

What happened then? Professor Spencer's nice theory fits all facts. "The marginal culture seems always to offer the paradox of extremes of elasticity as against those of rigidity" (*ibid.*, 275). How excellent! We can now explain how "the henchmen [sic] of Ataturk" (*ibid.*, 274) who idealized the ancient nomadic life of the Turks, suddenly eradicated the ancient Ottoman society and set up an entirely new order—again without culture.

Sir, this is balderdash. Such theories can only be built upon ignorance or prejudice. Of course the pejorative epithets which Professor Spencer so lavishly uses show his lack of sympathy with the subject matter. But anyone who has considered the history of Turkish society knows that what was represented as a cultural revolution of the first order in the West had its roots deep in Ottoman history. Ataturk's victory was the final outburst of those modernizing pressures which had convulsed the Ottoman polity right through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. And as to the assertion that the Turks have no culture and have contributed "little that is distinctive in art, literature or in science", Professor Spencer is entitled to his own prejudices as long as they do not masquerade as scientific anthropological theories.

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*To the Editor:*

My few remarks on Dr. Mardin's excellent paper appear to occasion some indignation on Dr. Yalman's part. I am sorry, but in spite of wounded feelings, I incline to stand by my guns.

The issue, from my own vantage point, is not of course whether the Turks have culture or even where that culture comes from. Rather, it is the question as to what the Turks have done with the cultural heritage they come to call their own. Remarks on cultural marginality, therefore, hardly reflect opprobrium, as Dr. Yalman seems to think. In my comments on Dr. Mardin's study, I was not reflecting on the social issues which he so ably depicted; I was, however, referring to the nature of Ottoman and modern Turkish culture and considering the type of total cultural integration which had been achieved. In so doing, I saw my task as creating a background in which Dr. Mardin's paper could more readily be fitted and simply assumed that the concept of cultural marginality was one with which virtually every culture historian is accustomed to deal. Unless one still takes seriously Lowie's "shreds and patches" theory of culture (something which Lowie himself was glad to abandon), a culture is a holistic entity capable of generating what has

been variously called energy, vitality, inventiveness, etc. There is achieved a "level of integration" which provides the source for a total cultural expression. Some cultures are thus more volatile, more vital, than others, more capable of a display of energy, leading, as Kroeber affirms, to climax of development. According to Kroeber, "marginal backwardness is manifest in total culture rather than in particular traits" (*Anthropology*, 1948, p. 421). The concept of marginality may, as Steward suggests (*Theory of Culture Change*, 1955, pp. 85-86), be less useful on a comparative ethnographic level where historical perspective is lacking. In historic situations, however, as Kroeber has repeatedly noted, the shifts of culture centers, the relations of center to margins, the problems of cultural intensity and climax, as well as the essential conservatism of the marginal area are highly informative of the nature of culture. If the criterion is level of integration, then England, however diverse the historic beginnings, is no marginal culture, but from Henry VIII to Churchill, from Cromwell to Watt, a culture center of vital significance in the Western World. The age of Suleyman the Magnificent possesses a different ethos from that of the Elizabethan era. Perhaps it is because in the lifetimes of most of us we see the shift of social culture centers toward the east that we entertain a certain apprehension.

Or again, since Kroeber's theories fit prominently in this discussion, one is reminded of his concern with the peculiar style patterns developed by historic civilizations as well as with his consuming interest in invention (cf. *Style and Civilizations*, 1957; *Configurations of Culture Growth*, 1944). He finds no problem in recognizing that Dante, Shakespeare, Rubens, Cervantes, Po Chü-i, or Kalidasa, and so on through any one cares to name in culture history, represent aspects of total cultural expression for their respective times and places. Where are the Turks of like achievement and stature?

And finally, knowing something of Atatürk and those who influenced him, some of whom are still, as this is written, cheerfully knifing each other, his "henchmen", in other words, I am obliged to come to grips with the general question of determinism in culture. Dr. Yalman's comments suggest a virtually absolute freedom of will, the well meaning sultan hindered by ulema and janissary. It seems to follow from this that society can be looked at without culture, culture itself becoming synonymous with mere refinement. I do not agree with Professor Leslie A. White in his view of an absolute cultural determinism and I should defend the proposition that Atatürk does give the Turkish revolution direction. But I should also support the thesis that without Atatürk the situation was such as to call for reform inevitably. And it is the characteristic of the level of integration of the marginal culture that such reform should be sweeping and violent yet vacillating and uncertain. It could never have happened in the Athens of Pericles or in Augustan Rome.

Hence, judgements are not prejudices. One can admit being wrong when shown why. Nationalism is an important subject worthy of scholarly investigation but an affronted patriotism leads to no scholarly discussion.

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