

The Baku Commune should become, even with these points of concern, a noteworthy contribution to the history of the Caucasus and of the first Soviet administration in its oil-rich metropolis on the Caspian Sea. Professor Suny has brought to his study a sense of immediacy, sympathy without overt partiality, and much basic—though selective—information on a subject too little known among Western historians.

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OBORONNAIA PROMYSHLENNOST' SOVETSKOI ROSSII V 1918–1920
GG. By *D. A. Kovalenko*. Moscow: "Nauka," 1970. 416 pp. 1.87 rubles.

According to the author of this monograph the defense industry played a more positive role in the Civil War than Soviet historians have generally realized. For despite the catastrophic decline of industrial production for the economy as a whole and continuous shortages at the front, the tremendous effort to direct all output toward supplying the army resulted in significant increases of new and repaired military equipment during 1919 and 1920. This success helps explain the otherwise almost unbelievable victory over the counterrevolutionaries and interventionists.

Based on intensive study of both archival and printed sources, this is a very full book. Principal topics include the prerevolutionary armaments industry and its shortcomings, the sabotage and lockouts of the bourgeoisie, the countless organizational changes affecting industry, the movement toward and away from workers' control, the struggle to safeguard military supplies, the decisions of the political leaders, and of course the genius of Lenin. One of the most interesting discussions is about the spontaneous conversion of war plants under workers' control to non-military production well before the Brest-Litovsk peace with Germany in March 1918. This contrasts sharply with the strict centralized chain of command in the defense industry by 1919, when workers in "militarized" factories, for example, were assimilated to the stern discipline of soldiers at the front, and when 60 percent of all factory workers produced for the needs of the Red Army.

Perhaps the most serious weakness of this work is that it often loses its monographic focus and wanders as a general dogmatic history of the entire period, with only special reference to the defense industry. The author's freshest and most revealing material is thus buried to some extent in another party hagiology. One example among many is the uncritical lumping together of all foreign anti-Soviet forces, whether the Austro-Germans in 1918 or the Allies in 1919, without distinction as to circumstances or motives.

This should not obscure the author's very real achievements, based on years of archival research. Again and again we see the Soviet commitment to direct "everything to the front" whatever the cost, and the accompanying increase in output of key supplies in the midst of collapse. This is a useful addition to our knowledge, and one that will be particularly valuable for specialists of "war communism" and the wartime origins of planning and the command economy.

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