentally, he argues, a new orientation toward the future. Financialization (which is historically coextensive and symbiotic with neoliberalism and yet analytically distinct from it), in this view, circulates at the highest echelons of wealth and power, but also permeates society, shaping the lives of capitalists and laborers alike. The effects of financialization are wide-ranging, but borrowing Ivan Ascher's pithy formulation, Maia suggests that where industrial capital had commanded the means of production, financial capital commands the means of prediction. Rather than deriving profits directly from the production of commodities, finance turns money into more money by carefully managing risk, by rendering the future calculable, and by subjecting the future to its calculations.

Maia argues that the logic of finance—managing the future to generate profit—unfolds at the most abstract level of derivatives, and at the somewhat more concrete level of their underlying securities, but also within the quite material patterns of labor within workplaces, and down to the ways a person's life chances will be lived out as a function of individual consumption, credit, and debt. From the perspective of the poor and the worker adopted by Liberation Theology, he argues that financialization

increases the precarity of labor and drives laborers into debt (in part by increasing the demand for "flexibility" in response to fluctuating markets; and in part by simply capturing a larger share of profits that might otherwise go to wages). From FICO scores, credit cards, student loans, and mortgages to securities and derivatives—Maia emphasizes a singular logic of finance connecting hedge funds to workers' pocketbooks: at every level, he argues, financial capitalism consumes the future to generate profit. The first part of *Trading Futures* pictures financialized capitalism as a system whose power derives from governing time. Finance—through its predictive capacity—projects, molds, and devours a future made in its image. By imposing debt, finance subjects humanity to lifetimes of repayment.

Against this picture of financialization's grasp on the future, the second part of *Trading Futures* proposes a theology of time grounded in a conception of the future as what is "not—yet," and Chapters 4–6 mine the archive of Liberation Theology to flesh out this alternative vision. Here Maia draws on the German-Chilean-Costa-Rican theologian Franz Hinkelammert (1931–), "whose lifelong project has been to develop a theological critique of capitalism" (p. 89), and the Brazilian-and-U.S.-American-educated theologian and poet Rubem Alves (1933–2014), "an author whose scholarship cannot be framed in any particular disciplinary regime" (p. 112). For Maia, these thinkers represent a radical strain of the tradition of Liberation Theology that presses temporality to the forefront.

Maia argues that Hinkelammert's formative experience lay partly in the cultural and political efflorescence that surrounded the Unidad Popular movement and Salvador Allende's presidency in 1960s and 1970s Chile, but even more so in the violent response dealt to this movement by Augusto Pinochet's coup, crackdown, and subsequent repressive dictatorship. Hinkelammert "is haunted by arguments that depict violence and state-sponsored terrorism as necessary means to obtain a certain type of society," Maia argues, with the particular upshot that "Pinochet's coup and the ensuing market-driven ideology that he inaugurated in Chile must be thought of as a symptom of a deeply theological sensibility," which necessitated "a theological *critique* of capitalism" in response (pp. 95, 97). That response would focus on the "idolatry" of capitalism and the problems of state-violence and sacrifice that accompany it in the emergence of the neoliberal regime in Chile. For Maia, Hinkelammert importantly demonstrates a logic of capitalism that sacrifices the present in the name of a projected future.

Where Maia finds an account of neoliberalism's foreclosure of the future in Hinkelammert, he finds resources with which to resist that violence and with which to project a different future in Alves. He argues that Alves discovers "hope as an affective, creative, and imaginative force that can support the takeover of the means of production of future-talk ... [as] a summons that prepares

the way for what may come.” For Maia “the recognition of suffering as the condition of possibility of a liberating hope is Alves’s most meaningful contribution to the shaping of liberation theology” (pp. 112, 119). Centrally, in Alves, “The inadequacy of the present is bodily felt, not superimposed from an external promise. Alves firmly argues that the human consciousness of the future is born out of the *inadequatio* of the inhumanity of the reality of suffering” (p. 117). For Maia, Alves’s exuberant, poetic aesthetics—his “politics of beauty” (p. 126)—exceed both the confines of the present moment imposed by capitalist realism, and even strain the boundaries of theology itself.

Maia’s readings of Hinkelammert and Alves tell a persuasive story about the figuration of a hope within the development of Liberation Theologies that frames the future as unknowable and unmasterable, and therefore disrupts the present with a potentially emancipatory force. Brief overtures aligning Maia’s argument with currents in queer theory, disability studies, and Black studies in its introduction and conclusion notwithstanding, this is the core argument presented in *Trading Futures*: a Christian eschatological imagination inflected by twentieth century Liberation Theology as “a critical reflection on hope” that can provide the resources necessary for creating an alternative to financialized capitalism (p. 10). Maia develops a lucid picture of the domineering temporality of finance, and contrasts that with subtle renderings of alternatives drawn from the tradition of Liberation Theology in constructing that argument. *Trading Futures* effectively shows that agents of financial capitalism and theologians of liberation can differ profoundly in their orientations toward the future.

Whether or not such a theology provides a counter to the discourse of finance, however, is another question. *Trading Futures* seems to deliver both less and more than promised by its subtitle, “a theological critique of financialized capitalism”—less insofar as the liberation traditions Maia draws on predate the specific valences of the current era of finance he details; less insofar as his readings of theology are free-standing rather than woven into the account of financialized capitalism with any great specificity; less again insofar as the mechanism by which this theology might challenge the hegemony of financial future-talk is unclear. The hope for a future “not—yet” described by Maia would seem as reasonably well-suited to any and perhaps every political moment (rather than being specifically attuned to our own), and as remote. But at the same time, the argument seems to be more than an iteration of a specifically Christian theology.

In concluding his reading of Rubem Alves, Maia writes that “the poetico-metaphorical overabundance of Alves’s writings speaks to his commitment to the naming of absences as the proper name for Christian hope” (p. 128). And yet just pages before, Maia is much more capacious and improper in allowing that Alves “divides his

life into three periods. ‘In the first phase we only spoke of things as big as the universe: God. Then God died, and we stepped back a little and searched for political heroes. We left theology for politics, then politics failed us, and we went to our backyards to play with spinning tops’”, nevertheless continuing to argue that Alves’s “mature writings demonstrate a disciplinary eclecticism and a religious incredulity that distanced him from theological circles” (p. 125). If *Trading Futures* is not the kind of book whose argument necessarily compels its readers, and if it is less than a critique in that sense, in its eclecticism it also seems to be a bit more than theology, offering a series of provocative formulations, penetrating engagements, and diverse food for thought for readers who—like Alves—might be interested in generating “other senses, other directions, other meanings, other affects” in response to our moment (p. 129). Theological or not. Dominated by finance or otherwise.

Self-Control: Individual Differences and What They Mean for Personal Responsibility and Public Policy. By

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The message of this intriguing but frustrating book is that self-control is not just a matter of willpower: instead, it is a personality trait that is largely inherited but is strongly influenced by early upbringing. In this respect it is like intelligence. The ability to practice self-control changes little over the course of a lifetime, and none of us possesses an infinite supply. Everyone will fail at self-control during periods of stress and exhaustion. The author never defines self-control precisely but treats it as roughly equivalent to willpower, the ability to delay gratification.

That differences in self-control are inherited and to a considerable degree, fixed is a bold claim. Whatever objections one might have to this thesis, W. L. Tiemeijer is clear that these differences have nothing to do with race, sex, or ethnicity. Instead, they have a lot to do with socioeconomic status, which the author treats as one of the variables subject to change. Children brought up in poverty are less likely to receive the warm, constant, and loving support that contributes to self-control. Change that, and one can change society. If it helps the reader to categorize the book, then behavioral economics is probably the best place to locate it, though the author has a better appreciation of social theory than most who write in this field.

The book falls into two parts. First, it reviews recent social scientific and neurobiological research on trait and state self-control, as they are called. Second, it considers the social theoretical relevance of this research. The subtitle captures accurately the book’s intellectual range.