

(the complex problems of agriculture, problems created by information manipulation, the Soviet official view of the West, Russification of minorities), it can be strongly recommended both to specialists and to the general reader.

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FOUNDATIONS OF A PLANNED ECONOMY, 1926–1929. Volume 1, in two parts. A HISTORY OF SOVIET RUSSIA. By *Edward Hallett Carr* and *R. W. Davies*. New York: Macmillan, 1971 [London, 1969]. Part 1: pp. xv, 1–452. Part 2: pp. 453–1023. \$12.50 each.

These two volumes represent the first half of the final series in Professor Carr's mammoth history of Soviet Russia from the Revolution to 1929. Here (for the first time with the aid of a coauthor, the economist R. W. Davies of the University of Birmingham) Carr covers in exhaustive detail the economic institutions and development of the USSR during the three years just before the initiation of the First Five-Year Plan. Subsequent volumes, dealing with political history and foreign relations in this period, will bring the entire series to a close.

As it has progressed, Carr's work has become more encyclopedic than historical. It avoids all reference to secondary sources and to the issues of interpretation that have long characterized the study of Soviet history. The organization of the work into topical studies within a succession of very short time spans facilitates the presentation of exhaustive detail on legal and institutional arrangements, but at the cost of pulling apart the overall contemporary context and the interrelationship of events. "The Economic Order" is examined in the present two volumes in highly informative though narrowly defined sections dealing with agriculture, industry, labor, trade and distribution, finance, and planning. On the other hand, political influences on the economic order—especially the factional struggles raging in this period—are barely mentioned in passing, and are rarely considered as decisive factors. Even among the sections on the economy some important interconnections are not made. For instance, such matters as the industrial productivity drive and the rising accident rate are discussed in some detail, but in different chapters, and the question of a causal relationship is never asked.

The Carr-Davies work is most useful in its descriptions of specific institutions: in agriculture, the details of land tenure, the development of the cooperatives, and the early kolkhoz arrangements; in industry, the shifting relationships among ministries, syndicates, and trusts; the status of private enterprise and the treatment of managerial specialists; and the myriad of competing proposals and conflicting agency involvements that lay behind the ultimate formulation of the First Five-Year Plan. In their dedication to detail Carr and Davies have implicitly underscored the complexity that was Soviet society even in its relatively "backward" state in the 1920s, as well as the momentum with which a web of institutions and problems can carry the leadership along (as Richard Neustadt has demonstrated concerning the U.S. government), regardless of the ideological simplicities that may be fired back and forth at the surface level of politics.

In this connection the Carr-Davies material on economic planning brings out the crucial institutional factor in the genesis of economic planning—the competition between Gosplan, which was relatively conservative and scientifically oriented, and

the Supreme Economic Council ("Vesenkha"), which was far more ambitious and politically inspired from the time V. V. Kuibyshev took over its leadership in 1926. Stalin was then able to use the Vesenkha proposals to undercut politically the Bukharin Opposition, while at the same time he was saddling the country with extravagant industrialization targets.

Economists should give particular heed to the evidence marshaled here on industrial progress in the years immediately preceding the Five-Year Plan, inasmuch as the tendency in economic studies has been to regard the NEP as relatively static and to take 1929 as the beginning of the intensive developmental process in the USSR. Across the board the Soviet economy had already begun to grow successfully, and not only in conventional quantitative terms; the socialist sector was rapidly crowding out the last substantial areas of private industry and trade. But this only highlights the problem of explaining why the political authorities had to intervene in 1928–29 with a risky and disruptive command and coercive approach to the economy. The grain-collection problem was hardly sufficient reason for all that followed.

Carr and Davies do not undertake to answer this fundamental question posed by their own data. Rather the contrary: they convey an undertone of self-evident necessity in all the steps that were taken by the Stalinist leadership. This is a cast of mind consistent with the philosophy implicit in Carr's earlier volumes of this history as well as in his *What Is History*—the assumption of a "mysterious world force that he sees as making history without consulting us," to quote Pieter Geyl (in his G. M. Trevelyan lecture of 1963, published in *History of the Low Countries: Episodes and Problems*, London, 1964, p. 26).

*Foundations of a Planned Economy* carries its detailed account just to the point of Stalin's heavy-handed intervention in 1929, without duly appraising this stage, and leaves the impression (not unlike the official histories) that Stalin was to proceed after 1929 in the same style as under the regime of 1926–28. The discussion of the planning controversies, for example, lapses without any consideration of the purge of Gosplan and the virtual demise of scientific economics in 1929 (cf. Naum Jasny, "A Soviet Planner—V. G. Groman," *Russian Review*, January 1954). No systematic appraisal is made of the criticisms and alternatives offered by the Bukharin Opposition, which Carr no doubt regards as one of his "parlour-games with the might-have-beens of history" (*What Is History*, New York, 1961, p. 127). It is no parlor game, but a question of appraising the fundamental forces and possibilities operating on a society and, to put it bluntly, a matter for moral judgment of the alternatives chosen. That Carr's philosophy has precluded his viewing the history of Soviet Russia in this perspective will, unfortunately, ultimately circumscribe the merit of his entire work.

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RUSSIAN PEASANTS AND SOVIET POWER: A STUDY OF COLLECTIVIZATION. By *Moshe Lewin*. Translated by *Irene Nove* with *John Biggart*. Preface by *Alec Nove*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968. 539 pp. \$15.00.

No major event of Soviet history has been more thoroughly obscured by the official historiography than the collectivization of agriculture. As Professor Nove