y deterioro de las condiciones de sobrevivencia. Este desgaste, desde mi perspectiva, resta a los pobres capacidad de acción y de reacción y los hace mucho más vulnerables.

## FROM MARGINALITY TO SOCIAL EXCLUSION: FROM LAISSEZ FAIRE TO PERVASIVE ENGAGEMENT

By Bryan R. Roberts

In comparing the urban poverty and marginality of the 1960s with their equivalents today, my assessment is necessarily influenced both by where I began my studies and by where I am doing research today. The contrast is both geographical, as well as in terms of levels of economic development. I began working in Guatemala City in the 1960s, one of the poorest Latin American countries with very low levels of urbanization, but with a rapid and highly concentrated urban growth. Today, I am looking at urban poverty in the Southern cone countries, which, in the 1960s, were already substantially urbanized and industrialized and which, with the exception of Chile, have experienced worsening poverty in recent decades. This highlights one important source of difference in the meaning of the "new" urban poverty in different Latin American countries. In comparison with countries such as Brazil, Central America, Mexico, and Peru, the working- and middle-class populations of Argentina and Uruguay are confronting a much more severe deterioration in living standards, a more dramatic reconfiguration of job opportunities and, importantly, a memory of much better times. The urban populations of many Latin American countries, in contrast, have no "golden" benchmarks in the past with which to evaluate present crises. They have always struggled for survival. The ways in which these differences affect politics and the formal and informal ways in which people cope with crisis pose interesting research topics.

A central issue in analyzing the "new" poverty is whether the change in the concepts that we use reflects a change of reality, a shift in intellectual fashions, or a combination of both. "Social exclusion" replaces marginality as a means of characterizing the situation of the poor, while the term "assets" replaces "survival strategies" to depict the potential of the poor to manage their situation (Kaztman et al. 1999; Moser 1998). Inequality and vulnerability, rather than poverty per se, are seen as the major challenges of the Latin American urban environment. Another key concept that has gained popularity lately is citizenship, which has largely replaced class as a means of analyzing the political struggles of the poor. Citizenship was not a concept that was widely used to capture the dynamic of poverty in the 1960s and 1970s, since, as Gino Germani (1980) argued, marginality was precisely the absence of citizenship.

My sense is that the change in concepts reflects both fashion and a change in reality; but for brevity's sake I will only note some of the changing circumstances that require us to look at poverty with a new optic. One area where the facts are substantially different is that of rising violence. Crime and violence are common features of the large cities of Latin America and, in many cities, the incidence of both has shown a sharp increase in the 1990s. The various reports of the Andrew W. Mellon research project on Latin American Urbanization coordinated by Alejandro Portes and myself document this increase for five of the six major Latin American metropolises being studied (for more information, see the Center for Migration and Urbanization website, http://cmd. princeton.edu). The debates about marginality in the 1960s focused on the urban situation and were closely related to the political movements of the time, particularly in Chile with the competition between the Christian Democrats and the more left-wing, Marxist-related movements. The issue, to an extent, was that of capturing the support of poor populations mobilized by rural-urban migration and the "making" of the city. In contrast, urban environments today are much more consolidated physically and provide a very different context both for living and demand-making. The competition for space is more severe as empty spaces are filled in and deregulation exposes both public and private land to commercial development. In some respects, the economic environment is a more hostile one as free trade exposes small and large-scale producers to import competition to a much greater extent than occurred in the days of ISI. The "informal economy" grows, but incomes drop within it. In this situation, there are severe constraints upon the upward mobility of the poor. In contrast, the urban poor of the 1960s and 1970s—migrants and natives—had real opportunities for their rising expectations to be met, albeit through their own efforts in constructing their homes and creating work opportunities.

The increasing institutional formalization of the urban environment creates new challenges to the poor, particularly in terms of education and in the relation between education and employment. Social exclusion, in its European sense, differs from marginality (Rosanvallon 2000). As Peter Ward describes above, marginality implied that people were outside the formal institutions that promoted the values and skills of modernity—the educational system, the formal labor market and so on. Social exclusion, in contrast, is basically a second-class citizenship in which disadvantage derives from the differentiation produced by the institutions of the state. In education, for example, all citizens receive a public education. The poor are not marginal to the educational system. However, the education that you get marks you for life, determining your occupational possibilities. Social exclusion is thus based on a differentiated inclusion in a social system. This apparent paradox is increasingly evident in Latin America in the

mismatch between ever-higher levels of education, rising unemployment, and the reduced number of decent jobs.

The workings of the state were very different in the 1960s and 1970s than they are now in the era of neoliberalism and state downsizing. There was, of course, considerable variation in the size and effectiveness of the state between Latin American countries, but it had certain common characteristics. It exercised a highly centralized, bureaucratic control, but its reach was limited and based principally on employment relations through coverage of workers at their place of work. It did not really permeate systematically into poor urban neighborhoods. When it did so, its intervention was clientelistic and discretionary, often operating through official parties as in the case of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional in Mexico. Today, while the state is slimmer and downsized, its reach is, I would argue, much deeper and more effective. Governance is increasingly decentralized to sub-national and local entities and is also more efficient and managerial in nature (Bresser Pereira and Spink 1999; Ward 1998). Central government may have less of a national reach, but the delegation of functions to lower-order authorities is accompanied by central oversight, regulation and intervention through targeted national programs. The state also intervenes indirectly as when it delegates programs and their implementation to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). When these activities are added to those independently undertaken by national and international NGOs—whose presence is very much greater than in the 1960s and 1970s—the result is widespread external intervention in the lives of the poor. No one leaves the poor alone anymore. Under the influence of multilateral and bilateral organizations, this intervention is accompanied by a stress on the rights and the responsibilities associated with citizenship and participation. Whether this new situation improves the capacities and welfare of the poor by helping or hindering organization and demand-making amongst them are important issues for research. As Alejandro Portes pointed out in the LASA forum, we must look to the unanticipated consequences of these new forms of relations as states, community organizations, and NGOs overlay their traditional functions with additional ones. The new sets of relationships with urban populations can lead to greater control from above and to the fragmentation of collective action below. They can also create new spaces of participation and a stronger and more diverse sense of rights among urban populations.

## CIUDADANÍA, DERECHOS E IDENTIDAD

By Elizabeth Jelin

El debate sobre la marginalidad en los años sesenta fue rico y complejo, tanto en orientaciones y posturas teóricas como en los estudios empíricos