

developed in response to the changing circumstances of Czech and European politics. The idea of Czechoslovakia was not an opportunistic afterthought but Masaryk's most important political idea.

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HUNGARY BETWEEN WILSON AND LENIN: THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1918-1919 AND THE BIG THREE. By *Peter Pastor*. East European Monographs, 20. Boulder, Colo.: *East European Quarterly*, 1976. viii, 191 pp. \$13.00. Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York.

Revolution as a response to military defeat is a political reflex that can take a number of different directions, depending on a variety of local conditions and external pressures. Hungary's experience at the end of the First World War is particularly interesting in this regard, as it includes two distinct variants of this process: the People's Republic of Hungary led by Mihaly Karolyi, and its equally short-lived successor, the Hungarian Soviet Republic led by Bela Kun. Professor Pastor's monograph examines the struggle for survival of the Karolyi regime, mainly in the context of its relations with the Western Allies.

Focusing on the relationship between victors and vanquished, the study is a detailed account of Hungary's attempts to evade the territorial consequences of a punitive peace during the five-odd months between the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire and the coming to power of Bela Kun. Since Wilsonian principles were the stated ideology of the victors, any attempt to ameliorate the peace conditions appeared to require a government pledged to democratic rule, which in the case of Hungary implied not only social and political reforms but also plebiscites to determine the future of her subject nationalities. Nonetheless, that the Frostflower Revolution (as the author labels the events that led up to the proclamation of a Hungarian republic in late October 1918) "had its roots deeply set in the Hungarian past" seems open to question. The author's reference to 1848-49 is too brief to be convincing on this point.

Though the study fully documents the disillusionment and the humiliation suffered by the Karolyi government at the hands of the Allies, particularly the French, the author does not confront the underlying question: To what extent was the Karolyi regime merely a form of nationalist self-defense, to be discarded when it proved ineffective in preserving "territorial Hungary" from the claims of her neighbors? Beyond the personal integrity and reformist aspirations of members of the Karolyi government, how much of the support it commanded was a function of its assumed capacity to negotiate a favorable settlement with the Allies? This question is also central to the author's thesis that it was Allied insensitivity and lack of understanding that brought about the rapid demise of Hungary's "liberal democratic revolution." But how strong was a revolutionary regime that could be brought down by outraged nationalism responding to a foreign ultimatum?

In the immediate aftermath of the Habsburg Monarchy's dissolution, the question of the subject nationalities was clearly of overarching importance for the future of a socialist or democratic regime in Hungary. Yet Pastor does not attempt to analyze the implications, for Hungary and for her neighbors, of the nationalities policy advocated by the Karolyi government. Scattered references to self-determination through plebiscites and cultural autonomy can not do justice to this complex question, which would have a determining influence not only on domestic politics and social policy, but also on Hungary's relations with the peacemakers in Paris.

Magyar leaders of this period emerge from Professor Pastor's account as naïve visionaries, united in their determination to avoid the consequences of a lost war and

out of touch with the aspirations of their national minorities and with the mood of the victorious Allies. There obviously was a failure to recognize the fact that Hungary, because the Hungarian revolution of October 1918 had come too late to affect the course of the war, could expect to be treated as a defeated power regardless of changes in political leadership. As the author points out, France had the dominant voice in Allied policy toward Hungary during this period and French attitudes were determined largely by the requirements of the faltering intervention in Russia and by the demands of the successor states. Having fought for the Entente against the Central Powers, Czechs, Rumanians, and Serbs were now being called upon to supply troops for the anti-Bolshevik campaign in Russia. Thus, a shared hostility to bolshevism merely added a potent ideological dimension to a relationship forged in wartime between France and some of the subject nationalities of the Habsburg lands. Yet to assert that "France needed little prodding to make the area a French *Mittleuropa*" is to assume a capacity for dominance that was far beyond French economic and military resources in 1918–19.

Some of the material presented suffers from a lack of critical analysis, particularly with regard to the corrosive effects of nationalism in undermining Karolyi's liberal democratic experiment. Much of the evidence suggests that the adoption of "Wilsonian" or "Leninist" ideals in government was primarily a matter of expediency and that the wellspring of both was a nationalism outraged by the prospect of crippling territorial losses.

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DAS WIRTSCHAFTSLENKUNGSSYSTEM DES UNGARISCHEN SOZIALISMUS: ENTWICKLUNGEN SEIT 1968. By *Endre Antal*. Untersuchungen zur Gegenwartskunde Südosteuropas, 10. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1976. 179 pp. Tables. DM 25, paper.

This book describes and to some extent attempts to analyze the establishment (1968), evolution, and impact of the celebrated Hungarian New Economic Mechanism (NEM). The first two chapters discuss the ideological and institutional foundations of the Hungarian economic system and the principal "reforms" of the NEM, which were designed to increase competition and economic efficiency. These changes included the elimination of most detailed central planning of production (devolving this responsibility to individual enterprises responding to market forces), introduction of flexible prices on some products, linkage of foreign and domestic prices for a subset of traded goods, and other departures from "Soviet-type" central planning. Antal characterizes the NEM as a socialist indicative-plan economy (*Rahmenplanwirtschaft*), a mixture of plan and market.

The following six chapters deal with specific aspects of the Hungarian economy: investment, credit, and price policy; enterprise policy; industry; agriculture; transportation and services; and foreign trade. The latter is not discussed extensively, however, which is rather curious given the author's stress on Hungary's great dependence on foreign trade and the pivotal role it was designed to play in the overall NEM. A final chapter, devoted to the "effects" of the NEM, is disappointing because Antal does not really attempt an overall analysis or evaluation of the NEM in terms of its stated purposes and internal and external constraints.

Perhaps most interesting is the postscript, written after the announcement in early 1976 of further changes in economic regulations which, the author suggests, tended to strengthen recentralization tendencies already observable in 1972–73. Antal presents an impressive catalog of recent recentralizing measures, and asks (but does