

Of the multitude of examples, one may cite his references to the record of President Beneš's 1943 conversations in Moscow. According to Král, the document proves the Czech leader's effort to sabotage any close collaboration with the Soviet Union—the very opposite of what the document really conveys. Similarly, the well-known evidence about the voluntary cessation of the United States military advance into central Europe in the spring of 1945 is used to support the absurd contention that the American imperialists wanted nothing more than to double-cross the Red Army by beating it to Prague but that their weakness foiled this evil design.

Above all, the book is calculated to repair the ideological damage done in the 1960s by those Czech and Slovak historians who dared to cast doubt on the absolute purity and selflessness of Moscow's motives as well as on the constancy and infallibility of its policies. Most readers are likely to find Král's recurrent innuendos against the culprits of these heresies in poor taste. But even more repulsive is his eagerly servile adoration of anything Soviet—to a degree rarely to be found any more even among Soviet writers themselves. Still, the book is well worth reading—not as serious history, to be sure, but rather as an eloquent document of the plight of scholarship in a part of Europe where *détente* is yet to reach.

VOJTECH MASTNY

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

DIE PROTOKOLLE DES ÖSTERREICHISCHEN MINISTERRATES, 1848–1867. PART 3: DAS MINISTERIUM BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN, vol. 1: 14. APRIL 1852–13. MÄRZ 1853. Edited by *Helmut Rumpler*. Compiled by *Waltraud Heindl*. Introduction by *Friedrich Engel-Janosi*. Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1975. lxxx, 580 pp.

This volume contains the protocols of the Austrian Ministerial Conference for the period April 14, 1852 to March 13, 1853. It is part of a multivolume series being published in Austria which will eventually include all of the protocols of the various ministerial councils from 1848 to 1867. A similar project is also under way in Hungary to publish the protocols from 1867 to the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1918.

The 102 protocols printed here seem at first glance to confirm the judgment of one of the participants, Foreign Minister Count Buol, that the discussions of the ministerial conferences were a waste of time. With few exceptions, the issues under consideration were minor ones; and the conclusion is inescapable that, for this period, at least, the Conference was a powerless organ, whose only function was to coordinate and carry out the decisions made by Emperor Francis Joseph.

The protocols are nevertheless an important source for the study of Austrian neoabsolutism in the 1850s. As Waltraud Heindl indicates in her excellent introduction, they provide evidence to suggest that not only was Francis Joseph himself the principal architect of the neoabsolutist system, but also that he consciously attempted to re-create the pre-March regime of his grandfather, Francis I. During the period covered by the protocols in this volume, he completed the destruction of the powerful *Ministerrat* of Felix Schwarzenberg and replaced it with a cumbersome and inefficient system which concentrated all decision making in his own hands. Against a willful young ruler and the skillful intrigues of Kübeck, Metternich, and other prerevolutionary figures, the attempts of Alexander Bach and the other post-March ministers to preserve even a shadow of real authority were pathetically unsuccessful.

As in the earlier volumes of this series, the redaction is excellent. The protocols are annotated, and each is preceded by an outline of its contents. There is a separate chronological list of the protocols with a brief summary of each, as well as a short bibliography, an index, and helpful lists of archaic words, abbreviations, and the participants in the discussions. The introductory essays by Waltraud Heindl and Friedrich Engel-Janosi are indispensable.

ROY A. AUSTENSEN
Illinois State University

AUSTRO-GERMAN RELATIONS IN THE ANSCHLUSS ERA. By *Radomír Luža*. Princeton and London: Princeton University Press, 1975. xvi, 438 pp. \$20.00.

In the flood of writings on the Third Reich, one major subject has gone largely unexplored: what happened to Austria after March 1938. This excellent study fills a large part of the gap. The title appears anomalous; how can one discuss Austro-German relations after Germany has swallowed up Austria? But it proves accurate. For this is not a full history of Austria between 1938 and 1945 (a project both too large in scope and, according to Professor Luža, still impossible because some vital materials remain inaccessible). Instead, the book portrays the Nazi takeover and rule of an independent state and people theoretically an integral part of Germany before the Anschluss and therefore not to be handled like other conquests, by exploitation, decimation, and expulsion, but to have its special form of German *Kultur* integrated and developed under the Nazi aegis. Hence, though Austria certainly was ruled from Berlin with little autonomy, by *Reichsdeutsch* rather than native leaders and by the Nazi Party even more than by the German state, Austrian feelings and traditions did have to be considered, special problems of the Austrian society, economy, and culture taken into account, and Austrian loyalty to the Reich preserved. Thus the story becomes one of Austro-German relations, not simply German rule in Austria.

The work has a few blemishes. It is not easy or compelling reading, for various reasons. Administrative history, which comprises a good part of it, is a vital but not especially exciting genre. The author has worked hard and successfully at penetrating the Nazi bureaucratic jungle himself, but does less well in guiding the reader through it. Ambiguous or confusing phrases and sentences sometimes obscure the meaning of a passage, and the partly topical, partly chronological organization inevitably entails some overlap and repetition. The attempt to integrate the vast, diverse material under the theme of the survival and emergence of Austrian self-consciousness does not seem to me to have worked.

But these defects weigh little alongside the book's outstanding merits. Based on massive, painstaking research, it is a mine of useful information, including many tables and appendixes. The tone is objective and dispassionate throughout, even where some moral denunciation would be understandable (for example, on the prominent role Austrians played in the Final Solution, or the shabby record of postwar Austrian denazification). The author's judgments are sound, his insights occasionally quite acute, and his conclusions clear, important, and often suggestive of the irony of history. Hitler's determination to break up Austria as a nation led him to exploit regional loyalties so as to expand the rift between Vienna and the provinces. But precisely these regional feelings became the source of ultimate Austrian regeneration. The Germans failed to solve the economic troubles which had done much to make Austrians accept and endorse the Anschluss, and this failure contributed to Austrian