

quate detail and documentation. He also fails to substantiate his view that the bourgeois parties were frightened to the point of tactical ineptitude by worker unrest. Nevertheless this is the first major study of the progressive Moscow capitalists and provides a new and valuable dimension in the examination of the pre-Soviet political order.

Diakin's volume, much broader in coverage, offers a more detailed and thorough analysis of Russian "bourgeois" politics during the war. He sees the attempts to organize in the summer of 1915, particularly in the Duma, as a veiled endeavor to obtain a real constitutional monarchy, but argues that the failure to accomplish this objective immediately, coupled with the stabilization of the situation at the front, induced the bourgeoisie to revert to its more traditional indifference to politics. Renewed political activism in the fall of 1916 came too late, and Diakin contends that Miliukov's famous Duma "stupidity or treason" speech revealed the bourgeois fear that by then revolution had become inevitable. In a final attempt to win control of the revolutionary movement, the liberals, disunited and timid, continued to advocate legal pressure on the government, fearing that more decisive action would unleash a revolutionary torrent from below.

Diakin's treatment of the moderate Duma fractions, the public organizations, particularly the Central and Moscow War-Industry Committees and the Union of Towns, and the regional differences among bourgeois groups is exceptionally strong. Both authors frequently cite unpublished archival sources, although Diakin's range of sources is much broader. Both of them preface their works with historiographical essays, and Diakin's is the more comprehensive. Diakin's volume remains the best study of the politics of the moderate opposition in any language in both scope and analysis.

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DEUTSCH-SOWJETISCHE BEZIEHUNGEN BIS RAPALLO. By *Horst Günther Linke*. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970. 295 pp. DM 35.

Few aspects of modern diplomatic history have attracted as much attention as the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. The first years of that relationship, culminating in the Treaty of Rapallo and the initiation of military cooperation between the two powers, have been the subject of several books; and in the last few years German policy in Eastern Europe in the year and a half from the beginning of 1918 to the summer of 1919 has been the subject of re-examination, especially by Winfried Baumgart. With some Soviet documentary sources now also published, a general review of the whole subject is in order, and this is what Linke provides.

Using the published sources, and combining these with materials from archives in West Germany, Linke reconstructs the course of German-Soviet relations in the years 1918–22. This is a dependable summary of the evidence, carefully weighing the choices made by both sides in the broader context of the time. The interaction between foreign and domestic policy, the relations with other powers and their interests, the role of personalities—especially on the German side—are all considered. The expectation of a more congenial regime in the other of the two countries for a while led each to hold off while awaiting a possibly imminent overthrow of the other, but at the Genoa Conference the two finally came together.

Although Linke traces the course of events with great care, there is very little interpretation. For the most recent thoughtful perspective the reader should consult Hermann Graml's article in the October 1970 issue of *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*. It is unfortunate that Linke did not combine his scholarly effort with any interpretations or conclusions of his own, and that the publisher failed to provide a subject index and otherwise to give this important monograph the format it deserves.

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JAPANESE RECOGNITION OF THE U.S.S.R.: SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS, 1921-1930. By *George Alexander Lensen*. Tokyo: Sophia University, in cooperation with the Diplomatic Press, Tallahassee, 1970. 419 pp. \$15.00.

For an understanding of international politics in East Asia during the interwar period, a study of Japanese-Soviet relations is of paramount importance. However, the subject has had very little scholarly attention in the past. Thus the appearance of Dr. Lensen's latest book, the first significant monograph dealing with Japanese-Soviet relations in the 1920s, is a welcome event.

The author painstakingly traces a series of attempts by the Japanese and Soviet governments to resume diplomatic relations following the Japanese Intervention in Siberia. These efforts finally resulted in Japanese recognition of the Soviet Union in 1925. But even after recognition, problems remained. Suspicion and mistrust rather than friendship characterized Japanese-Soviet relations for the remainder of the decade.

Strictly speaking, this book is a history of Japanese-Soviet negotiations. Rather than dealing with the problem in the broad context of international relations, the author chose to limit himself to describing the events in the conference rooms. Proposals and counterproposals, the personalities of the negotiators, and the process of negotiation are presented in minute detail and with scholarly accuracy. Lensen skillfully uses both Russian and Japanese sources, though his documentation is not extensive and relies mostly on published materials.

Those who are interested in more fundamental problems, such as the position of Japanese-Soviet relations in the overall foreign policy of each country, or in the related problems associated with decision-making processes, or the influence of public opinion, or the conflict between ideology and national interests may be disappointed with this study. Eight of the twelve chapters are concerned exclusively with eight particular sets of negotiations. For the reader to follow the course of these tedious discussions is made even more difficult by the author's failure to illuminate the developments between conferences that influenced and guided their direction. For instance, he does not even explain what led up to Japanese recognition of the Soviet Union.

Another weakness is the excessive use of direct quotations, which occupy almost a third of the text. Though interesting, many documents do not warrant being quoted. For example, I question the necessity of quoting in full a draft proposal by the Far Eastern Republic (seven pages), a Japanese counterproposal (three and a half pages), and a revised Japanese proposal (five pages) at the Dairen Conference, when all these proposals were rejected and the conference produced no tangible results. Important documents could better be placed in the ap-