

Croatia in recent years. In addition, it is a tribute to Professor Jaroslav Šidak, who has been primarily responsible for training the postwar generation of Croatian historians. In this volume Šidak and three of his students, Professors Mirjana Gross and Dragovan Šepić and Dr. Igor Karaman—all well-known scholars—have written the standard work on recent Croatian history.

The volume begins with a discussion of the economic and social conditions in the Croatian lands in the 1860s. The rest of the book is essentially divided into two chronological parts, from 1860 to 1903 and from 1903 to 1914; each part in turn has numerous logical subdivisions. The book's major strength is its treatment of the political, social, and economic problems of the Croatian lands, with emphasis on the peculiarities and contradictions within these lands. The nationalistic writing of the past—often full of clichés—is not found here. The authors show clearly that at different times local factors or issues overrode national considerations. Economic motives were responsible for some political decisions that were contrary to the national interest. This was evident in Istria, among other areas, where the Croatian Social Democrats supported their Italian colleagues because it furthered their own local economic interests. One may speak of Croatia and Croatian national goals, but this study discloses that the interests in common, for example, between the Croatian peasant in southern Dalmatia and his counterpart in eastern Slavonia were limited, because each was chiefly interested in his own immediate survival.

To support their many conclusions, the authors present eleven statistical tables, which show, among other things, the rise of the population in the towns in Croatia-Slavonia, the growth of industrial firms (both large and small), the role of the wood industry in Croatia, the development of institutions of credit (such as banks and savings organizations), and capital investment and landowning. Two detailed charts trace the evolution of political parties in Croatia-Slavonia, Istria, and Dalmatia. There is also an excellent twenty-page annotated bibliography on the basic issues in Croatian history as dealt with in recent publications.

This outstanding book does have some shortcomings. For example, Bishop Strossmayer's role in Croatian history appears to be slighted. More attention is given to the Social Democrats than to the Peasant Party in the immediate prewar years. Also, Istria receives closer and more detailed scrutiny than Bosnia-Herzegovina does, although it is generally acknowledged that the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina was at the heart of the Serbo-Croatian difficulties. Bosnia-Herzegovina was slighted because the detailed, scholarly, impartial studies which were available for the study of other areas of Croatian history upon which this volume is based have not yet been produced for this area. The volume also lacks an index.

Notwithstanding these deficiencies, this is an outstanding piece of historical scholarship. It is indispensable reading for anyone studying South Slav history, and should, to repeat, be translated into English.

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OPERATION SLAUGHTERHOUSE: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF  
POSTWAR MASSACRES IN YUGOSLAVIA. Edited by *John Prcela* and  
*Stanko Guldescu*. Philadelphia: Dorrance & Co., 1970. xiii, 557 pp. \$10.00.

This book purports to be a factual and documented account of the so-called Bleiburg massacres, perpetrated by the Yugoslav Communists on Croat soldiers who had surrendered to the British in Austria, and were then handed over by

the British to the Partisans to be abused, mistreated, and often killed. The book is factual only in part. The Partisans did kill Ustaši and Domobrans (members of the territorial army of the state of Croatia) by the thousands in southern Austria, and later during so-called death marches across Yugoslavia, long after the guns of war fell silent in Europe. The liquidations were in part the result of deliberate policy, in part the expression of individual bestiality of Partisan commanders and certain units. The murders were motivated by ideological and national hatred.

What was the extent of the massacre? Prcela and Guldescu claim that hundreds of thousands of Croat soldiers were murdered. They offer as proof the "eyewitness" accounts of survivors. These accounts, however, are often anonymous, of a highly generalized sort, and hearsay. The litany of massacre claims goes on and on for hundreds of pages: forty-five hundred shot in one place near Maribor in Slovenia, five thousand murdered in another location, thousands more killed somewhere else. The statistics numb, they do not convince.

Milovan Djilas, a member of the Communist Politburo in 1945, may have been closer to the truth when he told me that fifteen thousand of the prisoners handed over by the British—Chetniks, Montenegrin anti-Communists, as well as Croats—were liquidated on Austrian territory and later in Yugoslavia. The decision was made at the highest political level, by Tito and the Politburo. The justification was that those who remained under arms beyond the war's end were die-hard enemies of the Communist revolutionary new order. In part, the massacres were caused by fear that the Ustaši and Chetniks might help England and the United States against Yugoslavia.

*Operation Slaughterhouse* does not really even pretend to be a clinically objective account of what happened to the Croat prisoners. It is a frankly partisan and polemical reply to equally partisan and exaggerated accounts of Ustaši atrocities published in Yugoslavia by official propaganda and abroad by remnants of the Chetniks. The intent is twofold: to "prove" that the Communists committed genocide against the Croat nation and that the Serbs among the Communist Partisans were the main perpetrators of the killings.

In Yugoslavia the Bleiburg tragedy is either denied, ignored, or only hinted at. For instance, in an interview in the Pittsburgh weekly *Zajedničar* (organ of the Croatian Fraternal Union), Dr. Savka Dabčević-Kučar, president of the Croat Communist league, disclaimed any knowledge of the massacres, though she did not explicitly deny that they had occurred. But Slavko Goldstein, writing in the Zagreb magazine *Kritika* (no. 14, 1970), knows of the "death marches." In a moving obituary of the Croat Partisan hero General Većeslav Holjevac, Goldstein mentions the general's older brother Leo, a Domobran, "who was killed anonymously in the chaos of a massive transport of prisoners" after the war. How hard it is to discover the truth! Not even a top Communist like Holjevac was ever able to "establish for certain how and where his brother was killed."

Perhaps the most valuable part of the book is General Vjekoslav Luburić's account of the Ustaši decision to withdraw the Croat army to Austria and surrender to the British. Incidentally, Luburić was a leading Ustaša, who was himself charged with numerous massacres; he was mysteriously murdered in Spain a few years ago. Luburić says that Ustaši Chief of State Dr. Ante Pavelić made the decision to withdraw the Croat army to Austria. But Prcela and Guldescu never come to grips with the question of Pavelić's responsibility for the ensuing

tragedy. Those who killed prisoners without any semblance of individual justice are clearly guilty of crimes. But so is Pavelić. He kept up the struggle to the bitter end, ordered the retreat, kept the army in formation even after the war was over, then deserted and escaped to Italy, and from there with the aid of some priests to Argentina, while leaving his hapless followers and soldiers to a cruel fate.

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CONTEMPORARY YUGOSLAVIA: TWENTY YEARS OF SOCIALIST EXPERIMENT. Edited by *Wayne S. Vucinich*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969. xi, 441 pp. \$9.50.

It is an irony of history that war or threat of war should play a major role in shaping the political, economic, and social contours of Yugoslavia. The First World War brought the Karadjordjević dynasty to power in the newly created Yugoslav state. The Second World War, destroying that dynasty, installed the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its leader, Josip Broz Tito, in the seat of power. Then the threat of invasion by the Cominform states spurred a program of economic and social reform. Now, some twenty years after Tito's successful political revolution, Yugoslavia is still in the throes of another continuing revolution—socialist innovation. *Contemporary Yugoslavia*, a collection of eight research papers, attempts to place these twenty years in perspective.

Professor Vucinich characterizes the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as a state beset "by a succession of parliamentary crises, a political life largely inconsistent with democratic practices, and a failure to solve major constitutional, nationality and economic questions." Yet he doubts that the best of democratic governments could have overcome these problems. Hence, he states, "it would be grossly unfair to adjudge interwar Yugoslavia a failure."

The war years are succinctly and graphically delineated by Jozo Tomasevich. His discussions of the Mihailovich-Tito conflict, and the war itself, and his analysis of the various reasons for the triumph of Tito and the partisans are dispassionate and thorough. His is a unique contribution.

Victory by Tito meant the establishment and administration of a state on the Soviet model. The masters of the new Yugoslavia were slavish in their imitation, and Woodford McClellan shows precisely how the political order evolved from the Stalinist system to national communism. The author makes no judgments on whether the new institutions will survive, but he does insist that Tito has "built a nation . . . [which] has a larger and more important voice in international affairs than the old Yugoslavia ever had." This judgment is disputed by Phyllis Auty in a pedestrian review of Yugoslavia's postwar international relations. She concludes that Tito's foreign policies realistically acknowledge that Yugoslavia, a small country, alone cannot play any great part in international affairs. Moreover, Yugoslavia's international position depends not only on the quality of leadership but on the maintenance of domestic unity.

The conflict of nationalities bedeviled the old regime as it does the new. Neither Communist federalism nor socialist ideology has solved the question, as Vucinich points out in his essay on nationalism and communism. The author attributes the re-emergence of nationalism (did it ever submerge?) less to "historically accumu-