indicates, some others still cling to them. Only Bilinsky detects a clear pattern of influence flowing from the Western Ukraine, acquired by the Soviets during World War II, into the Ukraine at large. But even he circumscribes the influence and limits it to the dissident movement, not extending it to official policy-makers.

In spite of these criticisms, the book can be recommended to all who are interested in East Europe and the Soviet Union. Space does not permit me to analyze the individual essays, but I do want to note that I especially enjoyed the theoretical essay on diffusion of innovations by Gitelman and the essays by Vardys and Fischer-Galati, for they brought forth information about the Soviet West, an area still largely unexplored by American scholars.

ANDREW EZERGAILIS
Ithaca College

THE INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL OF MICHAŁ KALECKI: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC THEORY AND POLICY. By *George R. Feiwel.* Foreword by *Lawrence R. Klein.* Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1975. xxii, 583 pp. $22.50.

Michał Kalecki was the Continental, socialist Keynes. Embodied, so to speak, in his intellectual capital were Tugan-Baranovsky, Rosa Luxemburg, engineering, and the statistical description of the Polish economy. From Tugan he seems to have acquired a sensitivity to both the process of economic change and the role of organization in economic change; from Luxemburg he may have obtained a notion not unlike the Keynesian multiplier, combined with a theory of limited effective demand as a fundamental inhibiter of capitalist growth; from his engineering studies, a strong interest in mathematics and the preference for a succinct and logically coherent analytic approach; and from his more pragmatic work, a predilection for quantitative as opposed to qualitative analysis, combined with a recognition of the need to be *au courant* with available statistical descriptions of an economy as a prerequisite for analysis. This was a revolutionary combination, certainly for his time, and, embedded in a first-rate mind, it produced a revolutionary result. In 1933, three years before Keynes's *General Theory*, Kalecki published his *Proba teorii koniunktury*, which, along with two other papers, contains the basic analysis of Keynesian macroeconomics, but in a more coherent and, in some ways, more developed presentation than Keynes himself achieved.

Notably missing from the intellectual influences on Kalecki is the great Polish tradition, whose philosophers were instructing the world during the interwar period. Partly, this reflects Kalecki's more pragmatic education, but mostly it reflects another side of his character. Kalecki was a poor boy, who had to work at an early age and whose identification throughout his life was with society's impoverished majority. This orientation is reflected strongly in the substance of his work, if not in its form. Kalecki was strongly influenced by Marx but here, too, it was the spirit of Marxism more than the trappings which appealed to him. Unlike Keynes, his concern in developing a theory of business fluctuations was neither to save capitalism nor to bury it, but, rather, to find a way to ease the burden on that impoverished majority. He seems to have preserved a genuinely open mind as to whether capitalism or socialism could do this job, and though he never seems to have been very optimistic that capitalism *would* do it, his theory and appraisals did not exclude the possibility. His defense of Communist Poland, to which he returned after exile and whose government he served, was that the condition of the poor had been substantially improved by even that version of socialism. Perhaps Kalecki found his two great moral commitments—to improving the lot of the poor and to the open-minded search for the truth—about equally difficult to sustain. He once said that the story of his life could be told as a series of resignations-in-protest, a fact that seems to capture well the flavor of his relations with organized society, well enough that Feiwel uses this remark in his closing sentence.

George Feiwel's account of Kalecki is flawed. Where Kalecki was laconic, Feiwel is verbose. Individual sentences and paragraphs in Feiwel's book tend to contain a very diverse freight of information, contributing to redundancy and making it harder to follow the argument. A single paragraph will frequently contain the views of Feiwel, Kalecki, and several others, melded somewhat, with little direct quotation from Kalecki himself. As a consequence, the reader often loses contact with the emphases and the style of the book's subject. Feiwel provides little sense of the development of Kalecki's ideas over time, and little information about the influences that conditioned Kalecki's thought. Moreover, there is no overview of Kalecki's thought for the relatively casual reader, and no name index.

Nevertheless, this is a very useful book, which presents, so far as I can determine, an accurate account of Kalecki's ideas. Feiwel has attempted to fit the ideas into the then current state of economic theory, and he has succeeded in giving the reader some appreciation of the controversies in which Kalecki became involved. The reader who is willing to search a bit can find a description of Kalecki's ideas on a particular subject. Perhaps this book serves best as a supplement to Kalecki's own basic works, now essentially available in English. But even the reader who simply works through the book will have acquired a basic understanding of the ideas of this important and hitherto neglected economist.

There has been a recent revival of interest in Kalecki. Partly it is directed toward setting the record straight as to the importance of Kalecki in the history of economic thought. But, more than that, some of his ideas—including his theory of the distribution of income between classes and of the role of monopolization on the rate of economic growth—have been adapted to certain models of economic growth which have been used to challenge conventional theory by a group of economists centered in English Cambridge, Kalecki's home-in-exile. I am not sure that Kalecki, who died in 1970, would approve. As Feiwel emphasizes, his model of growth with fluctuations under capitalism was designed to show whether, and how, mass consumption standards could be raised under capitalism. And his socialist growth models, in particular the long-run plan for Poland prepared under his supervision, were designed to prevent politicians from using overoptimistic planning as an excuse to make consumption pay the price for their excessive investments. The arguments between the two Cambridges, on the other hand, are quite abstract and at the same time quite dogmatic. They seem far removed from an open-minded quest for the solution to mass poverty, the central issue which defined both Kalecki's interest in these ideas and the substance of his work.

Benjamin Ward
University of California, Berkeley