

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CENTER-LED REDISTRIBUTION IN BRAZILIAN FEDERALISM

The Fall of Subnational Party Machines

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Abstract: The article aims to identify the factors behind a series of center-left electoral victories in the 2002 and 2006 state elections, which indicate the decay of state political machines in Brazil's poorest regions. It is argued that vertical competition between the federal and state governments in the provision of public policies works as a constraint on state bosses' strategies of political control. The withering of state political machines may be understood as an indirect consequence of the national political shifts represented by the rise of Brazil's most important left-wing organization—the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores)—to the presidency in 2002 and 2006. Social and economic policies implemented by the federal government under PT rule undermined subnational patron-client networks by improving the life conditions of the poorest sections of the electorate. The article explores the interlinking of national and subnational electoral dynamics by developing statistical models for state- and municipal-level data.

Brazil's democracy is an exemplary case of the empowerment of subnational institutions and interests by decentralized federal arrangements. The Brazilian 1988 constitution instituted a robust variant of federalism in which local and, especially, state governments have been allowed to implement a wide range of social and economic policies and to pursue local and regional interests in the national political arena. State governors emerged as powerful political brokers in the 1980s, as the decentralized organization of national parties allowed subnational rulers to rely on their increased powers over policy making to strengthen regional party machines and to maximize their autonomy from central actors and institutions (Abrucio 1998; Ames 2001; Hagopian 1996; Mainwaring 1999; Samuels and Abrucio 2000; Weyland 1996).

Not different from other large and heterogeneous federations of the developing world, the Brazilian experience of democratization and decentralization has been characterized by wide territorial variation in the performance and workings of democratic institutions (Fox 1994; Gibson 2005; Heller 2000; McMann 2006; Snyder 1999). Comparative analysis has demonstrated that, whereas the consolidation of a restricted political arena, under control of a few political families, has characterized some states, others have witnessed the rise of more pluralistic and fragmented patterns of competition and decision making in the postdemocratiza-

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tion period (Desposato 2001; Schneider 2001; Souza and Dantas Neto 2006). In the least developed regions of the country, state bosses have sought to parochialize power in their home states and at the same time increase their leverage over national political actors, thus organizing structures of political representation and decision making that severely limited the exercise of effective opposition (Ames 2001; Bonfim 2004; Costa 1997; Dantas Neto 2006; Souza 2010; Spinelli 2006).

Notwithstanding the resilience of less-than-democratic structures in the peripheral states, there is evidence that state elections have become more competitive in the past years, in parallel to the rapid decay of political bosses. It is noticeable that these trends have been developing in places previously considered bastions of oligarchy and clientelism. The old political structures suffered a serious blow in the 2002 and 2006 gubernatorial elections, when the political elites and parties that had long dominated politics in poverty-ridden states such as Piauí, Rio Grande do Norte, Bahia, Maranhão, and Ceará were defeated by left and center-left opposition forces, which, until then, had been mostly excluded from access to executive posts in those states.

This article seeks to further an understanding of the changes in the electoral landscape of Brazil's least developed regions. The main argument is that the rise of the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) to the presidency in 2002 and 2006 intensified vertical competition between the federal and state governments, thus undermining state bosses' strategies of political control. Once the center-right forces that had benefited from almost unchallenged dominance at the national and subnational levels were forced to move into the ranks of the opposition, the political left was able to take advantage of access to national government to increase its electoral chances in Brazil's peripheral regions. In particular, public policies implemented by Lula's government allowed the PT and its left-wing allies to obtain significant political rewards among the poor electorate, generating higher rates of economic growth in the poorest regions of the country and redistributing income. The article explores the interlinking of national and subnational electoral dynamics by developing a regression model for time-series cross-section panel data covering four election years, from 1994 to 2006, in Brazil's twenty-seven states. Further, it assesses the impact of federal social expenditure on the 2006 subnational electoral results by testing a regression model for municipal-level data.

STATE GOVERNMENT, ELECTORAL DOMINANCE,
AND SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN BRAZIL

Spatial variation in democratic institutions and practices in contemporary Brazil has been associated, to some extent, with regional inequalities. As a general rule, political bosses have been strongest in the least developed states of the North and Northeast regions, where a substantial part of the population is employed in the urban informal sector and in low-productivity primary activities. Because of poor voters' dependence on government, state governors find themselves in a privileged position to extract electoral returns by means of clientelistic exchange (Desposato 2001).

Demographic characteristics are also important to explain the differential power of state elites in the peripheral states. Where a substantial share of the electorate lives in rural areas and small municipalities, governors may count on a wide network of local brokers to mobilize voters and engineer electoral majorities. In more urbanized and populated regions, in contrast, politics is an activity that occurs under conditions of relative anonymity, and local intermediaries play a less important role in voters' choice (Desposato 2001; Diaz-Cayeros, Mangaloni, and Weingast 2006; Stokes 2005; Stokes and Medina 2002).

Brazil's South, Southeast, and Center-West regions display higher rates of urbanization and much better social indicators relative to the North and Northeast. The states of the South and Southeast concentrate the bulk of the country's industrial production and are home to the majority of the urban middle classes. Electoral politics has been more fragmented and competitive in these regions, which reflects the presence of stronger left-wing parties and organized groups, as well as the relative weakness of traditional political families. The Center-West developed more recently as a result of the expansion of mechanized agriculture, and it accounts for a significant share of Brazil's agricultural exports. Even though the region has higher per capita incomes than the North and Northeast, political competition has been characterized by the perennial dominance of rural and conservative interests. Hence, some of the Center-West polities have displayed political traits similar to those observed in the North and Northeast: a feeble political left and a political arena dominated by conservative elites and political organizations.

Hybrid Regimes and Subnational Political Monopolies in Brazil

The territorial unevenness of democratic institutions and practices in contemporary Brazil raises questions on the conceptualization of the less democratic subnational units within a federation. Behrend (2009) has argued that in countries where subnational units are embedded in a national democratic framework and subnational elites face significant institutional and political constraints on their rule, one will observe the rise of hybrid subnational regimes that combine democratic and authoritarian practices. These polities are strong on participation but weak on contestation; that is, even though citizens are allowed to vote and express their preferences, there are constraints on liberal components of democracy that make elections essentially uncompetitive (McMann 2006).

Diamond (2002) classifies hybrid regimes in two main categories. Competitive authoritarian regimes, originally defined by Levitsky and Way (2002), are characterized by incumbents' systematic employment of undemocratic means to weaken opposition groups and restrict electoral competition, even though the persistence of democratic institutions and a significant parliamentary opposition may represent a threat to autocratic governments' rule. This is not the case of hegemonic authoritarian regimes, a situation in which a single party rules almost unchallenged and elections are largely an authoritarian facade.

In Brazil's multiparty, fragmented democracy, one will hardly find clear-cut cases of hegemonic party rule at the subnational level. Most, if not all, of the less

democratic states seem to fit better the definition of competitive authoritarianism, but even that is disputable because subnational rulers confront large and autonomous business classes and civil societies (Montero 2007). It is also important to note that subnational hybrid regimes in contemporary Brazil differ from the cases of hegemonic party rule that Gibson (2005) analyzed in Mexico and Argentina. Autocratic governors in these countries have taken advantage of relatively strong party organizations to regularly engineer electoral majorities and institutionalize territorial strategies of political control aimed at restricting effective contestation by opposition forces. Further, provincial governments in both Mexico and Argentina have the prerogative of redesigning electoral districts, which has favored the perpetuation of authoritarian elites by enabling them to create electoral rules that overrepresent the less populated and less urbanized districts.

Brazilian state governors lack such formal resources of power. The country has a long history of party system underdevelopment, and it has adopted an open-list proportional system that weakens party leadership and promotes factionalism. Also, all subnational units are submitted to the same electoral laws and rules, which divide the country in large multimember electoral districts that are the states themselves.

The survival of less-than-democratic enclaves in Brazil has depended on contingent, informal, and unstable strategies designed to construct and maintain political monopolies that maximize the electoral returns of clientelism. Although clientelistic practices may exist and prosper both under democracy and dictatorship, it is arguably the case that clientelism will allow for maximum political control in a hypothetical situation in which patrons have a monopoly over goods that clients desire (Stokes and Medina 2002). One key insight of this analysis is that what distinguishes a political from a private monopoly is that the patron can lay claim to it only if he or she returns to office.

Assuming that political parties compete mainly by mobilizing voters, followers, and party members through the distribution of material, individualistic benefits, one should expect the costs of voting against the incumbent party to increase as it obtains repeated victories against the opposition. Hence, the incumbent party would become stronger and attract new members as a consequence of its ability to monopolize control over government, the opposite being true for the opposition party. The two effects combined should increase voters' expected cost of voting against the government and thus reinforce the mechanisms responsible for the reproduction of the political monopoly.

Subnational political monopolies can survive only as long as political bosses succeed in restricting competition in both the horizontal (party competition) and the vertical dimensions (competition among government spheres). In the horizontal dimension of competition, control exerted by a small clique of state elites over access to top executive positions, the judiciary, and state legislatures, not to mention the indirect or direct control over business activities and the media, prevents the effective political contestation of opposition forces. In the vertical dimension, the construction of the subnational political monopoly requires strategies of boundary control aimed at restricting electoral competition by minimizing outside involvement in local politics. A key element of such strategies is the

monopolization of national-subnational linkages: regional elites will seek to occupy or control important national arenas to maximize local incumbents' leverage vis-à-vis the federal government, and yet prevent the local opposition from obtaining support of national actors and organizations (Gibson 2005).¹

In the Brazilian case, subnational political monopolies were created and strengthened in the context of regulated competition of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. Even though the transition to democracy and the opening up of political competition promoted the fragmentation of political forces, thus undermining political bosses' monopoly power in many instances, there were other cases in which party machines did survive and even extend their influence in the new democratic regime (Borges 2010; Power 2000).

According to Montero (2009), there is a very close relationship between the strength of the right at the subnational level and the parochialization of power. Today's right-wing political organizations are direct descendants of the party created by the military regime (1964–1985), *Aliança Renovadora Nacional* (ARENA). During the last years of the regime, ARENA remained strongest in the rural states of the North and Northeast, and subnational elites took advantage of generous patronage resources and development projects that military rulers provided to fortify their own, personally controlled party machines (Power 2000). In many cases, the political elites affiliated with the local ARENA machines continued to play a dominant role after the return to democracy, though under different party labels, such as the Liberal Front Party (*Partido da Frente Liberal*, PFL), the Popular Party (*Partido Popular*, PP), and the Liberal Party (*Partido Liberal*, PL).²

With the objective of measuring the extent to which state bosses succeed in controlling the electoral arena, I have developed an electoral dominance index to rank order all twenty-seven Brazilian states.³ The index is composed of three main variables: the governor's party share of the total vote in the first round, the share of seats the governor's party controls, and a political continuity index that measures governors' ability to obtain reelection or elect a party fellow throughout time. All the measures were calculated as averages for the 1982–1998 period, except for the political continuity index.⁴ Given the occurrence of moderately high levels of intercorrelation, I relied on factor analysis to reduce all three variables to a single index of electoral dominance.

The resulting composite index may be interpreted as a rough measure of the

1. Throughout this article I employ the concept of subnational political monopoly mainly as a heuristic device to evaluate state political systems comparatively across time and space. Even though few, if any, states in the posttransition period might be classified as clear-cut cases of monopolization of competition in the vertical and horizontal dimensions, the concept is still useful as an ideal type that can be compared with the actual cases.

2. In early 2007, the PFL adopted the label "DEM" (Democrats). However, because I examine political changes that occurred before 2007, I employ the old denomination, PFL, throughout this article.

3. This section relies on my previous work on subnational patterns of political competition (Borges 2007).

4. The index of political continuity was calculated by dividing the amount of times the governor succeeded in gaining reelection or electing a candidate from the same party by the number of elections held between 1978 and 1998. The interpretation is rather straightforward, as an index of 100 means that the governor succeeded all the times, whereas an index of 0 implies that the governor and his party were defeated in all elections.

extent to which a given state political system comes close to a situation in which a single party machine dominates. High scores thus should be associated with lowly competitive political structures. Analogously, states displaying low scores are likely to fit better a situation marked by more fragmented political competition and alternation in power. Table A1 in the appendix presents a list of dominance scores obtained for each of the Brazilian states. Note that the original factor scores were divided by the median value to facilitate interpretation and comparison across cases (for a more detailed discussion of conceptual and methodological issues involved in the development of the electoral dominance index, see Borges 2007).

By establishing as a cut line the scores located above the fourth quartile of the distribution, one may obtain a list of seven low-competitiveness states: Amazonas, Bahia, Ceará, Goiás, Paraíba, Maranhão, and Tocantins. It is worth noticing that five of the seven cases (Bahia, Ceará, Goiás, Paraíba, and Maranhão) were characterized by the dominance of a single party for a period equal or superior to three elections between 1982 and 1998. Also, two of the cases (Bahia and Maranhão) were paradigmatic examples of political continuity from authoritarian to civilian rule, as right-wing political families born and bred during the military regime succeeded in maintaining their political clout throughout most of the recent democratic period.

The remaining two cases, Amazonas and Tocantins, are states of the North region characterized by highly personalistic patterns of political competition and by the persistent hegemony of a closed circle of political bosses. Even though these states have experienced more alternation in power than the dominant political machines, the oligopolistic control over the supply of political alternatives exerted by state elites has restricted political competition.

It is symptomatic that six of the seven members of this list are low-development states located in the North and Northeast regions. The remaining case (Goiás) is a Center-West agricultural state. Moving to the group of states characterized by medium to high electoral dominance (third quartile of the distribution), one can observe a similar pattern. Of the seven states of this group (Alagoas, Mato Grosso, Pará, Paraná, Piauí, Rio Grande do Norte, and Sergipe), there is only one case that belongs to the wealthier regions, the southern state of Paraná. Also, at least three of the cases are clear-cut examples of oligarchic competition among rival political families, all located in the Northeast region (Rio Grande do Norte, Piauí, and Sergipe). Compared to the latter group, Mato Grosso and Pará have had slightly more competitive politics, although one can identify a restricted set of personalistic factions that have polarized competition since the return to democracy. Only the cases of Paraná and Alagoas do not seem to fit the notion of restricted competition in the horizontal and vertical dimensions.⁵

The intermediate and highly competitive groups are integrated mainly by Brazil's most developed states of the South and Southeast, where left-wing parties

5. Alagoas is especially hard to classify, as it has had extremely volatile and unstable patterns of competition. This may reflect the political and economic decadence of the sugarcane oligarchy that once dominated state politics. According to Ames (2001), the state of Paraná is characterized by the lack of established political families and machines as well as a pattern of competition based on elite accommodation.

Table 1 Correlation Matrix: Electoral Dominance versus State Social and Economic Development

	GDP per capita	Rural population (%)	Poverty (%)
Electoral dominance	-0.552(**)	0.422(*)	0.569(*)

Source: IBGE, 2000 National Census, Contas Regionais 2004. Per capita GDP figures are for the year 2003.

* $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$.

are usually stronger, whereas political families play a less important role in state-wide political alliances (although they may still be important in local politics).⁶ These categories also include a set of northern states characterized by highly volatile patterns of electoral competition (Rondônia and Roraima) and, sometimes, a relatively strong political left (Acre). These Amazon states have been recently colonized by migrants from all parts of Brazil, and for that reason, they lack the perennial political families of the Northeast.

Even though the electoral dominance index is certainly not a perfect measure of political competition at the state level, it does provide a reasonably accurate idea of the differential strength of subnational political rulers across the Brazilian regions. As one might have expected, the index is negatively and strongly correlated with states' gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and positively with poverty and rural population (see table 1). These results are consistent with structural accounts of electoral politics, according to which uncompetitive, machine-style politics is more likely to emerge in poor and underdeveloped regions where voters are more dependent on government policies.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE GROWTH OF THE LEFT IN THE LEAST COMPETITIVE STATES

Since 1998, left-wing parties have been experiencing a substantial growth in formerly machine-dominated states, a process that has become more intense after the 2002 elections, when the Worker's Party took over the presidency for the first time. The growth of the political left is a clear indicator of the decay of state political bosses, as long as the center-right forces have traditionally controlled oligarchic states.⁷ Not incidentally, the electoral dominance index was negatively

6. The state of São Paulo—Brazil's most developed and industrialized state—is a somewhat peculiar case because of the dominance of the centrist PSDB in gubernatorial elections since 1994. However, even though the state scores high on political continuity, state governors have faced relatively strong parliamentary opposition, fragmented legislatures, and fairly competitive gubernatorial elections. In this sense, São Paulo differs markedly from other instances of political continuity, such as Bahia in the Northeast.

7. To distinguish leftist parties from the others, I relied on the ideological classification developed by Figueiredo and Limongi (1999) and on Rodrigues's (2002) research on the social origins of federal deputies. The political parties coded as leftist are the following: Workers' Party (PT); Brazilian Com-

Table 2 *Evolution of the Left Share of Seats, by Electoral Dominance, 1994–2006 (State Assemblies)*

Electoral dominance		Seats controlled by left-wing parties (%)			
		1994	1998	2002	2006
Group A – Low	Average	28.48	30.17	40.08	35.00
	N	6	6	6	6
	Std. Deviation	9.28	6.33	5.69	6.01
Group B – Low-intermediate	Average	22.30	25.53	31.56	35.40
	N	7	7	7	7
	Std. Deviation	14.39	7.48	10.37	15.26
Group C – High-intermediate	Average	16.44	17.61	27.91	31.70
	N	7	7	7	7
	Std. Deviation	8.59	4.11	7.08	7.30
Group D – High	Average	13.27	13.63	20.77	25.94
	N	7	7	7	7
	Std. Deviation	9.64	7.84	6.99	8.24

Source: High Electoral Court. Calculations by the author.

correlated with the left's share of seats in state legislative assemblies: the Pearson coefficient for the year 1998 is -0.543 and -0.548 for the year 2002 ($p < 0.01$ in both elections).

Table 2 presents the evolution of the left's share of seats in the state legislative assemblies, according to the degree of electoral dominance. Brazil's twenty-seven states were divided in four groups according to their position in the electoral dominance ranking: group A, characterized by low dominance and high electoral competitiveness (states located below the twenty-fifth percentile); group B, characterized by low-intermediate levels of electoral dominance (second quartile); group C, characterized by high-intermediate electoral dominance (third quartile); and group D, characterized by high electoral dominance (states located above the seventy-fifth percentile).

The data in table 2 show clearly the rapid growth of the political left in the high-dominance group, following President Lula's election in the year 2002. Between 1994 and 2006, the left's average share of seats almost doubled, increasing from 13.27 percent to 25.94 percent. Also the gap between the extremes of the distribution (groups A and D) decreased from 17 percent in 1998 to approximately 9 percent in 2006.

Another important aspect is a change in the distribution of the left's growth across groups. In the year 2002, the left's representation grew, on average, in all groups; in the following election, though, the strongest growth was verified in the least competitive states (group D). In group A, which includes Brazil's most competitive political systems, left parties experienced a loss of seats, on average.

munist Party (PCB); Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B); Green Party (PV); Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB); Popular Socialist Party (PPS); Party of Socialism and Liberty (P-Sol); Urban Workers' Socialist Party (PSTU).

Table 3 Evolution of the Left Vote in Gubernatorial Elections (First Round), by Electoral Dominance, 1994–2006

Electoral dominance		1st-round vote, left-wing parties (%)			
		1994	1998	2002	2006
Group A – Low	Average	37.43	33.05	57.05	52.03
	N	6	6	6	6
	Std. Deviation	14.15	27.42	24.83	33.21
Group B – Low-intermediate	Average	36.30	25.26	42.10	43.04
	N	7	7	7	7
	Std. Deviation	23.87	19.25	24.16	32.13
Group C – High-intermediate	Average	30.21	26.20	51.01	41.30
	N	7	7	7	7
	Std. Deviation	21.28	23.05	10.22	18.37
Group D – High	Average	7.79	10.84	34.26	25.07
	N	7	7	7	7
	Std. Deviation	6.91	9.60	25.59	28.11

Source: High Electoral Court. Calculations by the author.

Overall, the results indicate that left-wing parties were able to expand their penetration in the high-dominance states, where state elites had demonstrated greater ability to control the supply of political representation.

Similar results are obtained when one analyzes the performance of leftist parties in gubernatorial elections throughout the same period. As one can observe in table 3, although in the year 1994 the average left vote within group A (low dominance) was five times greater than the average calculated for group D (high dominance), in 2006 the high-dominance group's average was less than half of the low dominance group's average. Throughout the period, left parties' performance improved dramatically in the least competitive states, moving from an average of 7.8 percent of the votes cast to 25 percent in 2006, after a peak of 34 percent in 2002.

It is important to note, however, that the standard deviations for the whole period are extremely high, which may indicate significant differences within groups, as well as the higher volatility of majoritarian as compared to proportional elections. Still, the data presented in tables 2 and 3 clearly reveal a rapid and intense change of the electoral landscape of the Brazilian states, given growth of left-wing parties in oligarchic enclaves previously dominated by more traditional, center-right forces.

EXPLAINING ELECTORAL CHANGE IN THE BRAZILIAN STATES

How can one explain the strengthening of the left in previous instances of quasi-monopolistic control over the subnational electoral arena? Montero's (2009) work claims that the key factor behind the decay of political bosses in Brazil's peripheral states was the formalization of the labor market in the North and

Northeast, which resulted from the relatively higher rates of economic growth that these regions experienced from 2000 to 2006. The argument on the electoral effects of labor market formalization may be understood as an extension of the pro-poor growth hypothesis, proposed by Kawakani, Neri, and Son (2005). According to this view, economic growth in Brazil since the stabilization of the economy in 1995 has favored disproportionately the poorest sections of society, as income inequality decreased despite sluggish GDP per capita growth from 1995 to 2000. Pro-poor growth is thus defined as a situation in which a reduction in inequality results in greater income increases for the poor relative to the overall income growth rate. From 2000 onward, the combination of rapid growth of exports, fostered by an increase in commodity prices, changes in the structure of the labor market, and the expansion of federal social expenditure interacted to produce higher average growth rates amid rapidly decreasing inequality (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada [IPEA] 2007).

According to Montero (2009), pro-poor growth should favor the left and erode conservative parties' support at the state level because it is poor voters' situation of economic insecurity and dependence on government favors that allows state bosses to maximize the electoral returns of patronage. Notwithstanding the persuasive theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence that Montero presents, the argument does not take into account the interdependence of national and subnational elections in federal settings. In Brazilian presidentialism, the national executive is an extremely powerful institution, whose capacity to formulate macroeconomic and social policies, distribute budget resources, and nominate thousands of political appointees (Amorim Neto 2007) greatly affects the career prospects of subnational officials. Hence, although I agree with most scholars that state elections do not follow a national logic, because of the decentralized character of national parties, I assume that access to national government plays a very important role in subnational political struggles.⁸

It is worth noting that the social and economic changes that resulted from pro-poor growth have coincided with national political shifts following the PT's victories in the 2002 and 2006 presidential elections. The available data suggest that the major decreases in poverty and inequality levels occurred throughout President Lula's first term (2003–2006).⁹ These changes may be partially attributed to the expansion of federal cash income transfer programs (on this point, see IPEA

8. Samuels's (2003) research has argued that the impact of presidential coattails on national legislative elections is weak or nonexistent because presidents depend on the support of governors and regional party machines to win a majority of the national vote. However, his conclusions are invalid because he relies on a misspecified statistical model to test the effect of gubernatorial coattails. Once all interaction terms are introduced in the regression, the model shows that presidential coattails, rather than gubernatorial coattails, are key to explaining party fragmentation in Congress (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).

9. It is also important to note that the second term of president Cardoso (1999–2002) was marked by rising inflation rates following the devaluation of the real and a severe power crisis that ultimately forced the government to implement a draconian program of energy conservation. By 2002, Cardoso was a lame duck, whereas Lula benefited politically from much more favorable economic conditions in 2006.

2007). Targeted poverty alleviation policies first implemented by the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government were expanded and centralized within a special agency, the Ministry of Social Development (MDS), during Lula's first term. The centerpiece of Lula's poverty alleviation strategy was a conditional cash-transfer program, Bolsa Família (Family Grant), which unified several preexisting federal policies and initiatives under a single label and a single budget. The program targeted families with an income of less than R\$120 a month and conditioned transfers on school attendance for students age six to fifteen. By 2006, Bolsa Família covered practically all the population below the poverty line: 11 million families, or an estimated 40 million people.¹⁰ The program was a key factor behind Lula's victory against the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, PSDB) in 2006, as it allowed the president to compensate for the losses suffered in the most developed and industrialized states with a much stronger electoral performance in the poorest regions of the country (Hunter and Power 2007; Nicolau and Peixoto 2007; Zucco 2008, 2009).¹¹

THE ROLE OF VERTICAL COMPETITION IN ELECTORAL CHANGE IN STATES

What I intend to argue is that the effects of pro-poor growth on the erosion of support for center and right-wing political machines at the state level must be understood in the context of national political shifts that have substantially altered the patterns of cooperation and competition among national and subnational political coalitions. In federal democracies, state bosses must deal not only with horizontal competition (among political parties) but also with the threat of vertical competition (among distinct government spheres). That is, the central and subnational governments compete for a similar pool of voters as they provide public services in a given territory. For instance, when state and local governments rely on social spending to buy voters' support, they must compete with similar policies of the federal government (Migué 1997). Similarly, state governors and the mayors of large cities often compete to mobilize the support of urban constituencies, especially when the latter represent a substantial share of the state's electorate.

Whenever vertical competition increases, subnational political monopolies laboriously constructed by subnational political bosses tend to become more unstable and subject to a breakdown. This is because the long-term survival of clientelistic relationships depends to a great extent on patrons being able to maximize control over access to patronage resources (Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2006; Fox 1994; Stokes and Medina 2002). Vertical competition weakens patrons at the state level, as the latter must deal with opposition leaders occupying executive posts at lower or upper levels of government with control over resources that may be employed to mobilize voters.

10. Data obtained from the Ministry of Social Development's Web site, at <http://www.mds.gov.br>.

11. Even though Bolsa Família has generated substantial electoral returns for President Lula and the PT, the program cannot be considered an instance of clientelism, for the selection of beneficiaries is based on universalistic criteria (mainly per capita income).

In the least developed states, where dominant political machines are more likely to flourish, both political elites and voters are extremely dependent on federal resources.¹² In these settings, presidents may take advantage of their control over federal social policies and bureaucratic appointments to help their favored candidates in state elections. It is no wonder, as Zucco (2008) has noted, that incumbent presidents from F. H. Cardoso (1995–2002) to Lula have been able to rely on federal social policies to mobilize a consistently pro-incumbent electorate in the poorest regions of the country.

The argument of the article may be summarized as follows. Because of the potential for vertical competition in Brazilian federalism, state bosses are more likely to be successful in their machine-building strategies in settings characterized by a persistent coincidence between the parties and/or coalitions occupying at the same time the federal and state governments. Once state bosses obtain persistent access to federal patronage over time, participating of national coalitions, they will find themselves in a more comfortable position to prevent the local opposition from establishing alliances with national actors and mounting feasible alternative coalitions. Conversely, a change in the partisan composition of national coalitions is likely to represent a threat to subnational political monopolies once it creates an opportunity for an alliance of national and local adversaries of incumbent governors.

Lula's victory in 2002 represented a serious blow for state bosses in many of the oligarchic states, as they were pushed into the ranks of the opposition. At the same time, the regional sections of the PT and its left-wing allies were strengthened by gaining access to federal posts and resources that their center-right adversaries had long monopolized.

It is important to note that national electoral change has followed a set of changes in Brazilian fiscal federalism that have contributed for the weakening of state governments vis-à-vis the center. Following macroeconomic adjustment in the 1990s, the federal government partly succeeded in recentralizing fiscal resources and disciplining state government's capacity to issue bonds and rely on state bank loans to fund budget deficits (Afonso and Melo 2000; Almeida 2005; Souza 2002). These changes have imposed significant institutional constraints on state governors' capacity to rely on preelection spending to boost the performance of their political machines.

Also, since the mid-1990s, decentralization of resources and authority over policy making have strengthened local governments. At least since the first Cardoso government (1995–1998), the Ministries of Health and Education created inducements for the municipalization of these services, by allocating federal funds directly to municipalities (Almeida 2005; Arretche 2000). As a consequence, state governments partly lost the ability to intermediate the distribution of federal funds to municipalities, which contributed to the weakening of traditional mechanisms employed to secure local political machines' support.

12. For instance, in Brazil's poorest states, Piauí and Maranhão, federal constitutional transfers represented 43 percent and 44 percent, respectively, of state current receipts in the year 2006.

*Vertical Competition and Electoral Change in the States:
Some Empirical Evidence*

One implication of the hypothesis on vertical competition is that national political shifts substantially affect subnational elections. That is, changes in national governing coalitions are often followed by similar changes at the state level. As a matter of fact, there are good reasons to believe that the degree of interdependence among national and state elections has been increasing since the early 1990s. First, because national (presidential) and state elections have been held concurrently since 1994. Second, with the approval of the reelection law in 1998, presidents and their parties gained an important mechanism to enable the construction and consolidation of electoral coalitions. Among other factors, throughout their first term, presidents may rely on their formal and informal powers—distribution of appointive posts, implementation of social policies—to strengthen the government coalition and increase the likelihood of reelection.

These are important issues to understand electoral change in the least competitive states, given the systematic association between electoral dominance at the state level and the hegemony of a similar pool of center and right-wing political parties at the national level. Four of five states in which there existed a dominant party until 1998 were governed by political parties that participated, with few exceptions, in all national coalitions formed from 1985 to 2002: the Liberal Party governed the states of Bahia and Maranhão, and the Brazilian Democratic Movement governed the states of Goiás and Paraíba. The state of Ceará was dominated by a “centrist” machine organized within the Brazilian Social Democratic Party, which played a key role during the interim government of Itamar Franco (1992–1994) and governed the country during the eight years that followed.

A similar picture emerges when one looks at the other states classified in the high-intermediate electoral dominance groups. In states such as Piauí, Rio Grande do Norte, Tocantins, and Mato Grosso, center and right-wing organizations dominant at the national level have been home to the dominant political families and factions. These include not only the PMDB, the PSDB, and the PFL, but also a number of right-wing organizations, including the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party, PTB) and the Partido Progressista (Progressive Party, PP).

Arguably, state bosses’ ability to participate in national government and gain access to federal patronage resulted in the weakening of potential opposition groups and thus reinforced the dominant coalitions’ quasi-monopolistic control over the state political arena. In other words, to be part of the political opposition in these political systems would very often mean being in opposition to both the state and the federal governments, which is hardly a winning strategy in states that are extremely poor and dependent on federal funds.

To assess the effect of access to federal cabinet positions on subnational electoral results in the presence of adequate statistical controls, I developed and tested a regression model for time-series cross-section (TSCS) panel data. The data cover four election years, from 1994 to 2006, in Brazil’s twenty-seven states. The dependent variable is the share of seats obtained by the party of the elected governor in

year t_i and at the state x_i . I assume that the performance of governing parties in proportional elections is a proximate measure of electoral dominance at the state level. The share of seats of the governor's party is correlated with political continuity and the share of the vote in the first round of gubernatorial elections, which are the two remaining components of the electoral dominance index.

From 1994 to 2006, the averages for all twenty-seven states consistently decreased, with the high-dominance states experiencing a much more intense decrease than the most competitive group. This is an indication of two related phenomena that are of central interest for the argument developed here: on the one hand, once-dominant political machines have been losing ground election after election; on the other hand, the number of governorships controlled by left-wing parties in the machine-dominated states increased significantly after 1998, and, as it is often the case, the growth of the left has been associated with more competitive elections and a lower share of legislative seats controlled by the governing parties.

The advantage of looking at legislative rather than gubernatorial elections is that it allows one to test the independent effects of control over state patronage resources and access to presidential cabinet posts. I created two dummy variables to measure these effects: *reelection* indicates whether the incumbent governor and/or his party obtained reelection, whereas *coalition_governor* differentiates political parties that occupied ministerial posts for at least 50 percent of the incumbent president's term from the remaining parties. I applied these criteria to the national governments that preceded state elections from 1994 to 2006, starting with the Franco government (1993–1995) and finishing with President Lula's first term (2003–2006).

I expect both dummies to have a positive effect on governors' performance in legislative elections. State governors control budgetary resources and politically appointive posts that are vital to state deputies' careers; hence, incumbent parties should obtain, on average, a higher share of legislative seats than nonincumbent parties. Also, national governing parties are in a privileged position to shape federal policy implementation in favor of their allies at the subnational level.

Considering that the more developed states are likely to have more competitive elections and hence lower scores on the dependent variable, I included a set of controls for social and economic characteristics.¹³ The model is also intended to capture the impact of pro-poor growth on state political machines' support over time. To account for these dimensions, I included a set of measures of economic growth: employment formalization and poverty rates. These are *GDP per capita*, *GDP per capita growth* (percentage variation), *empformalization %* (a measure of the percentage of the workforce employed in the formal sector), *empformalization growth* (percentage variation), *poverty* (percentage of the population living below the poverty line), and *poverty reduction* (percentage decrease of the poverty rate). The variables *GDP per capita growth*, *empformalization growth*, and *poverty reduction* were calculated for the year previous to the election, as I assume that the impact of social and economic changes on voters' welfare takes some time to develop.

13. The data were obtained from the IPEA database, at <http://www.ipeadata.gov.br>.

The other figures refer to the election year. I expected poverty to be positively correlated with the dependent variable and all other variables to display negative coefficients.

On the basis of the assumption that political bosses obtain higher electoral returns from political manipulation of policy implementation in the states where voters are more dependent on government activities, I included a variable that measures the relative share of public-sector activities in states' GDP (*GDPpubshare*). I expected this latter variable to be positively correlated with the dependent variable.

A control variable for governors' ideological orientation was created to account for the fact that center and right-wing parties have enjoyed the benefits of state-level incumbency and control of ministerial posts for a much longer time than left-wing organizations. All else being equal, one should expect left-wing governors to obtain a lower share of state legislative seats than their center-right adversaries. A dummy that indicates the election of a leftist to the state executive (*left_governor*) is intended to capture such an effect.

Estimation of the model was based on Beck and Katz's (1995) proposal for statistical analysis of TSCS panel data with a small number of time periods. Model parameters were estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), and standard errors were corrected using panel-corrected standard errors. I also included a lag of the dependent variable to account for serial correlation. The dependent variable and all the independents were mean-centered to control for cross-sectional fixed effects. I also included dummies for election years (1994 was the base year). I estimated two main models: Model 2 was estimated with all independents together, whereas Model 1 did not include the *reelection*, *coalition_governor*, and *left_governor* dummies. The results are shown in table 4.

As expected, the full model performs much better than Model 1, as the average effects calculated for reelection and access to federal cabinet positions are positive and very strong. It is worth noting that the results of the model indicate that having access to ministerial positions and state incumbency have an equivalent impact on governors' performance in legislative elections. Similar results were obtained with different model specifications. When the variable *left_governor* was removed from Model 2, however, the effect of *coalition_governor* becomes significantly stronger in comparison with the coefficient estimated for the *reelection* dummy. This suggests that part of the difference between the performance of the national governing parties and the baseline group is related to governors' ideological orientation, mainly because left-wing parties have remained for a disproportionate amount of the time in opposition to the federal government. Thus, even though factors endogenous to state political systems may explain electoral dominance, access to national government is a key predictor of the performance of the governing parties in state legislative elections.

In both Models 1 and 2, the variables *poverty* and *GDP per capita growth* have a strong and statistically significant effect. Higher levels of poverty are associated with less competitive elections and a greater share of seats controlled by the governor's party. In contrast, income growth weakens governors' control over the electoral arena. The regression coefficients estimated for labor market

Table 4 Panel Corrected Standard Error Models for Governors' Share of Seats

	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	PCSE	p	B	PCSE	p
(Intercept)	4.372	2.999	0.148	5.159	1.835	0.006
Lagged dependent	-0.154	0.199	0.442	-0.045	0.145	0.759
GDPpub-share	-0.068	0.075	0.366	-0.043	0.051	0.403
GDP per capita	-0.743	1.877	0.693	-0.219	0.953	0.819
GDP per capita growth	** -10.706	2.637	0.000	** -6.491	1.899	0.001
Poverty	*0.441	0.205	0.034	**0.499	0.164	0.003
Poverty reduction	-0.164	0.236	0.488	0.151	0.167	0.367
Empformalization %	0.174	0.205	0.399	0.218	0.156	0.164
Empformalization growth	0.114	0.252	0.652	0.123	0.208	0.554
Left governor	-	-	-	** -3.390	1.047	0.002
Coalition governor	-	-	-	**4.896	1.268	0.000
Reelection	-	-	-	**4.631	1.075	0.000
	R ²	0.142		R ²	0.418	
	N	108		N	108	

** $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$.

formalization and participation of public administration on states' GDP were highly unstable and associated with large standard errors. The coefficient estimates were statistically insignificant in all alternative model specifications. The coefficient for poverty reduction was negative in the first equation, as expected, but the sign inverted when the political variables were added in Model 2. The coefficients lacked statistical significance in both models.

The negative coefficient obtained for the measure of GDP per capita growth indicates that socioeconomic transformation has played an important role in electoral change in Brazil's poorest regions. Because economic growth is often associated with stronger private economies (and, hence, a lower dependence on government) and urban growth, it should increase the relative importance of constituencies less likely to exhibit the kind of systematic pro-incumbent voting behavior that Zucco (2008) identified in poor, rural municipalities where government activities are predominant. The model suggests that growth—which was much higher, on average, in the North, Northeast, and Center-West regions—increases the competitiveness of elections and, hence, the likelihood of an opposition challenger defeating incumbents. Most probably, left-wing parties represented the major opposition alternative to dominant political families in several of the least competitive states, and for that reason, they were able to benefit most from structural change.¹⁴

14. These results must be interpreted with some care, as the units of analysis, the states, are large and heterogeneous territories, and the effects of growth are likely to be distributed unevenly across mu-

Economic growth tells only part of the story, though. In 2002, the left was in opposition to national government and maintained its historical voting patterns, obtaining greatest support in the most industrialized, wealthy, and urbanized municipalities, whereas right-wing machines, such as the PFL, kept their rural strongholds. This was especially true of the North and Northeast regions, where the left was strongest in state capitals and their surrounding metropolitan areas. Following Lula's election in 2002, these patterns changed radically, as leftist parties benefited from access to federal resources and bureaucratic jobs. I ran simple correlations to evaluate the impact of social, economic, and demographic factors on the left-wing vote at the municipal level, in all of Brazil's 5,500 municipalities. The correlations were calculated for a composite variable, *left support*, which includes the first-round vote in gubernatorial elections plus the vote in state proportional contests for the left parties that integrated Lula's coalition in 2002 and supported the president's reelection in 2006: the Worker's Party (PT), the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), the Green Party (PV), and the Communist Party (PC do B). I assumed that parties' ability to obtain electoral benefit from government policy and patronage would be greater for those parties that were members of both the governing and the electoral coalitions.¹⁵ Table A2 in the appendix indeed shows that the left parties that supported Lula's reelection in 2006 significantly increased their share of state legislative seats in the North and Northeast regions, where the president obtained smashing victories, and lost space in the Center-South, where the PT candidate fared poorly. However, the two left parties that abandoned Lula's coalition (the PDT and the PPS) did not experience similar growth in the poorest regions.

The *left support* variable was correlated with measures of municipal population, GDP per capita, rural population (percentage), percentage of the population below the poverty line (*poverty*), and the contribution of industrial activities to the municipality's GDP (*industrial GDP*). To account for the geographic concentration of the left-wing vote in state capitals and the surrounding metropolitan areas, which concentrate the bulk of modern economic activities, I included a measure of the municipality's distance (in kilometers) to the state capital (*distance*).¹⁶ The variables *population*, *distance*, and *GDP per capita* were logged to correct distribution asymmetries. Table 5 shows the correlations for the elections of 2002 and 2006.

As table 5 shows, in the year 2002, when the PT and its left-wing allies were in opposition to the national government, support for the left was strongly and

municipalities. Urban and populous localities tend to benefit more from growth than sparsely populated, rural localities.

15. Because the purpose here was to look at the impact of national incumbency on the territorial distribution of the vote, the variable did not include the left parties that did not join the coalition led by the PT, including the Party of Socialism and Liberty (P-Sol) and the Urban Workers' Socialist Party (PSTU). The Popular Socialist Party (PPS) and the Democratic Labor Party (PDT) abandoned the government coalition well before the end of Lula's term, and hence were not included in the analysis. It is also worth noticing that these two parties did not support Lula's reelection in 2006. In fact, the PDT disputed the presidential election against Lula, whereas the PPS joined the center-right opposition to the president.

16. All the data were obtained from the IPEA database, at <http://www.ipeadata.gov.br>. Figures are from the 2000 national census, with the exception of GDP per capita and industrial GDP, both calculated for the year 2006.

Table 5 Correlations for Left Support in Subnational Elections, 2002 and 2006

		Left support 2002	Left support 2006
Population (log)	Pearson	.361(**)	.249(**)
	Sig.	0	0
	N	5408	5379
Distance (log)	Pearson	-.142(**)	-0.018
	Sig.	0	0.19
	N	5408	5379
Rural population (%)	Pearson	-.227(**)	-.031(*)
	Sig.	0	0.022
	N	5408	5379
GDP per capita (%)	Pearson	.151(**)	-.119(**)
	Sig.	0	0
	N	5408	5379
Industrial GDP (%)	Pearson	.228(**)	.081(**)
	Sig.	0	0
	N	5408	5379
Poverty	Pearson	-.229(**)	.088(**)
	Sig.	0	0
	N	5408	5379

* $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$.

positively correlated with GDP per capita and industrial GDP, and negatively correlated with poverty, rural population, and distance to the state capital. In the following election, however, the correlation coefficients obtained for distance and rural population were weak and insignificant for the distance variable. Further, the signs for the variables poverty and GDP per capita inverted, which indicates that national incumbency pushed left-wing parties away from their original electoral base and toward the poorest regions, which center-right party machines had previously controlled.

Could these results be attributed to the centerpiece of the federal government's poverty reduction strategy, Bolsa Família? To test this hypothesis, I ran a simple OLS regression for the left support variable in the year 2006 (left support in 2002 was a control variable). I included the same municipal indicators employed in the previous correlations, as well as two measures of the impact of Bolsa Família at the municipal level (both variables were transformed into their natural logs). The first variable, *scope of the Bolsa Família*, indicates the percentage of families enrolled in the program a few months before the election (July 2006). The second variable, $BF \times \text{municipal GDP}$, is a measure of the total expenditure of Bolsa Família as a percentage of local GDP (figures are for the year 2005). The inclusion of the latter variable is based on Zucco's (2009) recent research, which demonstrates the impact of Bolsa Família transfers on local economic growth. In municipalities that rely heavily on the program, there is often very little private-sector activity, and even this limited private economy is to a great extent dependent on some kind of government transfer. In these poor localities one would expect Bolsa Família to

have not only a direct impact on the income of program beneficiaries but also an indirect impact on the material well-being of nonbeneficiaries by boosting consumption and economic growth. According to this reasoning, the $BF \times \text{municipal GDP}$ should be a better predictor of left support at the municipal level than the simple measure of the scope of Bolsa Família.

The model also included two dummies that indicate the ideological orientation of incumbent governors: *left incumbent* and *right incumbent*. The *left incumbent* dummy was intended to assess potential incumbency effects on left-wing parties' electoral performance. The dummy for right-wing governors was introduced to test whether the PT and its allies in national government have been able to "invade" previous right-wing strongholds, moving away from their original electoral base. I expected both variables to display positive coefficients.

Because the measures of poverty and GDP per capita were highly collinear among themselves, and yet strongly correlated with Bolsa Família variables, they were excluded from the main models. As a matter of fact, once the measures of the impact of Bolsa Família were included in the models, the *poverty* and *GDP per capita* variables added little or nothing to the explanation. I estimated two main models. The first model employs the measure of the scope of Bolsa Família, whereas the second includes the contribution of the program to municipal GDP (table 6).

As expected, the measures of the importance of Bolsa Família at the municipal level have a strong and positive impact on the left-support dependent. It is also worth noting that the second model, which includes a measure of Bolsa Família expenditure as a percentage of GDP, has slightly greater explanatory power than Model 1. The coefficient estimated for the Bolsa Família variable in Model 2 is also more elastic than the beta calculated for the first model. Further, the model confirms the hypothesis that the PT and its coalition partners have been able to

Table 6 Regression Models for Left Support in 2006

	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	Std. Error	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Sig.
(Constant)	**−1.004	0.163	0.000	**−0.44	0.148	0.003
Lagged dependent	**0.599	0.015	0.000	**0.601	0.015	0.000
Population	**0.102	0.013	0.000	**0.096	0.012	0.000
Distance	**0.105	0.014	0.000	**0.103	0.013	0.000
Rural population (%)	**0.002	0.001	0.000	*0.001	0.001	0.025
Industrial GDP (%)	**0.002	0.001	0.009	**0.003	0.001	0.000
Scope of Bolsa Família	**0.204	0.021	0.000	–	–	–
$BF \times \text{municipal GDP}$	–	–	–	**0.335	0.025	0.000
Right incumbent	**0.236	0.034	0.000	**0.215	0.032	0.000
Left incumbent	**0.283	0.038	0.000	**0.240	0.037	0.000
	R ²	0.329		R ²	0.341	
	N	5438		N	5438	

** $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$.

grow in areas that right-wing parties previously governed: the coefficient for the *right incumbent* dummy is positive and significant in both models. The model also suggests that control over the state executive has improved the performance of the left in subnational elections (positive coefficient estimated for *left incumbent*).

Even though the data indicate that the territorial distribution of the left vote at the subnational level has substantially changed between 2002 and 2006, one cannot conclude that left-wing organizations have lost the support of their more traditional constituencies. The fact that the *lagged dependent* has a highly significant and elastic coefficient suggests that there has been some continuity in the patterns of left vote, notwithstanding electoral growth in Brazil's peripheral areas.

CONCLUSION

The Brazilian experience reinforces the view that subnational democratization is never a purely local issue. As Gibson (2005) has argued, explaining subnational political change requires a systematic understanding of how subnational political institutions and elites are enmeshed in a larger system of territorial governance. The mastery of politics at the subnational level requires controlling the linkages between center and periphery, which is to say that subnational autocratic elites will seek to minimize national involvement in local affairs and maximize their representation in national arenas. The intensification of vertical competition following Lula's election in 2002 undermined center-periphery accommodation and state bosses' control over national-subnational linkages. Part of the center-right forces that had controlled the national executive during most of the recent democratic period were forced to move into the ranks of the opposition, thus sealing the fate of state party machines whose life and blood was in their privileged access to federal patronage.

What is peculiar about Brazilian democracy is its combination of weak electoral parties and strong executives, which greatly affects the way subnational rulers develop and implement their electoral strategies. The policy-making capacities of legislatures at both the national and the subnational levels are rather limited, thanks to institutional rules that provide chief executives with wide powers over budget planning and implementation, as well as the monopoly of legislative initiative in administrative, fiscal, and tax matters (Figueiredo and Limongi 1999). The combination of strong executives and an open-list proportional electoral system that weakens political parties in the electoral arena leads to executive-centric political dynamics (Pereira and Mueller 2003; Samuels 2003). An important consequence of these institutional features is that chief executives at both the federal and the state levels are bound to play a crucial role in the making and remaking of electoral coalitions.

The predominance of executives in the electoral arena has intensified the effects of vertical competition, given the poorly institutionalized character of oligarchic enclaves. Different from party-centric systems such as Mexico and Argentina, in Brazil, state governors have lacked the formal resources of power required to develop the hegemonic party regimes analyzed by Gibson (2005), Snyder (1999), and Behrend (2009).

Recent changes to Brazil's federal arrangements have further weakened subnational political machines, as the federal government recentralized resources and increased its social policy coordination and implementation capacities at the expense of the states (Almeida 2005; Arretche 2000; Fenwick 2009; Souza 2002). The political consequences of the relative strengthening of the federal executive are clear: in an executive-centric presidential system characterized by stark regional inequalities, subnational officials' political survival should be more closely tied to the president's electoral and coalition-making strategies.

Whether vertical competition in the context of federal control over major social policy initiatives will eventually lead to the development of stronger national parties is yet to be seen. What one can say for sure is that recent development of Brazil's democratic institutions has created an environment that conspires against the reproduction of state bosses and their party machines, notwithstanding the substantial repertoire of formal and informal powers acquired by state governors since the return to democracy in the 1980s.

APPENDIX

Table A1 Dominance Scores Calculated for the Brazilian States, 1982–1998

Group	States	Dominance score
High dominance	Ceará	43.68
	Paraíba	35.33
4th quartile	Bahia	28.1
	Goiás	23.94
	Maranhão	23.26
	Amazonas	19
	Tocantins	16.53
High-intermediate	Mato Grosso	14.02
	Sergipe	8.74
	Rio Grande do Norte	5.19
3rd quartile	Piauí	3.07
	Alagoas	2.14
	Paraná	2.12
	Pará	1
	Low-intermediate	Pernambuco
Acre		-5.63
São Paulo		-7.32
Espírito Santo		-7.93
Santa Catarina		-8.81
Roraima		-11.4
Mato Grosso do Sul		-15.3
Low dominance	Rio Grande do Sul	-17.4
	Minas Gerais	-23.2
1st quartile	Amapá	-23.3
	Rio de Janeiro	-28.4
	Distrito Federal	-37
	Rondônia	-40.1

Table A2 Left Parties' Share of Seats by Region, State Legislative Assemblies, 2002–2006

	<i>North</i>			<i>Northeast</i>			<i>Southeast</i>			<i>South</i>			<i>Center-West</i>		
	2006	2002	Diff.	2006	2002	Diff.	2006	2002	Diff.	2006	2002	Diff.	2006	2002	Diff.
<i>Left parties that supported Lula's reelection</i>															
PT	10.8	10.3	0.5	10	9.7	0.3	13.7	18.5	-4.8	14.8	20.8	-6	11.5	12.4	-0.9
PSB	4.3	4.9	-0.6	9.7	5.6	4.1	4.4	8.1	-3.7	2.7	3.4	-0.7	2.7	3.5	-0.8
PV	4.9	2.7	2.2	2.3	1.5	0.8	5.9	1.5	4.4	0.7	0.7	0	0	1.8	-1.8
PC do B	1.6	0.5	1.1	1.8	0.3	1.5	0.7	3.3	-2.6	0.7	0	0.7	0	0	0
Total	21.6	18.4	3.2	23.8	17.1	6.7	24.7	31.4	-6.7	18.9	24.9	-6	14.2	0	-3.5
<i>Left parties that did not support Lula's reelection</i>															
PDT	4.3	5.9	-1.6	6.2	5.6	0.6	7	5.5	1.5	8.1	8.7	-0.6	6.2	3.5	2.7
PPS	5.9	3.2	2.7	1.8	4.1	-2.3	4.1	3.7	0.4	5.4	4	1.4	5.3	4.4	0.9
Total	10.2	9.1	1.1	8	9.7	-1.7	11.1	9.2	1.9	13.5	12.7	0.8	11.5	7.9	3.6

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