MAKING FISHERY AGREEMENTS WORK: POST-AGREEMENT BARGAINING IN THE BARENTS SEA. Geir Hønneland. 2013. Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar. vi + 152 pp, hardcover, illustrated. ISBN 978-0-85793-362-1. £58.50.

There are not many scientific books that one can read almost like a crime story. But Geir Hønneland's latest book *Making fisheries agreements work* is such a book as it takes the reader onto a journey of meeting room deliberations and offshore inspection. This may not make too much sense to the readers of this review. Let me thus explain: Hønneland's focus in this book, the end-result of a research project carried out at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, is in essence 'compliance' within the Barents Sea fisheries, since 1976 jointly managed between Norway and Russia. But Hønneland does not merely focus on Russian or Norwegian overall compliance, but also on events out at sea. He traces the development of 'why' compliance occurred both on an official as well as individual level, based on the 'how' it was achieved.

The main theme of this book is Russian overfishing in the Barents Sea. By taking into account diplomatic and scientific efforts of Norway and individual efforts of Norwegian Coast Guard officials to convince Russian fishermen to comply – which is necessary in the waters around Svalbard where Norway does not have enforcement rights – Hønneland creates almost a criminological and suspenseful account of what measures were taken to tackle the problem of overfishing. This is due to the fact that he bases most of his findings on personal observations, by using a very personalised style and through interviews, therefore making deliberations and individual actions very 'human'.

And this is a great asset of the book, as the name implies: deliberation, negotiation - bargaining - does not stop upon conclusion of an agreement, but continues thereafter, making it work or not. And it is after all human beings who ensure the effectiveness of an agreement. Throughout six chapters Hønneland therefore assesses the Barents Sea fisheries regime under the keyword 'bargaining'. While the introductory chapter outlines the scope and methods of the book, Chapter 2 is a theoretical framing and literature review of the concept of 'post-agreement bargaining' in which 'compliance' is then considered in the realist and institutionalist approaches. But Hønneland makes clear that the approach of the book goes beyond realist or institutionalist concepts. Instead, it takes norms, values, ethics and legitimacy into account when tracing the mechanisms of compliance and therefore considers law not merely as a deterrence element, but within a social-economic and cultural context.

In Chapter 3, Hønneland sets the empirical scene by presenting the relevant fish species and areas of distribution. Moreover, he makes the reader aware of the complications of management, based for example on unclear Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), the difficult status of Svalbard or the role of the high sea area in the Barents Sea – the 'Loophole'. Key actors are introduced here by presenting national management bodies and enforcement authorities, the bilateral fisheries management scheme and the overall working of the Joint Norwegian-Soviet (now Russian) Fisheries Commission.

But it is truly Chapter 4 which marks the start of the almost suspenseful part of the book. Here, Hønneland looks

at overfishing and how the (proclaimed) elimination of such was achieved. He traces how the precautionary approach found its way into the management scheme and the reasons why overfishing occurred in the first place: after the collapse of the Soviet Union fishing above the quota suddenly became profitable while social mechanisms that make captains stay within the law were absent. But although cooperation within the Commission was marked by efficiency and friendliness throughout the 1990s, this changed at the turn of the centuries when Russia started to accuse Norway of deliberately discriminating against Russian fishermen when the precautionary approach was introduced.

The difficult bargaining environment is richly depicted by locating science within political discourses and by also presenting inner-Russian disagreements between the regional and 'All-Russian' fisheries agencies. The chapter provides insight into the working relations of the different committees and how disagreements were resolved also through unofficial means. But it also shows how mistrust on both sides and perceived political agendas aggravated the efficiency of the work within the committees. This is done very nicely by paraphrasing and directly citing interview partners and by outlining the nature of different meetings based on Hønneland's personal observations. And by using the counterfactual – what if Norway had not taken steps to eliminate overfishing – he shows how crucial Norwegian initiatives were for the overall development of the Barents Sea fisheries regime.

In Chapter 5, Hønneland takes us to the Norwegian Coast Guard in which he served for five years himself. Based on personal observations and interviews the reader gains insight into methods of inspection of a fishing vessel, the working procedures at sea and the nature of encounters with Russian fishermen. Personal relations and social interaction between Coast Guard officials and fishermen are primary features of the enforcement scheme. It is thus that the foundation of argument to convince Russian captains to stop overfishing in for example the waters of Svalbard was crucial. The better the argument, the more likely a captain changes his fishing activities.

This chapter also shows how the Coast Guard is perceived by the Russian fishermen: effective, but strict if a violation is found. If not, they will also drink tea. Here, Hønneland also takes the difficulties of communication into account and the changes crew narratives concerning the enforcement authorities have undergone throughout the 1990s. This chapter makes enforcement and compliance a very 'human' issue and draws a beautiful picture of a very rich and diverse interaction between seafaring enforcement officers and fishermen.

Chapter 6 constitutes the last and summarising chapter. It highlights the importance of scientific collaboration for the inclusion of the precautionary approach into the Barents Sea fisheries regime. And it poses the fundamental question: Why did Russia comply with Norwegian efforts to tackle overfishing? Hønneland screens this question through a realist lens and concludes that for example the precautionary approach was not a Russian state interest, therefore rendering realist assumptions pointless. Rather, he sees internal power struggles as a contributor to why compliance occurred. Also the good working relations within the Commission whose members were all seafarers with a common understanding and common interest irrespective of national interests may have contributed to compliance.

Through an institutional lens compliance is not satisfactorily explainable as Norwegian support for Russia came with too high a price. It therefore could have been the notion of compromise in the Joint Committee itself and iteration which in the end led Russia to comply. For Hønneland it seems that institutional development, good neighbourly relations and shared seafaring norms were crucial in Russian compliance.

But why did captains comply? Hønneland cannot provide a completely satisfactory answer to this question due to blurry data and therefore he rephrases the question: Why did the majority of captains seem to comply? Deterrence of the law is a crucial answer, while also the Coast Guard was perceived as a legitimate, seafaring authority. Normative elements with regard to species conservation may also have played a role. Hønneland is very careful with his conclusions here as he bases a large extent of his findings on interview partners whose sincerity cannot always be ensured.

Through Hønneland's lively and personal account on the working processes in the different committees and on board the ships the reader does not want to stop reading! But also from an academic perspective this book provides utterly valuable insights into working relations between two countries interested in the same resource. This generates the interest of knowing

more about other resources such as oil and gas and how deliberation and bargaining occurs within management bodies dealing with these. Hønneland has unveiled the complexity of bargaining in resource management bodies and has defied the realist, and often media, assumption of an unregulated race for resources

This book is therefore relevant for different groups. Politicians and media representatives could learn plenty about dynamics and complexity within negotiating bodies; resource managers could learn from mistakes that were made in such a complex political environment such as in the Barents Sea; and researchers could see how complexities in theory are complemented by complexities in the field. In particular students conducting field research and interviews could furthermore learn through Hønneland's self-critical assessment of his methodology, and hints and means for how to interpret and contextualise observations, interviews and interviewees. This book is indeed a very beautiful and highly recommendable linkage between institutional theory and practice in the field and an outstanding case study that furthers the understanding of the Barents Sea region, resource management and institutional dynamics. (Nikolas Sellheim, University of Lapland, Faculty of Law, P.O. Box 122, 96101 Rovaniemi, Finland (nikolas.sellheim@ulapland.fi)).