Washington than from Moscow, and she expects her book to be influential in the United States but not in the Soviet Union.

There is one theme in Mrs. Myrdal's book which deserves special emphasis—the role which she sees for the nonaligned nations in the global dialogue on disarmament. For too long nonaligned governments have deferred to the nuclear superpowers on questions of arms control and disarmament. One does not have to agree entirely with Mrs. Myrdal's analysis to acknowledge that there is a much larger and more vigorous responsibility for the nonaligned nations to assume on issues which affect their security as much as that of the superpowers.

Arthur Cox's book, *The Dynamics of Détente*, hardly deserves mention in the same review with Alva Myrdal's work. Cox has written a period piece, an extended essay on the domestic debate in the United States about détente circa summer 1976. According to Cox, there is simply no reason not to end the arms race and live in peace and harmony forever. Cox trivializes the concerns and arguments of Senator Jackson, former Defense Secretary Schlesinger, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. None of these men is as ludicrous, paranoiac, and cynical as Cox would have us believe. This book does a double disservice: to hawks, by misrepresenting their case; to doves, by refusing to confront and respond to legitimate questions that their critics raise about security in the nuclear age.

These two books share one perceptual flaw which is all too common in the literature of arms control and disarmament. They portray the arms debate as a struggle between the forces of light, those who support arms control, and forces of darkness, those who support the arms race. This is a false dichotomy. Defense strategy is a combination of arms control and arms deployment, of simultaneous cooperation and competition between potential adversaries. Recognizing this fundamental fact of international life is the first step to a meaningful and productive debate about international security.

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INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL: ISSUES AND AGREEMENTS. By *Stanford Arms Control Group*. Edited by *John H. Barton* and *Lawrence D. Weiler*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976. xii, 444 pp. $18.50, cloth. $12.95, paper.

As the time approaches when a treaty to replace the SALT I Interim Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union is accepted by the two governments and the ratification process begins, this book should prove useful both to undergraduates, for whom it was intended, and to concerned citizens, who will be attempting to follow the inevitable debate over the treaty. The text, an interdisciplinary effort by the Stanford Arms Control Group, is based on lectures given by members of the group and by various visitors. Specific credits are provided for some of the chapters, but, after acknowledging Lawrence Weiler's contribution in the preface, John H. Barton notes that in editing the final draft he has not hesitated to revise individual contributions, and he also accepts responsibility for emphasis, opinions, and factual errors.

The book offers a discussion of the cultural context and motivations for arms control, a brief history of disarmament efforts before World War II, and concentrates on developments since the advent of nuclear weapons. The utility of the text is enhanced by appendixes which include a glossary of abbreviations associated with arms control, an annotated chronological listing of past and current arms control forums, the texts of major arms control agreements, a list of discussion questions, and suggested further readings keyed to each chapter.

As might be expected in such an ambitious undertaking, the volume contains some textual inaccuracies as well as debatable judgments which, in some cases, reflect the arms control bias of the editors. For example, on page 65 the reader is told that "undoubtedly one of the reasons the Air Force continues to press for aircraft and the Navy for surface ships is that duty in a missile silo or Poseidon submarine is boring," implying that conventional forces, in particular, U.S. conventional forces, have no real modern military function except as a very high cost form of recreation. This has clearly not been the case since the end of World War II, is not now, nor is it likely to be in the foreseeable future.

In addition, the authors may have allowed their enthusiasm for arms control to cause them to be overly sanguine about the arms limitations achieved by SALT I. The United States and the Soviet Union did not forgo as yet undeveloped weapons technologies for exotic ABM systems (p. 204); they did agree (in Agreed Interpretation E) that, in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems would be subject to discussion and agreement between the two sides. The ABM Treaty did not solve the problem of defining the difference between ABM and air defense systems (p. 138), but established areas in which ABM components may be deployed. Moreover, the signatories of the treaty undertook not to give ABM capabilities to missiles, launchers, or radar systems, other than specifically ABM missiles, launchers, or radars. The two sides also agreed that only ABM systems could be tested in an ABM mode, thus providing a verifiable means of declaring any system so tested an ABM system. These appear to be reasonable safeguards against the possible upgrading of an air defense system. However, estimating system capabilities in this way can hardly be called defining the difference between the systems. The limitations on silo dimensions did not alleviate U.S. concerns over the dangers that might arise if high-yield weapons were made more accurate and MIRVed so as to be effective against Minuteman missiles (pp. 202–3). The 10–15 percent increase in silo dimensions, the development of MIRVs, and the improvements in reentry vehicle accuracies—all authorized under the Interim Agreement—have, as readers of the daily press are aware, raised questions about the survivability of fixed ICBMs.

In most respects, however, the book provides a balanced presentation of the complexities of arms control negotiations, whether between the superpowers or between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The chapter on the institutions of arms control, based on a lecture by Ambassador James Leonard, is particularly useful in its explanation of the terms "inspection" and "verification." The institutions discussed, unfortunately, are primarily U.S. institutions. Although information on parallel Soviet institutions is sparse, the text would have been improved by at least an attempt to describe them.

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THE RUSSIAN NAVY: MYTH AND REALITY. By *Eric Morris*. New York: Stein and Day, 1977. 150 pp. Map. $9.95.

The student of Soviet affairs who is not a specialist in military matters will be considerably informed by Eric Morris. His book contains much that the scholar needs to know in order to gain some appreciation of the complex factors affecting the development of contemporary Soviet naval power. However, if the reader is seeking to illuminate fully the realities behind the myths surrounding the Soviet navy, he must read more than this brief, general work.

Morris presents a balanced picture of checkered Russian maritime history. Moments of glory and periods of impotence punctuate an uncertain maritime tradition. Indeed,